CN115743565A - Automatic throttle alarming and protecting logic architecture based on man-machine effect and automatic throttle system - Google Patents

Abstract

An automatic throttle alarming and protecting logic structure and an automatic throttle system based on man-machine efficiency can balance the problems of harassment alarming and alarming but not alarming. The logic architecture comprises alarm logic of an automatic accelerator function, and can ideally balance human-computer efficacy problems under the scenes of takeoff, low-altitude missed approach, misoperation of a TO/GA button after landing and the like. In the alarm logic of the automatic throttle function, there is alarm trigger suppression logic that suppresses the triggering of both a voice alarm indicating that the automatic throttle function is off and a CAS alarm indicating that the automatic throttle function is disabled, the suppression logic being configured to: in the non-inhibition stage which does not meet the inhibition condition that the automatic flight vertical mode is a take-off mode, the voice alarm and the CAS information are in a state of being capable of being triggered; in the suppression phase when the suppression condition is satisfied, the voice alarm and the CAS information are not triggered, and only the notification that the auto throttle function is off is displayed in the FMA region of the main display.

Description

Auto-throttle warning and protection logic architecture and auto-throttle based on ergonomics system

5 technical fields

The present invention relates to an automatic throttle warning and protection logic architecture based on man-machine efficacy, specifically including the protection logic of the automatic throttle (AT) function and the automatic throttle (AT with alarm trigger suppression logic for suppressing voice/CAS warnings) ) function alarm logic.

In addition, the present invention also relates to an automatic throttle system adopting the above-mentioned automatic throttle alarm and protection logic framework based on ergonomics.

Background technique

Autothrottle system (Autothrottle, referred to as AT) is an airborne system on the aircraft, which automatically controls two 5-thrust handles by providing instructions to independent servo motors on each throttle platform, providing , automatic thrust control during approach and go-around. For the active throttle platform, in order to prevent uncommanded movement of the thrust lever during the critical stage of take-off, the thrust lever should be kept at the take-off thrust position or the flexible take-off thrust position.

From the perspective of human factors, the critical stage of take-off should deal with the possible automatic throttle (AT)

Function disconnection voice warning, automatic throttle (AT) function failure CAS information, etc. are suppressed to avoid interference with the pilot. At the same time, scenarios such as take-off, landing, and go-around need to be considered to ensure that the alarm trigger suppression logic of voice alarms and CAS information achieves the expected effect in each scenario and avoid false suppression.

At present, mainstream regional airliners such as ARJ21 and ERJ160/190 use active accelerator consoles.

When the take-off airspeed is greater than 60 knots to 400ft above the ground, the autothrottle enters the hold mode, and the throttle station does not respond to the autothrottle command. Mainline aircraft such as B737/B787 also use active throttle consoles,

When the takeoff airspeed is greater than 80 knots to 400ft above the ground, the autothrottle enters the hold mode, and the throttle console does not respond to the autothrottle command. The Airbus series aircraft A320/A330/A350 adopts a passive throttle console, and the autothrottle is always in the armed state during the take-off phase. connected.

Both B787 and A320 aircraft have warning-level autothrottle disconnection CAS information. This information and the corresponding voice are suppressed during the critical stage of take-off, and the specific definition of the suppressed stage is different. ERJ160/190 is similar to ARJ, there is no CAS message indicating autothrottle disconnection, there is a separate autothrottle disconnection voice, and there is a CAS message indicating autothrottle failure, and the CAS information is suppressed during the critical stage of takeoff. The difference is that the autothrottle disconnect voice of ERJ160/190 is not suppressed during the critical stage of takeoff.

However, in the prior art, when designing the autothrottle protection logic, it is impossible to ideally balance the accidental grounding of a low-altitude go-around and the misoperation of the "TO/GA" (throttle to the maximum position) button after landing in two similar scenarios. Ergonomic issues, such as the Emirates B787 crash, are evidence of problems with existing technology. The accident investigation report of Emirates flight UAE5211 on August 6, 2016 revealed that the direct cause of the disaster was that the pilot pressed the "TO/GA" button to go around after the aircraft touched the ground. The function of the "TO/GA" button was inhibited, so the autothrottle did not advance the throttle stick to the go-around thrust position as the pilot expected, causing the aircraft to hit the runway due to insufficient thrust when going around. In this accident, the aircraft encountered wind shear when approaching the landing. Both main wheels touched the ground within 6 seconds, but the two main wheels were on the ground at the same time for less than 2 seconds, leading the pilot to think that he was on the ground when the aircraft touched the ground. Press the "TO/GA" button before going around. In addition, the manufacturer of this model stated during the accident investigation that the "TO/GA" button was suppressed on the ground to meet the requirements of FAA120-29A, that is, wrongly selecting the GA mode after touching the ground should not affect the safe taxiing and Stop having adverse effects. It can be seen from the accident that the design logic of using the ground state suppression "TO/GA" button to meet the requirements of the auto throttle has potential safety hazards in terms of human factors.

