CN115685260A - Identification deception jamming identification method, device, platform and medium for GLS reference station - Google Patents
Identification deception jamming identification method, device, platform and medium for GLS reference station Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses a deception jamming identification method, a deception jamming identification device, a deception jamming identification platform and a deception jamming identification medium of a GLS reference station. The method utilizes the application characteristic that the position of the GLS reference station is accurately known, and consistency check is carried out on the pseudo-range residual value of each visible satellite, so that the method can identify the forwarding type deception jamming and the generating type deception jamming, particularly the deception jamming in the scene without real signals, can identify which signal is the deception jamming, does not need to add extra measuring equipment, is simple, does not need to carry out algorithms with high complexity such as least square calculation and the like, and has small calculated amount. In addition, the geometric distance of mathematical calculation is used as a judgment reference, the random error is smaller and is about 3dB smaller than that of the traditional deception jamming identification method, and in addition, the false alarm probability and the false alarm probability of deception jamming identification are both greatly reduced.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of visual satellite navigation, and particularly relates to a deception jamming identification method, a deception jamming identification device, a deception jamming identification platform and a medium for a GLS reference station.
Background
A Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) has been widely applied to the fields of travel exploration, urban traffic, aviation Navigation, and precision guidance of weaponry, and in particular, a GNSS-based approach Landing System (GLS) has received wide attention from the aviation industry due to the characteristics of small floor space, no need of being laid on a runway extension line, simple verification and activation, and support of curve approach.
The GLS is mainly composed of a Base Station (BS) disposed in a suitable area of an airport, an onboard GLS receiver, and a differential and integrity Data Link (DL) radio Link. Wherein: the BS mainly completes tasks such as differential data generation, integrity detection and alarm, and the like, and the airborne GLS receiver outputs guide information to guide a pilot or an autopilot to approach and land according to a specified lower navigation path; DL is a one-way data transmission radio, and sends the differential and integrity alarm information generated by BS to the airborne equipment.
Because the GNSS visible satellite navigation signal has weak landing power, and a modulation coding system, a ranging code structure and an air interface control protocol of a public signal are disclosed, illegal molecules hidden near an airport can easily broadcast deception type interference signals by adopting illegal means such as storage forwarding or reconstruction regeneration and the like, thereby seriously influencing the approach of an aircraft to landing by utilizing GLS operation and even causing disaster type safety accidents. Therefore, it is important to accurately identify and reject fraudulent interfering signals in time during GLS operation.
Conventional deceptive jamming detection schemes mainly include a multi-peak detection method based on acquisition and a shortest path method based on tracking. A multi-peak detection method based on capture adopts a two-dimensional search method in a signal capture stage according to signal autocorrelation characteristics, can detect the values of a plurality of correlation peaks when the time delay of the forwarding type deception interference and the real signal is large, and considers that deception signals exist, and when the time delay of the forwarding type deception interference and the real signal is small, or when the signals only have the generating type deception interference and the real signal does not exist, whether the current signals are deception interference signals or the real signals cannot be detected. The technical principle of the method is mainly based on the characteristic that the time for the forwarding type deception jamming to reach a receiver is later than that of a real signal, and the propagation delay of the signal is estimated in a tracking stage, namely, which path of signal firstly reaches the receiver and which path of signal is considered to be the real signal. The existing method detects and identifies deception jamming by using the difference of deception jamming and real GNSS signals, and is only suitable for scenes of aliasing deception jamming signals and real signals. When illegal molecules adopt a certain means (such as broadband suppression type interference), all or part of GNSS visible satellite signals at a station and the periphery cannot be normally received, and only deception signals exist in an area, the deception type interference signals cannot be effectively detected, namely, the identification has limitation.
Disclosure of Invention
In view of the above, the present invention is directed to overcoming the limitations and disadvantages of the conventional GNSS spoofing interference identification method, so as to solve the problems set forth in the background art.
