CN116244754A - Computer target object verification method, device, storage medium and related devices - Google Patents

Abstract

The embodiment of the invention provides a method and a device for verifying a computer target object, a storage medium and a related device. The method for verifying the computer target object comprises the following steps: obtaining a public key signature, wherein the public key signature comprises a signature of a processor private key on a public key certificate, and the public key certificate at least comprises a computer public key; signing the public key signature by utilizing a processor public key which is fixedly arranged in the processor in advance; when the public key signature verification of the processor passes, the public key signature verification is performed on a target signature by using the computer public key, wherein the target signature is a signature of a target object by using a computer private key; and when the public key of the computer passes the signature verification of the target signature, the verification of the target object passes. Therefore, the verification method of the computer target object provided by the embodiment of the invention can be conveniently implemented by a computer while utilizing the trust root verification program or data set in the processor.

Description

Computer target object verification method, device, storage medium and related devices

technical field

The embodiments of the present invention relate to the field of computer technology, and in particular to a computer target object verification method, device, storage medium and related devices.

Background technique

In order to ensure computer security, it is necessary to verify whether certain programs or data in the computer have been maliciously tampered with. In order to realize fast verification, an existing method is to verify the program or data by using the root of trust set in the processor. The root of trust refers to the source and foundation of trust, and the root of trust cannot and does not need to be verified.

However, the existing solution for verifying a program or software using a root of trust set in a processor is not convenient for computer implementation.

It can be seen that how to use the root of trust set in the processor to verify the program or data and at the same time facilitate computer implementation has become a technical problem that needs to be solved urgently in this field.

Contents of the invention

In view of this, the embodiments of the present invention provide a computer target object verification method, device, storage medium and related devices to facilitate computer implementation while using the root of trust set in the processor to verify programs or data such as firmware.

In order to achieve the above purpose, embodiments of the present invention provide the following technical solutions:

In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a method for verifying a computer target object, including:

Obtain a public key signature, the public key signature includes the signature of the processor private key to the public key certificate, and the public key certificate includes at least the computer public key;

verifying the signature of the public key by using the processor public key pre-fixed in the processor;

When the processor public key passes the verification of the public key signature, use the computer public key to verify the target signature, and the target signature is the signature of the computer private key on the target object;

When the computer public key passes the verification of the target signature, the verification of the target object passes.

Optionally, the target object includes computer firmware; if the verification of the computer firmware passes, start the computer system corresponding to the computer public key.

Optionally, before using the computer public key to verify the target signature, it also includes:

judging whether the computer identification corresponding to the computer public key is consistent with the processor identification pre-fixed in the processor, the processor identification corresponds to the computer one by one, and the processor identification corresponding to the computer corresponds to the processor identification The computer IDs corresponding to the computer public keys of the computers are the same;

When the computer identification is inconsistent with the processor identification, the verification of the target object fails.

Optionally, the public key certificate also includes the computer identifier.

Optionally, before using the computer public key to verify the target signature, it also includes:

judging whether the computer version information corresponding to the computer public key is greater than or equal to the public key certificate version information preset in the processor, and the computer version information is suitable for indicating the version of the corresponding computer public key;

When the computer version information is smaller than the public key certificate version information, the verification of the target object fails.

Optionally, the public key certificate also includes the computer version information.

Optionally, a one-time programmable storage circuit is configured in the processor, and the one-time programmable storage circuit is used to preset the processor identification and/or the public key certificate version information.

Optionally, the one-time programmable storage circuit supports bit-by-bit programming, and when the one-time programmable storage circuit is read, only the programmed data is read.

In the second aspect, the embodiment of the present invention also provides a computer target object verification device, including:

A public key signature acquisition unit, adapted to acquire a public key signature, the public key signature including the signature of the processor private key on the public key certificate, the public key certificate at least including the computer public key;

The public key signature verification unit is adapted to verify the public key signature by using the processor public key pre-fixed in the processor;

The target signature verification unit is adapted to use the computer public key to verify the target signature when the processor public key passes the verification of the public key signature, and the target signature is the computer private key to the target object signature; when the computer public key passes the verification of the target signature, the verification of the target object passes.

Optionally, the target object includes computer firmware; if the verification of the computer firmware passes, start the computer system corresponding to the computer public key.

Optionally, also include:

The identification judging unit is adapted to judge whether the computer identification corresponding to the computer public key is fixed in advance in the processor before the target signature verification unit uses the computer public key to verify the target signature. The processor identification of the computer is consistent, and the processor identification corresponds to the computer one by one, and the processor identification corresponding to the computer is the same as the computer identification corresponding to the computer public key of the computer; when the computer identification and the processor identification If not, the verification of the target object fails.

