DE9317049U1 - Safety device for motor vehicles - Google Patents

Description

Schneidemühler Strasse 3 GM

81929 Munich

Safety device for motor vehicles

The present invention relates to a security device for protecting motor vehicles against unauthorized use by third parties.

Security devices to protect motor vehicles against unauthorized use by third parties have been known for a long time.

A first group of known security devices, such as door locks, alarm systems, etc., are designed to prevent unauthorized persons from entering the vehicle.

A second group of security devices is designed to prevent the use of the vehicle after someone has entered the interior of the vehicle. This includes, for example, the ignition lock itself, the steering wheel lock and similar devices.

The problem with these known security devices, however, is that they generally only offer protection for a short period of time, i.e. the time required to break into the vehicle and start it up is extended. This may limit the number of thefts, but, as the theft statistics show, it does not significantly reduce them.

It would be desirable to have an improved safety device that even well-equipped professionals cannot overcome or can only overcome with great effort.

It is the object of the present invention to provide such a safety device.

This object is achieved according to the invention by the subject matter of the

Claim 1 is resolved.

Preferred developments of the invention are the subject of the subclaims.

The security device according to the invention has a control device which controls at least one relevant function of the motor vehicle. A first key receiving device is also provided, which can receive a first key device. A testing device is also provided, which is preferably a part of this control device, or is particularly preferably integrated into it, and which checks whether the correct key device is received in the key receiving device. If this is not the case, the control device interrupts the control of this at least one relevant function of the motor vehicle, so that the operation of the vehicle is only possible to a limited extent or preferably not at all.

The relevant control function to be interrupted is preferably a function that can be assigned to the drive area of the vehicle, i.e. in particular one or more functions that control the operation of the engine and/or a transmission, e.g. an automatic transmission. This makes it impossible to use the vehicle without the correct key device.

The first described embodiment of the invention can reliably prevent a parked motor vehicle from being used by a third person.

The first embodiment of the invention is, however, not able to prevent unauthorized use of a vehicle if the unauthorized user has gained possession of the key device. This is the case if the driver of the vehicle is forced, for example by threat of violence, to hand over both the vehicle and the key device. This is also the case if a rented

Vehicle is stolen.

It is therefore the particular aim of a further development of the invention to make the theft of a motor vehicle or the theft of a rental car unattractive for third parties. In order to solve this problem, the invention proposes in a further development to provide a second key receiving device which receives a second key device, with a second testing device being provided which also causes the interruption of one or more relevant functions of the control of the motor vehicle.

The interruption of this relevant function caused by the second test device does not occur depending on the presence or absence of the second key device, but rather occurs when a limit value for a specified operating parameter is exceeded. This operating parameter is preferably the time, the distance covered by the motor vehicle, or the number of operating hours of the motor vehicle. Preferably, two or three operating parameters can also be combined. The combination of the time and the distance covered by the vehicle is particularly preferred.

This second key device is not carried by the user when the motor vehicle is in operation, but is kept in a safe place away from the vehicle. The second key device is only used to define new limit values for the operating parameters. To do this, the user inserts the second key device into the corresponding key holder, whereupon the limit value for the corresponding operating parameters is then redefined. In a first variant, the limit value(s) for the operating parameters are fixed. In a second, preferable variant, the limit values for the operating parameters and, if necessary, also the operating parameters can be specified by the user when the second key device is inserted into the key holder.

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The authorized user therefore inserts the second key device into the key holder and enters a limit value for the time parameter of, for example, 14 days. After this period of time has elapsed, the corresponding controlled function is interrupted and the operation of the vehicle is only possible to a limited extent or, preferably, completely impossible. Operation is enabled again when the second key device is inserted into the second key holder. The authorized user can prevent the interruption of the relevant controlled function by inserting the second key device into the key holder again before the expiry of, for example, 14 days. The user can also be reminded in good time by a corresponding display to insert the second key device.

The use of this second key device has significant advantages.

Since the second key device is not carried with the vehicle, its release cannot be extorted. A potential robber can take control of the vehicle for a short time, but since the vehicle's function is interrupted after a certain time or distance or something similar, the use of the vehicle is limited to a short period of time.

When renting a vehicle, the renter only receives the first key. By selecting the operating parameters, the lessor ensures that the vehicle is operational for a sufficient period of time.

In the event of theft, the legitimate user of the vehicle can present the second key device to the authorities and in particular to his insurance company, and thus prove that he did not support or facilitate the theft of the vehicle. The insurance company will, for its part, retain the second key device. This will rule out any misuse.

and secondly, it prevents the owner of the vehicle from being forced to hand over the second key device after the theft.

The user can preferably select the limit values of the operating parameter(s) themselves. This makes it possible to specify enough time and/or distance even for a longer journey, so that he is not forced to carry the second key device with him. To prevent misuse, a maximum time, e.g. three months, should be specified.