In addition, in the prior art, there is no disclosure on how to balance nuisance alarms and alarms that should be alarmed but not alarmed in the design of auto-throttle voice alarm suppression logic.

Contents of the invention

The present invention is made to solve the above-mentioned technical problems, and its purpose is to provide an automatic throttle warning and protection logic framework based on man-machine efficacy and an automatic throttle system using the logic framework, which can balance the disturbance when designing the automatic throttle voice warning suppression logic. Non-alert alerts and issues that should have been alerted but were not alerted.

Another object of the present invention is to provide an automatic throttle warning and protection logic framework based on ergonomics and an automatic throttle system using the logic framework, which can ideally balance take-off, low-altitude go-around accidental touchdown, and misoperation after landing Ergonomic problems in scenarios such as the "TO/GA" button.

In order to achieve at least one of the above-mentioned objects of the present invention, the present invention provides a human-machine function-based autothrottle warning and protection logic architecture, including the warning logic of the autothrottle function, characterized in that, in the warning logic of the autothrottle function , have the alarm trigger suppression logic that suppresses the triggering of both the voice alarm indicating that the auto-throttle function is disconnected and the CAS alarm that represents the failure of the auto-throttle function, and the alarm trigger suppression logic is set to:

In the non-suppression phase that does not meet the suppression conditions including the automatic flight vertical mode being the take-off mode, the voice warning and the CAS information are in a state that can be triggered;

In the suppression stage where the suppression condition is met, the voice warning and the CAS information will not be triggered, but only a notification that the autothrottle function is disconnected is displayed in the FMA area of the main display.

In addition, the automatic throttle warning and protection logic framework based on man-machine efficacy of the present invention, because during the low-altitude go-around process, if there is a touchdown scene, the automatic throttle (AT) function will be disconnected, and the automatic throttle can be seen in the FMA area of the main display. status (autothrottle (AT) function disengaged), and the "Autothrottle Disengage" voice warning is also triggered normally, so it is ideal to ensure that the process of going around the aircraft from a very low altitude is accidentally triggered indirectly. An autothrottle (AT) disengagement condition alerts the pilot via a voice alert. Therefore, it is possible to balance the nuisance warning and the problem that should be given but not given a warning during the logic design of auto throttle voice warning suppression.

More specifically, the inhibiting condition is set as: when the autopilot vertical mode is the takeoff mode, the radio altitude is greater than 400 feet from twin engine takeoff thrust, brake release, or the aircraft is in the air for more than 30 seconds.

Preferably, the human-machine efficacy-based autothrottle warning and protection logic framework includes not only the autothrottle function warning logic, but also the autothrottle function protection logic.

Wherein, the protection logic of the automatic throttle function is designed as:

During the takeoff phase, the autoflight vertical mode is set to the takeoff mode. When the aircraft touches the ground for longer than the specified time and the average airspeed on both sides is greater than the specified airspeed, the autothrottle system enters into the hold mode of the autothrottle function. The critical stage of take-off before the altitude is greater than 400 feet is always in the hold mode, until after the radio altitude is greater than 400 feet, the autothrottle system exits the hold mode,

During the landing phase, the autoflight vertical mode is set to approach mode,

When the aircraft lands normally and touches the ground, if the autothrottle function is on,

Then the auto throttle function will be disconnected automatically,

When the "TO/GA" button is pressed in the air, it enters the go-around phase,

During the go-around phase, the autoflight vertical mode is set to go-around mode,

When the go-around mode is activated at normal altitude, the autothrottle function is automatically engaged,

When the go-around mode is activated at low altitude, the autothrottle function is automatically engaged,

And when the main wheel of the aircraft touches the ground, the auto throttle function is automatically disconnected.

In addition, the alarm logic of the auto-throttle function is designed to:

During takeoff,

While in said critical phase of takeoff in the hold mode of the autothrottle function,

Executing the alarm trigger suppression logic,

After taking off to a radio altitude greater than 400 feet, if the autothrottle function is still disabled, trigger the display of the CAS information on the EICAS display, and the autothrottle function has not been re-engaged after that or the subsequent confirmation of disabling the autothrottle function, further trigger the voice alarm,

During the landing phase and the go-around phase, when the aircraft touches the ground, the voice warning is triggered while the auto-throttle function is disconnected.