Optionally, also include:

The version information judging unit is adapted to judge whether the computer version information corresponding to the computer public key is greater than or equal to the computer version information preset in the computer public key before the target signature verification unit uses the computer public key to verify the target signature. Public key certificate version information in the processor, the computer version information is suitable for representing the version of the corresponding computer public key; when the computer version information is smaller than the public key certificate version information, the verification of the target object fails .

In a third aspect, an embodiment of the present invention further provides a storage medium, the storage medium stores a program to implement the method for verifying a computer target object as described in the first aspect.

In the fourth aspect, the embodiment of the present invention also provides a processor, including a processor public key hardware circuit, and the processor public key hardware circuit is hard-coded with the processor public key as a hardware circuit integrated in the processor , suitable for performing the method for verifying a computer target object described in the first aspect.

In the fifth aspect, the embodiment of the present invention also provides an electronic device, including a memory, a main board and at least one processor on the main board, the main board stores the target object, the memory stores a program, and the processor calls The program is used to execute the computer target object verification method described in the first aspect to verify the target object.

The computer target object verification method provided by the embodiment of the present invention includes obtaining a public key signature, the public key signature includes the signature of the processor private key on the public key certificate, and the public key certificate includes at least the computer public key; The processor public key set in the processor is used to verify the public key signature; when the processor public key passes the verification of the public key signature, use the computer public key to sign the target Perform signature verification, the target signature is the signature of the computer private key on the target object; when the computer public key passes the verification of the target signature, the verification of the target object passes.

It can be understood that in the production process of computer equipment, processor producers use the processor public key as the root of trust in the processor production process, and set it in the processor unchangeably, so that different computer machines can be produced After obtaining the processor, the operator does not need to write the root of trust (for example, the computer public key) in the processor immutably, but only needs to provide the public key signature of its signature through the private key of the processor, so that the target object can be authenticated by the root of trust. Verification, thereby facilitating the implementation of computer target object verification methods.

It can be seen that the computer target object verification method provided by the embodiment of the present invention uses the processor public key as the root of trust, and is set in the processor by the processor producer during the production stage of the processor. After obtaining the processor, write the root of trust into the processor through a specific tool, so that the computer produced by the computer manufacturer can verify the target object based on the root of trust, so that the root of trust verification program set in the processor can be used At the same time, the private key of the processor is not stored in the computer, so the private key of the processor does not have the risk of being stolen by malicious software during the operation of the computer, which is more secure and prevents the private key of the computer from being stolen or After tampering, the computer public key and computer private key need to be replaced, and the computer public key fixed in the processor as the root of trust cannot be replaced.

Description of drawings

In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the following will briefly introduce the drawings that need to be used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art. Obviously, the accompanying drawings in the following description are only It is an embodiment of the present invention, and those skilled in the art can also obtain other drawings according to the provided drawings without creative work.

Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of a computer target object verification method;

2 is a schematic diagram of the implementation of the computer target object verification method provided by the embodiment of the present invention;

Fig. 3 is a flowchart of the computer target object verification method provided by the embodiment of the present invention;

Fig. 4 is another schematic flowchart of the computer target object verification method provided by the embodiment of the present invention;

Fig. 5 is another flow chart of the verification method of the computer target object provided by the embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of a computer target object verification device provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

Detailed ways

The following will clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention with reference to the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some, not all, embodiments of the present invention. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by persons of ordinary skill in the art without making creative efforts belong to the protection scope of the present invention.

For ease of understanding, a method for verifying a computer target object is firstly provided, please refer to FIG. 1 , which is a schematic diagram of a method for verifying a computer target object.

As shown in the figure, the processor includes a one-time programmable memory circuit (One Time Programmable Memory; OTP). The one-time programmable memory circuit is a permanent storage space that can be programmed once but cannot be modified after programming. . The computer first burns the computer public key into the one-time programmable storage circuit provided by the processor, and then uses the computer private key to sign the target object, so that the computer public key in the processor can be used to verify the signature of the target object. When the signature verification is passed, it can be judged that the program or data has not been tampered with. In this way, by utilizing the unchangeability of the one-time programmable storage circuit, it can be guaranteed that the computer public key in the one-time programmable storage circuit of the processor will not be tampered with by malicious programs during the startup and operation stages of the computer, so that the computer in the processor The public key is the root of trust. Wherein, the target object is a computer program or data verified by a root of trust; the computer is a complete machine except a processor.