The control device is preferably designed in such a way that it can only be manufactured by the automobile manufacturer itself or on its behalf, so that the control device can only be replaced if the factory has verified the identity and lawful acquisition of ownership of the respective user.

In order to prevent control units from decommissioned vehicles from being used in stolen vehicles, it is also conceivable that the manufacturer will take special measures, such as paying a special fee, a kind of deposit, when the control unit is returned to the factory when the vehicle is unusable or has been decommissioned.

However, it is also a further aim of the present invention to make it more difficult or to prevent as far as possible the activation of a stolen vehicle whose control device is blocked by installing another control device for another vehicle of the same type, etc.

In a further development, the invention proposes to individualize the control device so that even identical vehicles usually have non-identical control devices, so that the exchange of a control device from one vehicle to another is not possible. This is achieved in a further development of the present invention, which is applicable to both embodiments, by the control device

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device is connected to one or more sensors and/or actuating devices which have an individual nature and in particular an individual characteristic.

In a preferred development of the invention, the control device is intended, for example, to control the operation of a motor vehicle with an internal combustion engine based on the Otto or diesel principle using predefined calculation rules, for example a characteristic map or the like. For the control, operating variables such as the speed of the engine, temperatures of the engine, the cooling water, the engine oil, the temperature of the intake air, the load, for example measured via the throttle valve angle position or the air intake speed, etc. are recorded. Individual sensors with individual characteristics are now used for an engine. This respective characteristic is stored in the control device and used to determine the corresponding variables. If a control device from another vehicle is used which has different sensor characteristics, the engine control becomes so faulty that it is impossible to operate the vehicle with this incorrect control device.

By individualizing several sensors, the number of possible combinations of the characteristics can be increased in the form of encryption to so many combinations that it is completely or practically impossible for two otherwise identical vehicles to have an identical control device.

If an unauthorized third party wanted to adapt the characteristics of the sensors of a stolen vehicle to a control device from another vehicle, he would have to change or replace the corresponding sensors, which is very complex and can also be made more difficult or prevented by design measures.

If the control device is limited in its function exclusively to the engine, it would be conceivable that in a vehicle

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after replacing the motor and key receiving devices, unauthorized use is possible. In order to prevent this and to further increase security, the invention proposes in a preferred development that additional functions of the vehicle control system be included in the control device. Depending on the vehicle type and equipment, additional functions may be:

the functional control of a charging device (turbocharger or similar)

the functional control of an anti-lock braking system; the functional control of an automatic slip control; the functional control of an automatic transmission; the functional control of a power steering system; the functional control of one or more differentials, e.g. the axle differentials in single-axle vehicles and the axle and/or center differentials in two-axle vehicles;

the functional control of an all-wheel steering system; the functional control of shock absorbers; the functional control of a semi-active or active chassis;

the function control of a service interval device; the function control of a central locking system the function control of auxiliary devices such as alternator, heating, air conditioning, seat adjustment device, airbag, radio, etc.

These functional controls can be integrated (also spatially) into the control device. In this case, too, sensors and actuating elements required for one of the functional control devices can be individualized.

According to a further preferred development of the invention, the function control devices for the anti-lock braking system etc. remain as autonomous devices. However, they are intended to be connected to a preferably

If the third test device determines that one of these function control devices does not correspond to a predetermined individual function control device, the control of the relevant vehicle function(s) is interrupted. In this case, too, the function control devices are preferably at least partially connected to individualized sensors and/or actuating elements. The first and second key receiving devices are also preferably designed (in all embodiments) in such a way that identification data of the key receiving devices themselves, and not just the key devices, can be exchanged with the test or control device.

In the latter case, if a vehicle according to the second embodiment is stolen or robbed, the unauthorized third party would have to obtain and replace the following components as soon as the specified parameter in the control device has been exceeded: control device, first and second key receiving device, engine control sensors, engine control actuators, automatic transmission sensors, automatic transmission function control device, anti-lock braking system function control device, anti-lock braking system actuators, etc. It is easy to understand that the cost has become so high that theft is no longer attractive, even for expensive vehicles. In addition, it is relatively easy to monitor the delivery of all or some of these functional parts by the factory, so that security-relevant functional parts are not available on the market.

In order to prevent forgery or copying of the key device(s), according to a further development of the invention, at least one, and here in particular the second key device, but preferably both, are provided with a data memory from which data can be transmitted to the test device and transmitted back from the test device.

With the appropriate structure of security data, it becomes practically impossible to create or copy the key device without authorization.

In particular, the invention proposes that each time the key device is used, relevant data in the key device are changed, so that it is not possible to predict which data are expected from the key device for transmission to the key receiving device.

A key receiving device in the sense of the present invention is also to be understood as a receiving device or a transmitting/receiving device which receives signals transmitted wirelessly from the associated key device or transmits them to it. For the wireless transmission, transmission with electromagnetic waves (radio waves), ultrasound, infrared or light is preferably selected.