More preferably, the protection logic of the automatic throttle function is further designed as:

When the aircraft does not touch the ground for more than the specified time during the landing phase and the go-around phase, the aircraft does not inhibit the auto-throttle function. At this time, press the "TO/GA" button to automatically activate the auto-throttle function.

When the aircraft touches the ground during the landing phase for more than the specified time, the aircraft inhibits the autothrottle function.

According to the above structure, compared with the prior art, the present invention focuses on different special requirements in take-off, landing and go-around scenarios according to signals such as the aircraft’s automatic flight vertical mode, wheel load, airspeed, throttle stick angle, etc. The present invention’s unique automatic throttle alarm and protection logic framework based on man-machine functions can effectively avoid the false suppression of the alarm of the automatic throttle function and the non-command of the throttle lever that may occur in special scenarios in the prior art. Occurrence of false activation of the auto throttle function caused by movement, misoperation of the "TO/GA" button.

The present invention additionally provides an automatic throttle system, which is characterized in that the automatic throttle system has: a main display, the main display receives signals about airspeed and altitude from the atmospheric system; a data concentrator, the data concentrator The wheel-loaded signal from the landing gear system is forwarded. In the data concentrator, the ergonomics-based autothrottle warning and protection logic architecture described above is adopted.

Preferably, the autothrottle system has an autothrottle section, the autothrottle section has an autothrottle monitor and an autothrottle application, and the autothrottle monitor receives information about airspeed and altitude processed by the main display Process the signal and the on-wheel signal forwarded by the data concentrator, and send the enabling signal or disabling signal of the autothrottle function to the flight control board.

After the autothrottle monitor sends the enable signal of the autothrottle function to the flight control board, the flight control board sends the enable signal to the throttle station, and the throttle station is in the state of receiving the automatic throttle instruction automatic control at this time, and the throttle The lever responds to the control command sent by the auto-throttle application to control the operation of the engine, and the auto-throttle application receives the feedback status signal of the throttle console to indicate the next control command. On the other hand, when the aircraft touches the ground for more than the prescribed time and the average airspeed on both sides is greater than the prescribed airspeed, the autothrottle monitor sends a signal to the flight control board to disable the autothrottle function, and the flight control board will The disabling signal is forwarded to the throttle console, and the throttle console uses the disabling signal to power off the servo of the throttle console, and no longer responds to the control commands sent by the automatic throttle application.

In addition, when the auto-throttle function is disconnected or fails, the auto-throttle application sends a warning signal of the auto-throttle function disconnection or failure to the main display and data concentrator, and forwards the warning signal to the speaker or EICAS Display, that is, triggering a voice alarm indicating that the auto-throttle function is disconnected, or triggering the display of CAS information indicating that the auto-throttle function is invalid on the EICAS display.

At the same time, when the auto-throttle function is automatically disconnected, the logo representing the auto-throttle function in the FMA area of the main display flashes for a specified time, and then continues to display the logo until it disappears after the pilot confirms the disconnection.

When designing the alarm and protection logic of the automatic throttle (AT) function in view of the prior art,

Unable to ideally balance takeoff, low altitude go-around accidental touchdown, misuse of "TO/GA" after landing

Human-machine efficiency problems in scenarios such as buttons, the human-machine function-based auto-throttle warning and protection logic architecture of the present invention and the automatic throttle system using the logic architecture can ideally balance the human-machine efficiency problems in multiple scenarios, specifically The scene is:

(1) Considering the takeoff with reduced thrust, the minimum thrust position allowed for takeoff is 60 degrees. The results of statistical analysis show that when the speed of the aircraft reaches 60 knots during takeoff, the autothrottle system has moved the throttle lever to the takeoff thrust position. Therefore, in the suppression logic of the voice alarm indicating that the automatic throttle (AT) function is disconnected and the CAS alarm indicating that the automatic throttle (AT) function is invalid, the dual-engine take-off thrust is defined as the engine is started and the angle of the throttle lever is greater than 59°, and the automatic throttle ( The airspeed used in the protection logic of the AT) function is that the average airspeed on both sides is greater than 60 knots;

(2) During the normal landing process of the aircraft, press the "TO/GA" button at a low altitude (about 30 feet) to activate the go-around mode (low altitude go-around), the auto throttle (AT) function is automatically turned on and the throttle is pushed forward pole. When the aircraft touches the ground during a low-altitude go-around, the angle of the throttle sticks on both sides is greater than 59 degrees and the thrust position of the go-around is not reached, the brake is released, the wheel load is on the ground, and the airspeed is greater than 100 knots, meeting the requirements for takeoff and go-around Definition of flight phase T2.

