CN117097561B - Trusted equipment transfer identity authentication method for industrial Internet of things - Google Patents

Abstract

The invention belongs to the technical field of internet of things authentication, and relates to an industrial internet of things-oriented trusted equipment identity authentication method, which comprises four processes of registration of equipment and a gateway, direct authentication of the equipment and authentication of the equipment; according to the invention, each device can generate own device fingerprint, so that the device fingerprint can not be tampered, and the safety of the device fingerprint is ensured; the method comprises the steps of using a random character generation algorithm, a hash function, an exclusive OR operation, character strings and other lightweight operations to realize mutual authentication among equipment, a gateway and a server of the Internet of things; the new equipment which cannot be connected to the gateway is transmitted and authenticated through the trusted equipment authenticated by the server, so that the trusted equipment assists the new equipment to authenticate, single-point faults generated by authentication of a single equipment are avoided, and meanwhile, the application range of a protocol is greatly improved.

Description

Trusted device delivery identity authentication method for industrial Internet of things

Technical field

The invention belongs to the technical field of Internet of Things authentication, and relates to a trusted device transfer identity authentication method for the industrial Internet of Things.

Background technique

With the continuous development of communication technology and the Internet of Things, the application range of the Internet of Things ranges from smart homes that require only a few sensors to smart cities and smart factories that require a large number of IoT devices. The latter may use thousands of IoT devices, and integrating a large number of IoT devices into cyber-physical systems is a very challenging task. From the perspective of security and privacy, a large amount of communication data will be generated, and the information security of these devices requires reliable communication protocols to protect it. Therefore, designing a reliable secure communication protocol is the basis for ensuring the normal operation of large-scale Internet of Things systems.

In large-scale IoT applications, such as industrial IoT or smart cities containing thousands of devices, not all devices can be directly connected to the gateway in the IoT system, but can be connected to devices at a corresponding distance. Therefore, some IoT devices that cannot be directly connected to the gateway need to use a verified trusted device to support the device for authentication.

The invention patent application with patent application number CN202110386425.0 proposes a two-factor identity authentication method for smart home scenarios. However, this method has the following flaws: 1) It uses cryptographic encryption technology that consumes huge amounts of resources and is not suitable for resources. Restricted IoT devices; 2) This method can only be applied to specific scenarios and cannot be applied to more complex environments.

The invention patent application with patent application number CN202310607953.3 proposes a certificate-less identity authentication and key agreement method and system. However, this method has the following flaws: 1) The key generation center has the risk of a single point of failure. If the center If the transmission fails or is attacked, the entire security system may be paralyzed; 2) This solution has the risk of privacy leakage.

Existing device authentication methods have the following shortcomings: they cannot guarantee the anonymity of the device, they cannot resist node capture attacks, there may be a risk of shared keys being exposed during information transmission, they cannot guarantee forward security, and they do not have data integrity. Most solutions use expensive encryption calculations, are not suitable for resource-constrained IoT devices, and have a narrow scope of application.

Contents of the invention

In view of the shortcomings of the existing technology, the present invention proposes a trusted device transfer identity authentication method for the industrial Internet of Things.

The present invention is realized through the following technical solutions: a trusted device transfer identity authentication method for the industrial Internet of Things, including four processes of registration of the device and gateway, direct authentication of the gateway, direct authentication of the device, and transfer authentication of the device; The transfer authentication process of the device includes the following steps:

Step D1: The new device enters the new device identity and new device fingerprint, and uses the random character generation algorithm Gen(•) and the hash function to generate part of the new device authentication information. Then, the new device selects a random number and obtains the first current timestamp. and location information, generate new device authentication information through cascade, XOR and hash operations of calculated information and stored information, and send the new device authentication information to trusted devices through public channels;

Step D2: After receiving the new device authentication information, the trusted device obtains the second current timestamp and location information, and verifies the first current timestamp and location information of the new device; the trusted device uses the session key to authenticate the new device The authentication information is encrypted, and then the device authentication parameters are obtained using the gateway's session key combined with the timestamp, and the new device authentication message is sent to the gateway through the public channel;

Step D3: After receiving the new device authentication information, the gateway obtains the third current timestamp and compares it with the second current timestamp to verify whether the communication delay is within the maximum communication delay range. The gateway authenticates the device through the stored session key. The parameters are verified, and then the gateway sends the new device authentication information to the server through the public channel;

Step D4: After receiving the new device authentication information, the server obtains the fourth current timestamp and compares it with the third current timestamp, and verifies whether the communication delay is within the maximum communication delay range. The server searches the database based on the new device authentication information. The stored data verifies the device authentication information of the trusted device; then, the server verifies the new device authentication information based on the decrypted information; the server generates random numbers and performs cascade and hash operations with the decrypted new device authentication information to generate the new device's authentication information. Session keys and some server authentication information;

Step D5: The server uses its own private key to perform a hash operation and performs an XOR operation with the session key to obtain the secret information corresponding to the new device and stores it in the database. The server uses random numbers and its own private key to calculate the new device and the available secret information. The session key between the communication devices, and after encrypting the message into server authentication information, the server sends the server authentication information to the gateway through the public channel;

Step D6: After receiving the server authentication information, the gateway obtains the fifth current timestamp and compares it with the fourth current timestamp, and verifies whether the communication delay is within the maximum communication delay range. The gateway sends the server authentication information to the public through the public channel. letter equipment;

Step D7: After receiving the server authentication information, the trusted device obtains the sixth current timestamp and compares it with the fifth current timestamp to verify whether the communication delay is within the maximum communication delay range; the trusted device uses its own secret After the information decrypts part of the server authentication information, the decrypted information and the secret information are used for hashing to obtain the session key with the new device; the trusted device performs XOR based on the session key and private data to generate a secret corresponding to the new device. information and store it in the database; send the server authentication message to the new device through the public channel;

Step D8: After receiving the server authentication message, the new device obtains the seventh current timestamp and compares it with the sixth current timestamp to verify whether the communication delay is within the maximum communication delay range, and then verifies the server authentication message; the new device passes the server The authentication message and its own private data are concatenated and hashed to generate a session key with the server and trusted device; the new device performs XOR based on the session key and private data to generate secret information corresponding to the server and new device. Stored in database.