Further advantages, features and possible applications of the present invention emerge from the following description of embodiments in conjunction with the drawing. They show in a highly schematic manner:

Fig. 1 is a block diagram of a first embodiment of the invention;

Fig. 2 is a block diagram of a second embodiment of the invention;

Fig. 3 shows a data arrangement for explaining a method for data exchange;

Fig. 4 is a block diagram of another embodiment of the invention;

Fig. 5 a sectional view of a control device

according to the embodiment of Fig. 4;

Fig. 6 is a block diagram of another embodiment of the invention.

The first embodiment of the invention will now be described with reference to Fig. 1.

The embodiment is designed for a conventional multi-cylinder internal combustion engine based on the Otto principle, which is equipped with a characteristic-controlled gasoline injection, whereby the mixture formation takes place taking into account the values of a lambda probe that is arranged in the exhaust area of the engine.

Figure 1 shows a control device 10 which is housed in a housing 11 and which, in this embodiment, serves to control motor functions.

The components of the control device are grouped together in individual functions in functional blocks in Fig. 1. However, it should be understood that the division into functional blocks is not absolutely necessary in practice, or can also be done in another way. Individual functional blocks can also be grouped together in individual separate modules with separate housings, so that the control device consists of two or more individual components. This also applies to the other embodiments described later.

In the embodiment shown in Fig. 1, the individual function blocks are semi-autonomous, which means that each function device has a memory device in which data can be stored digitally and/or modifiably, as well as a decentralized microprocessor device by which data can be processed. This representation is for reasons of clarity. It is of course possible to divide the function of the memory device of one or more of the function blocks into one or more memory

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devices or to use only one or more central microprocessor devices instead of several decentralized microprocessor devices.

In the left part of the control device 10, the detection device 14 is arranged as a functional block.

This detection device 14 is connected to sensors which detect physical quantities and convert them into electrical signals. In the embodiment, the sensor 20 is a speed sensor for detecting the engine speed. This speed sensor preferably has a pulse generator with a pulse counter, whereby the pulse generator outputs a predetermined number of pulses per revolution of the engine's crankshaft.

The sensor 21 is a sensor that detects the load acting on the engine. In the embodiment, this sensor is designed as a rotary angle sensor, which detects the angular position of the throttle valve.

The sensor 22 is a lambda probe, which is arranged in the usual way in the exhaust system.

The sensor 2 3 is a first temperature sensor that measures the oil temperature, the sensor 24 is a second temperature sensor for detecting the water temperature and the sensor 25 is a pressure sensor for detecting the oil pressure. A knock sensor 26 is also provided. The use of other sensors, e.g. to check the valve control, is possible.

The signals from these sensors are fed to the control device 10, where they are recorded in the recording device 14 and converted into engine operating data, e.g. current speed, etc., and transmitted to an engine function control device 16.

The individual sensors can be standard sensors, which in the present application means that all vehicles of a corresponding

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of the corresponding type are equipped with the same sensors.

However, it is particularly preferred that at least some of the sensors are individualized. This means that the characteristic curve, i.e. the relationship between the physical quantity to be recorded and the electrical signal emitted by the sensor, is different for corresponding sensors of the same vehicle type.

This is done, for example, by having the speed sensor on different vehicles with different pulse generators, which each output a specific, different number of pulses per crankshaft revolution. In a corresponding way, different temperature and pressure sensors with different characteristics can be used.

The characteristics of all sensors are stored in the recording device 14, so that for individualized sensors the correct values for speed, angle of rotation, temperature, pressure, etc. are calculated.

The individualized sensors are preferably divided into different classes, for example 10, 20 or more classes per sensor, from which sensors are then put together for the individual vehicles of a series, for example randomly. This allows several thousand sensor groups to be formed, so that a correspondingly large number of different types of detection devices are created and the chance that two specific vehicles have the same detection device becomes very small.

The engine function control device 16 calculates the optimal control of the engine on the basis of the operating data, for example based on a characteristic map and on adaptive correction methods known in the prior art, and outputs the values by which the duration and length of the injection process and the timing of the ignition are controlled.

The values are output via an output device 18, which is also part of the control device 10. If the engine is designed accordingly, the control can also include the control of valve opening times or valve lift.

The values are output to an injection device 30, to an ignition device 31 and, if necessary, to the valve timing and lift control device 32.

The devices 30 to 32 can also be individualized, i.e. devices of the same vehicle can be designed differently, and the corresponding characteristics can be stored in the output device 18. However, individualization is only necessary if particularly high value is placed on safety.

The control device 10 also includes a first testing device 15, which interacts with a key receiving device 40.

Furthermore, the control device 10 has a timer 17, which specifies a time cycle according to which the control device 10 works overall.

The control device is powered externally via the vehicle's on-board voltage. Preferably, a long-life battery, for example a lithium battery 12, is arranged in the housing, which at least ensures the operation of the timer and the preservation of the memory contents, if corresponding components are used, when the control unit is not connected to the on-board voltage.

