DE10240845A1 - Proxy server for computer based, decentralized personalization of qualified cryptographically signed chip cards, has chip card control and secure communication software layers - Google Patents

Abstract

The proxy server for a computer based, decentralized personalization of qualified cryptographically signed chip cards within a public key infrastructure, makes use of a secure Internet data connection between an authorized, remote computer in an authorization authority and a computer in a certification authority. The proxy is configured with a software layer for controlling the chip cards, as well as a software layer for communication over a secure protocol with the web server of the certificating authority and the client application. The invention also relates to a corresponding method.

Description

State of technology

The development of information and communication technology opened New opportunities the exchange of information and economic activity. Orders for goods, money orders to banks, applications or appeals with authorities, the transmission sensitive data in the medical field and a variety of other Communication relationships in the past on paper have been processed electronically. The legal obligation can in almost all cases not always guaranteed become. The electronic signature realizes the digital one solution the legally binding signature based on the Signature Act Signatures.

To use an electronic Signature becomes a private and a public cryptographic key generated. These unique key pairs are made by the state recognized certification bodies permanently assigned to natural persons (qualified signature). The assignment is made by a qualified Signature key certificate of issuing certification bodies. The purpose of certification bodies the setup is more trustworthy Instances that are bound by their digital signatures Insure public keys to a user identity. The digital one This is the signature of a certification body Public key to a high degree trustworthiness than can be reached through the signatures of any user can. The certificates used by a certification authority usually correspond to the format defined in X.509. It deals is a signed digital document that the respective public key as well as the name of the person to whom it is assigned or a pseudonym contains.

Such an infrastructure is a prerequisite for the trustworthy, legally binding one Use of e-government services and communication in the network of public Administrations, supported through security services such as integrity, authenticity and confidentiality.

According to the SigG signature law, storage is permitted of a private cryptographic key of a certificate the risk of corruption or the possibility of making copies be given. In this respect, chip cards are according to the state of the art used to record and protect the private key. Smart cards, or smart cards, are IT components the size of a check card. Initially, they were only available as memory chip cards and were used to store data. Later processor chip cards were added, into the microprocessors and storing components are integrated. Currently smart cards increasingly used for handling cryptographic applications, also the digital signature. Chip cards can be designed that the key stored on them cannot be read. The The chip card is activated by its own PIN.

For the issue of a chip card with a qualified certificate is Establishment of identity of the users to be certified in a registration instance indispensable requirement. With a registration authority it is an authorized one Employees of the certification body act on behalf of this Certification body reviewing the Applicant takes over. Applicants will receive an ID and a copy of their ID card and subsequent processing in the certification body the chip card delivered by post.

With a widespread distribution of digital Signatures, however, it is inevitable that the responsible certification body localized far from the users to be certified is. In this case trustworthy Registration instances for the local review of identity and authenticity of individual users. By using such Registration instances generate customer or citizen proximity, however, the cost and time required to process an application increases in the same way digital signature. Prevent the high cost of a digital signature their significant numerical penetration and thus the offer of legally compliant e-business or e-government Products that are future regular signature authentication would require.

problem

The invention specified in claims 1-4 the problem underlying that usual Process the personalization of smart cards for digital signatures directly can not make in the registry. This leads to the certification body and subsequently for the customer to a significantly higher Expense for the issue of a qualified digital signature certificate. Likewise can not easily produce chip cards in small quantities promptly, or each request must be made individually with a higher security effort to be edited. In addition, the certification body centrally issued chip card subsequently cost-intensive for the applicant be delivered.

achievable benefits

With the invention, the public administrations in particular are given the opportunity, for example, to hand over a digital signature to their citizens directly in the residents' registration offices. This allows the chip card to be issued at the point where the identity of the citizen is open wall can be ensured. Additional administration and thus costs are avoided.

The production and initialization the chip cards can be made in larger batch sizes, because individual personalization takes place later. This allows achieve a further cost reduction.

