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EP0617819A1 - Method for intervention on a terminal delivering goods or services - Google Patents

Method for intervention on a terminal delivering goods or services

Info

Publication number
EP0617819A1
EP0617819A1 EP93902345A EP93902345A EP0617819A1 EP 0617819 A1 EP0617819 A1 EP 0617819A1 EP 93902345 A EP93902345 A EP 93902345A EP 93902345 A EP93902345 A EP 93902345A EP 0617819 A1 EP0617819 A1 EP 0617819A1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
terminal
intervention
secure
memory
relating
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Granted
Application number
EP93902345A
Other languages
German (de)
French (fr)
Other versions
EP0617819B1 (en
Inventor
Jean-Jacques Foglino
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Gemplus SA
Original Assignee
Gemplus Card International SA
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Gemplus Card International SA filed Critical Gemplus Card International SA
Publication of EP0617819A1 publication Critical patent/EP0617819A1/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP0617819B1 publication Critical patent/EP0617819B1/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Expired - Lifetime legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/22—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder
    • G07C9/23—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder by means of a password
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/29—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass the pass containing active electronic elements, e.g. smartcards
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F9/00—Details other than those peculiar to special kinds or types of apparatus
    • G07F9/02—Devices for alarm or indication, e.g. when empty; Advertising arrangements in coin-freed apparatus
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F9/00—Details other than those peculiar to special kinds or types of apparatus
    • G07F9/06—Coin boxes