The control device 10 is preferably designed in such a way that it is not possible to read out data important for the function of the security device using external devices. This can be achieved by arranging the control device or individual parts of it in a housing which is completely

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cast out of suitable plastic or the like.

The function of the first testing device 15 will now be explained in connection with the function of the key device of the first key receiving device 40.

The first key receiving device 40 receives a key device 41 and is arranged inside the vehicle, for example as an ignition lock, in the area of the driver's side dashboard. The key receiving device can be designed in such a way that it receives a conventional key, as is generally known today as a vehicle key and as is also used to open doors, trunks, lids and the like. Other designs are also possible (see below).

In this design of the first key receiving device, the receiving device 40 determines whether the key is correct after the key 41 has been inserted and then sends a corresponding signal to the testing device 15. If the key is correct, the testing device 15 enables the operation of the control device 10, i.e. values that control the operation of the motor are sent out via the output device 18.

If the key is not correct, the correct signal is not output and the test device leaves the control device in the passive state or deactivates it so that no control signals are output to the engine. In addition, as is known, the ignition current to the starter etc. can also be interrupted, which, if designed accordingly, can also be done via the control device 10.

For safety reasons, the control device 10 is designed in such a way that the function lock is only interrupted when the vehicle is at a standstill.

A design of the key receiving device and the key device is preferred, through which data with the first

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Testing device 15 can be exchanged. This is possible by equipping a conventional key with a processor and data storage device, which is electrically connected to the testing device when the key device is inserted into the key receiving device. A key device in the form of a card with such a processor in a similar shape to a telephone card or the like can also be used.

Preferably, the data stored in the key is changed by the test device 15 each time the key is used, as will be explained later with reference to Fig. 3, so that the test device 15 only activates the control device 10 when the complete identity of the key device has been established. Preferably, several first key devices are available for the vehicle. In this case, the test device is designed so that it recognizes the key used at any given time.

The function and advantages of this first embodiment are summarized as follows:

The driver uses the first key in the usual way to open the vehicle door and then inserts the key into the key receiving device 40. The control device is switched to a test mode and the first test device, as will be explained later with reference to Fig. 3, requests control data from the first key device and compares this with control data or calculation rules for calculating the control data that are stored in the test device. If the key is identical to one of the keys that authorize use of the vehicle, the control device 10 is switched to operating mode and the vehicle can be started and used in the usual way.

It is not possible for an unauthorized third party who does not have the correct key to start the vehicle.

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This can reliably prevent theft of the vehicle.

There is no chance for an unauthorized third party to start the vehicle, even if they have sufficient time, sufficient expertise and equipment.

Attempting to open the control device or its safety-relevant parts, if it is cast in plastic, will destroy the control device so that it can no longer perform its function.

Reading the data from the control device is also not possible, as two-way data communication only takes place via the test device. However, the test device cannot output data that relates to the recording device, for example.

Due to the individualization of the sensors, it is also not possible to replace the control device with a control device from another vehicle. In this case, the unauthorized third party would have to replace all the sensors, which is at least very complex and which renders the other vehicle from which the sensors and control device are taken unusable.

With reference to Fig. 2, a second embodiment of the invention is now described, which further increases safety compared to the first embodiment.

The second embodiment of the invention is largely identical to the first embodiment and the variants described therein with regard to the structure of the control devices and the function of the sensors, etc. Identical reference numerals are therefore used in the drawing.

The control device 45 is additionally equipped with a sensor 27

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which is located, for example, on the output shaft of the gearbox and outputs a signal that corresponds to the distance travelled by the vehicle.

In contrast to the first embodiment, a second key receiving device 50 is also provided here, which is connected to a second testing device 19.

This second key receiving device 50 additionally has a display 51 and an input device 52, by means of which inputs can be made using two, three or more keys or the like.

The second key receiving device 50 is intended to receive a second key device 54.

This second key receiving device 54 preferably has a data memory, the content of which is at least partially changeable. A chip card, the size of a standard plastic card, such as is used for telephone cards, credit cards and the like, is preferably used as the second key device. However, other forms of a second key device are also possible.

In any case, the key device should be designed in such a way that it is not possible to copy the key device and capture its contents.

The second key device is not carried during normal operation of the vehicle. It is only used from time to time to unlock the vehicle for a specified period of time, a specified distance or a combination of these two values. The values can be fixed, but it is preferred that these values can be entered by the user himself.

The function of this second embodiment is correct as far as the

As far as the rest of the structure and the first key device are concerned, they correspond to the function described above. Therefore, only the function of the second key device is explained.

The user inserts the second key device 54 into the key receiving device 50 and then uses the input keyboard 52 to select a period of time within which the vehicle should be functional. This period may be a week for normal use. Alternatively or additionally, he can enter a distance, which for example is 1000 kilometers for normal use.

The set values are shown on the display 51 during the setting process. The second key device is then removed from the holder and stored in a safe place outside the vehicle.

The vehicle can now be used exclusively with the first key device for a week or for a distance of 1,000 kilometers. As soon as the specified time or the specified distance has been exceeded, the output of engine control data is interrupted and it is then no longer possible to start the vehicle with the first key device.