If, as in the prior art, as shown in Figure 3, the definition of the flight stage T2 to meet the requirements of take-off and go-around is determined as a voice warning indicating that the auto-throttle (AT) function is disconnected, indicating that the auto-throttle (AT) function is invalid. The suppression condition of the CAS warning is that the autothrottle (AT) function is disconnected due to the aircraft touching the ground (WOW=1), and the voice warning indicating that the autothrottle (AT) function is disconnected is suppressed because it meets the definition of flight phase T2 , therefore, in this scenario, the Auto Throttle (AT) function is disconnected but "Autothrottle Disengage" will not appear

Voice warning, the pilot may not realize that the autothrottle (AT) function is disconnected, resulting in insufficient go-around thrust.

In contrast, in the present invention, based on the analysis of the take-off and go-around scenarios, comprehensively considering the definition of the aircraft flight phase, the logic of the auto-throttle (AT) function entering and exiting the take-off inhibition state, will represent the auto-throttle (AT) The suppression conditions for the voice warning of function disconnection and the CAS warning indicating that the autothrottle (AT) function fails are set to include the automatic flight vertical mode as the take-off mode, and more specifically: "When the automatic flight vertical mode is the take-off mode Mode, from twin-engine take-off thrust (engines on and throttle lever angle greater than 59°), brake release to radio altitude greater than 400 feet, or aircraft in the air for more than 30 seconds." Therefore, the warning of the autothrottle function of the present invention In the logic, as shown in Figure 2, when the throttle sticks on both sides are greater than 59 degrees and the thrust level of the go-around is not reached, the aircraft touches the ground. At this time, the autothrottle (AT) function is cut off, and the FMA (flight mode signal plate) area of the main display It can be seen that the notification of the autothrottle status (autothrottle (AT) function disconnected) is visible. In addition, since the automatic flight vertical mode at this time is the go-around mode instead of the take-off mode, it does not meet the requirements for indicating that the autothrottle (AT) function is disconnected. The suppression condition of the voice alarm and the CAS alarm indicating that the auto throttle (AT) function fails, that is, the "Autothrottle Disengage" voice alarm is triggered when the auto throttle function is disconnected. Similarly, if the auto throttle (AT) function is disconnected during this process, the "AT FAULT" CAS message and the "Autothrottle Disengage" voice alarm will also be triggered normally.

(3) When the aircraft touches down on a normal landing, the autothrottle (AT) function is disconnected. When the aircraft touched down briefly (less than 5 seconds), that is, when the Emirates aircraft encountered wind shear during approach and landing, both main wheels touched the ground within 6 seconds, but the state of both main wheels on the ground at the same time was less than 2 seconds (WOW=1 is not maintained for more than 5 seconds), the aircraft will not inhibit the automatic throttle (AT) function, at this time, press the "TO/GA" (throttle adjusted to the maximum position) button to automatically activate the automatic throttle (AT) function, If touchdown occurs again during this process, the autothrottle (AT) function will be disconnected and accompanied by the "Autothrottle Disengage" voice warning. When the aircraft lands for 5 seconds (WOW=1 for more than 5 seconds), even if the "TO/GA" (throttle is adjusted to the maximum position) button is mis-operated, the auto throttle (AT) function will not be automatically turned on.

Therefore, the ergonomics-based autothrottle warning and protection logic framework of the present invention can ideally ensure that the throttle lever will not move uncommanded when the thrust of the autothrottle system reaches the takeoff thrust during takeoff.

In addition, even if the "TO/GA" button is unintentionally pressed after the aircraft has landed for a period of time, the autothrottle (AT) function will not be automatically turned on based on the ergonomics-based autothrottle warning and protection logic framework of the present invention. Adversely affect the ability of the aircraft to taxi and stop safely.

Thus, under the premise of ensuring the safety of the aircraft, the present invention accurately identifies the aircraft take-off, go-around and landing scenarios, and correctly suppresses the alarm of the auto throttle (AT) function, In this stage, the automatic throttle warning and protection logic framework based on the man-machine function of the present invention can be ideally balanced for taking off, accidentally touching the ground during a low-altitude go-around, and misoperation of the "TO/GA" button after landing. Improve the ergonomics of the automatic throttle system.