It can be seen that the implementation of the verification method for the above-mentioned computer target object requires a one-time programmable storage circuit in an unprogrammed state in the processor, and the computer writes the computer public key into the one-time programmable storage circuit of the processor as a root of trust, and Programming a one-time programmable memory circuit requires a special programming tool, and the process is cumbersome, so the above method for verifying a computer object is actually inconvenient to implement.

In order to solve the above-mentioned technical problems, an embodiment of the present invention provides a method for verifying a computer target object. For details, please refer to FIG. 2 and FIG. 3 . It is a flow chart of the computer target object verification method provided by the embodiment of the present invention.

As shown in Figure 3, the verification method of the computer target object provided by the embodiment of the present invention may include:

In step S11, a public key signature is obtained, and the public key signature includes a signature of the processor private key on the public key certificate.

The public key signature includes the signature of the processor private key to the public key certificate, and the public key certificate includes at least the computer public key. The computer public key is a public key belonging to the computer and corresponds to a computer private key belonging to the computer. A computer has only one pair of computer public key and computer private key. The computer private key can be stored in a special signature server, and there is a risk of being tampered or stolen. Once the computer private key is tampered with or stolen, the computer will update the computer private key and the computer public key. A computer public key can be stored on a computer and sent to a device outside of the computer.

In some embodiments, a pair of computer public key and computer private key is only owned by one computer, which can prevent the computer private key of other computers from being stolen and cause the computer private key of this computer to be leaked, thereby improving the security of the computer private key In other embodiments, a pair of computer public keys and computer private keys can be shared by multiple computers, specifically, computers of the same model or computers produced by the same computer manufacturer can share a pair of computer public keys In this way, fewer computer private keys and computer public keys can be set to manage a large number of computers, thereby reducing the cost of setting and managing computer private keys and computer public keys.

The processor private key is a private key belonging to the processor, and a processor has only one processor private key and one processor public key corresponding to the processor private key. The processor private key is not stored in the processor. Once the processor private key is tampered with or stolen, the computer will update the computer private key and the computer public key. The processor public key can be stored in the processor, and cannot be sent to devices other than the processor, or parts of the computer other than the processor.

In some embodiments, the processor private key may be uniquely controlled and kept by the processor producer that produces the processor private key.

It is worth noting that the computer is a complete computer that includes the processor and can implement data processing. However, in the embodiment of the present invention, the computer private key cannot be obtained by the processor, and the processor public key cannot be stored in the computer except the processor. In the other parts, therefore, for the sake of easy understanding, it can be considered that the computer described in the embodiment of the present invention is a complete computer without a processor.

In some embodiments, a pair of processor public key and processor private key is only owned by one processor, which can prevent the processor private key of other processors from being stolen and cause the processor private key of this processor to leak, thereby improving The security of the processor private key; in some other embodiments, a pair of processor public key and processor private key can be shared by multiple processors, specifically, it can be the processor of the same model or the same processor producer The processors produced share a pair of processor public key and processor private key, so that fewer processor private keys and processor public keys can be set to manage a large number of processors, thereby reducing the number of processor private keys and processor public keys. setup and management costs.

The public key signature includes the signature of the processor private key to the public key certificate including the computer public key. Since the processor private key is controlled by the processor producer and is not stored in the processor or the computer, the processor producer needs to obtain this key in advance. A public key certificate including the computer public key, so that the processor private key can be used to sign the public key certificate including the computer public key, and return the public key certificate to the computer that sent the public key certificate after signing.

The private key of the processor signs the public key of the user. In some embodiments, the private key of the processor can be used to encrypt the public key certificate to obtain encrypted data, and the encrypted data is the signature of the public key; in another In some implementations, the abstract of the public key certificate may be calculated first by using the hash algorithm, and then the private key of the processor is used to encrypt the abstract of the public key certificate to obtain encrypted data, and the encrypted data is the public key sign.

The public key signature is stored in the computer, specifically, it may be stored in a flash memory (flash) chip of the computer motherboard.

In step S12, the signature of the public key is verified by using the public key of the processor fixed in advance in the processor.

Since the public key signature is signed using the processor's private key, it is necessary to use the processor's public key corresponding to the processor's private key to verify the public key signature, since the processor's public key is pre-installed in the processor , it is difficult to be tampered by attackers such as malicious software, so the public key of the processor is considered to be the root of trust of the target object verification method provided by the embodiment of the present invention. The root of trust refers to the source and foundation of trust, and the root of trust cannot and does not need to be verified.