To achieve the above object, the present invention provides a spoofed interference identifying method of a GLS reference station, comprising,
step S100, acquiring visible satellite observation information and navigation messages provided by a baseband, wherein the visible satellite observation information comprises a carrier-to-noise ratio and pseudo-range measurement information, and the navigation messages comprise satellite ephemeris and ionosphere parameters;
step S200, calculating pseudo-range residual values of each visible satellite through prior information; the method comprises the following steps:
step S210, calculating the geometric distance from each visible satellite to the receiver according to the position of the receiver and the received satellite ephemeris, calculating the geometric distance from the pseudo-range of the mth visible satellite to the receiver by adopting a formula E1,
wherein, the receiverPosition r r ＝(x 0 ，y 0 ，z 0 ) T The position of the mth visible satellite is r s ＝(x m ，y m ，z m ) T M is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to M, M is the total number of visible satellites, and M is more than or equal to 4;
step S220, calculating pseudo-range residual values of each visible satellite; pseudo range residual value v of mth visible satellite m The calculation is carried out by adopting a formula E.2,
wherein,
a pseudorange measurement representing the mth visible satellite,
representing the geometrical distance, dT, of the m-th visible satellite from the receiver m Representing the visible satellite clock offset for the mth visible satellite,
indicating the ionospheric delay of the mth visible satellite,
representing the tropospheric delay of the mth visible satellite;
based on residual values v of pseudoranges from all visible satellites m Obtaining a pseudo-range residual vector v = (v) 1 ，v 2 ，v 3 ，...，v M ) T ，
Weighting the obtained pseudo-range residual vector v by a formula E.3,
v＝v*W
wherein R is r Error ratio of code and carrier phase, a σ 、b σ 、c σ Is a constant coefficient of the number of the,
is the elevation angle, σ, of the mth visible satellite eph Is the standard deviation, σ, of ephemeris and clock error ion Is the standard deviation, σ, of the ionosphere trop Is the standard deviation of the troposphere, σ bias Is the standard deviation, snr, of the pseudo code offset max Is the carrier-to-noise ratio threshold, snr m Is the carrier-to-noise ratio, MAX (snr), of the mth visible satellite max -snr m 0) denotes taking snr max -snr m And 0;
step S300, using the obtained pseudo-range residual value of each visible satellite for consistency check, and checking whether the visible satellite signal is a deception signal or a real signal, comprising the steps of:
step S310, selecting one visible satellite as a reference satellite, assuming that a reference satellite signal is a real signal, calculating a difference value between pseudo-range residual values of other visible satellites received by a receiver and the reference satellite, wherein the difference value is called a single difference, if the single difference value is greater than a threshold value, the corresponding visible satellite signal is a real signal, otherwise, the corresponding visible satellite signal is considered to be a deceptive signal, and obtaining a signal confidence coefficient identifier of each satellite according to a result of comparing the single difference value with the threshold value, namely, whether the visible satellite signal is a real signal or a deceptive signal; judging whether the obtained signal confidence coefficients are more than 4 visible satellites of real signals or not, and if the signal confidence coefficients are more than or equal to 4 visible satellites, considering that the current reference satellite is supposed to be true, namely the confidence coefficients of all the signals are correctly distinguished; if the number of the reference star is less than 4, judging that the signal of the current reference star is a deception signal, and entering step S220;
step S320, another visible satellite is selected again as the reference satellite, and step S310 is repeated, if 4 or more visible satellites with signal confidences as real signals are not found after traversing all the visible satellites, the signals of all the current visible satellites are considered to be deceptive signals.
Further, the position of the receiver is position information in a CGCS3000 or WGS-84 coordinate system, and the acquisition means comprises geodetic surveying, or 24-hour calibration and RTK calibration.
Further, the threshold value in step S310 is 60 meters.
Further, wherein the constant coefficient a σ The value is 0.003 and the constant coefficient b σ The value is 0.003 and the constant coefficient b σ Value 1.0, standard deviation σ of ephemeris and clock error eph The value is 0.5, the standard deviation sigma of the ionosphere ion A value of 5, standard deviation σ of troposphere trop Value 3, standard deviation σ of pseudo code offset bias A value of 0.3 and a carrier-to-noise ratio threshold snr max The value was 55.0.
The invention also provides a differential correction and integrity detection and alarm method of the GLS reference station, which adopts the deception jamming identification method of the GLS reference station and further comprises the following steps:
and step S400, when the differential correction quantity and the integrity detection are calculated at the reference station, the deception signal recognized in the step S300 is removed, and a deception signal alarm is sent to the aircraft running in the taking-off and landing operation in the service area through the differential data link.
