DE675889C - Signal box control - Google Patents

Description

In the case of newer interlockings' takes place at the driveway a route signal lever does not always block the same against repositioning before the journey is completed, but only when a train is moving has already approached the signal a certain distance. The Faihrstrasse signal lever can be used beforehand completely put back in its basis and the driveway thus dissolved. This is called this dependency the driveway closure as a rudder lock.

The Anrückverschluß is then allowed to reset the route signal lever do not prevent this if the lever is still different from the previous one when the approach path is occupied Drive should be in the drive position so that a different route can be set for the train now can. The prerequisite for this, however, is that the signal has not yet returned to the driving position had taken, which is why the facility was hit, through a repeat lock to prevent the signal from automatically opening again after the route has become clear. The repeat lock causes the driving road signal lever only to be returned to the stop position must be before the signal can assume the driving position again.

The Anrüdksperre depends on the position of the Repeat lock relay dependent, e.g. B. according to the previously known circuit in such a way, that when the repetition blocking relay is picked up, the approach path must be free, if it should be possible to reset the route signal lever; if the blocking relay has dropped out on the other hand, the approach section can be occupied. Accordingly, in this circuit the repetition inhibitor relay, must be picked up when the signal is to assume the driving position can.

In particular, the installation of the entry signals on the length of the protective route in front of the monitored ones Track sections, with the track section between the signal and the start of the covered route to the approach section heard, allows when various errors or actions listed below coincide in the previous usual circuit a withdrawal of the route signal lever and thus a dissolution the route if the train has already passed the signal and is no longer through

(575889

a travel lock connected to the signal at the entrance to the broken route can be prevented. For this the following example;

By a contact error or by eiftsf When the train is in motion, there is a brief power interruption at the time the train is ready with the tip past the signal. The control attendant can on his display board recognize that a train is in the approach section, but not whether the train is within the approach section is in front of or behind the signal. To get the signal back into the driving position the guard is forced by the repeat lock to return the signal lever to the stop position beforehand. This is still possible for him even when the approach route is occupied, because through the brief power interruption also the repeat lock relay has dropped out and remains. The train, which, contrary to the guards' assumption, had already passed the signal, can then drive into an unlocked driveway. Did the keeper drop the If the signal is observed as a disturbance, there is no reason for it, now for the same. Train to set another route, so that in cases where not a second guard at the same time contributes to the signal box, incorrect operation will not occur; could the keeper, however, through other use, such as a long-distance call., not observe that the signal has moved to the stop position, ", and due to interference he assumes that the schedule for which he had set the signal is already taking place is, which is quite possible with a close train sequence, he takes the route signal lever back to change the route for the next train. - This is due to the coincidence of an error and a mistake created a danger. In the same way, there can be short power interruptions affect the supply networks. The interruption can also be brought about intentionally, even if without permission to change an incorrectly set route.

Another error dealt with below can result in the previous, Circuit also a 'hazard. .

If the route consists only of a switch track section and the detachment line and When driving on the switch section, the block relay does not fall due to faults from, then · the switchover · of the repetition blocking relay takes place by driving on the following retreat route nevertheless in the same way as by the falling off of the Block relay from the turnout section would have happened.

The withdrawal of the route signal, fi.he.bel s and thus the resolution of the

It can be done thinly in the same way, as "whether the relay of the turnout section!" has properly dropped when driving on the section and has picked up after it has become free. Since in the assumed case of the switch section ^also: appears on the driving signal panel as free, the guard, if he has not kept the non nightfall on the traveling display board, the vehicle 'road signal lever in good faith back' / place fifth The turnout lever locks provided for securing the turnouts, which are intended to prevent the turnout lever from turning over when driving on the section, regardless of the position of the route signal lever, can also not work in this case because the same block switch releases the locks in the wrong release.