Further preferably, the registration process of the device is as follows:

The device selects the device identity and device fingerprint, and uses the random character generation algorithm Gen(•) and the hash function to generate the corresponding device registration information and sends it to the server through a secure channel;

After receiving the device registration information, the server generates a random number, uses the private key to concatenate and hash the received device registration information to generate server authentication information and stores it, and then sends the server authentication information to the device through a secure channel;

The device receives the authentication information and stores it.

Further preferably, the registration process of the gateway is as follows:

The gateway selects the gateway identity and gateway fingerprint, and uses the random character generation algorithm Gen(•) and the hash function to generate the corresponding gateway registration information and sends it to the server through a secure channel;

After receiving the gateway registration information, the server generates a random number, uses the private key to concatenate and hash the received gateway registration information to generate server authentication information and stores it, and then sends the server authentication information to the gateway through a secure channel;

The gateway receives the authentication information and stores it.

Further preferably, the direct authentication of the gateway includes the following steps:

Step B1: The gateway inputs the gateway identity and gateway fingerprint, and uses the random character generation algorithm Gen(•) and the hash function to generate part of the gateway authentication information; then, the gateway selects a random number and obtains the first current timestamp, and uses the calculated information Concatenate, XOR and hash operations with the stored information to generate gateway authentication information, and send the gateway authentication information to the server through the public channel;

Step B2: After receiving the gateway authentication information, the server obtains the second current timestamp and compares it with the first current timestamp to verify whether the communication delay is within the range. The server retrieves the data stored during registration in the database based on the gateway authentication information. , verify the gateway authentication information, and then, the server generates a random number and concatenates and hashes the received gateway authentication information to generate the gateway's session key and server authentication information;

Step B3: The server calculates the server authentication information and sends it to the gateway through the public channel;

Step B4: After receiving the server authentication information, the gateway obtains the third current timestamp and verifies whether the communication delay is within the range and the server authentication information. If the verification is successful, the gateway performs cascading and hashing through the server authentication information and its own private data. Hashes compute the session key with the server. The gateway performs XOR based on the session key and private data to generate encrypted information corresponding to the server and stores it in the database.

Further preferably, the direct authentication process of the device includes the following steps:

Step C1: The device inputs the device identity and device fingerprint, and uses the random character generation algorithm Gen(•) and the hash function to generate part of the device authentication information. Then, the device selects a random number and obtains the first current timestamp, through the calculated information Concatenate, XOR and hash operations with the stored information to generate device authentication information, and send the device authentication information to the gateway through the public channel;

Step C2: After receiving the message, the gateway obtains the second current timestamp and verifies whether the time difference with the first current timestamp is within the maximum communication delay range. The gateway uses the session key to encrypt part of the device's authentication information and then Messages are sent to the server over a public channel;

Step C3: After receiving the message, the server obtains the third current timestamp and verifies whether the time difference with the second current timestamp is within the maximum communication delay range. The server retrieves the stored data in the database based on the device authentication information and verifies the device. Authentication information, then, the server generates a random number and concatenates and hashes it with the received device authentication information to obtain the session key between the server and the device, the session key between the device and the gateway, and the server authentication information;

Step C4: The server uses its own private key to perform a hash operation and performs an XOR operation with the session key to obtain the secret information corresponding to the device and store it in the database. The server sends the server authentication information to the gateway through the public channel;

Step C5: After receiving the message, the gateway obtains the fourth current timestamp and verifies whether the time difference with the third current timestamp is within the maximum communication delay range. The gateway uses its own secret information to decrypt the server authentication information and decrypts it. The information is XORed with its own private information and then stored in the database; the gateway sends the server authentication information to the device through the public channel;

Step C6: After receiving the message, the device obtains the fifth current timestamp, verifies whether the time difference with the fourth current timestamp is within the maximum communication delay range, and verifies the server authentication message. The device passes the server authentication message and its own private data. Perform cascade and hash operations to calculate the session key with the server. The device obtains the session key with the gateway based on the session key with the server and private data, and then XORs the information to obtain the secret information corresponding to the server and gateway. and stored in database.

Advantages of the invention:

(1) Using device fingerprints can effectively improve accuracy, stability, generation rate, and security.

Some authentication factors are not very secure and can be easily impersonated or unstable. In the solution of the present invention, the device fingerprints generated by different devices are different, and the device fingerprint of each device is unique. The device features extracted by using the device fingerprint through the random character generation algorithm Gen(•) are also unique, ensuring that Device fingerprints will not be impersonated and the accuracy of device fingerprints is guaranteed to be repeated. Internet of Things system upgrades or changes in a small number of parameters will not affect the device fingerprint, ensuring the stability of the device fingerprint. Each device generates its own device fingerprint to ensure the device fingerprint generation rate. The device fingerprint will not be tampered with, ensuring the security of the device fingerprint.

(2) Use lightweight cryptography technology to ensure security.

In current IoT systems, most IoT devices are resource-constrained and cannot apply protocols with high computing overhead and high communication overhead. Therefore, lightweight protocols are very important for IoT devices and can greatly improve the overall efficiency. The invention uses lightweight operations such as random character generation algorithms, hash functions, XOR operations, and string concatenation to realize mutual authentication between devices, gateways and servers in the Internet of Things. Hash functions, XOR operations, and string concatenation require very low computational overhead, so they can reduce computational resource consumption while ensuring security.

(3) Using pass-through authentication improves the scope of application.

Traditional authentication solutions generally only have direct authentication, and most protocols do not consider how to authenticate new devices that are directly connected to the gateway, which greatly limits the scope of application of the protocol. Therefore, the present invention proposes to use pass-through authentication in the Internet of Things system, through a trusted device that has been authenticated by the server to perform pass-through authentication on a new device that cannot be connected to the gateway. The trusted device assists the new device in the authentication, avoiding the need for a single The single point of failure generated by the device for authentication also greatly enhances the scope of application of the protocol.

