DE10259269B4 - Device and method for individualized encryption and decryption as well as signature and signature verification via central components - Google Patents
Device and method for individualized encryption and decryption as well as signature and signature verification via central components Download PDFInfo
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- DE10259269B4 DE10259269B4 DE10259269A DE10259269A DE10259269B4 DE 10259269 B4 DE10259269 B4 DE 10259269B4 DE 10259269 A DE10259269 A DE 10259269A DE 10259269 A DE10259269 A DE 10259269A DE 10259269 B4 DE10259269 B4 DE 10259269B4
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/76—Proxy, i.e. using intermediary entity to perform cryptographic operations
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
- Computer And Data Communications (AREA)
Abstract
Verfahren zur individuellen und transparenten Schlüsselgenerierung in einem Datennetzwerk mit einem Absender und Empfänger, mit folgenden Schritten: – Analyse des E-Mail-Verkehrs auf Gültigkeit der Absenderadressen oder Empfängeradresse anhand eines Adressverzeichnis, – Überprüfung in einem Schlüsselspeicher, ob ein Schlüsselpaar für die Empfängeradresse existiert und, falls dies nicht der Fall ist, Erzeugung eines individuellen Schlüsselpaares für die Empfängeradresse, – Bereitstellen einer Schnittstelle zum Auslesen des Schlüsselspeichers.Method for the individual and transparent generation of keys in a data network with a sender and recipient, comprising the following steps: analysis of the e-mail traffic for validity of the sender address or recipient address based on an address directory, check in a key memory whether a key pair exists for the recipient address and, if not, generating an individual key pair for the recipient address, providing an interface for reading out the key memory.
Description
Alle bisherigen Vorrichtungen und Verfahren für die Verschlüsselung und Signatur von Nachrichten in Computernetzwerken basieren auf der Verteilung von personalisierten kryptografischen Schlüsseln und deren Verwendung durch die jeweiligen Personen und Dienste oder durch allgemeine, nicht-personalisierte Unternehmens- oder Gruppenschlüssel zur Verwendung an zentraler Stelle. Im weiteren werden die beiden unterschiedlichen Ansätze daher Ende-Zu-Ende-Sicherheit und Gateway-Sicherheit bezeichnet. Beide Verfahren arbeiten mit bekannten Methoden der Nachrichten- oder Verbindungssicherheit, die mit symmetrischer und asymmetrischer Kryptographie unter Verwendung verschiedener Protokolle die Nachrichten oder die Verbindung sichern. Der Stand der Technik ist u. a. in [S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification, RFC 2633, Juni 1999], [S/MIME Version 3 Certificate Handling, RFC 2632, Juni 1999], [OpenPGP Message Format, RFC 2440, November 1998], [Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol, RFC 2401, November 1998] und [The TLS Protocol Verion 1.0, RFC 2446, Januar 1999] beschrieben.All previous apparatus and methods for encryption and signature of messages in computer networks are based on the distribution of personalized cryptographic keys and their use by the respective persons and services or by general, non-personalized corporate or group keys for use in a central location. In the following, the two different approaches are called end-to-end security and gateway security. Both methods use known methods of message or connection security that secure the messages or the connection using symmetric and asymmetric cryptography using various protocols. The state of the art is u. a. in [S /
Wesentlicher Nachteil der Ende-Zu-Ende-Sicherheit ist der hohe organisatorische Aufwand, der notwendig ist, um jeden Teilnehmer mit den benötigten kryptografischen Schlüsseln und ggf. auch Werkzeugen (z. B. entsprechende Clientsoftware) auszustatten und dauerhaft zu betreuen (Schlüssel müssen nach Ablauf erneuert werden, verlorene Schlüssel müssen zurückgezogen werden, etc. – in der Regel gewährleistet durch eine aufwendige ”Public Key Infrastructure”, kurz PKI).A major disadvantage of end-to-end security is the high level of organizational effort that is necessary to provide each participant with the required cryptographic keys and, if necessary, tools (eg appropriate client software) and to provide them with permanent support (keys have to be added) Processes to be renewed, lost keys must be withdrawn, etc. - usually ensured by a complex "Public Key Infrastructure", PKI short).