Definitions

  • the subject of the invention is a method of intervention on a terminal for delivering a good or a service.
  • the terminal is a parking meter or a parking meter. It can however be any automatic distributor of goods or services such as a drink distributor or even a counter connected to a server managing a database.
  • the terminals concerned by the invention comprise at least one payment device by chip card, and, in certain cases, a mixed device for payment by chip card and direct payment in cash, coins or banknotes, or by magnetic card. .
  • Payment by smart card is either a count of prepaid units and stored in a memory of the card, in this case the card is a smart card with at least one memory. Either the payment is a direct debit payment from a bank account. In the latter case, the card is a bank, magnetic or chip type card.
  • the problems encountered with this type of mixed payment device concern the monitoring of the agents who regularly work on the terminals, for example to withdraw the cash injected by the users. In fact, payments are made by users more or less in cash.
  • the terminal therefore normally issues three types of balances in three counters.
  • a first type of balance in a first counter measures the quantity of services delivered
  • a second type of balance in a second counter represents card payments (so-called electronic money)
  • the third type of balance in a third counter when present, indicates the amount of cash that the agent must collect, and of course give to the authorities who manage the terminal.
  • the total of the last two counters must be equal to the total of the first counter.
  • these fraud problems are solved by asking the parties involved to introduce a secure intervention medium of the type and format of the smart card into the terminal's smart card reader.
  • This terminal therefore necessarily includes a smart card reader.
  • the secure medium consequently has an end in chip card format when it is not itself a chip card. This end is that inserted into the smart card reader.
  • the secure medium is then recognized as an intervention smart card by the terminal. This recognition can be caused by the operator who can also act on control buttons on the terminal. This recognition can also preferably be automatic, from the introduction of the secure support, on the initiative of the terminal or of a microprocessor contained in the secure intervention support.
  • the subject of the invention is therefore a method of intervention on a terminal for delivering a good or a service, this terminal comprising a smart card reader with which payment is made for a good or a terminal service, characterized in that it includes:
  • this secure medium comprising a memory, a microprogrammed microprocessor, and means for exchanging information with the terminal, then
  • a step subsequent to the introduction of the secure medium, during which the terminal transfers information relating to the state of this terminal to the secure medium recovery memory before the intervention.
  • FIG. 1 a representation of a device useful for implementing the invention
  • Figure 1 shows a device useful for implementing the invention. It includes a terminal 1 provided with a smart card reader 2, and, in certain cases, a slot 3 or a similar device for introducing cash into the terminal.
  • the terminal also includes a certain number of command buttons such as 4 to choose a good or service from among several or to cancel the operation. The terminal is therefore in contact with a distributor of these goods or services.
  • the terminal delivers a parking ticket 5 corresponding to a duration chosen by a user. He places this ticket prominently behind the windshield of his vehicle, so that supervisors can verify that the vehicle is authorized to park.
  • a secure intervention medium 6 having an end of the smart card format.
  • This secure support 6 comprises a microprocessor 7 in relation to a programmed memory 8, with a data memory 11, and with contact pads such as 12 necessary to enter into relationship with the reader 2. In some cases the pads are absent: the connection is made by electromagnetic waves.
  • the programmed memory 8 comprises two programs. According to the flow diagram of FIG. 2, a first program 9 is a program for recognition, for example a recognition program of a conventional type. In such recognition the terminal interrogates the support. The medium responds by transmitting its identification and or its secret code, stored in a part 16 of its memory 11.
  • the microprocessor 7 can if necessary encrypt the secret code of the medium before sending it to the reader 2.
  • the reader 2 must be provided with means of decryption.
  • Such a program is for example described in a European patent application EP-A-0 284 133.
  • the terminal 1 is provided with a keyboard 4, it is possible for this recognition to use this keyboard 4 to ask the intervening operator to authenticate his intervention. This therefore indicates his personal code with this keyboard.