Description of drawings

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram showing an auto-throttle system adopting the ergonomics-based auto-throttle warning and protection logic framework of the present invention.

FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram showing how the autothrottle warning and protection logic framework of the autothrottle system of the present invention operates in the scenario of a go-around at a low altitude and an accidental touchdown.

FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram showing how the autothrottle warning and protection logic architecture of the prior art autothrottle system operates in the scenario of a low-altitude go-around and an accidental touchdown.

Detailed ways

Below, with reference to the accompanying drawings, the automatic throttle warning and protection logic architecture based on ergonomics (hereinafter referred to as "logical architecture") and the automatic throttle system 100 using the logic architecture of the present invention will be described. The schematic diagram of the autothrottle system 100 based on the automatic throttle warning and protection logic framework of the invention based on the human-machine function, FIG. A diagram of how it works.

First, the automatic accelerator system 100 of the present invention will be described. As shown in Figure 1,

The autothrottle system 100 has: the main display 110, which receives the signal S1a from the atmospheric system 200 about airspeed and altitude; the data concentrator 120, which forwards the wheel load Signal WOW. In the autothrottle system with the autothrottle system 100 of the present invention, the airspeed used is the indicated airspeed of the main display 110, in addition, the on-wheel signal WOW=1 represents the aircraft touchdown, and the on-wheel signal WOW=0 represents the aircraft In the air (not touching the ground).

As shown in FIG. 1 , the autothrottle system 100 has an autothrottle unit 130 having an autothrottle monitor 131 and an autothrottle application 132 . The autothrottle monitor 131 receives the processing signal S1b about airspeed and altitude processed by the main display 110 and the on-wheel signal WOW forwarded by the data concentrator 120, and sends an autothrottle (AT ) function enabling signal S _enabled or disabling signal S _Disabled .

After the automatic throttle monitor 131 sends the enabling signal S _enabled of the automatic throttle (AT) function to the flight control board 140, the flight control board 140 sends the enabling signal S _enabled to the throttle console, and the throttle console is at this moment. Receiving the state of the automatic control of the auto-throttle command, the throttle lever 150 responds to the control command sent by the auto-throttle application 132 to control the operation of the engine 400, and the auto-throttle application 132 receives the throttle console status signal S3 fed back to indicate the next control command .

On the other hand, when WOW=1 (that is, the aircraft touches the ground) for more than 5 seconds and the average airspeed on both sides is greater than 60 knots, the autothrottle monitor 131 sends an error of the autothrottle (AT) function to the flight control board 140. The enabling signal S _Disabled , the flight control board 140 forwards the disabling signal S _Disabled to the throttle console, and the throttle console uses the disabling signal S _Disabled to power off the throttle console servo (not shown), and no longer Respond to control commands sent by the auto throttle application 132 .

In addition, when the auto-throttle (AT) function is disconnected or malfunctions, the auto-throttle application 132 sends a warning signal S2 of the auto-throttle function disconnection or failure to the main display 110 and the data concentrator 120, and the auto-throttle function is disconnected or disabled. The failed warning signal S2 is forwarded to the loudspeaker or the EICAS (i.e., Engine Indicating and Crew Warning System) display 160, which triggers the voice warning “Autothrottle Disengage” indicating that the automatic throttle (AT) function is disconnected, or triggers on the EICAS display 160 Show "AT FAULT" CAS

information.

In addition, in the data concentrator 120, alarm trigger suppression logic is set for disconnected or invalid alarm signal S2.

More specifically, the alarm trigger suppression logic is set to: in the non-suppression phase,

The data concentrator 120 receives the warning signal S2 of the disconnection or failure of the automatic throttle (AT) function and forwards it to the speaker or EICAS (that is, the engine indication and crew warning system) display 160, which triggers the signal indicating that the automatic throttle (AT) function is disconnected. Open voice alarm "Autothrottle Disengage", or display "AT FAULT" CAS information on the EICAS display 160 alone or additionally; in the suppression phase, the aforementioned voice alarm and CAS information will not be triggered, but the main display 110 The FMA (Flight Mode Signature) area of the AUTOMATIC does not suppress indications of autothrottle (AT) function disengagement. When the automatic throttle (AT) function is automatically disconnected, the "AT" character representing the automatic throttle function in the FMA area of the main display 110 will flash for 5 seconds, and then the yellow "AT" character will continue to be displayed until the pilot confirms the disconnection and then disappears .