However, in one embodiment, the user is made aware of the elapsed time by the display 51 and uses the second key device again in good time to enter a new time and/or a new distance.

If the vehicle is to be used outside of its usual location for a longer period of time, for example during a holiday trip, the user will increase the specified time accordingly, for example to four weeks, in order to be able to start the holiday trip without a second key device.

However, the setting option should not exceed a certain time frame, for example two months or something similar.

The design with the second key device brings significant advantages for security:

First of all, the protection against unauthorized use and theft is the same as in the first embodiment. In contrast to the first embodiment, however, in this embodiment it is not possible to use the vehicle if the unauthorized person has gained possession of the first key by force or in any other way. An unauthorized person can steal the vehicle by forcing the owner to hand over the vehicle and the first key device. However, the use of the vehicle is made impossible after a short time or short distance due to the lack of the second key device.

It will also be impossible to use a legally obtained vehicle, such as a rental car, beyond the specified period.

It is also easy for the vehicle owner to prove, for example, to the authorities or an insurance company that he did not assist in the theft by presenting the second key device to the authorities or the insurance company. If the corresponding key device is then retained by the insurance company, there is no way of starting the vehicle again later using the second key device.

The display 51 is preferably controlled in such a way that the remaining distance and/or the remaining operating time is only shown if the vehicle has not been used for several hours beforehand. As a result, if the vehicle is stolen, it is not possible to determine how much time/distance is still sufficient, which increases the risk.

In a further embodiment, which corresponds to the second embodiment according to Fig. 2, the second key receiving device is connected to the first key receiving device

identical. Firstly, effort is saved here by omitting the second key receiving device. Otherwise, the function is the same. Here too, a second key device is provided, which works in the same way as in the example according to Fig. 2. The test device distinguishes which key device is inserted. The user here uses the first key device in the manner described above to use the vehicle. The second key device is not carried with the vehicle but is only inserted into the key receiving device when necessary in order to release the vehicle for a certain distance and/or period of time as described. Preferably, however, the first and second key devices are designed very differently in relation to the part that is not inserted into the key receiving device, so that no confusion can occur.

If a data exchange of the key device takes place in the embodiments described above, this exchange should be designed in such a way that it offers a high level of security for the identity check and with regard to the unauthorized reading of the corresponding program routines in the control device 10.

Such a method will now be explained with reference to Fig. 3. The following describes how the data exchange between the key device, which can be the first or the second key device, and the associated test device is carried out.

When checking the identity of the key device, the test device first issues an activation signal AKl, which must be recognized by the key device. As soon as the key device recognizes that the activation value AKl is present, the key device issues the control value KOl, the identity of which is in turn checked by the test device. If the value KOl is the value that the test device expects, it issues the second activation signal

characteristic value AK2.

When the key device has received the activation value AK2, it outputs the control value K02, the identity of which is checked by the test device. If the value K02 is identical to the value that the test device expects, an activation value AK3 is output. If this is not the case, the further course of the procedure is blocked and the control device remains passive. In order to prevent the values from being read out by "trial and error", the test device simultaneously specifies a time period within which the test procedure is not repeated. This time period is short on the first attempt and is greatly increased with each subsequent attempt.

In order to prevent transmission errors, the test procedure can provide that the value AK2 is output a predetermined number of times, for example five times in succession, and the key device is given a predetermined period of time, for example a certain number of seconds, to return the control value K02. If this is not the case after these five attempts, the test device and thus the control device is blocked for the predetermined period of time.

Since the second control value must be output within a fixed time period after the first control value has been output and the second activation value has been received, it is not possible to find the value by trial and error.

To increase security, after the second control value has been entered, a third activation value is issued by the test device, to which the key device then issues a third control value within a specified time frame. The control device 10.45 is only released once all control values have been checked for their identity.

Before the control device is released, or shortly thereafter, the key is preferably checked by the test device.

seleinrichtung data is transmitted which changes the stored activation parameters and the control values.

These values can be transmitted in an identical manner. To further increase security, however, it is preferable that the values transmitted by the test device are converted in the key device so that the values transmitted and the values transmitted back to the test device during the next test process are not identical. The conversion can be carried out according to a fixed scheme, but it is preferred that a variable conversion is carried out, which is based, for example, on the number η of test procedures carried out for the respective key device, whereby this value η is then stored in the test device and in the key device in a non-readable manner.

The method described above offers the possibility of checking the identity of the key device in such a way that counterfeiting the key device or making an unauthorized copy is made difficult or impossible. Instead of this method, however, other known methods for data encryption and data protection can also be used with the device according to the invention.

In the embodiments described above, the control device was used to control the operation of a gasoline engine equipped with a catalyst. However, by appropriate design, the operation of other engines can also be controlled, for example diesel engines and other drive sources.

In addition to the described control of the engine, other functions of the vehicle can also be controlled alternatively or additionally.