  • This personal code which can be the same as that of the card or another, is compared, by terminal 1 or microprocessor 7 of the card, to a carrier code contained in the card or even to a code contained in the terminal . This prevents a lost intervention smart card from being used by a thief to loot the monetary content from the terminals: the cash received there. This also makes it possible to detect the presence of the false terminals, the terminal having to carry out a control of the card, while the card carries out a control of the terminal.
  • a second program 10 contained in the memory 8 is also a program of the invention: its purpose, after the authentication operations, is to cause the transfer of the information contained in the counters or the state registers of the terminal 1 to memory 11 of the secure medium.
  • the microprocessor 7 waits for a response.
  • the microprocessor 7 of support 6 takes control of the terminal. This grip is simply achieved by the fact that after recognition the reader 2 stands by for order.
  • the program 9 of the card can for example then include for this purpose, in fine, a time delay instruction calibrated at the end of which the program 10 of the card is triggered.
  • the microprocessor 7 Under the effect of the instructions of this program 10, the microprocessor 7 then reads the content of the counters and or the content of state registers of the terminal. Then it records this information read in the memory 11 of the medium. When these recordings are made the microprocessor 7 sends an order to the reader 2 _r that this reader 2 causes the unlocking of a logical lock or a physical lock which prevents the opening of a door 13 of the terminal and therefore the unfolding of the desired intervention.
  • the program 10 can also contain instructions for resetting the counters or status registers of the reader 2.
  • the program 10 includes instructions for modifying a consumption tariff with the terminal. These instructions are followed, if necessary, before opening the door. But it is not essential.
  • the program 10 preferably includes instructions for recording the information relating to the terminal in an encrypted form in the memory 11. Therefore this information is not even directly understandable by an operator who would be content to read the memory 11 as it is.
  • the encryption is of the same type as that used to encrypt the secret code in program 9 before sending it.
  • the rest of program 10 can include instructions to record again in memory 11, at places other than previously, the values of the state registers resulting from the intervention.
  • the card is then ejected from reader 2.
  • microprocessor 7 executes all the necessary operations. If the program is changed, it is easier to change the supports 6 than the terminals 1.
  • a reader 14 available to the authorities which manage the terminals 1 and the supports 6, one requests in the support 6 the execution of a third program 15.
  • the microprocessor 7 of the support 6 verifies that the reader 14 which interrogates it is an authorized reader. If this is the case, the program 15 includes instructions for writing into a memory of the reader 14, if necessary after decryption, information recorded in its memory 11. In this way the authorities which manage the terminals have exact reports on the stakeholder operations.

Landscapes

  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
  • Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
  • Credit Cards Or The Like (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

On intervient sur une borne (1) de délivrance d'un bien ou d'un service en introduisant une carte à puce (6) dans la borne (1). Cette carte (6) à puce comporte une mémoire (11), un microprocesseur (7) microprogrammé (8) et des moyens (12) d'échange d'informations avec la borne (1). On autorise l'intervention par comparaison d'un code secret relatif à la borne avec un code secret relatif à la carte (6) et il s'ensuit une action physique d'intervention sur la borne (1). Selon l'invention on ajoute une étape, ultérieure à l'introduction de la carte (6) à puce et antérieure à l'action physique d'intervention, au cours de laquelle la borne (1) transfère dans une mémoire (11) de relèvement de la carte (6) des informations relatives à l'état de cette borne (1) avant l'intervention.We work on a terminal (1) for the delivery of a good or service by inserting a smart card (6) in the terminal (1). This smart card (6) comprises a memory (11), a microprocessor microprocessor (7) (8) and means (12) for exchanging information with the terminal (1). Intervention is authorized by comparison of a secret code relating to the terminal with a secret code relating to the card (6) and there follows a physical action of intervention on the terminal (1). According to the invention, a step is added, subsequent to the introduction of the chip card (6) and prior to the physical intervention action, during which the terminal (1) transfers into a memory (11) reading of the card (6) of information relating to the state of this terminal (1) before the intervention.