The signature verification may be to use the processor public key in the processor to decrypt the public key signature to obtain decrypted data. In some embodiments, the decrypted data may be a public key certificate. When the decrypted data and the public key When the public key certificates corresponding to the signatures are the same, the signature verification is passed; in other implementations, the decrypted data can be a summary of the user’s public key calculated using a hash algorithm, and the computer can further calculate the hash algorithm through the same hash algorithm. The public key certificate corresponding to the public key signature gets a digest, and when the digest is the same as the decrypted data, the signature verification is passed.

The public key certificate including the computer's public key is stored in the computer and is located outside the processor, and in some embodiments, may be stored in a flash memory chip together with the public key signature. In this way, the public key certificate and public key signature can be automatically read from the flash memory chip during the startup phase of the processor.

It is worth noting that since the processor public key is pre-fixed in the processor as the root of trust, and the processor producer owns the processor public key, the processor producer can immediately The processor public key is fixed in the processor. In some embodiments, a one-time programmable storage circuit may be set in the processor, and the processor public key may be written in the one-time programmable circuit by the processor producer. The one-time programmable circuit written by the computer is set in the processor by the processor producer during the production stage of the processor, so that it is not necessary for the computer machine producer to use specific tools to trust the processor after obtaining the processor. Root writes to the processor.

In some other embodiments, the public key of the processor may be directly hard-coded as a hardware circuit integrated in the processor. In this way, a one-time programmable circuit for the root of trust may not be set in the processor, because the same fixed The smaller processor public key can occupy a smaller processor area, so it can save processor space; at the same time, it can also save the resources of the one-time programmable circuit, and provide the one-time programmable circuit originally provided to the root of trust to other data.

In step S13, when the processor public key passes the verification of the public key signature, use the computer public key to verify the target signature, and the target signature is the signature of the computer private key on the target object; When the signature verification is passed, step S14 is executed, and when the signature verification is not passed, step S15 is executed.

The target object is a program or data that is a target to be verified. In some embodiments, the target object may be firmware. Firmware is a program (software) that undertakes the most basic and lowest-level work of a system, such as the operating system of a computer. The importance of firmware is such that if the firmware is tampered with, it will cause serious computer security problems, such as core data leaks or the computer cannot run directly, so the firmware can be verified before the firmware is started, so as to determine whether the firmware has been tampered with. When the computer firmware is verified and passed, start the computer system corresponding to the computer public key.

When the public key of the processor passes the signature verification of the public key, it can be considered that the public key of the computer signed by the private key of the processor has not been tampered with and is safe. Therefore, the computer public key can be used to verify the target signature. When the target signature verification is passed, it can be further considered that the target object has not been tampered with; on the contrary, when the target signature verification fails, it can be considered that the target object has been tampered with.

In step S14, pass the verification of the target object.

When the verification of the target signature is successful, it is considered that the target object has not been tampered with, so through the verification of the target object, other subsequent steps can be performed. For example, when the target object is firmware, the target object is verified before starting the firmware, and after the verification is passed, the firmware can be started, so that the computer can execute instructions to process data and complete various computer tasks.

In step S15, the verification of the target object fails.

When the signature verification of the target object fails, it can be judged that the target object has been tampered with, so remedial measures can be performed. In some embodiments, a termination signal can be sent to the processor so that the processor terminates the verification of the target object. read or start.

It can be seen that the computer target object verification method provided by the embodiment of the present invention uses the processor public key as the root of trust, and is set in the processor by the processor producer during the production stage of the processor. After obtaining the processor, write the root of trust into the processor through a specific tool, so that the computer produced by the computer manufacturer can verify the target object based on the root of trust, so that the root of trust verification program set in the processor can be used At the same time, it is convenient for computer implementation; at the same time, since the private key of the computer is stored in the computer, but the private key of the processor is not stored in the computer, there is no risk of the private key of the processor being stolen by malicious software during the operation of the computer. It is more secure and avoids the need to replace the computer public key and computer private key after the computer private key is stolen or tampered with, and faces the dilemma that the computer public key fixed in the processor as the root of trust cannot be replaced.

It is worth noting that when the processor public key and processor private key belong to multiple processors, the multiple processors may be set in multiple computers, and the computer public key and computer private key in each computer may not be the same, so there may be a risk that one of the computers signs with its own public key to tamper with the public key signatures of other computers. Since the two are signed by the same processor private key, they may also be verified by the processor public key. If the signature is passed, the computer uses the wrong computer public key to verify the signature, which may misjudge that the target object has been tampered with, or make the wrong target object pass the verification.