The public administrations are allowed to the numerical distribution the digital signature, the increased demand of their e-government solutions expect. this leads to in connection with process breakage that is free of media breaks and can be signed extensive administration products on the Internet in turn to reduce costs for the Administration.

In the same way, others can Companies such as Banks in collaboration with a certification body output digital signatures directly to their customers.

description of embodiments

The following are the exemplary embodiments based on the figure for the smart card production initialization and personalization in closer to the registrar to be discribed.

Show it

1 the diagram to illustrate the process for the smart card production initialization. Personalization technology is used for production 1 used, which either has its own computer hardware or by external hardware 5 is controlled. The private key of the certification body is stored in a backup hardware (HSM) 2 protected and can with a signature chip card 3 reload if necessary. The system must be aligned with the requirements of the respective national signature legislation. The chip cards 4 are delivered raw by the chip card manufacturer. After initialization with a private and a public cryptographic key from the representation in 2 are the chip cards 8th ready for delivery to the registries. The public key, the serial number of the chip card and the secret production PIN are stored on an encrypted data carrier 6 , such as Floppy, Zip, CD-ROM taken from the production system and into the database of the web server 7 the certification body.

2 the flowchart to illustrate the procedure for the smart card production initialization. For the start of production 25 enters the security staff 26 the security room. Security personnel go through an authentication process 27 on the product system. The user interface of the product system expects the production quantity to be allocated 28 (Number of chip cards) which is compared with the database of the maximum available valid chip card serial numbers 29 , If the number of the maximum available valid chip card serial numbers is smaller than the production quantity, the production quantity is set equal to the maximum available valid chip card serial numbers 33 , The raw chip cards are physically fed to the initialization system 30 initialization started 31 and set the loop value to the production quantity 32 , A chip card is fed to the read / write part, the serial number of the chip card is read and compared with the database entries 35 , Any invalid serial number is rejected and logged in a report 39 , A key pair and a PIN are generated for each valid serial number 36 , the chip card opened for writing and written with a key pair and PIN 37 , After a write process without errors, the loop value is checked. If the loop value is smaller than the production quantity 40 , production continues. Otherwise production is stopped 41 , At the end of the process, the encrypted file is written with the public keys, the serial numbers and the PINs 42 and saves on data media for export 44 , At the same time, the production report 45 printed and signed by security personnel 43 , The security personnel then leaves the security room with the data carrier 46 for downloading to the certification authority's web server 47 , The chip cards can be prepared for dispatch to the registration offices 48 ,

3 the scheme for representing the procedure for chip card personalization in the registration office. The pre-initialized chip cards delivered by the certification body 8th are available at the registration office for issuing to applicants. Personalization is carried out by an authorized employee of the registration office on an approved computer 9 , The specialist application calls with an authentication string and the chip card data 10 the web server 7 the certification body via secure access. The private key of the certification body is stored in a security hardware (HSM) 14 protected. With a read / write device 11 A chip card taken from the warehouse will meet the required security class 12 with a character string correspond to the procedure from the illustration 4 personalized. The applicant receives the option of his chip card 13 immediately or later (see 5 and 6 ) with a freely assignable PIN.