The invention also provides a deception jamming identification device of the GLS reference station, which comprises a satellite information acquisition module, a pseudo-range residual error calculation module and a deception jamming identification module, wherein,
the satellite information acquisition module is used for acquiring visible satellite observation information and navigation messages provided by a baseband, wherein the visible satellite observation information comprises a carrier-to-noise ratio and pseudo-range measurement information, and the navigation messages comprise satellite ephemeris and ionosphere parameters;
the pseudo-range residual calculation module comprises a distance calculation sub-module and a pseudo-range residual calculation sub-module, wherein,
a distance calculation submodule for calculating the geometric distance from each visible satellite to the receiver according to the position of the receiver and the received satellite ephemeris information, wherein the geometric distance from the pseudo-range of the mth visible satellite to the receiver is calculated by adopting a formula E.1,
wherein the receiver is located at r r ＝(x 0 ，y 0 ，z 0 ) T The position of the mth visible satellite is r s ＝(x m ，y m ，z m ) T M is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to M, M is the total number of visible satellites, and M is more than or equal to 4;
the pseudo-range residual error calculation submodule is used for calculating the pseudo-range residual error value of each visible satellite; pseudo range residual value v of mth visible satellite m The calculation is carried out by adopting a formula E.2,
wherein,
a pseudorange measurement representing the mth visible satellite,
the geometric distance from the mth visible satellite to the receiver is shown, dTM shows the visible satellite clock error of the mth visible satellite, which is calculated by the satellite ephemeris,
the ionospheric delay of the mth visible satellite is calculated according to the ionospheric parameters,
representing the tropospheric delay of the mth visible satellite;
based on residual values v of pseudoranges from all visible satellites m Obtaining a pseudorange residual vector v = (v) 1 ，v 2 ，v 3 ，...，v m ) T ，
The obtained pseudorange residual vector v is weighted by a formula E.3,
v＝v*W
wherein R is r Error ratio of code and carrier phase, a σ 、b σ 、c σ Is a constant coefficient of the number of the,
is the elevation angle, σ, of the mth visible satellite eph Is the standard deviation, σ, of the ephemeris and clock error ion Is the standard deviation, σ, of the ionosphere trop Is the standard deviation of the troposphere, σ bias Is the standard deviation, snr, of the pseudo code offset max Is the carrier-to-noise ratio threshold, snr m Is the carrier-to-noise ratio, MAX (snr), of the current visible satellite max -snr m 0) represents taking snr max -snr m And 0;
the deception jamming identification module is used for carrying out consistency check on the pseudo-range residual value of each obtained visible satellite and checking whether the visible satellite signal is a deception signal or a real signal;
the consistency check is: selecting one visible satellite as a reference satellite, assuming that a reference satellite signal is a real signal, calculating a difference value between residual values of other visible satellites received by a receiver and a reference satellite pseudo-range, namely a single difference, if the single difference value is greater than a threshold value, the corresponding visible satellite signal is a real signal, otherwise, the corresponding visible satellite signal is considered to be a deceptive signal, and obtaining a signal confidence coefficient identifier of each satellite according to a result of comparing the single difference value with the threshold value, namely, whether the visible satellite signal is a real signal or a deceptive signal; judging whether the obtained signal confidence coefficients are more than 4 visible satellites of real signals or not, and if the obtained signal confidence coefficients are more than or equal to 4 visible satellites, considering that the current reference satellite is supposed to be true, namely the confidence coefficients of all the signals are correctly distinguished; and re-selecting another visible satellite as a reference satellite to repeatedly calculate the single difference and comparing the single difference with the threshold, and if more than 4 visible satellites with signal confidence coefficients as real signals are not found after traversing all the visible satellites, considering that the signals of all the current visible satellites are deception signals.
Further, the threshold value in the spoofed jamming identification module is 60 meters.
The invention also provides a GLS reference station, which adopts a deception jamming identification device of the GLS reference station and also comprises a differential correction quantity and integrity detection and alarm module,
and the module rejects the deception signal identified by the deception jamming identification device when calculating the differential correction quantity and the integrity detection, and sends the deception signal alarm to the aircraft running in the taking-off and landing operation in the service area through a differential data link.
The invention also provides a deception jamming identification platform of the GLS reference station, which comprises the following steps: at least one processor; and a memory communicatively coupled to the at least one processor; wherein the memory stores instructions executable by the at least one processor to enable the at least one processor to perform the method of spoof interference identification of a GLS reference station.
The invention also provides a computer readable storage medium storing a computer program which, when executed by a processor, implements the spoof interference identifying method of the GLS reference station.
Advantageous effects
The method utilizes the application characteristic that the position of the GLS reference station is accurately known, and consistency check is carried out on the pseudo-range residual value of each visible satellite, so that the method can identify the forwarding type deception jamming and the generating type deception jamming, particularly the deception jamming in the scene without real signals, can identify which signal is the deception jamming, does not need to add extra measuring equipment, is simple, does not need to carry out algorithms with high complexity such as least square calculation and the like, and has small calculated amount. In addition, the geometric distance of mathematical calculation is used as a judgment reference, the random error is smaller and is about 3dB smaller than that of the traditional deception jamming identification method, and in addition, the false alarm probability and the false alarm probability of deception jamming identification are both greatly reduced.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a flowchart of a spoofed interference identifying method of a GLS reference station according to the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a schematic view of the geometrical distance between the receiver and the visible satellite.
Fig. 3 is a block diagram of the spoofed interference identifying means of the GLS reference station of the present invention.
Fig. 4 is a block diagram of the spoofed jamming identification platform of the GLS reference station of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The following describes in detail embodiments of the present invention with reference to the drawings.
The invention fully utilizes the application characteristic that the position of the GLS reference station is accurately known, and solves the problem that the traditional deception jamming identification method can not identify the environment in which only deception signals exist on the basis of comparing the relation between the estimated geometric distance and the measured pseudo range. The invention provides a novel GNSS deception jamming identification method, which solves the limitations and the defects of the traditional GNSS deception jamming identification method.