In order to avoid the occurrence of the above situation, in a specific implementation manner, please refer to FIG. 4 , which is another schematic flowchart of a method for verifying a computer target object provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

As shown in the figure, in step S21, a public key signature is obtained, and the public key signature includes the signature of the processor private key on the public key certificate.

For the relevant content of step S21, refer to the relevant description of the above-mentioned step S11.

In step S22, it is judged whether the computer identification corresponding to the computer public key is consistent with the processor identification pre-fixed in the processor; if they are consistent, step S23 is performed; when they are not consistent, step S26 is performed.

The computer public key is the computer public key corresponding to the public key signature in step S21.

The processor ID corresponds to the computer one by one, and the processor ID corresponding to the computer is the same as the computer ID corresponding to the computer public key of the computer. When the computer ID corresponding to the computer public key is the same as the processor ID, it can be judged The computer public key is the computer public key of the computer, not the computer public key of other computers encrypted with the same processor private key; when the computer identification corresponding to the computer public key is different from the processor identification, it can be judged that the computer The public key is not the computer's public computer key, but the computer's public keys of other computers encrypted with the same processor's private key.

By fixing the processor identifier in the processor in advance, the processor identifier can be prevented from being tampered with by malicious software during the running phase of the computer.

In some embodiments, the processor identification can be set in the processor during the production stage of the processor. In this way, it is not necessary for the complete computer manufacturer to pass the root of trust through a specific tool after obtaining the processor. It is written into the processor to facilitate the implementation of the computer target object verification method provided by the embodiment of the present invention.

In order to fix the processor identification, in some embodiments, a one-time programmable memory can be built in the processor, so that the processor corresponding to the processor identification computer can be set in the processor in a one-to-one manner. logo.

In order to obtain the computer identification corresponding to the computer public key, in some embodiments, the public key certificate also includes the computer identification in addition to the computer public key. In this way, the computer identification corresponding to the computer public key recorded in the public key certificate is the computer identification recorded in the same public key certificate.

Specifically, the entirety of the computer identification and the computer public key may be encrypted and calculated with the private key of the processor, so as to obtain a public key signature that can determine whether the entirety of the computer identification and the computer public key has been tampered with.

In some embodiments, the length of the processor identifier may be equal to 8 bits, that is, 1 byte. Of course, the specific number of digits can be set as required.

In step S23, the public key signature is verified by using the processor public key pre-fixed in the processor.

In addition to the computer public key, the public key certificate also includes the computer identification, and the verification of the public key signature of the public key certificate can determine whether the computer identification and the computer public key as a whole have been tampered with.

In step S24, when the processor public key passes the verification of the public key signature, use the computer public key to verify the target signature, and the target signature is the signature of the computer private key on the target object; When the signature verification is passed, step S25 is executed, and when the signature verification is not passed, step S26 is executed.

In step S25, the verification of the target object is passed.

In step S26, the verification of the target object fails.

When the computer identification is inconsistent with the processor identification, it is forbidden to use the computer public key to verify the target signature.

For the specific content of step S23 to step S26, please refer to the related description of above step S12 to step S15.

In this way, it can be distinguished whether the computer public key corresponding to the public key signature of the request for signature verification belongs to other computers. When the processor public key and processor private key belong to multiple processors, the multiple processors may be set on multiple computers. However, when the computer public key and computer private key in each computer may be different, it can avoid the public key signature tampered with by other computers using their own public key signatures to pass the verification.

It is worth noting that when malicious software steals the computer private key and causes the computer to update the computer private key and computer public key, although the processor public key fixed in the processor does not need to be updated, the malicious software may use the stolen computer private key Sign the tampered target object, and then use the computer public key and public key signature before the computer is updated to deceive the processor to make the tampered target object pass the verification.

In order to distinguish between the updated computer private key and computer public key, and the updated public key signature re-applied based on the updated computer public key, please refer to Figure 5, which is the computer target object provided by the embodiment of the present invention Another flowchart of the verification method.

As shown in Figure 5, the verification method of the computer target object provided by the embodiment of the present invention includes:

In step S31, a public key signature is obtained, and the public key signature includes the signature of the processor private key on the public key certificate.

In step S32, it is judged whether the computer version information corresponding to the computer public key is greater than or equal to the public key certificate version information preset in the processor; when greater than or equal to, execute step S33, and when less than, Execute step S36.

