DE9216798U1 - Kit for checking the legitimacy of electronic access and / or information media - Google Patents

Description

Electronic access and/or information media in the form of chip cards and electronic keys are becoming increasingly important, among many other areas of application.

The key is a particularly vulnerable point in locking systems, as it can be read out in a simplified design and thus "copied" via a PC, for example.

For this reason, the so-called PIN was developed for chip cards, for example, which provides a certain level of protection in that the user must first identify himself using this PIN. Misuse occurs because strangers can, for example, see the PIN being entered and then, after stealing the chip card, use it to commit a criminal offense.

It is of course also possible to use a PIN for keys, but this almost inevitably requires the development of a reader device that, through the size of the keyboard alone, ensures that even less skilled people can enter the PIN.

When using the chip card as a key, it is of course possible to design the chip card as a so-called "Super/Smart/Card", which also has an alphanumeric keyboard in addition to its chip.

If the key is to have a certain level of security without a PIN, it is necessary that it cannot be read by unauthorized persons. This means that when the key is activated, its code must not be readable.

Under this premise, in the application of access and/or information media as a key with the communication of an electronic lock, use was made of the fact that both the key and the lock execute an algorithm that is appropriately coordinated with each other.

In a preferred embodiment, this invention presents a method and a kit that makes it possible to make the key code unreadable, so that, for example, in security areas, the key user does not even have to know his own authentication code.

In the procedure, the key with its microprocessor chip is programmed with a lock code, which is preferably stored in a reprogrammable read-only memory, e.g. via EEPROMs. The microprocessor of the key preferably has an integrated arithmetic unit, which is sufficient in its function to carry out basic arithmetic.

It is intended that the lock microprocessor is first switched to readiness for action by a "wake-up pulse" from the key and then, for example, a random number is sent to the key via an LED, which receives it via a photodiode and forwards it to its microprocessor. A simple calculation is then carried out via the key's arithmetic unit, which can, for example, consist of a simple multiplication and from which the lock "knows" which calculation is carried out in the key so that it can be calculated back during the legitimacy check by the lock.

In the example, the determined number of the key is in turn fed through a key LED to the photodiode of the lock and thus to its microprocessor, which contains the aforementioned random number stored in a read-write memory. The transmitted number is processed using this random number and the known back calculation operation, ie here division instead of multiplication, which allows the lock to recognize the legitimation code of the key, which is then checked for legitimacy using a read-only memory code list.

If this legitimacy check is positive, the necessary mechanism is activated on the lock side to open the lock or to keep it open or to make it lockable.

The invention will now be explained in more detail with reference to the kit claims 1-10 and Figure 1, which is shown as a pure block diagram.

On the left side we can see the key (1) with its logic memory chip (2) and its arithmetic unit (3). The application area as a lock is symbolized on the right with (6), whereby its logic memory chip (8) first sends a random number (e.g. LED not shown here) to the arithmetic unit (3) via the chip (2) via the random generator (9).

The arithmetic unit (3) then carries out the arithmetic operation described above, which is transmitted to the logic memory chip (8) of the lock symbolized here (12), with a photodiode (not shown) taking over the recording.

Chip (8) transmits the number transferred from chip (2) to the arithmetic unit (10), which carries out the counter arithmetic operation with the random number stored in the read-write memory of chip (8) and calculates the key code. This is searched for in the code list (11) by key (6), and if the search is positive, key (6) confirms the legitimacy for operation.

Claims (10)

I · * i • · CLAIMS 1. Kit for verifying the legitimacy of electronic access and/or information media, characterized in that that it consists of an access and/or information medium (1) with at least one microprocessor chip (2) with integrated arithmetic unit (3) and the possibility of receiving (5) preferably digital information from an application area (6) and outputting it in a modified form via a computing process (4), its specific code being stored and the application area (6) for the algorithm of the access and/or information medium being able to output a random number (9) digitally (7) by means of at least one microprocessor chip (8) with arithmetic unit (10) and to convert the received signal of the access and/or information medium in order to calculate its code which , when authenticated, is suitable for carrying out a specific process in the application unit (6), the user code stored in at least one memory unit (11) of at least one application microprocessor chip (8) being erasable and/or readable by the chip (8). 2. Kit according to claim 1,
characterized, that the microprocessors (2,8) are suitable for communicating with each other. 3. Kit according to claim 1,2,
characterized, that the microprocessors (2,8) have a common interface. 4. Kit according to at least one of claims 1-3, characterized in that the microprocessors (2,8) preferably represent logic memory chips. 5. Kit according to at least one of claims 1-4, characterized in that in particular the application microprocessor (8) is combined as a hybrid with memory units. 6. Kit according to at least one of claims 1-5, characterized in that the read-only memory parts of the chips (2,8) preferably work with EEPROMs. 7. Kit according to at least one of claims 1-6, characterized in that the microprocessor chip (2) is able to emit a "wake-up pulse" for the microprocessor chip (8). 8. Kit according to at least one of claims 1-7, characterized in that the microprocessor chip (8) can be controlled and supplied with power in a frequency-modulated manner, preferably via a generator. 9. Kit according to at least one of claims 1-8, characterized in that the communication between the chips (2,8) takes place via light or infrared and that both (2,8) are supplied with separate power sources. 10. Kit according to at least one of claims 1-9, characterized in that access codes definable in the application unit (6) and in its microprocessor chip/s (8) can be deleted and thus lose their access authorization and/or that new codes can be recorded (11).