Wesentlicher Nachteil der Gateway-Sicherheit ist die geringe Flexibilität, da eine statische Beziehung zwischen den Nachrichtenübergängen (z. B. Mail-Server) hergestellt werden muss, um eine transparente Verschlüsselung und Datenintegrität zu ermöglichen. Ausserdem kann mit konventioneller Gateway-Sicherheit keine transparente, aber sichere Kommunikation mit Teilnehmern der Ende-Zu-Ende-Sicherheit aufgenommen werden.A major disadvantage of gateway security is its low flexibility, since a static relationship between message transitions (eg, mail server) must be established to enable transparent encryption and data integrity. In addition, conventional gateway security does not allow transparent but secure communication with end-to-end security participants.
Ein Fortschritt in der Gateway-Sicherheit ist in
Aus der
Aus der
Aus der
Durch die Erfindung wird dieses Problem gelöst. Aufgabe der Erfindung ist die Möglichkeit, eine am Nachrichtenaustausch teilnehmende Entität als vollwertigen Teilnehmer einer Ende-Zu-Ende-Sicherheitsarchitektur erscheinen zu lassen, ohne den organisatorischen und administrativen Aufwand einer solchen zu etablieren. Dabei werden die Vorteile der Gateway-Sicherheit mit den Vorteilen der Ende-Zu-Ende-Sicherheit verbunden. Eine zentrale Vorrichtung arbeitet dabei als Gateway zwischen der Entität und dem Kommunikationsnetz (Internet) und sendet und empfängt sichere Nachrichten mit gängigen Verfahren (z. B. [S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification, RFC 2633, Juni 1999] oder [OpenPGP Message Format, RFC 2440, November 1998]), wobei die verwendeten Schlüssel vollwertige personalisierte PKI-konforme Schlüssel sind. Die entitätseigenen Schlüssel werden dabei auf den Erfindungen nach den Patentansprüchen 1 bis 8 generiert und die entitätsfremden Schlüssel werden durch gängige Suchverfahren festgestellt.The invention solves this problem. The object of the invention is the possibility of having an entity participating in the message exchange appear as a full participant of an end-to-end security architecture, without establishing the organizational and administrative outlay of such an entity. It combines the benefits of gateway security with the benefits of end-to-end security. A central device acts as a gateway between the entity and the communication network (Internet) and sends and receives secure messages using standard methods (eg [S /
Erfindungsgemäss wird die Vorrichtung beim Verbindungsaufbau eines Kommunikationspartners, der Ende-Zu-Ende-Sicherheit nutzen möchte, für den Empfänger der Nachricht in der eigenen Entität einen öffentlichen Schlüssel bereitstellen, den der Absender transparent und ohne manuellen Eingriff dem Empfänger zuordnen kann und damit eine verschlüsselte Kommunikation aufbauen kann. Dabei wird, wenn es noch keinen Schlüssel für den Empfänger in der eigenen Entität gibt oder wenn dieser unbrauchbar (abgelaufen, zurückgezogen) ist, nach einer optionalen Validierung durch eine Validierungskomponente ein personalisiertes, PKI-konformes Schlüsselpaar auf der Vorrichtung generiert bzw. die Generierung von der Vorrichtung angestossen und der öffentliche Schlüssel ggf. durch eine optionale Zertifizierungskomponente PKI-konform zertifiziert. Dieser Schlüssel wird dann zum Abruf durch gängige Methoden den Kommunikationspartnern zur Verfügung gestellt.According to the invention, when establishing a communication partner who wishes to use end-to-end security, the device will provide the receiver of the message in his own entity with a public key which the sender can assign to the recipient transparently and without manual intervention and thus an encrypted one Can build communication. In this case, if there is still no key for the recipient in the own entity or if it is unusable (expired, withdrawn), after an optional validation by a validation component, a personalized, PKI-compliant key pair is generated on the device or the generation of triggered the device and the public key possibly certified by an optional certification component PKI compliant. This key is then made available to the communication partners for retrieval by common methods.