Description

PROCEDE D'INTERVENTION SUR UNE BORNE DE DELIVRANCE D'UN BIEN OU D'UN SERVICE METHOD OF INTERVENING ON A TERMINAL OF GOODS OR SERVICES
L'invention a pour objet un procédé d'intervention sur une borne de délivrance d'un bien ou d'un service. Dans un exemple préféré, la borne est un parcmètre ou un horodateur, Elle peut cependant être tout distributeur automatique de biens ou de services tel que distributeur de boissons ou même un guichet relié à serveur gérant une base de données. Les bornes concernées par 1'invention comportent au moins un dispositif de paiement par carte à puce, et, dans certain cas, un dispositif mixte de paiement par carte à puce et de paiement direct en argent liquide, monnaies ou billets, ou par carte magnétique. Le paiement par carte à puce est soit un décompte d'unités prépayées et enregistrées dans une mémoire de la carte, dans ce cas la carte est une carte à puce avec au moins une mémoire. Soit le paiement est un paiement par prélèvement sur un compte en banque. Dans ce dernier cas la carte est une carte de type bancaire, magnétique ou à puce.The subject of the invention is a method of intervention on a terminal for delivering a good or a service. In a preferred example, the terminal is a parking meter or a parking meter. It can however be any automatic distributor of goods or services such as a drink distributor or even a counter connected to a server managing a database. The terminals concerned by the invention comprise at least one payment device by chip card, and, in certain cases, a mixed device for payment by chip card and direct payment in cash, coins or banknotes, or by magnetic card. . Payment by smart card is either a count of prepaid units and stored in a memory of the card, in this case the card is a smart card with at least one memory. Either the payment is a direct debit payment from a bank account. In the latter case, the card is a bank, magnetic or chip type card.
Les problèmes rencontrés avec ce ype d'appareil à paiement mixte concernent la surveillance des agents qui interviennent régulièrement sur les bornes, par exemple pour en retirer l'argent liquide injecté par les utilisateurs. En effet, les paiement sont faits par les usagers plus ou moins en argent liquide. La borne délivre donc normalement trois types de soldes dans trois compteurs. Un premier type de solde dans un premier compteur mesure la quantité de services délivrés, un second type de solde dans un deuxième compteur représente les paiements par carte (monnaie dite électronique) , et le troisième type de solde dans un troisième compteur, quand il est présent, indique la somme en liquide que l'agent doit ramasser, et bien entendu remettre aux autorités qui gèrent la borne. Le total des deux derniers compteurs doit être égal au total du premier compteur. On soupçonne que des agents indélicats vont être amenés à trafiquer le deuxième compteur, de façon à augmenter sa valeur, afin de garder pour eux-mêmes l'argent liquide correspondant à la différence créée. On craint aussi par ailleurs que d'autres intervenants ne tirent parti de la complexité d'un tel système pour voler des autorités qui gèrent un grand parc de bornes. En effet, dans une grande ville, on peut admettre qu'il y ait plusieurs milliers de bornes d'un tel type, même pour ne délivrer qu'un seul bien: par exemple des tickets de stationnement. Ces bornes sont sujettes à tomber en panne ou à recevoir un entretien préventif. Une entreprise étrangère à ces autorités de gestion peut donc être chargée de ces opérations. Cette entreprise peut faire des rapports d'intervention dans lesquels des opération coûteuses ont été déclarés, par exemple changement d'une imprimante qui imprime les tickets de stationnement, alors qu'il n'en a rien été.The problems encountered with this type of mixed payment device concern the monitoring of the agents who regularly work on the terminals, for example to withdraw the cash injected by the users. In fact, payments are made by users more or less in cash. The terminal therefore normally issues three types of balances in three counters. A first type of balance in a first counter measures the quantity of services delivered, a second type of balance in a second counter represents card payments (so-called electronic money), and the third type of balance in a third counter, when present, indicates the amount of cash that the agent must collect, and of course give to the authorities who manage the terminal. The total of the last two counters must be equal to the total of the first counter. It is suspected that indelicate agents will be led to tamper with the second counter, so as to increase its value, in order to keep for themselves the cash corresponding to the difference created. It is also feared that other stakeholders may take advantage of the complexity of such a system to steal from the authorities who manage a large fleet of terminals. Indeed, in a big city, we can admit that there are several thousand terminals of this type, even to deliver only one good: for example parking tickets. These terminals are prone to break down or to receive preventive maintenance. A company foreign to these managing authorities can therefore be responsible for these operations. This company can make intervention reports in which costly operations have been declared, for example changing a printer that prints parking tickets, when nothing has happened.