In the following, the ergonomics-based autothrottle warning and protection logic framework of the present invention will be described respectively when the aircraft is in different stages. The human-machine efficacy-based autothrottle warning and protection logic architecture includes the protection logic of the autothrottle (AT) function and the warning logic of the autothrottle (AT) function. In addition, the alarm logic of the auto throttle function includes alarm trigger suppression logic for suppressing both the voice alarm indicating that the auto throttle (AT) function is disconnected and the CAS alarm indicating that the auto throttle (AT) function is invalid.

(takeoff phase)

For the autothrottle system designed based on the active throttle console, the pilot will arm the autothrottle system 100 by pressing the “AT” (ie, autothrottle function) button on the flight control panel 140 before the aircraft takes off.

A typical operating procedure when taking off is: the pilot releases the brakes, pushes the throttle lever 150 forward to a certain position, presses the "TO/GA" (that is, the throttle is adjusted to the maximum position) button, and then the autothrottle system 100 (autothrottle part 130) automatically Activate and push the throttle stick 150 forward to the takeoff thrust position. Once the takeoff thrust is set, the pilot will keep his hands on the throttle stick 150 until the aircraft speed reaches the takeoff decision speed. When WOW=1 (that is, the aircraft touches the ground) for more than 5 seconds and the average airspeed on both sides is greater than 60 knots, the autothrottle system 100 enters the hold (HOLD) mode, and pushes the throttle lever 150 forward to the takeoff thrust position to takeoff During the critical stage of takeoff greater than 400 feet above the ground, it is always in the hold (HOLD) mode, until when the radio altitude is greater than 400 feet, the autothrottle system 100 exits the hold (HOLD) mode, which is the automatic throttle (AT) function. protection logic. When the autothrottle system 100 is in the hold (HOLD) mode, the autothrottle unit 130 (autothrottle application 132 ) no longer sends any control commands to the throttle lever 150 including moving the throttle lever 150 . At the same time, preferably, the throttle lever 150 is also designed not to respond to the erroneous control command issued by the auto throttle application 132 at this stage.

In addition, in the critical stage of takeoff, due to the heavy workload of the pilot, the voice warning indicating that the automatic throttle (AT) function is disconnected is suppressed at this stage to avoid interference to the crew. In other words, if the autothrottle (AT) function is disconnected during the critical stage of takeoff, only the notification of the autothrottle status will be displayed in the FMA area of the main display 110, and the "AT FAULT" CAS message (indicating that "the autothrottle system 100 is fail to disconnect"

and other fault information) and the voice alarm indicating that the automatic throttle (AT) function is disconnected, this is the voice alarm indicating that the automatic throttle (AT) function is disconnected, indicating that the automatic throttle (AT)

The CAS alarm of function failure is suppressed, and the alarm triggers the suppression logic.

After takeoff greater than 400 feet, if the autothrottle (AT) function is still disabled, an "AT FAULT" CAS message is displayed on the EICAS (ie, Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System) display 160 . If the autothrottle (AT) function has not been reconnected after that or the pilot presses the "AT OFF" button to cancel the announcement of the autothrottle status, a further voice indicating that the autothrottle (AT) function is disconnected is given Alarm, this is the alarm logic of the Auto Throttle (AT) function. Doing this prevents the pilot from being unaware that the AT function has been disengaged, because if the pilot is unaware that the AT function has been disengaged, the AT function will not be activated when the pilot changes vertical mode after takeoff. Failure to automatically reduce thrust accordingly, resulting in overspeeding of the aircraft.

(landing phase)

In the landing stage, when the aircraft lands normally and touches the ground, at this time, if the auto throttle (AT) function is turned on, the auto throttle (AT) function will be automatically turned off. This is the protection logic of the auto throttle (AT) function , and at the same time, since the voice warning indicating that the automatic throttle (AT) function is disconnected is not suppressed, it is accompanied by a voice warning "AutothrottleDisengage", which is the warning logic of the automatic throttle (AT) function. In addition, if the pilot touches the "AT" (autothrottle) button or "TO/GA" by mistake 5 seconds after the plane lands (WOW=1)

(throttle to the maximum position) button, the automatic throttle (AT) function will not be automatically turned on,

It is still disconnected, which is also the protection logic of the automatic throttle (AT) function.

(go-around phase)

After the pilot received the landing instruction from the tower, the aircraft started to land normally, and the automatic flight vertical mode was the approach mode. It approached steadily along the glide path built by the radio, and descended while approaching. If a special situation suddenly occurs, such as runway incursion, wind shear and a series of factors make it impossible to continue the approach, the pilot needs to operate the aircraft's throttle stick 150, go around and climb, re-approach or return to another airport for alternate landing. During the go-around phase, two scenarios, normal go-around and low-altitude go-around, are considered.