The computer version information is suitable for indicating the version of the corresponding computer public key, and when the computer version information is smaller than the public key certificate version information in the processor, it is considered that the computer public key corresponding to the computer version information is too backward in version , so the target object must not pass validation.

In order to set the computer version information in the processor, in some embodiments, the processor is configured with a one-time programmable storage circuit, and the one-time programmable storage circuit is used to preset the version information of the public key certificate. Further, in order to allow updating while realizing the fixed setting, in a specific embodiment, the one-time programmable storage circuit also supports bit-by-bit programming, and when reading the one-time programmable storage circuit, only Read the programmed data, so that when the public key certificate version information is set in the processor, the data bits of the one-time programmable circuit in the processor can be programmed bit by bit. Specifically, each data bit of the provided one-time programmable circuit may be "0" before programming, as the public key certificate version information of the first version of the computer public key. After updating the computer public key and the computer private key each time, the next data bit in the one-time programmable circuit of the processor is programmed as "1" to represent different versions.

In some embodiments, the one-time programmable circuit can be one byte in size, that is, has eight data bits to be programmed, then "00000000" represents the initial version, and the computer public key of the initial version has a corresponding computer The version information is also "000000000". When the computer public key and computer private key in the computer need to be updated due to reasons such as being stolen, the updated computer public key and computer private key can be used to burn a data of the one-time programmable circuit through the programming tool bit, to update it to "00000001", so that when an attacker uses the stolen old version of the computer public key to form a public key signature, the computer version information of the computer public key of the public key certificate corresponding to the public key signature is " 00000000", which is smaller than the public key certificate version information "00000001" in the processor, so it is judged that the verification has not passed. When the version information of the public key certificate needs to be updated again, "1" is written bit by bit sequentially. Therefore, when the one-time programmable circuit is 1 byte, a total of up to 8 versions can be updated.

In some embodiments, the computer version information corresponding to the computer public key of the computer may be the same as the public key certificate version information in the processor of the computer. When the computer public key and the computer private key are updated, the public key certificate version is updated at the same time. Information and computer version information, so that the updated public key certificate version information is consistent with the computer version information.

In other embodiments, the computer version information corresponding to the computer public key of the computer may be greater than the version information of the public key certificate. In this way, although the version information of the public key certificate is not updated, it is impossible to prevent attackers from using the leaked old version The computer version information is verified, but it can prevent the updated computer version information from failing the verification.

When the computer version information corresponding to the computer public key is greater than or equal to the version information of the public key certificate, it can be judged that the computer public key is the current version of the computer public key, not the computer public key of the leaked version; otherwise, it can be judged that the computer public key The key is not the current version, but the public key of the computer that has been leaked. The attack on the computer after stealing the private key of the computer by malicious software cannot pass the verification.

In order to obtain computer version information corresponding to the computer public key, in some embodiments, the public key certificate includes computer version information in addition to the public key signature and the computer public key. In this way, the computer version information corresponding to the computer public key recorded in the public key certificate is the computer version information recorded in the same public key certificate.

In some embodiments, the public key signature further includes a signature of the processor private key on the computer version information. In this way, when verifying the public key signature, it can also be judged whether the computer version information judged in step S32 has been tampered with. Specifically, the entirety of the computer version information and the computer public key can be encrypted and calculated with the private key of the processor, so as to obtain a public key signature that can determine whether the computer version information and the computer public key as a whole have been tampered with.

In some embodiments, the length of the public key certificate version information may be less than or equal to 8 bits, that is, 1 byte. Of course, the specific number of digits can be set as required.

In step S33, the public key signature is verified by using the processor public key pre-fixed in the processor.

In step S34, when the processor public key passes the verification of the public key signature, use the computer public key to verify the target signature, and the target signature is the signature of the computer private key to the target object; When the signature verification is passed, step S35 is executed, and when the signature verification is not passed, step S36 is executed.

In step S35, the verification of the target object is passed.

In step S36, the verification of the target object fails.

For the specific content of step S33 to step S36, please refer to the related description of above step S12 to step S15.

In this way, malicious software can be prevented from using the stolen computer private key to sign the tampered target object, and then using the computer public key and the public key signature before the computer is updated to deceive the processor so that the tampered target object passes verification.