According to the principle of visual satellite navigation and positioning, after a receiver receives all visual GNSS visual satellite signals through an antenna, data processing is carried out on the signals, the transmitting time of each visual satellite signal can be accurately measured, the distance between the receiver and the visual satellite is obtained by multiplying the difference between the local time of the receiver and the transmitting time of the measured signal by the light speed, and the distance at the moment comprises ionospheric delay and tropospheric delay brought by the signal passing through the atmosphere, earth rotation error, relativistic effect error, measuring error of the receiver and the like, so that the measured value at the moment is called pseudo range.
Conversely, when the position of the user is known, the position of the visible satellite at the signal transmitting time can be easily obtained through the measurement information and the satellite ephemeris, and further the geometric distance (including the earth rotation correction and the relativistic effect) between each visible satellite and the receiver can be obtained. The ionosphere delay is obtained through ionosphere parameter calculation, the troposphere delay is obtained through troposphere model calculation, after the errors are corrected, the pseudo range between each visible satellite and the receiver can be accurately estimated, the estimated pseudo range and the measured pseudo range are used for making a difference value (called pseudo range residual), and at the moment, the error of the pseudo range residual only remains the error of the correction model and the error brought by the receiver noise.
In order to make the threshold value uniform, the pseudo range residuals of all visible satellites are weighted. After the weighted pseudo-range residual error is obtained, 1 visible satellite is selected as a reference satellite, the difference value between the other visible satellites and the reference satellite is calculated and called as a single difference, the single difference value of each visible satellite obtained through calculation has high consistency, when the single difference value is larger than a threshold value (for example, 60 meters), the corresponding visible satellite signal is a deception jamming signal, and the signal smaller than the threshold value is a real signal, when the traversal of the current round is completed, if more than 4 real signals exist, the traversal is considered to be completed, otherwise, the reference satellite is replaced to continue the traversal, and when more than 4 real signals are not found after all visible satellite signals are traversed, no real signal exists in the scene.
Example 1
The embodiment provides a deception jamming identification method of a GLS reference station. As shown in FIG. 1, the detailed process flow of the present invention is as follows:
step S100, visible satellite observation information and navigation messages provided by a baseband are obtained, wherein the visible satellite observation information comprises a carrier-to-noise ratio and pseudo-range measurement information, and the navigation messages comprise satellite ephemeris and ionosphere parameters;
step S200, calculating pseudo-range residual values of each visible satellite through prior information; the method comprises the following steps:
step S210, as shown in fig. 2, the european equation calculates the geometric distance from each visible satellite to the receiver according to the receiver position (the receiver position, including but not limited to the position information in the CGCS3000 or WGS-84 coordinate system obtained by geodetic surveying, 24-hour calibration, RTK calibration, etc.) and the received satellite ephemeris, the pseudo-range from the mth visible satellite to the receiver is calculated by the equation e.1,
wherein the receiver is located at r r ＝(x 0 ，y 0 ，z 0 ) T The position of the mth visible satellite is r s ＝(x m ，y m ，z m ) T M is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to M, M is the total number of visible satellites, M is more than or equal to 4, and the positions of the visible satellites can be calculated according to a satellite ephemeris;
step S220, calculating pseudo-range residual values of each visible satellite; pseudo range residual value v of mth visible satellite m The calculation is carried out by adopting a formula E.2,
wherein,
the method comprises the steps that a pseudo-range measurement value of an mth visible satellite is represented, and can be directly obtained from visible satellite observation quantity information and a navigation message provided by a baseband, wherein the visible satellite measurement information specifically comprises a carrier-to-noise ratio, original pseudo-range measurement information, carrier whole-cycle counting and the like, and the navigation message comprises a satellite ephemeris, an almanac and an ionosphere parameter;
representing the geometrical distance, dT, of the m-th visible satellite from the receiver m The clock error of the visible satellite of the mth visible satellite is represented, and the clock error of the visible satellite is calculated by a satellite ephemeris;
the ionospheric delay of the mth visible satellite is expressed, the ionospheric delay is calculated according to the ionospheric parameters,
representing the tropospheric delay of the mth visible satellite, which can be calculated by a Saastamoinen model;
based on residual values v of all visible satellites m Obtaining a pseudorange residual vector v = (v) 1 ，v 2 ，v 3 ，...，v M ) T ，
The obtained pseudo-range residual vector v The weighting process is performed by the formula e.3,
v＝v*W
wherein R is r Error ratio of code and carrier phase, a σ 、b σ 、c σ Is a constant coefficient, a σ The value is usually 0.003,b σ Usually, the value is 0.003,c σ Usually the value is 1.0 and,