For example, it is possible to control the engine in the usual way and, in contrast, to control the automatic transmission via a corresponding control device 10,45. In addition,

Other control functions can also be used as a substitute for or in addition to the control.

Thus, such a comprehensive control device, which otherwise corresponds in its structure to the previously described embodiments (Fig. 1 to Fig. 3), can be provided to control a vehicle with a gasoline engine and automatic transmission, which is also equipped with an anti-lock braking system and a power steering system.

Additional sensors are then provided which are required to control the other functions of the vehicle. As an example, the sensors for detecting the wheel speed are mentioned, namely a sensor for the left front wheel, for the front right, for the rear left, and for the rear right. Additional sensors for the system pressure etc. can be provided, but are not listed here for the sake of simplicity.

Furthermore, sensors are provided which detect the state of the automatic transmission, namely a first sensor for detecting the input speed of the torque converter, a sensor for detecting the output speed of the torque converter, a sensor for detecting the output speed of the transmission and further sensors, not listed for reasons of simplicity, for detecting the switching states and pressure states in the various areas of the hydraulic control of the automatic transmission.

Furthermore, a sensor is provided which detects the steering angle of the vehicle's steering wheel, and a sensor which detects the rotational speed of the steering wheel movement, a sensor which detects the steering angle of the front wheels and, if the vehicle has four-wheel steering, also the steering angle of the rear wheels. Furthermore, pressure sensors are provided which detect the pressure in the hydraulic area of the power steering control.

For vehicles that have at least one controlled differential, speed sensors can also be provided to

Input speed and output speed of the respective differential gear to be recorded, namely in a single-axle driven vehicle the speeds of the axle distribution differential and in a two-axle driven vehicle, depending on the design, the speeds of the front axle differential, the rear axle differential and the center differential.

If the vehicle has a device to influence the spring/damper behavior, for example a semi-active or active chassis control, sensors can also be provided which record the relative speed of the chassis components with respect to the body, the acceleration values of the body, and the yaw acceleration values, roll acceleration values and pitch acceleration values.

Preferably, at least some of these sensors are individualized. In the detection device, the operating data of the various devices are converted from the transmitted signal based on the rules stored there in accordance with the respective characteristics. In the function control device, the required control variables are calculated in accordance with stored calculation rules and characteristic maps and output via the data output device. The function of the first and second test devices is the same as in the previously described embodiments, although here too a design with only one key device is possible.

Since in this embodiment a large number of sensors, which can be individualized, and very complex control routines for the individual functions are stored in the control device, a particularly high degree of security is achieved here, even against replacing the control device.

Fig. 4 and 5 show a further embodiment which can be combined with all the embodiments described above.

The embodiment is described here according to the second embodiment of the invention, and the same reference numerals are used for the same parts as in Figs. 1 and 2.

In this embodiment, a detection device 12 and a data output device are provided in the control device 200.

However, the structure of the function control device has been changed. One part of the function control device is arranged in module 210, a second part in module 211 and a third part in module 212. All calculation rules, characteristic maps and the like are stored in module 211, which are required to calculate the engine control values from the data provided by the recording device.

Fig. 5 shows a schematic sectional view of such a control device. The control device 200 is completely cast in plastic and has a cavity 213 in which a base 214 with a plurality of electrical connections is provided for receiving the module 211, which is held against the cover 215 by a spring 218.

The module 211 can therefore be removed and replaced. This design has the following advantage:

The control device 200 contains, preferably in an individualized manner, the rules according to which the sensor values are converted into values that are relevant for the control, as well as devices that are required to control the operation of the motor from control signals.

By replacing module 211, it is possible to change the engine control if this is necessary due to technical developments, to adapt to modified engine components or to modified vehicle components, to adapt to regulations in different countries, etc.

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without having to replace the control device or reducing safety.

In the same way as described here, the control devices for other functions of the vehicle, for example the anti-lock braking system, the transmission, etc., can also be divided.

It is then conceivable, for example, to have a control device as in the embodiment shown in Fig. 4, in which interchangeable components influence or largely take over the control of the engine, the anti-lock braking system, the transmission, the chassis, the power steering, etc., while in particular the common or appropriately divided detection device(s) is/are individualized for the individual vehicle.

A further embodiment will now be explained with reference to Fig. 6.

The embodiment according to Fig. 6 can be designed according to the first embodiment according to Fig. 1 or the second embodiment according to Fig. 2. In Fig. 6, the second embodiment is selected, in which the control device 300 is provided with two test devices and is connected to two key receiving devices. The sensors 20 to 27 and the actuating devices 30 to 32 as well as the detection device 14 and the output device 18 have the same function as in the second embodiment according to Fig. 2 and are also provided with the same reference numerals.

In this embodiment of the safety device, a function control device for an anti-lock braking system 302 with sensors 322, for an automatic transmission 303 with sensors 323 and for a power steering device 304 with sensors 324 are provided. Other function control devices, as already mentioned, can also be used.