Description of the drawings

Figure 1 is a flow chart of the identity authentication method for trusted devices oriented to the industrial Internet of Things of the present invention.

Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of the network model of the method of the present invention.

Detailed ways

The present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the drawings and examples. It should be noted that the devices described in the present invention are all Internet of Things devices.

Referring to Figures 1 and 2, a trusted device transfer identity authentication method for the industrial Internet of Things includes four processes: registration of the device and gateway, direct authentication of the gateway, direct authentication of the device, and transfer authentication of the device.

The registration process for both devices and gateways is the same, including the following steps:

Step A1: The device or gateway selects the device or gateway identity and device or gateway fingerprint, and uses the random character generation algorithm Gen(•) and the hash function to generate the corresponding device or gateway registration information and sends it to the server through a secure channel;

Step A2: After receiving the device or gateway registration information, the server generates a random number, uses the private key to concatenate and hash the received device or gateway registration information to generate server authentication information and stores it, and then passes the server authentication information through Secure channel sent to device or gateway;

Step A3: The device or gateway receives the authentication information and stores it.

After registration is completed, proceed to the direct authentication process of the gateway. The direct authentication process of the gateway includes the following steps:

Step B1: The gateway inputs the gateway identity and gateway fingerprint, and uses the random character generation algorithm Gen(•) and the hash function to generate part of the gateway authentication information; then, the gateway selects a random number and obtains the first current timestamp, and uses the calculated information Concatenate, XOR and hash operations with the stored information to generate gateway authentication information, and send the gateway authentication information to the server through the public channel;

Step B2: After receiving the gateway authentication information, the server obtains the second current timestamp and compares it with the first current timestamp to verify whether the communication delay is within the range. The server retrieves the data stored during registration in the database based on the gateway authentication information. , verify the gateway authentication information, and then, the server generates a random number and concatenates and hashes the received gateway authentication information to generate the gateway's session key and server authentication information;

Step B3: The server calculates the server authentication information and sends it to the gateway through the public channel;

Step B4: After receiving the server authentication information, the gateway obtains the third current timestamp and verifies whether the communication delay is within the range and the server authentication information. If the verification is successful, the gateway performs cascading and hashing through the server authentication information and its own private data. Hashes compute the session key with the server. The gateway performs XOR based on the session key and private data to generate encrypted information corresponding to the server and stores it in the database.

The direct certification process for devices includes the following steps:

Step C1: The device inputs the device identity and device fingerprint, and uses the random character generation algorithm Gen(•) and the hash function to generate part of the device authentication information. Then, the device selects a random number and obtains the first current timestamp, through the calculated information Concatenate, XOR and hash operations with the stored information to generate device authentication information, and send the device authentication information to the gateway through the public channel;

Step C2: After receiving the message, the gateway obtains the second current timestamp and verifies whether the time difference with the first current timestamp is within the maximum communication delay range. The gateway uses the session key to encrypt part of the device's authentication information and then Messages are sent to the server over a public channel;

Step C3: After receiving the message, the server obtains the third current timestamp and verifies whether the time difference with the second current timestamp is within the maximum communication delay range. The server retrieves the stored data in the database based on the device authentication information and verifies the device. Authentication information, then, the server generates a random number and concatenates and hashes it with the received device authentication information to obtain the session key between the server and the device, the session key between the device and the gateway, and the server authentication information;

Step C4: The server uses its own private key to perform a hash operation and performs an XOR operation with the session key to obtain the secret information corresponding to the device and store it in the database. The server sends the server authentication information to the gateway through the public channel;

Step C5: After receiving the message, the gateway obtains the fourth current timestamp and verifies whether the time difference with the third current timestamp is within the maximum communication delay range. The gateway uses its own secret information to decrypt the server authentication information and decrypts it. The information is XORed with its own private information and then stored in the database; the gateway sends the server authentication information to the device through the public channel;

Step C6: After receiving the message, the device obtains the fifth current timestamp, verifies whether the time difference with the fourth current timestamp is within the maximum communication delay range, and verifies the server authentication message. The device passes the server authentication message and its own private data. Perform cascade and hash operations to calculate the session key with the server. The device obtains the session key with the gateway based on the session key with the server and private data, and then XORs the information to obtain the secret information corresponding to the server and gateway. and stored in database.

The device delivery certification process includes the following steps:

Step D1: The new device enters the new device identity and new device fingerprint, and uses the random character generation algorithm Gen(•) and the hash function to generate part of the new device authentication information. Then, the new device selects a random number and obtains the first current timestamp. and location information, generate new device authentication information through cascade, XOR and hash operations of calculated information and stored information, and send the new device authentication information to trusted devices through public channels;

Step D2: After receiving the new device authentication information, the trusted device obtains the second current timestamp and location information, and verifies the first current timestamp and location information of the new device; the trusted device uses the session key to authenticate the new device The authentication information is encrypted, and then the session key combined with the gateway's time stamp is used to obtain the device authentication parameters, and the new device authentication information is sent to the gateway through the public channel;

Step D3: After receiving the new device authentication information, the gateway obtains the third current timestamp and compares it with the second current timestamp to verify whether the communication delay is within the maximum communication delay range. The gateway authenticates the device through the stored session key. The parameters are verified, and then the gateway sends the new device authentication information to the server through the public channel;

Step D4: After receiving the new device authentication information, the server obtains the fourth current timestamp and compares it with the third current timestamp, and verifies whether the communication delay is within the maximum communication delay range. The server searches the database based on the new device authentication information. The stored data verifies the device authentication information of the trusted device; then, the server verifies the new device authentication information based on the decrypted information; the server generates random numbers and performs cascade and hash operations with the decrypted new device authentication information to generate the new device's authentication information. Session keys and some server authentication information;