is the elevation angle of the mth visible satellite,calculated from the receiver position and the received satellite ephemeris, σ eph Is the standard deviation of ephemeris and clock error, usually taken to be 0.5, σ ion Is the standard deviation of the ionosphere, and the elutriation factory value is 5, sigma trop Is the standard deviation of the troposphere, usually taken to be 3, σ bias Is the standard deviation of the pseudo-code offset, typically 0.3, snr max Is a carrier-to-noise ratio threshold, typically 55 m Is the carrier to noise ratio, MAX (snr), of the mth visible satellite max -snr m 0) denotes taking snr max -snr m And 0;
step S300, using the obtained pseudo-range residual value of each visible satellite for consistency check, and checking whether the visible satellite signal is a deception signal or a real signal, comprising the steps of:
step S210, selecting one visible satellite as a reference satellite, assuming that a reference satellite signal is a real signal, calculating a difference value between pseudo-range residual values of other visible satellites received by a receiver and the reference satellite, wherein the difference value is called a single difference, if the single difference value is greater than a threshold value, the corresponding visible satellite signal is a real signal, otherwise, the corresponding visible satellite signal is considered to be a deceptive signal, and obtaining a signal confidence coefficient identifier of each satellite according to a result of comparing the single difference value with the threshold value, namely, whether the visible satellite signal is a real signal or a deceptive signal; judging whether the obtained signal confidence coefficients are more than 4 visible satellites of real signals or not, and if the signal confidence coefficients are more than or equal to 4 visible satellites, considering that the current reference satellite is supposed to be true, namely the confidence coefficients of all the signals are correctly distinguished; if the number of the satellite signals is less than 4, judging that the signal of the current reference satellite is a deception signal, and entering step S220;
step S220, another visible satellite is reselected as the reference satellite, and step S310 is repeated, and if 4 or more visible satellites with true signal confidences are not found after traversing all the visible satellites, the signals of all the visible satellites are considered to be deceptive signals.
The invention is based on a variation of the idea that the deception signal inevitably causes the position deviation, adopts the mode of a reference station, and carries out 24 hours or RTK calibration technology in advance through the geodetic mapping technology or using authorization signals and the like to obtain the real position of the reference station, and when the deception signal is received, adopts the idea that the information of the deception signal inevitably causes the deviation of the positioning result.
Example 2
In embodiment 2, when the differential correction and integrity detection are calculated at the reference station, the identified cheating signals are removed, and the cheating signal alarm is sent to an aircraft running in a take-off and landing operation in a service area through a differential data link.
Example 3
As shown in fig. 3, the present embodiment provides a spoofed interference identifying apparatus of a GLS reference station, which includes a satellite information obtaining module, a pseudo-range residual calculating module and a spoofed interference identifying module, wherein,
the satellite information acquisition module is used for acquiring visible satellite observation information and navigation messages provided by a baseband, wherein the visible satellite observation information comprises a carrier-to-noise ratio and pseudo-range measurement information, and the navigation messages comprise satellite ephemeris and ionosphere parameters;
the pseudo-range residual calculation module comprises a distance calculation sub-module and a pseudo-range residual calculation sub-module, wherein,
a distance calculation submodule for calculating the geometric distance from each visible satellite to the receiver according to the position of the receiver and the received satellite ephemeris information, wherein the geometric distance from the pseudo-range of the mth visible satellite to the receiver is calculated by adopting a formula E.1,
wherein the receiver is located at r r ＝(x 0 ，y 0 ，z 0 ) T The position of the mth visible satellite is r s ＝(x m ，y m ，z m ) T M is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to M, M is the total number of visible satellites, M is more than or equal to 4, and the positions of the visible satellites can be calculated according to a satellite ephemeris;
the pseudo-range residual error calculation submodule is used for calculating the pseudo-range residual error value of each visible satellite; pseudo range residual value v of mth visible satellite m The calculation is carried out by adopting a formula E.2,
wherein,
a pseudorange observation representing the mth visible satellite,
representing the geometric distance, dT, from the mth visible satellite to the receiver m The visible satellite clock error representing the mth visible satellite,
indicating the ionospheric delay of the mth visible satellite,
representing the tropospheric delay of the mth visible satellite;
based on residual values v of pseudoranges from all visible satellites m Obtaining a pseudorange residual vector v = (v) 1 ，v 2 ，v 3 ，...，v m ) T ，
Weighting the obtained pseudo-range residual vector v by a formula E.3,
v＝v*W
wherein R is r Error ratio of code and carrier phase, a σ 、b σ 、 cσ Is a constant coefficient of a σ The value is usually 0.003,b σ The value is usually 0.003,c σ Usually, the value is 1.0, and,
is the elevation angle of the mth visible satellite, calculated from the receiver position and the received satellite ephemeris, σ eph Is the standard deviation of ephemeris and clock error, usually taken to be 0.5, σ ion Is the standard deviation of the ionosphere, and the elutriation factory value is 5, sigma trop Is the standard deviation of the troposphere, typically 3, σ bias Is the standard deviation of the pseudo-code offset, typically 0.3, snr max Is the carrier-to-noise ratio threshold, which is usually 55 m Is the carrier-to-noise ratio, MAX (snr), of the mth visible satellite max -snr m 0) denotes taking snr max -snr m And 0.