The monitoring circuit that has already been used everywhere to prevent BlO'cfc switches, in which a block relay can only pick up again when the next one has dropped out is, nothing helps in this case. ES: the repetition blocking relay should drop out be prevented. On the other hand, that the switchover is not necessarily through the driving on the retreat occurs, you could make the contact behind the locking relay switch, as was done earlier with the switch contacts. It But then there is still the possibility that the repetition inhibitor relay by others short power interruptions drops. . Another shortcoming of the previous interlocking circuits consists in the fact that with malfunctioning. The block relay does not drop out the approaching distance does not occur, which also occurs after driving past of the train at the signal that is in motion, a resolution of the route before the one entering Train is possible. To eliminate this possibility, a circuit is known, the entry signal from the dropping of the tramway lever lock magnet which in turn only makes it dependent on opening a contact of the contact block relay should be made to fall off. But this circuit is obvious Imperfect because every 115th interruption of the circuit, contact error or other coincidences that would have the same effect.

The circuit shown below prevents the occurrence of hazardous conditions, raodie through short interruptions or by not dropping out the block relays of the

The approach path and the first switch line result in the previously known circuits.

Fig. Ι shows the part of a stretch in which there is a junction. The signal ι is set up in front of the switch 2 at a protective distance. The route is monitored by track currents and is divided into the track sections An, W and Ab . The track sections are separated from one another by insulating joints i ¹ and i ″ . The arrow to the right of signal 1 shows the direction of travel.

The new circuit is shown in Fig. 2. In this circuit, the closing contact S / .7 ^{1 of} the relay Sp , which closes in the released position, means that the current ^{can only reach the signal setting relay S 1} when the relay S / 9 has released. The relay Sp is only activated when the route signal lever contact H ^{1 is closed} by moving the lever into the driving position and the contact VV ¹ closes when the block switch of section W drops. The relay Sp is then self-closing

»5 through its contact Sp ^{2, which} closes in the attracted position. It only drops out again when contact H ^{1 is} opened. The contacts S / 9 ³ and Sp ^{i of} the relay S ^ are connected in such a way that the relay S /? Closing contact Sp ³ supplies the current for the route signal lever locking magnet F, which prevents the lever from being completely reset and thus the disconnection of the route when it has dropped out, ^{via contacts 1 of} the block relay of the approach path, which closes when the block relay is on. The contact Sp ^ , which closes when the relay Sp is energized, bypasses the contact / z ¹ . The circuit to the signal ^{setting relay S x} is routed in the usual way via the contacts W ″ of the switch section W and Abi of the switch section Ab , which close when the block switch is in the attracted position, as well as via the switch control contact Wk, the monitoring contact F ^{1 of} the blocking magnet F and the lever contact Ii ^s . a new feature is, however, that must be the contact at ^two closed, but only closes when the Bloekrelais has fallen on the Anrückstrecke. SA is a locking magnet in a known manner in the fallen state, the ramp points of the Eahrstraßensignalhebels after ¹ Z ₃ or ² ₃ prevents / his way. U ¹ and CI ² contacts of a switching lever which, after conversion cancels the operation force for the driveway signal lever and locks it in the running position. the contact U ¹ then interrupts the circuit to the relay Sp, so that this fallen continuously and the contact S /? ¹ remains permanently closed. U ² interrupts the circuit to the blocking device agneten SÄ, so that the same does not work, since the lever is always in the driving position. H ³ is a contact of the route signal lever, which is interrupted in the stop position and in the drive position of the lever and only closes in the middle third of the lever travel.

How the circuit shown in the figure fulfills its purpose is shown in the following explained:

If the switch section W and the disengaging section Ab are free, if the switch 2 is in the correct end position and the relay Sp has dropped out, the blocking magnet S / i also receives current and the route signal lever can be fully moved to the driving position. Contact // ² is then closed, contact FP is open. However, the signal ^{control relay S 1} cannot pick up before the block relay An has dropped out and contact An ² closes.

If the Bloefcrelais On does not drop due to a malfunction, although a train is on the track section, the signal does not start moving and the train cannot enter the route, i.e. the switch section W , in response to a travel signal, because the locking mechanism has not entered. If, however, the block relay An has dropped out properly and the contact closure is activated by opening contact An ¹ , contact An ² also closes the circuit to relay S ¹ , the relay picks up and sets signal 1 and the travel lock to travel.

Is. the Zugspitze now passed the signal showing the journey, but has not yet reached the switch section W, and there is a power interruption for the signal ^{setting relay S 1} , the signal changes to the stop position, but the relay Sp does not change its position, since it has also previously had already fallen off _; and the rear closure stays over the contact .Are ¹ and S /.? ³ effective.