Step D5: The server uses its own private key to perform a hash operation and performs an XOR operation with the session key to obtain the secret information corresponding to the new device and stores it in the database. The server uses random numbers and its own private key to calculate the new device and the available secret information. The session key between the communication devices, and after encrypting the message into server authentication information, the server sends the server authentication information to the gateway through the public channel;

Step D6: After receiving the server authentication information, the gateway obtains the fifth current timestamp and compares it with the fourth current timestamp, and verifies whether the communication delay is within the maximum communication delay range. The gateway sends the server authentication information to the public through the public channel. letter equipment;

Step D7: After receiving the server authentication information, the trusted device obtains the sixth current timestamp and compares it with the fifth current timestamp to verify whether the communication delay is within the maximum communication delay range; the trusted device uses its own secret After the information decrypts part of the server authentication information, the decrypted information and the secret information are used for hashing to obtain the session key with the new device; the trusted device performs XOR based on the session key and private data to generate a secret corresponding to the new device. information and store it in the database; send the server authentication message to the new device through the public channel;

Step D8: After receiving the server authentication message, the new device obtains the seventh current timestamp and compares it with the sixth current timestamp to verify whether the communication delay is within the maximum communication delay range, and then verifies the server authentication message; the new device passes the server The authentication message and its own private data are concatenated and hashed to generate a session key with the server and trusted device; the new device performs XOR based on the session key and private data to generate secret information corresponding to the server and new device. Stored in database.

An embodiment of the present invention takes device D _i as an example, where i is the number of the device, to illustrate the registration process of the device:

Step A1: Device D _i selects its own device identity ID _i and device fingerprint BIO _i . The device D _i uses the random character generation algorithm Gen(•) to generate the characteristic data R _i and auxiliary data _Pi of the device D _i based on the device fingerprint BIO _i , and calculates the first secret information of the device A _i =h(ID _i ||R _i ), the second secret information of the device B _i =h(A _i ||R _i ), h represents the hash function. Device D _i sends device registration information {ID _i , B _i } to server S through a secure channel.

Step A2: After receiving the device registration information {ID _i ,B _i }, the server S generates a random number r _i , and uses the server's private key x to calculate the device pseudo-identity CID _i =h(ID _i ||r _i ), the first authentication secret of the device C _i =h(CID _i ||x||B _i ), the second authentication secret of the device E _i =h(B _i ||C _i ||CID _i ). The server S saves the server authentication information {CID _i , E _i } in its database, and sends the server authentication information {CID _i , C _i } to the device D _i through the secure channel.

Step A3: Device D _i receives server authentication information {CID _i , C _i } and stores it.

An embodiment of the present invention takes gateway G _j as an example, where j is the number of the gateway, to illustrate the registration process of the gateway:

Step A1: Gateway G _j selects its own gateway identity GID _j and gateway fingerprint GBIO _j . The gateway G _j uses the random character generation algorithm Gen(•) to generate the characteristic data GR _j and auxiliary _data GP _j of the gateway G j based on the gateway fingerprint GBIO _j , and calculates the first secret information of the gateway GA _j =h(GID _j ||GR _j ), the second secret information of the gateway GB _j =h(GA _j ||GR _j ). The gateway G _j sends the gateway registration information {GID _j , GB _j } to the server S through the secure channel.

Step A2: After receiving the gateway registration information {GID _j , GB _j }, the server S generates a random number Gr _j , and uses the server's private key x to calculate the gateway pseudo identity GCID _j =h(GID _j ||Gr _j ), the gateway's first authentication secret GC _j =h(GCID _j ||x||GB _j ), the gateway's second authentication secret GE _j =h(GB _j ||GC _j ||GCID _j ). The server S saves the server authentication information {GCID _j , GE _j } in its database, and sends the server authentication information {GCID _j , GC _j } to the gateway G _j through the secure channel.

Step A3: Gateway G _j receives the server authentication information {GCID _j , GC _j } and stores it.

Further, in this embodiment, the direct authentication process of the gateway includes the following steps:

Step B1: Gateway G _j inputs the gateway identity GID _j and gateway fingerprint GBIO _j , j is the gateway number, and uses the random character generation algorithm Gen(•) to generate the characteristic data GR _j and auxiliary data GP of gateway G _j based on the gateway fingerprint GBIO _{j j} , and calculate the first secret information of the gateway GA _j =h(GID _j ||GR _j ), and the second secret information of the gateway GB _j =h(GA _j ||GR _j ). The gateway G _j selects the random number GN _j and obtains the first current timestamp T ₁ , and uses its own stored gateway pseudo identity GCID _j =h(GID _j ||Gr _j ), Gr _j is a random number, and the gateway first Authentication secret GC _j =h(GCID _j ||x||GB _j ), calculate gateway’s second authentication secret GE _j =h(GB _j ||GC _j ||GCID _j ), gateway’s third authentication secret GF _j =h (GN _j )⊕GE _j , gateway fourth authentication secret GQ _j =h(GCID _j ||GE _j ) and gateway integrity verification information M ₁ =h(GCID _j ||h(GN _j )||GE _j | |GQ _j ||T ₁ ), and sends the gateway authentication information {T ₁ , GCID _j , GF _j , GQ _j , M ₁ } to the server S through the public channel.

Step B2: After receiving the gateway authentication information {T ₁ , GCID _j , GF _j , GQ _j , M ₁ }, server S obtains the second current timestamp T ₂ and verifies whether the communication delay is within the maximum communication delay range. If it is not within the range, the communication is terminated. If it is within the range, the gateway's second authentication secret GE _j is retrieved in the database according to the gateway pseudo identity GCID _j , and the gateway's fourth authentication secret check value GQ ^* _j =h( GCID _j ||GE _j ). The server S verifies whether the gateway's fourth authentication secret check value GQ ^* _j is equal to the gateway's fourth authentication secret GQ _j . If not, the communication is terminated. Server S calculates hash value h(GN _j ) ^* =GF _j ⊕GE _j , gateway integrity verification message check value M ^* ₁ =h(GCID _j ||h(GN _j ) ^* ||GE _j ||Q _j ||T ₁ ). The server S verifies whether the gateway integrity verification message check value M ^* ₁ is equal to the gateway integrity verification information M ₁ . If not, the communication is terminated. Otherwise, a random number GN _sj is generated, and the session key with the gateway G _j is calculated. Key GSK _j =h(h(GN _sj )||GE _j ).