The deception jamming identification module is used for carrying out consistency check on the pseudo-range residual value of each obtained visible satellite and checking whether the visible satellite signal is a deception signal or a real signal;
the consistency check is: selecting one visible satellite as a reference satellite, assuming that a reference satellite signal is a real signal, calculating a difference value between residual values of other visible satellites received by a receiver and a reference satellite pseudo-range, namely a single difference, if the single difference value is greater than a threshold value, the corresponding visible satellite signal is a real signal, otherwise, the corresponding visible satellite signal is considered to be a deceptive signal, and obtaining a signal confidence coefficient identifier of each satellite according to a result of comparing the single difference value with the threshold value, namely, whether the visible satellite signal is a real signal or a deceptive signal; judging whether the obtained signal confidence coefficients are more than 4 visible satellites of real signals or not, and if the obtained signal confidence coefficients are more than or equal to 4 visible satellites, considering that the current reference satellite is supposed to be true, namely the confidence coefficients of all the signals are correctly distinguished; and re-selecting another visible satellite as a reference satellite to repeatedly calculate the single difference and compare the single difference with the threshold, and if more than 4 visible satellites with signal confidence degrees as real signals are not found after traversing all the visible satellites, considering that the signals of all the current visible satellites are deceptive signals.
Preferably, the threshold value in the spoofed jamming identification module is 60 meters.
Furthermore, the invention can realize the GLS reference station by adopting the deception jamming recognition device of the GLS reference station, and the GLS reference station also comprises a differential correction quantity and integrity detection and alarm module which is used for calculating the differential correction quantity and integrity detection and alarm, and the module rejects the deception signal recognized by the deception jamming recognition device when calculating the differential correction quantity and integrity detection and sends a deception signal alarm to the aircraft running in the taking-off and landing operations in the service area through a differential data link.
Example 4
As shown in fig. 4, the present embodiment provides a spoofed interference identification platform of a GLS reference station, which includes at least one processor and a memory communicatively connected to the at least one processor; the memory stores instructions executable by the at least one processor, and the instructions are executed by the at least one processor to enable the at least one processor to execute the spoof-interference identifying method for the GLS reference station.
Where the memory and processor are connected by a bus, the bus may comprise any number of interconnected buses and bridges, the buses connecting together one or more of the various circuits of the processor and the memory. The bus may also interface various other circuits such as peripherals, voltage regulators, power management circuits, and the like, which are well known in the art. The interface provides an interface, e.g., a communication interface, a user interface, between the bus and the transceiver. The transceiver may be one element or a plurality of elements, such as a plurality of receivers and transmitters, providing a means for communicating with various other apparatus over a transmission medium. The data processed by the processor is transmitted over a wireless medium via an antenna, which further receives the data and transmits the data to the processor.
The processor is responsible for managing the bus and general processing and may also provide various functions including timing, peripheral interfaces, voltage regulation, power management, and other control functions. And the memory may be used to store data used by the processor in performing operations.
Example 5
The present embodiment provides a computer-readable storage medium, in which a computer program is stored, which, when being executed by a processor, implements the above-described method embodiments.
As can be understood by those skilled in the art from the foregoing description, all or part of the steps in the method according to the foregoing embodiments may be implemented by a program, where the program is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions to enable a device (which may be a single chip, a chip, or the like) or a processor (processor) to execute all or part of the steps in the method according to the foregoing embodiments. The storage medium includes, but is not limited to, various media that can store program codes, such as a usb disk, a removable hard disk, a magnetic storage, an optical storage, and the like.
The present invention is not limited to the above preferred embodiments, and any modifications, equivalents, improvements, etc. made within the principle of the present invention are included in the scope of the present invention.