Dans 1'invention on résout ces problèmes de fraude en demandant aux intervenants d'introduire un support sécurisé d'intervention du type et de format carte à puce dans le lecteur de cartes à puce de la borne. Cette borne comporte donc nécessairement un lecteur de carte à puce. Le support sécurisé comporte en conséquence une extrémité au format carte à puce quand il n'est pas lui même une carte à puce. Cette extrémité est celle introduite dans le lecteur de carte à puce. Le support sécurisé est ensuite reconnu comme une carte à puce d'intervention par la borne. Cette reconnaissance peut être provoquée par 1'intervenant qui peut agir par ailleurs sur des boutons de commande de la borne. Cette reconnaissance peut aussi de préférence être automatique, dès l'introduction du support sécurisé, à 1'initiative de la borne ou d'un microprocesseur contenu dans le support sécurisé d'intervention. Ces vérifications d'un type connu amènent naturellement quand c'est nécessaire un déverrouillage d'un verrou logique ou d'un verrou physique, du type porte d'accès dans la borne, pour que l'intervenant puisse y faire ce qu'il a à y faire. Dans l'invention, après la reconnaissance, et avant le déverrouillage, quand cela est nécessaire, on injecte dans le support sécurisé de 1'intervenant des informations relatives à 1'état de la borne, notamment les valeurs de soldes quand il s'agit de relevés habituels, ou notamment les valeurs de registres d'états représentant les états de fonctionnement des différents organes de cette borne quand il s'agit d'intervention d'entretien. L'ouverture de la borne peut notamment ne pas être nécessaire si le contenu en argent liquide qui y est stocké est insuffisant pour justifier une vidange du coffre contenant l'argent liquide. Dans ce cas on ne transfère dans la carte à puce que les états des compteurs. Au moment de la reconnaissance, un protocole de reconnaissance peut même d'une manière connue déterminer quel type d'intervention va être engagée, ne transférer que les informations qui sont sensibles eu égard à cette intervention, et bien entendu n'ouvrir que la porte de la borne qui correspond à cette intervention.In the invention, these fraud problems are solved by asking the parties involved to introduce a secure intervention medium of the type and format of the smart card into the terminal's smart card reader. This terminal therefore necessarily includes a smart card reader. The secure medium consequently has an end in chip card format when it is not itself a chip card. This end is that inserted into the smart card reader. The secure medium is then recognized as an intervention smart card by the terminal. This recognition can be caused by the operator who can also act on control buttons on the terminal. This recognition can also preferably be automatic, from the introduction of the secure support, on the initiative of the terminal or of a microprocessor contained in the secure intervention support. These verifications of a known type naturally lead, when necessary, to unlocking a logical lock or a physical lock, of the access door type in the terminal, so that the operator can do what he has to do with it. In the invention, after recognition, and before unlocking, when necessary, information relating to the state of the terminal is injected into the operator's secure support, in particular the balance values when it is usual readings, or in particular the values of state registers representing the operating states of the various components of this terminal when it comes to maintenance intervention. In particular, the opening of the terminal may not be necessary if the content of cash stored there is insufficient to justify emptying the safe containing the cash. In this case, only the states of the counters are transferred to the chip card. At the time of recognition, a recognition protocol can even in a known manner determine what type of intervention will be undertaken, transfer only information that is sensitive in relation to this intervention, and of course only open the door of the terminal corresponding to this intervention.
Ce système présente alors l'avantage que l'intervenant n'a rien à faire: tout est fait par le microprocesseur de la carte en exécution du programme préenregistré contenu dans la carte. Non seulement ce système est ainsi simple, mais en plus, apparaissant comme une boîte noire à l'intervenant, celui-ci n'a aucune prise sur ce programme et ne peut le falsifier. Ceci ne serait pas le cas si ce programme était chargé dans la mémoire d'un micro-ordinateur comme cela est évoqué dans le document EP-A-0 413 636. En effet dans ce cas l'intervenant peut être tenté de modifier ce programme. La carte à puce apporte donc l'avantage d'être lisible par le moyen de payement de l'appareil et d'être en elle même d'une très grande sécurité.This system then has the advantage that the operator has nothing to do: everything is done by the microprocessor of the card in execution of the prerecorded program contained in the card. Not only what system is thus simple, but in addition, appearing like a black box to the speaker, this one has no influence on this program and cannot falsify it. This would not be the case if this program was loaded in the memory of a microcomputer as that is evoked in the document EP-A-0 413 636. Indeed in this case the speaker can be tempted to modify this program . The smart card therefore brings the advantage of being readable by the means of payment of the device and of being in itself very high security.
L'invention a donc pour objet un procédé d'intervention sur une borne de délivrance d'un bien ou d'un service, cette borne comportant un lecteur de cartes à puce avec lequel on effectue le paiement d'un bien ou d'un service à la borne, caractérisé en ce qu'il comporte:The subject of the invention is therefore a method of intervention on a terminal for delivering a good or a service, this terminal comprising a smart card reader with which payment is made for a good or a terminal service, characterized in that it includes:
- l'introduction d'un support sécurisé d'intervention au format carte à puce dans ledit lecteur de cartes à puce de la borne, ce support sécurisé comportant une mémoire, un microprocesseur microprogrammé, et des moyens d'échange d'informations avec la borne, puisthe introduction of a secure intervention medium in smart card format into said terminal smart card reader, this secure medium comprising a memory, a microprogrammed microprocessor, and means for exchanging information with the terminal, then
- l'autorisation de 1'intervention par comparaison d'un code secret relatif à la borne avec un code secret relatif au support, et- authorization of the intervention by comparison of a secret code relating to the terminal with a secret code relating to the support, and
- une étape, ultérieure à l'introduction du support sécurisé, au cours de laquelle la borne transfère dans une mémoire de relèvement du support sécurisé des informations relatives à l'état de cette borne avant 1*intervention.a step, subsequent to the introduction of the secure medium, during which the terminal transfers information relating to the state of this terminal to the secure medium recovery memory before the intervention.