In order to solve the foregoing problems, an embodiment of the present invention further provides a computer target object verification device, please refer to FIG. 6 , which is a schematic diagram of a computer target object verification device provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

As shown in the figure, the computer target object verification device provided by the embodiment of the present invention includes:

The public key signature obtaining unit 1 is adapted to obtain a public key signature, the public key signature includes the signature of the processor private key to the public key certificate, and the public key certificate includes at least the computer public key;

The public key signature verification unit 2 is adapted to verify the public key signature by using the processor public key pre-fixed in the processor;

The target signature verification unit 3 is adapted to use the computer public key to verify the target signature when the processor public key passes the verification of the public key signature, and the target signature is the computer private key to the target signature. The signature of the object; when the computer public key passes the verification of the target signature, the verification of the target object passes.

It can be seen that the computer target object verification device provided by the embodiment of the present invention uses the processor public key as the root of trust, and is set in the processor by the processor producer during the production stage of the processor. After obtaining the processor, write the root of trust into the processor through a specific tool, so that the computer produced by the computer manufacturer can verify the target object based on the root of trust, so that the root of trust verification program set in the processor can be used At the same time, the private key of the processor is not stored in the computer, so the private key of the processor does not have the risk of being stolen by malicious software during the operation of the computer, which is more secure and prevents the private key of the computer from being stolen or After tampering, the computer public key and computer private key need to be replaced, and the computer public key fixed in the processor as the root of trust cannot be replaced.

In a specific implementation manner, the target object includes computer firmware; if the verification of the computer firmware passes, start the computer system corresponding to the computer public key.

In a specific embodiment, the computer target object verification device provided by the embodiment of the present invention further includes:

The identification judging unit is adapted to judge whether the computer identification corresponding to the computer public key is fixed in advance in the processor before the target signature verification unit uses the computer public key to verify the target signature. The processor identification of the computer is consistent, and the processor identification corresponds to the computer one by one, and the processor identification corresponding to the computer is the same as the computer identification corresponding to the computer public key of the computer; when the computer identification and the processor identification If not, the verification of the target object fails.

In a specific embodiment, the computer target object verification device provided by the embodiment of the present invention further includes:

The version information judging unit is adapted to judge whether the computer version information corresponding to the computer public key is greater than or equal to the computer version information preset in the computer public key before the target signature verification unit uses the computer public key to verify the target signature. Public key certificate version information in the processor, the computer version information is suitable for representing the version of the corresponding computer public key; when the computer version information is smaller than the public key certificate version information, the verification of the target object fails .

In a specific implementation manner, the public key certificate further includes the computer identifier.

In a specific implementation manner, the public key certificate also includes the computer version information.

In a specific implementation manner, a one-time programmable storage circuit is configured in the processor, and the one-time programmable storage circuit is used to preset the processor identification and/or the public key certificate version information.

In a specific implementation manner, the one-time programmable storage circuit supports bit-by-bit programming, and when the one-time programmable storage circuit is read, only the programmed data is read.

An embodiment of the present invention also provides a storage medium, the storage medium stores a program to implement the computer target object verification method as described above.

The embodiment of the present invention also provides a processor, including a processor public key hardware circuit, the processor public key hardware circuit is hard-coded the processor public key as a hardware circuit integrated in the processor, suitable for executing A computer target object authentication method as described above.

An embodiment of the present invention also provides an electronic device, including a memory, a main board and at least one processor on the main board, the main board stores the target object, the memory stores a program, and the processor invokes the program, The target object is verified by executing the computer target object verification method as described above.

It can be seen that the storage medium, processor and electronic device provided by the embodiments of the present invention use the public key of the processor as the root of trust, which is set in the processor by the processor producer during the production stage of the processor, and may not require a complete computer After obtaining the processor, the producer writes the root of trust into the processor through a specific tool, so that the computer produced by the producer of the complete computer can verify the target object based on the root of trust, so that the trust set in the processor can be utilized. At the same time, it is convenient for computer implementation; at the same time, the private key of the processor is not stored in the computer, so the private key of the processor does not have the risk of being stolen by malicious software during the operation of the computer, which is more secure and avoids the need for the private key of the computer. After being stolen or tampered with, the computer public key and computer private key need to be replaced, and the computer public key fixed in the processor as the root of trust cannot be replaced.

The above description of the disclosed embodiments is provided to enable any person skilled in the art to make or use the invention. Various modifications to these embodiments will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the general principles defined herein may be implemented in other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of the invention. Therefore, the present invention will not be limited to the embodiments shown herein, but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the principles and novel features disclosed herein. Multiple embodiment solutions provided by the embodiments of the present invention are described above, and the optional modes introduced by each embodiment solution can be combined and cross-referenced without conflict, so as to extend a variety of possible embodiment solutions, All of these can be regarded as the embodiment disclosures of the present invention and the disclosed embodiment solutions.