If the train has entered the turnout section, W , but the block relay has not dropped out due to a fault, the contact W ¹ remains open and the relay Sp cannot pick up. The contacts Sp ³ and Sp ⁱ remain in the previous position, and the current for canceling the lock / ⁷ must still be via the contact Aß ¹ . Now the approach section An is released when the train continues to travel, but the block relay cannot pick up, since it is made dependent in the usual way on the dropping of the block relay of section W. If the block relay of the block section W does not drop out, the block relay Aß does not pick up again. However, if the block relay of the output

Claims (5)

If the cut W fell off properly, the contact W ^{1 was} closed and the relaySp was closed. At the same time, however, the contact W ^{2 was also} interrupted and thus the current to the signal setting relay S ¹ and also to the route magnet / ^{7 was} interrupted. The signal goes to the stop position and the lock / ⁷ prevents the lever from being moved back and thus the route being closed. The relay Sp has obtained self-closing through the contact Sp ^ and remains attracted, even when the train has left the section again, the block relay has attracted and thus the contact W ¹ is opened again. The now open contact Sp ^{1 also} keeps the circuit to the signal relay S ¹ interrupted, so that it cannot pick up again and the signal can start moving if the ϊο lever remains in the drive position, the disengagement distance is free again and the approach distance is occupied again has been. The prerequisite for the renewed setting of the travel signal is that the contact Sp ¹ closes again, i.e. the relay Sp has dropped out. The relay must then be made to drop out by opening the lever contact H ¹ , which opens shortly before the lever is in the stop position. If the relay Sp drops prematurely as a result of a contact error or for other reasons, this has the effect on the safety side in such a way that the lever is closed again by the push-on lock if the push-on connector Ali has been reoccupied in the meantime, but this is even in the assumed malfunction if the signal had not yet started moving again due to the fact that the disengagement section Ab was occupied. no Likewise, it has an effect on the safety side if the relay Sp does not pick up at all during a trip. If the relay Sp does not drop out, despite the interruption of the circuit at contact // ¹ , the signal cannot move when the lever is pulled again because contact Sp ¹ remains interrupted. In the case of automatic operation, the relay Sp is constantly held in the dropped position by the contact U ^{1 of} the switching lever, and the contact Sp ¹ remains permanently closed. Since the route signal lever is locked in the driving position, contacts H ¹ and H ^{2 are also} permanently closed and contact // ^{3 is} interrupted. The * signal relay S ¹ will therefore immediately pick up again every time the track sections W and Ab have become free and the contacts W ² and Ab ¹ as well as the switch contact Wk are closed and a train approaches the signal and the contact An ^% due to the drop of the relay of the approach section is closed. If the compulsory operation for the route signal lever is brought about again by moving the 6g switch lever, the contacts U ¹ and U ^{2 are} closed again and the relay Sp picks up again the next time the section W is driven and the contact VV ¹ closes. Since the contact Sp ^{1 is} now interrupted, the signal cannot start moving. The relay Sp must first be made to drop by opening the contact H ¹ , that is, by moving the route signal lift. Patent α NSi'Rü CHE: i. Interlocking switch, semi-automatic and automatic, with reset lock of the route signal lever when the route is occupied before the journey and the possibility of resetting when the route is occupied after the journey, characterized in that the relay (Sp), which switches the reset lock, has dropped out when the signal is in the driving position . 2. interlocking circuit according to claim 1, characterized in that the tightening of the relay (Sp) for switching the reset lock can only be brought about by closing a contact in the released position of the block relay from the first or further switch sections. 3. interlocking circuit according to claim 1 and 2, characterized in that the changeover relay (Sp) for the reset lock by a self-closing contact (Sp ² ) remains attracted until the route signal lever (H ¹ ) ■ when the interlocking is set to forced operation again the stop position is returned. 4. interlocking circuit according to claim ι to 3, characterized in that the reset lock is effective by the Anrückstrecfce when the switching relay (Sp) has dropped out. 5. interlocking circuit according to claim 1 to 4, characterized in that the 11 ο Entry of the reset lock is monitored by the signal setting relay traveling on the approach path by this can only attract when the block relay of the approach path has dropped out Position closes a contact. 1 sheet of drawings