L'invention sera mieux comprise à la lecture de la description qui suit et à l'examen des figures qui l'accompagnent. Celles ci ne sont données qu'à titre indicatif et nullement limitatif de l'invention. Les figures montrent:The invention will be better understood on reading the description which follows and on examining the figures which accompany it. These are given for information only and in no way limit the invention. The figures show:
- figure 1: une représentation d'un dispositif utile pour mettre en oeuvre l'invention;- Figure 1: a representation of a device useful for implementing the invention;
- figure 2: un organigramme des opérations de l'invention.- Figure 2: a flowchart of the operations of the invention.
La figure 1 montre un dispositif utile pour mettre en oeuvre l'invention. Il comporte une borne 1 munie d'un lecteur 2 de carte à puce, et, dans certains cas, d'une fente 3 ou d'un dispositif similaire pour introduire de l'argent liquide dans la borne. La borne comporte également un certain nombre de boutons de commandes tels que 4 pour choisir un bien ou un service parmi plusieurs ou pour annuler l'opération. La borne est donc en relation avec un distributeur de ces biens ou services. Ici, dans une application de paiement de place de stationnement, la borne délivre un ticket 5 de stationnement correspondant à une durée choisie par un utilisateur. Celui-ci place ce ticket en évidence derrière le pare brise de son véhicule, pour que des surveillants puissent vérifier que le véhicule est autorisé à stationner.Figure 1 shows a device useful for implementing the invention. It includes a terminal 1 provided with a smart card reader 2, and, in certain cases, a slot 3 or a similar device for introducing cash into the terminal. The terminal also includes a certain number of command buttons such as 4 to choose a good or service from among several or to cancel the operation. The terminal is therefore in contact with a distributor of these goods or services. Here, in a parking space payment application, the terminal delivers a parking ticket 5 corresponding to a duration chosen by a user. He places this ticket prominently behind the windshield of his vehicle, so that supervisors can verify that the vehicle is authorized to park.
Lors d'interventions sur la borne, des intervenants introduisent dans un lecteur de carte à puce de la borne, par exemple le lecteur 2, un support sécurisé d'intervention 6 possédant une extrémité du format carte à puce. Ce support sécurisé 6 comporte un microprocesseur 7 en relation avec une mémoire programmée 8, avec une mémoire de données 11, et avec des plots de contact tels que 12 nécessaires pour entrer en relation avec le lecteur 2. Dans certains cas les plots sont absents: la mise en relation est réalisée par des ondes électromagnétiques. La mémoire programmée 8 comporte deux programmes. Selon 1'organigramme de la figure 2, un premier programme 9 est un programme de reconnaissance, par exemple un programme de réponse à une reconnaissance de type classique. Dans une telle reconnaissance la borne interroge le support. Le support répond en transmettant son identification et ou son code secret, stocké dans une partie 16 de sa mémoire 11. Le microprocesseur 7 peut au besoin chiffrer le code secret du support avant de l'envoyer au lecteur 2. Dans ce cas le lecteur 2 doit être pourvu de moyens de déchiffrement. Un tel programme est par exemple décrit dans une demande de brevet européen EP-A-0 284 133.During interventions on the terminal, speakers introduce into a smart card reader of the terminal, for example the reader 2, a secure intervention medium 6 having an end of the smart card format. This secure support 6 comprises a microprocessor 7 in relation to a programmed memory 8, with a data memory 11, and with contact pads such as 12 necessary to enter into relationship with the reader 2. In some cases the pads are absent: the connection is made by electromagnetic waves. The programmed memory 8 comprises two programs. According to the flow diagram of FIG. 2, a first program 9 is a program for recognition, for example a recognition program of a conventional type. In such recognition the terminal interrogates the support. The medium responds by transmitting its identification and or its secret code, stored in a part 16 of its memory 11. The microprocessor 7 can if necessary encrypt the secret code of the medium before sending it to the reader 2. In this case the reader 2 must be provided with means of decryption. Such a program is for example described in a European patent application EP-A-0 284 133.
Comme la borne 1 est munie d'un clavier 4, on peut pour cette reconnaissance se servir de ce clavier 4 pour demander à l'opérateur intervenant d'authentifier son intervention. Celui-ci indique donc son code personnel avec ce clavier. Ce code personnel, qui peut être le même que celui de la carte ou un autre, est comparé, par la borne 1 ou le microprocesseur 7 de la carte, à un code porteur contenu dans la carte ou même à un code contenu dans la borne. Ceci permet d'éviter qu'une carte à puce d'intervention qui serait perdue puisse servir a un voleur pour qu'il pille le contenu monétaire des bornes: l'argent liquide qui y est reçu. Ceci permet aussi de détecter la présence des fausses bornes, la borne devant effectuer un contrôle de la carte, alors que la carte effectue un contrôle de la borne.As the terminal 1 is provided with a keyboard 4, it is possible for this recognition to use this keyboard 4 to ask the intervening operator to authenticate his intervention. This therefore indicates his personal code with this keyboard. This personal code, which can be the same as that of the card or another, is compared, by terminal 1 or microprocessor 7 of the card, to a carrier code contained in the card or even to a code contained in the terminal . This prevents a lost intervention smart card from being used by a thief to loot the monetary content from the terminals: the cash received there. This also makes it possible to detect the presence of the false terminals, the terminal having to carry out a control of the card, while the card carries out a control of the terminal.