4 the flowchart to illustrate the procedure for chip card personalization in the registration office. An applicant's request to issue a digital signature 50 leads in the registry CA 51 (e.g. residents' registration office) to check his identity 52 according to the requirements of the respective national signature law SigG. The personal data 54 are ent neither from a specialist application when starting the proxy 55 passed or requested by the proxy. When connected to the advertising server 55 The card terminal used is first checked via a secure line (SSL) by the registration authority 56 and the matching proxy is loaded from the advertising server 57 as well as an authentication string 57 , The CA web server uses this character string to check the authorization. transfers the further process control to the proxy if the authorization is confirmed. The proxy then establishes the connection to the chip card via the card terminal 58 , checks the status of the chip card 59 , reads the serial number of the chip card and the public key 60 , If the reading process is valid, the proxy sends the serial number of the chip card and the public key to the web server; whereupon the server process uses the serial number and the public key to check the validity of the process 61 and returns the secret PIN to the proxy if it is valid 62 , If the returned PIN is not equal to 0 63 , the applicant's private entries are sent to the web server 64 , The proxy then opens the chip card with the PIN 65 for writing private data 66 that were previously uploaded to the web server 64 , The applicant now has the option to activate his chip card either immediately with a PIN 67 or to do so later on another computer 70 , If the chip card is to be activated immediately, the proxy writes the chip card with the new PIN directly from the card terminal. The web server is informed of the successful activation so that the public key is published in the LDAP 71 , The serial number of this process is marked as active in the database at the same time. The connection between proxy and web server is now cleared. The chip card can now be removed 71 ,

5 the diagram to illustrate the procedure for the optional chip card activation. The cardholder had the option of his chip card in the registration office 021 Activate immediately with a PIN or catch up later. In this case, the cardholder is personalized on an unsecured computer 15 or with a low-security card terminal. For this reason, the cardholder is informed of the security risk on his home computer when entering his new PIN on the keyboard. The cardholder chooses the address of the web server 7 the certification body, which in turn establishes secure access (SSL) 16 , With a read / write device 17 becomes the smart card 18 of the cardholder with a PIN correspond to the procedure from the illustration 6 activated 19 ,

6 the flowchart to illustrate the procedure for the optional chip card activation. When connected to the advertising server 80 The cardholder first issues a security note via a secure line (SSL) 81 who informs the cardholder about the security risks when assigning a PIN using a computer keyboard. If the cardholder continues, the web server checks the card terminal used 82 and the matching proxy is loaded from the advertising server 83 , as well as an authentication string (signature) 83 , The CA web server uses this character string to check the authorization and, if the authorization is confirmed, transfers the further process control to the proxy. The proxy then establishes the connection to the chip card via the card terminal and checks the status of the chip card 84 , reads the serial number of the chip card and the public key 85 , If the reading process is valid, the proxy sends the serial number of the chip card and the public key to the web server; whereupon the server process uses the serial number and the public key to check the validity of the process 86 and returns the secret PIN to the proxy if it is valid 87 , If the returned PIN is not zero 88 , the proxy then opens the chip card with this PIN 89 to write the new PIN 90 , The proxy writes the chip card with the new PIN from the keyboard input. The web server is informed of the successful activation so that the public key is published in the LDAP 92 , The serial number of this process is marked as active in the database at the same time. The connection between the proxy and the web server is now terminated. The chip card can now be removed 92 ,

Claims (5)

Proxy for a computer-based, decentralized personalization of qualified cryptographic signature chip cards in public key infrastructures (PKI) using a secure data connection on the Internet between an authorized, decentralized computer in a registration authority and the computer of the certification authority, characterized in that the technical setup of the proxy is off a software layer for controlling the chip card, and a software layer for communication via secure protocols (eg SSL) with the web server of the certification body and the client application. Proxy according to claim 1, characterized in that the technical setup of the proxy, a connection to the Web server of the certification body manufactures, evaluates the chip card and transfers the personal data of the certificate to the web server. Proxy according to claims 1 and 2, characterized in that the technical device of the proxy, the production data of the certificate on the chip card around the personal data of the applicant supplemented securely using security components of the chip card, without causing the possibility of the private cryptographic key being compromised. Proxy according to claim 1, 2 and 3, characterized in that the technical setup of the proxy, an activation of the Allows smart card by assigning a PIN by entering a secret PIN from chip card production requested the web server from a database of the certification body is authorized with this the writing process of the chip card and the production PIN is replaced by a new PIN of the applicant becomes. Method according to claim 1, characterized in that the smart cards with a private and a public cryptographic key pre-initialized by the certification body to the registration authorities delivered and personalized according to claim 2 and 3 only there.