Eine ausgehende Nachricht kann durch den Absender aus der eigenen Entität durch die Vorrichtung integritätssichernd signiert werden, in dem beim Weiterleiten bzw. Versenden der Nachricht durch die Vorrichtung gleichermassen der Beschreibung oben ein Schlüssel generiert oder genutzt wird, der auf der Vorrichtung verfügbar ist und die Identität des Absenders trägt.An outgoing message may be integrity-integrity-signed by the sender of its own entity by the device in which, as the message is forwarded or sent by the device, the same key as described above is used to generate or utilize a key available on the device and the identity of the sender.
Die Erfindung wird nachfolgend mittels eines Ausführungsbeispiels anhand beigefügter Zeichnung 1 näher erläutert.The invention will be explained in more detail by means of an embodiment with reference to accompanying drawings.
Nachricht von Innen nach Aussen: Bei einer Nachricht, die von Innen (eigene Entität, z. B. Unternehmen) nach Aussen gesendet werden soll, kann die zentrale Komponente (
Nachricht von Aussen nach Innen: Wenn eine gesicherte Nachricht von Aussen an die Entität gesendet und nach Innen übertragen werden soll, dann kann der Absender (Kommunikationspartner,
Claims (8)
Priority Applications (1)
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DE10259269A DE10259269B4 (en) | 2002-12-17 | 2002-12-17 | Device and method for individualized encryption and decryption as well as signature and signature verification via central components |
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DE10259269A DE10259269B4 (en) | 2002-12-17 | 2002-12-17 | Device and method for individualized encryption and decryption as well as signature and signature verification via central components |
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DE10259269A1 DE10259269A1 (en) | 2004-07-15 |
DE10259269B4 true DE10259269B4 (en) | 2013-10-31 |
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DE10259269A Expired - Fee Related DE10259269B4 (en) | 2002-12-17 | 2002-12-17 | Device and method for individualized encryption and decryption as well as signature and signature verification via central components |
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CN109521240A (en) * | 2018-11-12 | 2019-03-26 | 中电科仪器仪表有限公司 | A kind of usb bus hardware trigger and coding/decoding method based on oscillograph |
Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO1999035783A1 (en) * | 1998-01-09 | 1999-07-15 | Cybersafe Corporation | Client side public key authentication method and apparatus with short-lived certificates |
US5956406A (en) * | 1996-03-21 | 1999-09-21 | Alcatel Alstrom Compagnie Generale D'electricite | Method of setting up secure communications and associated encryption/decryption system |
US20020181701A1 (en) * | 2001-05-30 | 2002-12-05 | Dong-Hyang Lee | Method for cryptographing information |
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- 2002-12-17 DE DE10259269A patent/DE10259269B4/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
Patent Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US5956406A (en) * | 1996-03-21 | 1999-09-21 | Alcatel Alstrom Compagnie Generale D'electricite | Method of setting up secure communications and associated encryption/decryption system |
WO1999035783A1 (en) * | 1998-01-09 | 1999-07-15 | Cybersafe Corporation | Client side public key authentication method and apparatus with short-lived certificates |
US20020181701A1 (en) * | 2001-05-30 | 2002-12-05 | Dong-Hyang Lee | Method for cryptographing information |
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Owner name: SYMANTEC CORPORATION (N.D.GES.D. STAATES DELAW, US Free format text: FORMER OWNER: GLUECK & KANJA TECHNOLOGY AG, 63069 OFFENBACH, DE Effective date: 20111227 |
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