Un deuxième programme 10 contenu dans la mémoire 8 est également un programme de l'invention: il a pour but, après les opérations d'authentification, de provoquer le transfert des informations contenues dans les compteurs ou les registres d'états de la borne 1 vers la mémoire 11 du support sécurisé. De préférence, dès son introduction dans le lecteur 2 le microprocesseur 7 se met en attente de réponse. Dès que le protocole de reconnaissance est terminé, le microprocesseur 7 du support 6 prend la main sur la borne. Cette prise de main est tout simplement réalisée par le fait qu'après la reconnaissance le lecteur 2 se met en attente d'ordre. Le programme 9 de la carte peut par exemple comporter alors à cet effet, in fine, une instruction de temporisation de durée calibrée au bout de laquelle le programme 10 de la carte est déclenché. Sous l'effet des instructions de ce programme 10, le microprocesseur 7 lit alors le contenu des compteurs et ou le contenu de registres d'états de la borne. Puis il enregistre ces informations lues dans la mémoire 11 du support. Quand ces enregistrements sont faits le microprocesseur 7 envoie un ordre au lecteur 2 _r que ce lecteur 2 provoque le déverrouillage d'un verrou logique ou d'un verrou physique qui empêche l'ouverture d'une porte 13 de la borne et donc le déroulement de 1'intervention souhaitée.A second program 10 contained in the memory 8 is also a program of the invention: its purpose, after the authentication operations, is to cause the transfer of the information contained in the counters or the state registers of the terminal 1 to memory 11 of the secure medium. Preferably, as soon as it is introduced into the reader 2, the microprocessor 7 waits for a response. As soon as the recognition protocol is completed, the microprocessor 7 of support 6 takes control of the terminal. This grip is simply achieved by the fact that after recognition the reader 2 stands by for order. The program 9 of the card can for example then include for this purpose, in fine, a time delay instruction calibrated at the end of which the program 10 of the card is triggered. Under the effect of the instructions of this program 10, the microprocessor 7 then reads the content of the counters and or the content of state registers of the terminal. Then it records this information read in the memory 11 of the medium. When these recordings are made the microprocessor 7 sends an order to the reader 2 _r that this reader 2 causes the unlocking of a logical lock or a physical lock which prevents the opening of a door 13 of the terminal and therefore the unfolding of the desired intervention.
Le programme 10 peut également contenir des instructions de remise à zéro des compteurs ou registres d'état du lecteur 2. En variante le programme 10 comporte des instructions pour modifier un tarif de consommation avec la borne. Ces instructions sont exécutées, le cas échéant, avant d'ouvrir la porte. Mais ce n'est pas indispensable. Le programme 10 comporte de préférence des instructions pour enregistrer les informations relatives à la borne sous une forme chiffrée dans la mémoire 11. De ce fait ces informations ne sont même pas directement compréhensibles par un opérateur qui se contenterait de lire telle quelle la mémoire 11. Le chiffrement est du même type que celui qui est utilisé pour chiffrer le code secret dans le programme 9 avant de l'envoyer.The program 10 can also contain instructions for resetting the counters or status registers of the reader 2. As a variant, the program 10 includes instructions for modifying a consumption tariff with the terminal. These instructions are followed, if necessary, before opening the door. But it is not essential. The program 10 preferably includes instructions for recording the information relating to the terminal in an encrypted form in the memory 11. Therefore this information is not even directly understandable by an operator who would be content to read the memory 11 as it is. The encryption is of the same type as that used to encrypt the secret code in program 9 before sending it.
Quand 1'intervention est terminée, lorsque la porte de la borne est refermée, la suite du programme 10 peut comporter des instructions visant à enregistrer à nouveau dans la mémoire 11, à des autres endroits que précédemment, les valeurs des registres d'états résultant de l'intervention. Par la suite la carte est éjectée du lecteur 2.When the intervention is finished, when the terminal door is closed, the rest of program 10 can include instructions to record again in memory 11, at places other than previously, the values of the state registers resulting from the intervention. The card is then ejected from reader 2.
Pour simplifier les interventions on peut de préférence faire exécuter par le microprocesseur 7 toutes les opérations nécessaires. En cas de changement du programme il est alors plus facile de changer les supports 6 que les bornes 1.To simplify the interventions, it is preferably possible to have the microprocessor 7 execute all the necessary operations. If the program is changed, it is easier to change the supports 6 than the terminals 1.
Pour lire la mémoire 11, au moyen d'un lecteur 14 à la disposition des autorités qui gèrent les bornes 1 et les supports 6, on sollicite dans le support 6 l'exécution d'un troisième programme 15. Dans ce programme 15 le microprocesseur 7 du support 6 vérifie que le lecteur 14 qui l'interroge est un lecteur autorisé. Si c'est le cas le programme 15 comporte des instructions d'écriture dans une mémoire du lecteur 14, au besoin après déchiffrement, des informations enregistrées dans sa mémoire 11. De cette manière les autorités qui gèrent les bornes disposent des rapports exacts sur les opérations menées par les intervenants. To read the memory 11, by means of a reader 14 available to the authorities which manage the terminals 1 and the supports 6, one requests in the support 6 the execution of a third program 15. In this program 15 the microprocessor 7 of the support 6 verifies that the reader 14 which interrogates it is an authorized reader. If this is the case, the program 15 includes instructions for writing into a memory of the reader 14, if necessary after decryption, information recorded in its memory 11. In this way the authorities which manage the terminals have exact reports on the stakeholder operations.