Step B3: Server S calculates the server first authentication secret GW _j =h(GN _sj )⊕GE _j corresponding to gateway G _j , and server integrity verification information M ₂ =h(h(GN _sj )||GCID _j ||T ₂ ||GE _j ); calculate the encrypted information GV _sj =GSK _j ⊕h(x) of the session key between the server and the gateway, the server S stores the tuple {GV _sj } in the database, and stores the server authentication information {T ₂ , GW _j ,M ₂ } is sent to gateway G _j through the public channel.

Step B4: After the gateway G _j receives the server authentication information {T ₂ , GW _j , M ₂ }, obtain the third current timestamp T ₃ and verify whether the communication delay is within the maximum communication delay range. If not, , the communication is terminated. Gateway G _j calculates hash value h(GN _sj ) ^* =GW _j ⊕GE _j , server integrity verification information check value M ^* ₂ =h(h(GN _sj ) ^* ||GCID _j ||T ₂ || GE _j ). The gateway G _j verifies whether the server integrity verification information check value M ^* ₂ is equal to the server integrity verification information M ₂ . If not, the communication is terminated. After the verification is successful, the gateway G _j calculates the session key GSK _j =h(h(GN _sj )||GE _j ) between it and the server S, and calculates the encrypted information of the session key between the gateway and the server GV _j =GSK _j ⊕GA _j , save the storage tuple {GV _j } in the database.

Further, the direct authentication process of the device includes the following steps:

Step C1: The device D _i inputs the device identity ID _i and the device fingerprint BIO _i , uses the random character generation algorithm Gen(•) to generate the characteristic data R _i and auxiliary data P _i of the device D _i based on the device fingerprint BIO _i , and calculates the device The first secret information A _i =h(ID _i ||R _i ), the second secret information of the device B _i =h(A _i ||R _i ). Device D _i selects a random number N _i and obtains the first current timestamp T ₁ , and uses its own stored device pseudo-identity CID _i =h(ID _i ||ri ₎ , _ri is a random number, and the device first Authentication secret C _i =h(CID _i ||x||B _i ), computing device second authentication secret E _i =h(B _i ||C _i ||CID _i ), device third authentication secret F _i =h (N _i )⊕E _i , device fourth authentication secret Q _i =h(CID _i ||E _i ) and device integrity verification information M ₃ =h(CID _i ||h(N _i )||E _i | |Q _i ||T ₁ ), and sends the device authentication message {T ₁ ,CID _i ,Fi _, Q _i ,M ₃ } to the gateway G _j through the public channel.

Step C2: After receiving the device authentication message {T ₁ , CID _i , _Fi , Q _i , M ₃ }, the gateway G _j obtains the second current timestamp T ₂ and compares it with the first current timestamp T ₁ to verify the communication delay. time is within the maximum communication delay range. If the communication delay is within the range, the gateway G _j inputs the gateway identity GID _j and the gateway fingerprint GBIO _j . The gateway G _j extracts the characteristic data GR _j of the gateway G _j according to Gen(GBIO _j )=(GR _j ,GP _j ). and auxiliary data GP _j , and calculate the gateway's first secret information GA _j =h(GID _j ||GR _j ), GSK _j =GV _j ⊕GA _j . The gateway G _j uses GSK _j to symmetrically encrypt the information {CID _i , Fi _, Q _i , M ₃ } and then generates the gateway symmetric encrypted information Mes _j , and converts the device authentication message {T ₁ , T ₂ , GMes _j , CID _j } Sent to server S through public channel.

Step C3: After receiving the device authentication message {T ₁ , T ₂ , GMes _j , GCID _j }, the server S obtains the third current timestamp T ₃ and compares it with the second current timestamp T ₂ to verify whether the communication delay is at the maximum within the communication delay range. Server S retrieves GV _sj and GE _j in its database based on the gateway pseudo identity GCID _j . Server S uses the hash value of its own private key to calculate the session key GSK _j =GV _sj ⊕h(x) with gateway G _j . Then, the server S uses the session key GSK _j to decrypt the gateway symmetric encrypted information GMes _j , and obtains the device pseudo identity ID CID _i , the device third authentication secret F _i , the device fourth authentication secret Q _i , and the device integrity verification information M ₃ . Server S uses the device pseudo-identity identifier CID _i to retrieve the device's second authentication secret E _i in its database, calculates the device's fourth authentication secret check value Q ^* _i =h (CID _i ||E _i ), and verifies the device's fourth authentication secret Check whether the check value Q ^* _i is equal to the fourth authentication secret Q _i of the device. Server S calculates hash value h(N _i ) ^* =F _i ⊕E _i , device integrity verification information check value M ^* ₃ =h(CID _i ||h(N _i ) ^* ||E _i ||Q _i ||T ₁ ), verify whether the device integrity verification information check value M ^* ₃ is equal to the device integrity verification information M ₃ . After the verification is passed, the server S generates two random numbers N _si and N _S , and calculates the session key _{SK i =} h(h(N _si )||E _i ) with the device D i , and calculates the device D _i and the gateway G Session key SK _ij =h(N _S ||x) of _j .

Step C4: Server S calculates the server's first authentication secret _Wi =h(N _si )⊕E _i , and the server integrity verification information M ₄ =h(h(N _si )||CID _i ||T ₃ ||E _i ), the gateway corresponds to secret information GGw _j =SK _ij ⊕h(E _i ), the device corresponds to secret information Dev _i =SK _ij ⊕h(E _i ), the gateway corresponds to symmetric encryption of secret information GGO _j =Enc _GSKj (GGw _j ), The device corresponding secret information is symmetrically encrypted O _i =Enc _SKi (Dev _i ), the encrypted information of the session key between the server and the device V _si =SK _i ⊕h(x), the server stores the tuple {V _si } in the database, and authenticates the server The message {T ₃ , _Wi , M ₄ , GO _j , O _i } is sent to the gateway G _j through the public channel.