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The control device 300 has a third test device 3210, which can exchange data with the function control devices 302, 303, 304.

The function control devices can be designed as standard devices, i.e. they have the same structure for every vehicle, but they can also be individualized, i.e. at least individual sensor devices and individual actuating devices are specifically adapted to the respective function control device.

The individual function control devices can be constructed as shown in Fig. 4 and 5, i.e. can have replaceable components in order to influence the function control itself.

In each function control device, an identification device is provided, which is intended for exchanging data with the third test device 310.

The test device 310 carries out a data exchange with these identification devices, which takes place, for example, at regular intervals, or each time the engine is started or each time the second key device is used (in the second embodiment). With this data exchange, the control device 300 determines whether the respective function control device is the specific function control device intended for this vehicle. If this is not the case, the output of signals by the control device 300 to the engine, etc. is interrupted.

Here too, data exchange procedures are preferably used which prevent the data transmission between the function control devices and the control device 3 00 from being manipulated.

This version has the following advantage: The control device 300

in this case, only the function of the engine needs to be controlled. If an unauthorized person in a stolen vehicle wants to replace the control device with a control device from another vehicle, for example by replacing both the engine and the control device, the operation of the new control device will continue to be blocked because the corresponding identification data of the individual function control devices are incorrect. The function control device will therefore not be able to perform its function in the other vehicle. Replacing all function control devices in order to enable the vehicle to operate is very complex and can also be made practically impossible if the function devices are individualized in terms of their sensors and/or actuation devices.

A corresponding individualization and a corresponding identification is also preferable for the first, and if such is used, also for the second key receiving device, whereby this can preferably also be used in all previously described embodiments and examples (Fig. 1 to 5).

A further embodiment will now be described with reference to Fig. 2, which can also be combined with the aforementioned embodiments. In this construction, the design is the same as in the embodiment according to Fig. 2. In contrast, however, two second key devices are provided here, namely one copy 54A and one copy 54B.

The test device 19 recognizes the difference between the specimens and only allows the selection of new parameters if the specimens are used alternately. With each specimen, the operating parameters can therefore only be specified once if the other specimen is not available.

This design has the following advantage:

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When the user needs to enter new parameters, he only inserts the copy he needs into the second key holder. If the vehicle is stolen during this process, the thief will have this one copy of the second key holder, but since the other copy is required for the next parameter selection, control of the relevant functions is interrupted after the corresponding limit values are exceeded. This also makes insurance fraud even more difficult, since the owner must always have a copy of the second key holder in his possession in this case too. Which copy is required for the extension is shown on display 51.

The security device according to the invention creates a device that offers a high level of security against unauthorized use of the vehicle at a reasonable cost. The security device can be manufactured in different ways, and it is possible to adapt the security device to the circumstances of the individual vehicle. For example, for a simple vehicle, whose risk of theft is possibly lower, the security device will be designed to be simpler, while for a very high-quality vehicle, a correspondingly higher cost for the security device is recommended and justified. The individualization of the control device and, if applicable, the individual function control devices ensures that exchanging such devices between individual vehicles is made very difficult or practically impossible. The automobile manufacturer can also ensure that no corresponding control devices and, if applicable, function control devices reach the market, so that in this respect too, overcoming the security device is very difficult. If safety-relevant elements have to be replaced, such as the control unit, a new control unit will be supplied by the car manufacturer itself, who can check the authorization of the respective owner and retain the control unit to be replaced. The car manufacturer can, with relatively little effort,

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Store and archive the corresponding functional data of the components so that the corresponding components can be manufactured and replaced even after a long period of time.

Claims (23)