Claims

REVENDICATIONS
1 - Procédé d'intervention sur une borne (l) de délivrance d'un bien ou d'un service, cette borne comportant un lecteur de cartes à puce avec lequel on effectue le paiement d'un bien ou d'un service à la borne, caractérisé en ce qu'il comporte:1 - Intervention method on a terminal (l) for the delivery of a good or a service, this terminal comprising a smart card reader with which payment for a good or a service is made at the terminal, characterized in that it comprises:
1'introduction d'un support sécurisé d'intervention au format carte à puce (6) dans ledit lecteur de cartes à puce de la borne, ce support sécurisé comportant une mémoire (11) , un microprocesseur (7) microprogrammé (8) , et des moyens (12) d'échange d'informations avec la borne,The introduction of a secure intervention medium in chip card format (6) into said terminal smart card reader, this secure medium comprising a memory (11), a microprocessor microprocessor (7) (8), and means (12) for exchanging information with the terminal,
- l'autorisation de l'intervention par comparaison d'un code secret relatif à la borne avec un code secret (16) relatif au support, - une étape, ultérieure à l'introduction du support sécurisé, au cours de laquelle la borne transfère dans une mémoire de relèvement (11) du support sécurisé des informations relatives à 1'état de cette borne avant 1'intervention. 2 - Procédé selon la revendication 1, caractérisé en ce qu'il comporte les étapes suivantes:- authorization of the intervention by comparison of a secret code relating to the terminal with a secret code (16) relating to the support, - a step, subsequent to the introduction of the secure support, during which the terminal transfers in a reading memory (11) of the secure medium of information relating to the state of this terminal before the intervention. 2 - Method according to claim 1, characterized in that it comprises the following steps:
- l'autorisation de l'intervention par comparaison d'un code secret relatif à la borne avec un code secret (16) relatif au support, - une action physique d'intervention sur la borne,- authorization of the intervention by comparison of a secret code relating to the terminal with a secret code (16) relating to the support, - a physical action of intervention on the terminal,
- une étape, ultérieure à 1'introduction du support sécurisé et antérieure à l'action physique d'intervention, au cours de laquelle la borne transfère dans une mémoire de relèvement (11) du support sécurisé des informations relatives à l'état de cette borne avant l'intervention.a step, subsequent to the introduction of the secure medium and prior to the physical intervention action, during which the terminal transfers into a memory (11) for the secure medium information relating to the state of this front terminal intervention.
3 - Procédé selon la revendication 1 ou la revendication 2, caractérisé en ce que pour lire la mémoire de relèvement après l'intervention, - on place le support sécurisé dans un lecteur3 - Method according to claim 1 or claim 2, characterized in that to read the reading memory after the intervention, - the secure medium is placed in a reader
(14),(14),
- on compose avec un clavier de ce lecteur un code d'accès en lecture,- a read access code is dialed with a keyboard from this reader,
- on compare ce code d'accès à un code d'accès en lecture contenu dans le support sécurisé, et- this access code is compared with a read access code contained in the secure medium, and
- on autorise la lecture et, éventuellement l'écriture ou l'effacement de la mémoire de relèvement (11) en fonction du résultat de cette comparaison.- it authorizes the reading and, possibly the writing or the erasure of the reading memory (11) according to the result of this comparison.
4 - Procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 1 à 3, caractérisé en ce qu'on fait exécuter par le microprocesseur (7) microprogrammé (8) du support les opérations de comparaison des codes.4 - Method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that the microprocessor (7) microprogrammed (8) of the support is executed the operations of comparison of the codes.
5 - Procédé selon 1'une quelconque des revendications 1 à 4, caractérisé en ce que les opérations d'écriture dans la mémoire de relèvement comportent des opérations de chiffrement ou respectivement de déchiffrement des données mémorisées.5 - Method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that the write operations in the reading memory include encryption operations or respectively decryption of the stored data.
6 - Procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 1 à 5, caractérisé en ce que l'opération d'autorisation comporte la frappe sur le clavier (4) de l'appareil d'un code d'intervenant, pour effectuer une reconnaissance de cet intervenant par cette borne et/ou ce support sécurisé.6 - Method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that the authorization operation comprises the typing on the keyboard (4) of the device of an operator code, to perform a recognition of this speaker by this terminal and / or this secure support.
7 - Procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 1 à 6, caractérisé en ce que l'opération d'intervention comporte l'écriture dans la borne d'une nouvelle configuration de cette borne. 7 - Method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that the intervention operation includes writing in the terminal a new configuration of this terminal.
EP93902345A 1991-12-17 1992-12-17 Device for intervention on a terminal delivering goods or services Expired - Lifetime EP0617819B1 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
FR9115659 1991-12-17
FR9115659A FR2685113B1 (en) 1991-12-17 1991-12-17 PROCESS OF INTERVENTION ON A TERMINAL OF GOODS OR SERVICES.
PCT/FR1992/001200 WO1993012510A1 (en) 1991-12-17 1992-12-17 Method for intervention on a terminal delivering goods or services

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EP0617819A1 true EP0617819A1 (en) 1994-10-05
EP0617819B1 EP0617819B1 (en) 2000-09-20

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EP93902345A Expired - Lifetime EP0617819B1 (en) 1991-12-17 1992-12-17 Device for intervention on a terminal delivering goods or services

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US (1) US5520275A (en)
EP (1) EP0617819B1 (en)
JP (1) JPH07507647A (en)
DE (1) DE69231470T2 (en)
ES (1) ES2152247T3 (en)
FR (1) FR2685113B1 (en)
WO (1) WO1993012510A1 (en)

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Publication number Publication date
EP0617819B1 (en) 2000-09-20
ES2152247T3 (en) 2001-02-01
FR2685113A1 (en) 1993-06-18
US5520275A (en) 1996-05-28
WO1993012510A1 (en) 1993-06-24
DE69231470D1 (en) 2000-10-26
FR2685113B1 (en) 1998-07-24
JPH07507647A (en) 1995-08-24
DE69231470T2 (en) 2001-05-23

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