Step C5: After receiving the server authentication message {T ₃ , _Wi , M ₄ , GO _j , O _i }, the gateway G _j obtains the fourth current timestamp T ₄ and compares it with the third current timestamp T ₃ to verify the communication delay. time is within the maximum communication delay range. Then gateway G _j calculates GB _j =h(GA _j ||GR _j ), GE _j =h(GB _j ||GC _j ||GCID _j ), GSK _j =GV _j ⊕GA _j , GGw _j =Dec _GSKj ( GO _j ), the session key of the gateway and the device SK _ij =GGw _j ⊕h(GE _j ), the encrypted information of the session key of the gateway and the device GZ _j =SK _ij ⊕GA _j , and the tuple {GZ _j } is stored in database. Send the server authentication message {T ₄ , T ₃ , _Wi , M ₄ , O _i } to the device D _i through the public channel.

Step C6: After receiving the server authentication message {T ₄ , T ₃ , _Wi , M ₄ , O _i }, the device D _i obtains the fifth current timestamp T ₅ and compares it with the fourth current timestamp T ₄ to verify the communication delay. time is within the maximum communication delay range. Device D _i calculates the hash value h(N _si ) ^* =W _i ⊕E _i and verifies the server integrity verification information M ^* ₄ =h(h(N _si ) ^* ||CID _i ||T ₃ ||E _i ), verify whether the server integrity verification information check value M ^* ₄ is equal to the server integrity verification information M ₄ . Then the device D _i calculates the session key SK _i =h(h(N _si )||E _i ) between it and the server S, calculates the device corresponding information Dev _i =Dec _SKi (O _i ), and the session between the device and the gateway Key SK _ij =Dev _i ⊕h(E _i ), encrypted information of device and server session key V _i =SK _i ⊕A _i , encrypted information of device and gateway session key Z _i =SK _ij ⊕h(A _i ), device D _i stores tuples {V _i , Z _i } in the database.

Further, the transfer authentication process of the device described in this embodiment includes the following steps:

Step D1: The new device D _n inputs the new device identity ID _n and the new device fingerprint BIO _n , and uses the random character generation algorithm Gen(•) to generate the characteristic data R _n and auxiliary data P of the new device D _n based on the new device fingerprint BIO _n . _n , and calculate the first secret information of the new device A _n =h(ID _n ||R _n ), the second secret information of the new device B _n =h(A _n ||R _n ); the new device D _n selects a random number N _n and the first current timestamp T ₁ , and use the new device’s pseudo identity CID _n =h(ID _n ||r _n ) stored by itself, r _n is a random number, and the new device’s first authentication secret C _n =h (CID _n ||x||B _n ), calculate the second authentication secret of the new device E _n =h(B _n ||C _n ||CID _n ), and calculate the third authentication secret of the new device F _n =h(N _n ) ⊕E _n , the fourth authentication secret of the new device Q _n =h(CID _n ||E _n ) and the new device integrity verification information M _1n =h(CID _n ||h(N _n )||E _n ||Q _n ||T ₁ ), generate the current location L _n of the new device, and send the new device authentication message {T ₁ ,L _n ,CID _n ,F _n ,Q _n ,M _1n } to the trusted device D through the public channel _i .

Step D2: After _receiving the new device message {T ₁ , L _n , CID _n , F _n , Q _n , M _1n }, the trusted device D i obtains the second current timestamp T ₂ and the trusted device location information. L _i , the trusted device D _i verifies whether the communication delay and location distance are within the maximum range. If it is within the range, enter the device identity ID _i and device fingerprint BIO _i . The trusted device D _i verifies whether the communication delay and location distance are within the maximum range. _i )=(R _i ,P _i ) extract the device’s characteristic data R _i and auxiliary data P _i , calculate A _i =h(ID _i ||R _i ), SK _i =V _i ⊕A _i , SK _ij =Z _i ⊕h(A _i ), the secret information Y _i =h(SK _ij ||T ₂ ) of the trusted device D _i and the gateway G _j . The trusted device D _i uses the session key SK _i to symmetrically encrypt the data {CID _n ||F _n ||Q _n ||M _1n } to obtain the device symmetric encryption information M ₅ , and converts the new device authentication message {T ₁ , T ₂ , Y _i , M ₅ , CID _i } are sent to the gateway G _j through the public channel.

Step D3: After receiving the new device authentication message {T ₁ , T ₂ , _Yi , M ₅ , CID _i }, the gateway G _j obtains the third current timestamp T ₃ and verifies whether the communication delay is within the maximum communication delay range. If within the range, input the gateway identity GID _j and gateway fingerprint GBIO _j , and the gateway G _j extracts the characteristic data GR _j and auxiliary data GP of the gateway G _j according to Gen(GBIO _j )=(GR _j ,GP _j ) _j , and calculate GA _j =h(GID _j ||GR _j ) ^, SK _ij =GZ _j ⊕GA _j , and calculate the secret information check value Y _{* i =} h( SK _ij ||T ₂ ), verify whether Y ^* _i is equal to Y _i , if not, terminate the communication. Send the new device authentication message {T ₁ , T ₃ , M ₅ , CID _i , GCID _j } to the server S through the public channel.