Although the embodiments of the present invention are disclosed above, the present invention is not limited thereto. Any person skilled in the art can make various changes and modifications without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, so the protection scope of the present invention should be based on the scope defined in the claims.

Claims (15)

1. A method for verifying a target object of a computer, comprising:

obtaining a public key signature, wherein the public key signature comprises a signature of a processor private key on a public key certificate, and the public key certificate at least comprises a computer public key;

signing the public key signature by utilizing a processor public key which is fixedly arranged in the processor in advance;

when the public key signature verification of the processor passes, the public key signature verification is performed on a target signature by using the computer public key, wherein the target signature is a signature of a target object by using a computer private key;

and when the public key of the computer passes the signature verification of the target signature, the verification of the target object passes.

2. The computer target object verification method of claim 1, wherein the target object comprises computer firmware; and if the verification of the computer firmware is passed, starting the computer system corresponding to the computer public key.

3. The method for verifying a computer target object as defined in claim 2, wherein prior to signing the target signature using the computer public key, further comprising:

judging whether a computer identifier corresponding to the computer public key is consistent with a processor identifier preset in the processor, wherein the processor identifier corresponds to the computer one by one, and the processor identifier corresponding to the computer is identical with the computer identifier corresponding to the computer public key of the computer;

when the computer identification is inconsistent with the processor identification, the verification of the target object is not passed.

4. A computer target object verification method as claimed in claim 3, wherein said public key certificate further comprises said computer identification.

5. The method for verifying a computer target object as defined in claim 3, wherein prior to signing the target signature using the computer public key, further comprising:

judging whether computer version information corresponding to the computer public key is greater than or equal to public key certificate version information preset in the processor, wherein the computer version information is suitable for representing the version of the corresponding computer public key;

And when the computer version information is smaller than the public key certificate version information, the verification of the target object is not passed.

6. The computer target object verification method of claim 5, wherein the public key certificate further comprises the computer version information.

7. The method of claim 5, wherein the processor is configured with a one-time programmable memory circuit, and the one-time programmable memory circuit is configured to preset the processor identifier and/or the public key certificate version information.

8. The method of claim 7, wherein the one-time programmable memory circuit supports bit-wise programming, and wherein only programmed data is read when the one-time programmable memory circuit is read.

9. A computer target object verification apparatus, comprising:

a public key signature acquisition unit adapted to acquire a public key signature including a signature of a public key certificate by a processor private key, the public key certificate including at least a computer public key;

the public key signature verification unit is suitable for verifying the public key signature by utilizing a processor public key which is fixedly arranged in the processor in advance;

The target signature verification unit is suitable for verifying a target signature by using the computer public key when the public key signature verification of the processor passes, wherein the target signature is a signature of a target object by using a computer private key; and when the public key of the computer passes the signature verification of the target signature, the verification of the target object passes.

10. The computer target object verification device of claim 9, wherein the target object comprises computer firmware; and if the verification of the computer firmware is passed, starting the computer system corresponding to the computer public key.

11. The computer target object verification device of claim 10, further comprising:

the identification judging unit is suitable for judging whether a computer identification corresponding to the computer public key is consistent with a processor identification preset in the processor before the target signature checking unit performs signature checking on the target signature by using the computer public key, the processor identification corresponds to the computer one by one, and the processor identification corresponding to the computer is identical to the computer identification corresponding to the computer public key of the computer; when the computer identification is inconsistent with the processor identification, the verification of the target object is not passed.

12. The computer target object verification device of claim 11, further comprising:

the version information judging unit is suitable for judging whether computer version information corresponding to the computer public key is larger than or equal to public key certificate version information preset in the processor before the target signature verifying unit verifies the target signature by using the computer public key, and the computer version information is suitable for representing the version of the corresponding computer public key; and when the computer version information is smaller than the public key certificate version information, the verification of the target object is not passed.

13. A storage medium storing a program to implement the computer target object authentication method according to any one of claims 1 to 8.

14. A processor comprising processor public key hardware circuitry, the processor public key hardware circuitry being hardware circuitry to hard-code the processor public key as integrated in the processor, adapted to perform the computer target object verification method of any one of claims 1-8.

15. An electronic device comprising a memory, a motherboard and at least one processor on the motherboard, the motherboard storing the target object, the memory storing a program, the processor invoking the program to perform the computer target object verification method of any of claims 1-8 to verify the target object.

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