During a normal go-around, after the pilot presses the "TO/GA" (throttle to the maximum position) button, the automatic flight vertical mode is the go-around mode, the autothrottle (AT) function is automatically connected, and the autothrottle system 100 automatically turns the throttle lever 150 is pushed to the "TO/GA" position.

A low-altitude go-around refers to a situation where a go-around is encountered at a low altitude (about 30 feet) in the air. As shown in Figure 2, the pilot manually disconnects the autothrottle (AT) function when entering the approach mode. Press at a low altitude (about 30 feet) due to sudden special circumstances

The "TO/GA" button activates the go-around mode (go-around at low altitude), the autoflight vertical mode is the go-around mode, and the autothrottle (AT) function is automatically engaged. During the process of the automatic throttle system 100 automatically pushing the throttle lever 150 forward from the "IDLE" (idle speed) position to the "TO/GA" position, the main wheel of the aircraft touches the ground (WOW=1), at this time, the automatic throttle The (AT) function is disconnected, which is the protection logic of the automatic throttle (AT) function. In addition, since the throttle lever 150 angle on both sides is greater than 59 degrees and the go-around thrust position is not reached, the brake is released, the wheel load is on the ground, and the airspeed is greater than 100 knots, that is, as shown in Figure 3, the flight stages required for take-off and go-around are met. The definition of T2, but as shown in Figure 2 does not satisfy the analysis based on the analysis of take-off and go-around scenarios in the present invention, comprehensively consider the definition of aircraft flight phase, the logic of automatic throttle (AT) function entering and exiting the take-off inhibition state and determined , Inhibition conditions including automatic flight vertical mode as take-off mode. At this time, not only the announcement of the autothrottle status (autothrottle (AT) function disconnection) can be seen in the FMA area of the main display 110, but also the voice alarm indicating that the autothrottle (AT) function is disconnected, indicating that the autothrottle (AT) function is invalid. The CAS alarm is not suppressed, ie accompanied by the "Autothrottle Disengage" voice alarm. Similarly, if it is disconnected due to AT failure during this process, the "AT FAULT" CAS message and

"Autothrottle Disengage" voice warning.

Although the embodiments of the present invention have been shown and described, those skilled in the art can understand that various changes, modifications and substitutions can be made to these embodiments without departing from the principle and spirit of the present invention. and modifications, the scope of the invention is defined by the appended claims and their equivalents.

For example, in the present invention, taking WOW=1 to keep more than 5 seconds as an example of the prescribed time length, and taking 60 knots as an example of the prescribed airspeed, the autothrottle monitor 131 sends an autothrottle (AT ) function of the enabling signal S _enabled or the discriminating condition of the disabling signal S _Disabled , but those skilled in the art should know that the specified duration should not be limited to only 5 seconds, and the specified airspeed should not be limited to only 60 knots, as long as It can meet the requirements of take-off and go-around, the specified duration can also be set to any value greater than 5 seconds, and the specified airspeed can also be set to a specified value greater than 60 knots.

Claims (12)

1. An automatic throttle alarming and protecting logic structure based on man-machine effect comprises an alarming logic of an automatic throttle function and is characterized in that,

in the alarm logic of the automatic throttle function, alarm trigger suppression logic which suppresses the triggering of both a voice alarm indicating that the automatic throttle function is off and a CAS alarm indicating that the automatic throttle function is disabled,

the alarm trigger suppression logic is configured to:

in a non-inhibition stage of not meeting the inhibition condition including that the automatic flight vertical mode is a take-off mode, the voice alarm and the CAS information are in a state capable of being triggered;

in the suppression phase when the suppression condition is satisfied, the voice alarm and the CAS information are not triggered, and only the notification that the automatic throttle function is disconnected is displayed in the FMA area of the main display.

2. The human-machine-efficiency-based automatic throttle alert and protection logic architecture of claim 1,

the suppression conditions are set to: when the auto-flight vertical mode is the takeoff mode, the dual takeoff thrust, brake release to radio altitude is greater than 400 feet, or the aircraft is airborne for more than 30 seconds.