Step D4: After receiving the new device authentication message {T ₁ , T ₃ , M ₅ , CID _i , GCID _j }, the server S obtains the fourth current timestamp T ₄ and verifies whether the communication delay is within the maximum communication delay range. . Server S retrieves V _si and E _i in its database based on the device pseudo identity CID _i , and uses its own private key hash value to calculate the session key SK _i =V _si ⊕h(x) with the trusted device D _i . Then the server S uses the session key SK _i to decrypt the device symmetric encryption information M ₅ to obtain the new device pseudo identity CID _n , the new device's third authentication secret F _n , the new device's fourth authentication secret Q _n , and the new device's integrity verification information M _1n . Server S uses CID _n to retrieve the new device's second authentication secret _En in its database, and calculates the new device's fourth authentication secret check value Q ^* _n =h (CID _n ||E _n ) to verify the new device's fourth authentication secret. Check whether the check value Q ^* _n is equal to the fourth authentication secret Q _n of the new device. If not, the communication is terminated; otherwise, the server S calculates the hash value h(N _n ) ^* =F _n ⊕E _n and verifies the integrity of the new device. Information check value M ^* _1n =h(CID _n ||h(N _n ) ^* ||E _n ||Q ^* _n ||T ₁ ), verify whether M ^* _1n is equal to M _1n . If not equal, communication is terminated. Otherwise, the server S generates a random number N _sn and calculates the session key SK _n =h(h(N _sn )||E _n ) with the new device D _n , and calculates the relationship between the new device D _n and the trusted device D _i The session key SK _ni =h(N _sn ||x).

Step D5: Server S calculates the server's first authentication secret W _n =h(N _sn )⊕E _n corresponding to the new device D _n , and the server integrity verification information M ₆ =h(h(N _sn )||CID _n || T ₄ ||E _n ), the trusted device corresponds to the secret information Dev' _i =SK _ni ⊕h(E _i ), the new device corresponds to the secret information Dev _n =SK _ni ⊕h(E _n ), the trusted device corresponds Symmetric encryption of secret information O' _i =Enc _SKi (Dev' _i ), symmetric encryption of secret information corresponding to the new device O _n =Enc _SKn (Dev _n ), encrypted information of the session key between the server and the new device V _sn =SK _n ⊕h(x), server S saves {V _sn } in its database, and sends the server authentication message {T ₄ , W _n , M ₆ , O' _i , O _n } to the gateway G _j through the public channel.

Step D6: After receiving the server authentication message {T ₄ , W _n , M ₆ , O' _i , On _} , the gateway G _j obtains the fifth current timestamp T ₅ and verifies whether the communication delay is within the maximum communication delay range. Within, the server authentication message {T ₅ , T ₄ , W _n , M ₆ , O' _i , On _} is sent to the trusted device D _i through the public channel.

Step D7: After receiving the server authentication message {T ₅ , T ₄ , W _n , M ₆ , O' _i , On _} , the trusted device _Di obtains the sixth current timestamp T ₆ and verifies whether the communication delay is Within the maximum communication delay range. The trusted device D _i calculates Dev' _i =Dec _SKi (O' _i ), calculates its session key SK _ni =Dev' _i ⊕h(E _i ) with the new device, and calculates the relationship between the trusted device and the new device The encrypted information of the session key V _t =SK _tn ⊕A _i , the trusted device D _i stores the tuple {V _t } in its database, and sends the server authentication message {T ₆ , T ₄ , W _n , M ₆ , O _n } is sent to the new device D _n through the public channel.

Step D8: After receiving the server authentication message {T ₆ , T ₄ , W _n , M ₆ , On _} , the new device D _n obtains the seventh current timestamp T ₇ and verifies whether the communication delay is within the maximum communication delay range. Within; new device D _n calculates hash value h(N _sn ) ^* =W _n ⊕E _n , server integrity verification message check value M ^* ₆ =h(h(N _sn )||CID _n ||T ₄ ||E _n ), verify whether M ^* ₆ is equal to M ₆ . If not equal, communication is terminated. Otherwise, calculate the session key SK _n =h(h(N _sn )||E _n ) between the new device D _n and the server S, and calculate the new device corresponding secret Dev _n =Dec _SKn (O _n ). The new device D _n calculates its session key SK _ni =Dev _n ⊕h(E _n ) with the trusted device D _i , and calculates the encrypted information V ₁ =SK _n ⊕A _n of the session key between the new device and the server, The new device has encrypted information V ₂ =SK _ni ⊕h(A _n ) with the trusted device session key, and the new device D _n stores the tuple {V ₁ , V ₂ } in its database.

The preferred embodiments of the invention disclosed above are only intended to help illustrate the invention. The preferred embodiments do not describe all details, nor do they limit the invention to the specific implementations described. Obviously, many modifications and variations are possible in light of the contents of this specification. These embodiments are selected and described in detail in this specification to better explain the principles and practical applications of the present invention, so that those skilled in the art can better understand and utilize the present invention. The invention is limited only by the claims and their full scope and equivalents.

Claims (3)