Claims (10)
1. A deception jamming identification method of a GLS reference station is characterized by comprising the following steps,
step S100, acquiring visible satellite observation information and navigation messages provided by a baseband, wherein the visible satellite observation information comprises a carrier-to-noise ratio and pseudo-range measurement information, and the navigation messages comprise satellite ephemeris and ionosphere parameters;
step S200, calculating pseudo-range residual values of each visible satellite through prior information; the method comprises the following steps:
step S210, calculating the geometric distance from each visible satellite to the receiver according to the position of the receiver and the received satellite ephemeris, calculating the geometric distance from the mth visible satellite to the receiver by adopting a formula E.1,
wherein the receiver is located at r r ＝(x 0 ,y 0 ,z 0 ) T The position of the mth visible satellite is r s ＝(x m ,y m ,z m ) T M is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to M, M is the total number of visible satellites, and M is more than or equal to 4;
step S220, calculating pseudo-range residual values of each visible satellite; pseudo range residual value v of mth visible satellite m The calculation is carried out by adopting a formula E.2,
wherein,
a pseudorange measurement representing the mth visible satellite,
representing the geometric distance, dT, from the mth visible satellite to the receiver m The clock error of the visible satellite representing the mth visible satellite is calculated by the satellite ephemeris,
the ionospheric delay of the mth visible satellite is calculated according to the ionospheric parameters,
representing the tropospheric delay of the mth visible satellite;
based on residual values v of all visible satellites m Obtaining a pseudorange residual vector v = (v) 1 ,v 2 ,v 3 ,...,v M ) T ，
The obtained pseudorange residual vector v is weighted by a formula E.3,
v＝v*W
wherein R is r Error ratio of code and carrier phase, a σ 、b σ 、c σ Is a constant coefficient of the number of the,
is the elevation angle, σ, of the mth visible satellite eph Is the standard deviation, σ, of the ephemeris and clock error ion Is the standard deviation, σ, of the ionosphere trop Is the standard deviation of the troposphere, σ bias Is the standard deviation, snr, of the pseudo code offset max Is the carrier to noise ratio threshold, s n r m Is the carrier to noise ratio, MAX (snr), of the mth visible satellite max -snr m 0) represents taking snr max -snr m And 0;
step S300, using the obtained pseudo-range residual value of each visible satellite for consistency check to check whether the visible satellite signal is a deception signal or a real signal, and comprising the following steps:
step S310, selecting one visual satellite as a reference satellite, assuming that a reference satellite signal is a real signal, calculating a difference value between pseudo-range residual values of other visual satellites received by a receiver and the reference satellite, wherein the difference value is called a single difference, if the single difference value is greater than a threshold value, the corresponding visual satellite signal is a real signal, otherwise, the corresponding visual satellite signal is considered to be a deceptive signal, and obtaining a signal confidence coefficient identifier of each satellite according to a result of comparing the single difference value with the threshold value, namely, whether the visual satellite signal is a real signal or a deceptive signal; judging whether the obtained signal confidence coefficients are more than 4 visible satellites of real signals or not, and if the obtained signal confidence coefficients are more than or equal to 4 visible satellites, considering that the current reference satellite is supposed to be true, namely the confidence coefficients of all the signals are correctly distinguished; if the number of the satellite signals is less than 4, judging that the signal of the current reference satellite is a deception signal, and entering step S320;
step S320, another visible satellite is reselected as the reference satellite, and step S310 is repeated, and if 4 or more visible satellites with true signal confidences are not found after traversing all the visible satellites, the signals of all the visible satellites are considered to be deceptive signals.
2. A method of deception jamming identification of a GLS reference station as claimed in claim 1 wherein the receiver position is position information in the CGCS3000 or WGS-84 coordinate system and the acquisition means includes geodetic surveying, or 24 hour calibration, RTK calibration.
3. A method of deception jamming identification of a GLS reference station as claimed in claim 1 wherein the threshold in step S310 is 60 meters.
4. A method of identifying deception jamming by a GLS reference station as claimed in claim 1 wherein the constant coefficient a σ The value is 0.003 and the constant coefficient b σ Value of 0.003, constant coefficient c σ Value 1.0, standard deviation σ of ephemeris and clock error eph The value is 0.5, the standard deviation sigma of the ionosphere ion A value of 5, standard deviation σ of troposphere trop Criterion for pseudo code bias with value 3Difference sigma bias A value of 0.3 and a carrier-to-noise ratio threshold snr max The value was 55.0.
5. A method for differential corrections and integrity detection and warning of a GLS reference station, characterized in that a spoof interference identifying method of a GLS reference station according to any one of claims 1-4 is used, further comprising:
and step S400, when the differential correction quantity and the integrity detection are calculated at the reference station, the deception signal recognized in the step S300 is removed, and a deception signal alarm is sent to the aircraft running in the taking-off and landing operation in the service area through the differential data link.