3. The human-machine-efficiency-based automatic throttle alert and protection logic architecture of claim 2, further comprising protection logic for an automatic throttle function,

the protection logic for the automatic throttle function is designed to:

in the takeoff phase, the automatic flight vertical mode is set as the takeoff mode, when the aircraft is kept grounded for more than a specified time and the average airspeed on two sides is more than the specified airspeed, the automatic throttle system enters the holding mode of the automatic throttle function and is always in the holding mode in the key takeoff phase before the radio altitude is more than 400 feet, until the automatic throttle system exits the holding mode after the radio altitude is more than 400 feet,

in the landing stage, the automatic flight vertical mode is set to the approach mode,

when the aircraft normally lands on the ground, if the automatic throttle function is in a connected state, the automatic throttle function is automatically disconnected,

when the "TO/GA" button is pressed in the air, the missed approach phase is entered,

in the fly-back stage, the automatic flight vertical mode is set to the fly-back mode,

when the fly-back mode is activated at normal altitude, the automatic throttle function is automatically switched on,

when the fly-back mode is activated at low altitude, the auto-throttle function is automatically turned on, and when the main wheel of the aircraft touches the ground, the auto-throttle function is automatically turned off.

4. The human-machine-efficiency-based automatic throttle alert and protection logic architecture of claim 3,

the warning logic of the automatic throttle function is designed to:

during the take-off phase, the aircraft is,

executing the alarm trigger suppression logic when the key takeoff phase of the holding mode of the automatic throttle function is in,

triggering the displaying of the CAS information on the EICAS display if the auto throttle function is still in a disabled state after takeoff to a radio altitude greater than 400 feet, and further triggering the voice alert if the auto throttle function has not been turned back on thereafter or is subsequently confirmed to be turned off,

in the landing stage and the re-flight stage, when the aircraft touches the ground, the voice alarm is triggered while the automatic throttle function is disconnected.

5. The ergonomic benefit based automatic throttle alert and protection logic architecture of claim 3 or 4,

the protection logic for the auto throttle function is further designed to:

when the touchdown time of the airplane does not exceed the specified time in the landing stage and the re-flying stage, the airplane does not inhibit the automatic throttle function, at the moment, the automatic throttle function can be automatically activated by pressing the 'TO/GA' button,

and when the contact time of the airplane in the landing stage exceeds a specified time, the airplane inhibits the automatic throttle function.

6. The human-machine-efficiency-based automatic throttle alert and protection logic architecture of claim 5,

the prescribed period of time is 5 seconds,

the specified airspeed is 60 knots.

7. An automatic throttle system is characterized in that,

the automatic throttle system includes:

a primary display that receives signals from an atmospheric system regarding airspeed and altitude;

a data concentrator that relays on-wheel signals from the landing gear system,

in the data concentrator, the automatic throttle warning and protection logic architecture based on human-machine efficiency of any one of claims 1 to 6 is adopted.

8. The automatic throttle system of claim 7,

the automatic throttle system has an automatic throttle section with an automatic throttle monitor and an automatic throttle application,

the automatic throttle monitor receives the processing signals of the airspeed and the altitude processed by the main display and the wheel-borne signals forwarded by the data concentrator, and sends enabling signals or disabling signals of the automatic throttle function to the flight control panel.

9. The automatic throttle system of claim 8,

after the automatic throttle monitor sends an enabling signal of an automatic throttle function to the flight control panel, the flight control panel sends the enabling signal to the throttle platform, the throttle platform is in a state capable of receiving an automatic throttle instruction for automatic control at the moment, the throttle lever responds to a control instruction sent by the automatic throttle application to control the running of an engine, and the automatic throttle application receives a feedback throttle platform state signal to indicate the next control instruction.

10. The automatic throttle system of claim 8,

when the airplane is maintained to touch the ground for more than a specified time and the average airspeed on two sides is greater than the specified airspeed, the automatic throttle monitor sends out a disabling signal of the automatic throttle function to the flight control panel, the flight control panel forwards the disabling signal to the throttle platform, and the throttle platform uses the disabling signal to power off the servo of the throttle platform and does not respond to a control command sent by the automatic throttle application.

11. The auto-throttle system of claim 8,

when the automatic throttle function is disconnected or disabled, the automatic throttle application respectively sends out an alarm signal indicating the disconnection or the failure of the automatic throttle function to the main display and the data concentrator, and forwards the alarm signal to a loudspeaker or an E I CAS display, namely, a voice alarm indicating the disconnection of the automatic throttle function is triggered, or CAS information indicating the failure of the automatic throttle function is triggered to be displayed on the E I CAS display.

12. The automatic throttle system of claim 8,

when the automatic throttle function is automatically disconnected, the mark representing the automatic throttle function in the FMA area of the main display flickers for a set time, and then the mark is continuously displayed until the pilot disappears after confirming the disconnection.

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