Expectations 1. Safety device for a motor vehicle which is driven by an engine, comprising: a control device which controls at least one relevant function of the motor vehicle, a key receiving device which is intended to receive a key device, a test device which causes the control of at least this at least one relevant function to be interrupted if the key device is not accommodated in the key receiving device or if a key device which is accommodated in the key receiving device is not identical to a key device which authorizes the use of the motor vehicle. 2. Security device according to claim 1, characterized in that a second key receiving device is provided for receiving a second key device, and that a second testing device is provided which interrupts the control of these at least one relevant functions of the motor vehicle if a limit value of at least one predetermined operating parameter of the motor vehicle is exceeded without the second key device having been received in the second key receiving device. 3. Safety device according to claim 2, characterized in net that the or at least one of the predetermined operating parameters is selected from a group of parameters which includes the time, the number of operating hours and the distance covered. 4. Safety device according to at least one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the control device is connected to at least one sensor generating an electrical signal in order to detect at least one current operating variable of the vehicle, and that the control of this at least one relevant function takes place on the basis of this detected operating variable(s). 5. Safety device according to claim 4, characterized in that at least one sensor for detecting the operating variables used for the control has an individual characteristic, and that the control device has a detection device in which a rule is stored, on the basis of which the operating variable detected by this sensor can be calculated from the signal of this individual sensor fed to the detection device. 6. Safety device according to at least one of the preceding claims, characterized in that this control device controls a relevant function, when interrupted the drive device of the vehicle is no longer functional and that this control device controls at least one further function of the vehicle which is selected from a group that includes the functions of the control systems of a drive motor, a charger control, a transmission, an anti-lock control, an anti-slip control of drive wheels, a power steering device, an axle differential, a center differential, an all-wheel steering, a shock absorber device, a semi-active or active chassis, an alternator or an air conditioning system. summarizes. 7. Safety device according to at least one of the preceding claims, characterized in that a third test device is provided which checks the identity of at least one control system and causes the control of this at least one relevant function to be interrupted if this control system is not identical to a specific control system, this control system being selected from a group which includes the control system of a drive motor, a charger control, a transmission, an anti-lock control, an anti-slip control of drive wheels, a power steering device, an axle differential, a center differential, an all-wheel steering, a shock absorber device, a semi-active or active chassis, an alternator or an air conditioning system. 8. Safety device according to at least one of claims 1 to 7, characterized in that the control device controls relevant functions of the engine, with at least one function being selected as the relevant function from a group of functions which includes the start of the fuel injection, the duration of the fuel injection, the ignition point in gasoline engines, the actuation of a second throttle valve in engines with anti-skid control, the valve opening time in engines with variable valve opening time and the valve lift in engines with variable valve lift. 9. Safety device according to claim 8, characterized in that the control device is connected to at least one sensor which is selected from a group of sensors which includes a sensor for detecting the engine speed, a sensor for detecting the throttle valve position, a sensor for detecting the temperature of the intake air, a sensor for detecting the boost pressure at a supercharged engine, a knock sensor, a sensor for detecting an engine temperature, a sensor for detecting the cooling water temperature in water-cooled engines, a sensor for detecting the oil temperature and a sensor for detecting the oil pressure. 10. Security device according to at least one of claims 1 to 9, characterized in that at least one key device has a data memory for storing data and that the associated key receiving device is provided for receiving data from the key device and transmitting it to the associated testing device. 11. Security device according to claim 10, characterized in that these data are stored digitally in the at least one key device and that these data are transmitted digitally from the associated key receiving device to the associated testing device. 12. Security device according to claim 11, characterized in that at least part of the data stored in the at least one key device can be changed when the key device is in the associated key receiving device and that the change in the data stored in the key device is controlled by the associated testing device. 13. Security device according to at least one of claims 2 to 12, characterized in that both key devices are provided with data memories. 14. Security device according to at least one of claims 2 to 13, characterized in that the functions of this first and second key receiving device in a common key receiving device and the functions of this first and second testing device in are combined in a common testing device and that this common testing device detects whether the first or the second key device is accommodated in the key receiving device. 15. Security device according to at least one of claims to 14, characterized in that at least one key receiving device has a data memory, and that this checking device exchanges control data with this key receiving device in order to determine whether this key receiving device corresponds to a specific individual key receiving device, and that the checking device causes the interruption of the control of this at least one relevant function if the key receiving device does not correspond to this individual key receiving device. 16. Security device according to at least one of claims 7 to 15, characterized in that the respective test device for identifying a key device, a key receiving device, or an individual control system exchanges data with the device to be identified, the test device transmitting activation signals to the device to be identified and control signals being transmitted back from this, and that the test device interrupts the output of the activation signals and the control of this at least one relevant function for a predetermined period of time if a predetermined period of time and/or a predetermined number of permissible inputs between the output of a first correct control signal of the device to be identified and the output of a second correct control signal is exceeded. 17. Safety device according to claim 16, characterized in that this predetermined period of time is increased substantially after each failed attempt. 18. Security device according to at least one of the preceding claims, characterized in that at least individual components of the control device and the test device are arranged in a housing which is designed in such a way that reading out the stored and processed data is not possible. 19. Safety device according to claim 18, characterized in that a part of the data and instructions required to control this at least one relevant function is stored in a component which is replaceable. 20. Security device according to at least one of the preceding claims, characterized in that at least one key device is designed in the form of a conventional car key, with a data processing device with a data memory being arranged in the head of the key. 21. Security device according to at least one of the preceding claims, characterized in that at least one key device is designed in the form of a code card, which contains a data processing device and a data memory. 22. Security device according to at least one of the preceding claims, characterized in that at least one key receiving device is designed as a receiving device or as a transmitting/receiving device, which receives a signal transmitted wirelessly from the associated key device and transmits it to the testing device, wherein this signal is preferably transmitted by means of radio waves, ultrasound, infrared or light waves. 23. Safety device according to at least one of claims 2 to 22, characterized in that two different examples plates of the second key device are provided; that the second testing device recognizes which copy is inserted at any given time, and that the control of these at least one relevant functions of the motor vehicle is interrupted if a limit value of at least one specified operating parameter of the motor vehicle is exceeded without the other copy of the second key device than the one used in the previous specification of new parameters having been received in the second key receiving device.