6. A deception jamming identification device of a GLS reference station is characterized by comprising a satellite information acquisition module, a pseudo-range residual error calculation module and a deception jamming identification module, wherein,
the satellite information acquisition module is used for acquiring visible satellite observation information and navigation messages provided by a baseband, wherein the visible satellite observation information comprises a carrier-to-noise ratio and pseudo-range measurement information, and the navigation messages comprise satellite ephemeris and ionosphere parameters;
the pseudo-range residual calculation module comprises a distance calculation sub-module and a pseudo-range residual calculation sub-module, wherein,
a distance calculation submodule for calculating the geometric distance from each visible satellite to the receiver according to the position of the receiver and the received satellite ephemeris information, wherein the geometric distance from the pseudo-range of the mth visible satellite to the receiver is calculated by adopting a formula E.1,
wherein the receiver is located at r r ＝(x 0 ,y 0 ,z 0 ) T The position of the mth visible satellite is r s ＝(x m ,y m ,z m ) T M is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to M, M is the total number of visible satellites, and M is more than or equal to 4;
pseudo-range residual calculation submoduleA block for calculating a pseudorange residual value for each visible satellite; pseudo range residual value v of mth visible satellite m The calculation is carried out by adopting a formula E.2,
wherein,
a pseudorange measurement representing the mth visible satellite,
representing the geometrical distance, dT, of the m-th visible satellite from the receiver m The visible satellite clock error of the mth visible satellite is calculated by the satellite ephemeris,
the ionospheric delay of the mth visible satellite is calculated according to the ionospheric parameters,
representing the tropospheric delay of the mth visible satellite;
based on residual values v of pseudoranges from all visible satellites m Obtaining a pseudorange residual vector v = (v) 1 ,v 2 ,v 3 ,...,v m ) T ，
Weighting the obtained pseudo-range residual vector v by a formula E.3,
v＝v*W
wherein R is r Error ratio of code and carrier phase, a σ 、b σ 、c σ Is a constant coefficient of the number of the,
is the elevation angle, σ, of the mth visible satellite eph Is the standard deviation, σ, of ephemeris and clock error ion Is the standard deviation, σ, of the ionosphere trop Is the standard deviation of the troposphere, σ bias Is the standard deviation, snr, of the pseudo code offset max Is the carrier-to-noise ratio threshold, snr m Is the carrier-to-noise ratio, MAX (snr), of the current visible satellite max -snr m 0) represents taking snr max -snr m And 0;
the deception jamming identification module is used for carrying out consistency check on the pseudo-range residual value of each obtained visible satellite and checking whether the visible satellite signal is a deception signal or a real signal;
the consistency check is: selecting one visible satellite as a reference satellite, assuming that a reference satellite signal is a real signal, calculating a difference value between residual values of other visible satellites received by a receiver and a reference satellite pseudo-range, namely a single difference, if the single difference value is greater than a threshold value, the corresponding visible satellite signal is a real signal, otherwise, the corresponding visible satellite signal is considered to be a deceptive signal, and obtaining a signal confidence coefficient identifier of each satellite according to a result of comparing the single difference value with the threshold value, namely, whether the visible satellite signal is a real signal or a deceptive signal; judging whether the obtained signal confidence coefficients are more than 4 visible satellites of real signals or not, and if the obtained signal confidence coefficients are more than or equal to 4 visible satellites, considering that the current reference satellite is supposed to be true, namely the confidence coefficients of all the signals are correctly distinguished; and re-selecting another visible satellite as a reference satellite to repeatedly calculate the single difference and compare the single difference with the threshold, and if more than 4 visible satellites with signal confidence degrees as real signals are not found after traversing all the visible satellites, considering that the signals of all the current visible satellites are deceptive signals.
7. The apparatus for spoof interference recognition of a GLS reference station as in claim 6 wherein said threshold in the spoof interference recognition module is 60 meters.
8. A GLS reference station, characterised in that fraud interference identification means associated with the GLS reference station of claim 6 or 7 is employed, further comprising a differential correction and integrity detection and warning module,
and the module rejects the deception signal identified by the deception jamming identification device when calculating the differential correction quantity and the integrity detection, and sends a deception signal alarm to the aircraft running the taking-off and landing operations in the service area through a differential data link.
9. A spoof interference identification platform for a GLS reference station comprising:
at least one processor; and the number of the first and second groups,
a memory communicatively coupled to the at least one processor; wherein,
the memory stores instructions executable by the at least one processor to enable the at least one processor to perform a method of spoof-interference identification of a GLS reference station as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 4.
10. A computer readable storage medium storing a computer program, wherein the computer program when executed by a processor implements the spoof interference identifying method of a GLS reference station of any one of claims 1 through 4.
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Cited By (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN116774252A (en) * | 2023-08-25 | 2023-09-19 | 中国人民解放军战略支援部队航天工程大学 | A navigation deception interference detection method based on single-receiver pseudorange variation |
| CN117388876A (en) * | 2023-12-11 | 2024-01-12 | 中国科学院微电子研究所 | Multi-station combined GNSS signal integrity monitoring method and equipment |
| CN118778080A (en) * | 2024-07-29 | 2024-10-15 | 广州斯达尔科技有限公司 | A GBAS pseudorange correction simulation method and device based on GPS simulator |
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Cited By (5)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN116774252A (en) * | 2023-08-25 | 2023-09-19 | 中国人民解放军战略支援部队航天工程大学 | A navigation deception interference detection method based on single-receiver pseudorange variation |
| CN116774252B (en) * | 2023-08-25 | 2023-10-27 | 中国人民解放军战略支援部队航天工程大学 | A navigation deception interference detection method based on single-receiver pseudorange variation |
| CN117388876A (en) * | 2023-12-11 | 2024-01-12 | 中国科学院微电子研究所 | Multi-station combined GNSS signal integrity monitoring method and equipment |
| CN117388876B (en) * | 2023-12-11 | 2024-03-22 | 中国科学院微电子研究所 | A multi-site joint GNSS signal integrity monitoring method and equipment |
| CN118778080A (en) * | 2024-07-29 | 2024-10-15 | 广州斯达尔科技有限公司 | A GBAS pseudorange correction simulation method and device based on GPS simulator |
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