1. A trusted device transfer identity authentication method for the industrial Internet of Things, which is characterized in that it includes four processes: registration of the device and the gateway, direct authentication of the gateway, direct authentication of the device, and transfer authentication of the device; The pass-through certification process includes the following steps: Step D1: The new device enters the new device identity and new device fingerprint, and uses the random character generation algorithm Gen(•) and the hash function to generate part of the new device authentication information. Then, the new device selects a random number and obtains the first current timestamp. and location information, by concatenating, XORing and hashing the authentication information stored by the new device and generated by the server during the registration phase to generate new device authentication information, and sending the new device authentication information to the trusted device through the public channel ; Step D2: After receiving the new device authentication information, the trusted device obtains the second current timestamp and location information, and verifies the first current timestamp and location information of the new device; the trusted device uses the session key to authenticate the new device The authentication information is encrypted, and then the session key and timestamp of the gateway are used to obtain trusted device authentication parameters, and the new device authentication message is sent to the gateway through the public channel; Step D3: After receiving the new device authentication information, the gateway obtains the third current timestamp and compares it with the second current timestamp to verify whether the communication delay is within the maximum communication delay range. The gateway uses the stored session key to trust Verify the device authentication parameters, and then the gateway sends the new device authentication information to the server through the public channel; Step D4: After receiving the new device authentication information, the server obtains the fourth current timestamp and compares it with the third current timestamp, and verifies whether the communication delay is within the maximum communication delay range. The server searches the database based on the new device authentication information. The stored data verifies the device authentication information of the trusted device; then, the server verifies the new device authentication information based on the decrypted information; the server generates random numbers and performs cascade and hash operations with the decrypted new device authentication information to generate the new device's authentication information. Session keys and partial server authentication information; Step D5: The server uses its own private key to perform a hash operation and performs an XOR operation with the session key to obtain the secret information corresponding to the new device and stores it in the database. The server uses random numbers and its own private key to calculate the new device and the available secret information. The session key between the communication devices, and after encrypting the message into server authentication information, the server sends the server authentication information to the gateway through the public channel; Step D6: After receiving the server authentication information, the gateway obtains the fifth current timestamp and compares it with the fourth current timestamp, and verifies whether the communication delay is within the maximum communication delay range. The gateway sends the server authentication information to the public through the public channel. letter equipment; Step D7: After receiving the server authentication information, the trusted device obtains the sixth current timestamp and compares it with the fifth current timestamp to verify whether the communication delay is within the maximum communication delay range; the trusted device uses its own secret After the information decrypts part of the server authentication information, the decrypted information and the secret information are used for hashing to obtain the session key with the new device; the trusted device performs XOR based on the session key and private data to generate a secret corresponding to the new device. information and store it in the database; send the server authentication message to the new device through the public channel; Step D8: After receiving the server authentication message, the new device obtains the seventh current timestamp and compares it with the sixth current timestamp to verify whether the communication delay is within the maximum communication delay range, and then verifies the server authentication message; the new device passes the server The authentication message and its own private data are concatenated and hashed to generate a session key with the server and trusted device; the new device performs XOR based on the session key and private data to generate secret information corresponding to the server and new device. stored in database; The registration process for the device is as follows: The device selects the device identity and device fingerprint, and uses the random character generation algorithm Gen(•) and the hash function to generate the corresponding device registration information and sends it to the server through a secure channel; After receiving the device registration information, the server generates a random number, uses the private key to concatenate and hash the received device registration information to generate server authentication information and stores it, and then sends the server authentication information to the device through a secure channel; The device receives the authentication information and stores it; The registration process of the gateway is as follows: The gateway selects the gateway identity and gateway fingerprint, and uses the random character generation algorithm Gen(•) and the hash function to generate the corresponding gateway registration information and sends it to the server through a secure channel; After receiving the gateway registration information, the server generates a random number, uses the private key to concatenate and hash the received gateway registration information to generate server authentication information and stores it, and then sends the server authentication information to the gateway through a secure channel; The gateway receives the authentication information and stores it. 2. A trusted device transfer identity authentication method for the industrial Internet of Things according to claim 1, characterized in that the direct authentication of the gateway includes the following steps: Step B1: The gateway inputs the gateway identity and gateway fingerprint, and uses the random character generation algorithm Gen(•) and the hash function to generate part of the gateway authentication information; then, the gateway selects a random number and obtains the first current timestamp, and stores it with the gateway The authentication information generated by the server during the registration phase is concatenated, XORed and hashed to generate gateway authentication information, and the gateway authentication information is sent to the server through the public channel; Step B2: After receiving the gateway authentication information, the server obtains the second current timestamp and compares it with the first current timestamp to verify whether the communication delay is within the range. The server retrieves the data stored during registration in the database based on the gateway authentication information. , verify the gateway authentication information, and then, the server generates a random number and concatenates and hashes the received gateway authentication information to generate the gateway's session key and server authentication information; Step B3: The server calculates the server authentication information and sends it to the gateway through the public channel; Step B4: After receiving the server authentication information, the gateway obtains the third current timestamp and verifies whether the communication delay is within the range and the server authentication information. If the verification is successful, the gateway performs cascading and hashing through the server authentication information and its own private data. The hash operation calculates the session key with the server; the gateway performs XOR based on the session key and private data to generate encrypted information corresponding to the server and stores it in the database. 3. A trusted device transfer identity authentication method for the industrial Internet of Things according to claim 1, characterized in that the direct authentication process of the device includes the following steps: Step C1: The device inputs the device identity and device fingerprint, and uses the random character generation algorithm Gen(•) and the hash function to generate part of the device authentication information. Then, the device selects a random number and obtains the first current timestamp, and stores it with the device The authentication information generated by the server during the registration phase is concatenated, XORed and hashed to generate device authentication information, and the device authentication information is sent to the gateway through the public channel; Step C2: After receiving the message, the gateway obtains the second current timestamp and verifies whether the time difference with the first current timestamp is within the maximum communication delay range. The gateway uses the session key to encrypt part of the device's authentication information and then Messages are sent to the server over a public channel; Step C3: After receiving the message, the server obtains the third current timestamp and verifies whether the time difference with the second current timestamp is within the maximum communication delay range. The server retrieves the stored data in the database based on the device authentication information and verifies the device. Authentication information, then, the server generates a random number and concatenates and hashes it with the received device authentication information to obtain the session key between the server and the device, the session key between the device and the gateway, and the server authentication information; Step C4: The server uses its own private key to perform a hash operation and performs an XOR operation with the session key to obtain the secret information corresponding to the device and store it in the database. The server sends the server authentication information to the gateway through the public channel; Step C5: After receiving the message, the gateway obtains the fourth current timestamp and verifies whether the time difference with the third current timestamp is within the maximum communication delay range. The gateway uses its own secret information to decrypt the server authentication information and decrypts it. The information is XORed with its own private information and then stored in the database; the gateway sends the server authentication information to the device through the public channel; Step C6: After receiving the message, the device obtains the fifth current timestamp, verifies whether the time difference with the fourth current timestamp is within the maximum communication delay range, and verifies the server authentication message. The device passes the server authentication message and its own private data. Perform cascade and hash operations to calculate the session key with the server. The device obtains the session key with the gateway based on the session key with the server and private data, and then XORs the information to obtain the secret information corresponding to the server and gateway. and stored in database.