CN115297475B - Quantum key distribution method for rail transit system - Google Patents
Quantum key distribution method for rail transit system Download PDFInfo
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- CN115297475B CN115297475B CN202211186141.8A CN202211186141A CN115297475B CN 115297475 B CN115297475 B CN 115297475B CN 202211186141 A CN202211186141 A CN 202211186141A CN 115297475 B CN115297475 B CN 115297475B
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- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 105
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
- H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
- H04W4/42—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P] for mass transport vehicles, e.g. buses, trains or aircraft
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/84—Vehicles
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Aviation & Aerospace Engineering (AREA)
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- Electromagnetism (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
A secret key distribution method for encrypted communication in rail transit. The method comprises the steps that a first ground control terminal obtains a first random secret key and a second random secret key; the first ground control terminal encrypts a first communication key and a second random key; the second ground control terminal acquires a second random key and a third random key; the second ground control terminal encrypts a second communication key and a third random key; the first ground control terminal sends the encrypted first communication key and the encrypted second random key; the VOBC decrypts the first communication key and the second random key; when the VOBC is located in the preset position interval, the second ground control terminal sends the encrypted second communication key and the encrypted third random key; the VOBC decrypts the second communication key and the third random key. In the application, the communication key encrypts the communication data, and the random key encrypts the communication key and the random key of the next site, so that the safety of communication between the VOBC and the ground terminal is improved through double encryption.
Description
Technical Field
The embodiment of the application relates to the technical field of quantum communication, in particular to a quantum key distribution method for a rail transit system.
Background
With the development of global informatization, the requirement of information technology on information security is increasing day by day, and quantum communication with high security is also more and more valued by people. In the field of Quantum communication, quantum Key Distribution (QKD) technology is one of core technologies.
The development of modern cities can not leave the urban rail transit, and along with the continuous expansion of cities, the rail transit also needs to be continuously expanded and developed. The Automatic Train Control (ATC) system in urban rail transit comprises: an Automatic Train Supervision (ATS) system, an Automatic Train Protection (ATP) system, and an Automatic Train Operation (ATO) system. In the ATC system, a vehicle-mounted Controller (VOBC) at a vehicle end and an ATS system/Zone Controller (ZC, zone Controller)/Computer Interlock (CI) at a ground end together implement a Communication-Based Train automatic Control (CBTC) system. The VOBC at the vehicle end and the ATS system/ZC/CI at the ground end realize communication through a wireless communication network.
In the related art, since the communication between the VOBC on the vehicle side and the ATS system/ZC/CI on the ground side is based on a wireless communication network, the security of the communication data is not high.
Disclosure of Invention
The application provides a secret key distribution method for encrypted communication in rail transit, which can be used for solving the problem that the safety of communication data is not high due to the fact that the communication between a VOBC at a vehicle end and an ATS system/ZC/CI at a ground end in the prior art is based on a wireless communication network.
The application provides a secret key distribution method for encrypted communication in rail transit, which comprises the following steps:
a first ground control terminal acquires a first random key and a second random key, wherein the first random key and the second random key are keys used for encrypting keys;
the first ground control terminal encrypts a first communication key and the second random key according to the first random key, wherein the first communication key is used for encrypting communication data of an Automatic Train Control (ATC) system;
the second ground control terminal acquires the second random key and the third random key;
the second ground control terminal encrypts a second communication key and the third random key according to the second random key, wherein the second communication key is used for encrypting communication data of the ATC system;
the first ground control terminal sends the encrypted first communication key and the encrypted second random key;
the vehicle-mounted controller VOBC receives and decrypts the encrypted first communication key and the encrypted second random key;
when the VOBC is located in a preset position interval, the second ground control terminal sends the encrypted second communication key and the encrypted third random key, wherein the preset position interval is an overlapped area of respective signal coverage areas of the first ground control terminal and the second ground control terminal;
the VOBC receives and decrypts the encrypted second communication key and the third random key.
Optionally, the obtaining, by the first ground control terminal, a first random key and a second random key includes:
if the first ground control terminal is the ground control terminal of the first station among the plurality of stations corresponding to the VOBC, using a preset random number as a first random key;
if the first ground control terminal is not the ground control terminal of the first station in the plurality of stations corresponding to the VOBC, a key management server group generates the first random key, wherein the key management server group comprises at least one key management server;
a first key management server corresponding to the first ground control terminal in the key management server group sends the first random key;
the first ground control terminal receives the first random key;
the key management server group generates the second random key;
the first key management server in the key management server group sends the second random key;
and the first ground control terminal receives the second random secret key.
Optionally, the first ground control terminal and the second ground control terminal are ground control terminals of two adjacent platforms of a plurality of platforms corresponding to the VOBC.
Optionally, the method comprises:
if the first ground control terminal is the ground control terminal of the last station in the plurality of stations corresponding to the VOBC, the last two key management servers in the key management server group generate the first random key;
the last key management server in the key management server group sends the first random key;
the first ground control terminal receives the first random secret key;
the first ground control terminal encrypts the first communication key according to the first random key;
the first ground control terminal sends the encrypted first communication key;
the VOBC receives and decrypts the encrypted first communication key.
In the application, the communication key encrypts the communication data, and the random key encrypts the communication key and the random key of the next site, so that the safety of communication between the VOBC and the ground terminal is improved through double encryption.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic illustration of an implementation environment provided by one embodiment of the present application;
fig. 2 is a flowchart of a key distribution method for encrypted communication in rail transit according to an embodiment of the present application.
Detailed Description
To make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present application more clear, embodiments of the present application will be described in further detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
The system architecture and the application scenario described in the embodiment of the present application are for more clearly illustrating the technical solution of the embodiment of the present application, and do not constitute a limitation to the technical solution provided in the embodiment of the present application, and it can be known by a person skilled in the art that the technical solution provided in the embodiment of the present application is also applicable to similar technical problems along with the evolution of the system architecture and the appearance of new application scenarios.
Refer to fig. 1, which illustrates an exemplary embodiment of the present application. As shown in fig. 1, a VOBC 101 is mounted in a train 102, and each station is provided with a ground control terminal. Among them, the ground control terminal 103 is configured with an ATS system/ZC/CI and the like. When the train 102 passes through different stations in the traveling process, a communication link is established with the ground control terminals 103 of the different stations, and the dispatching of the different ground control terminals is received within the traveling ranges corresponding to the different stations. Each site has an installed key management server 104, and the key management servers 104 of the sites together form a key management server group. Each group of quantum keys is generated by two key management servers in the key management server group through negotiation.
Fig. 2 is a key distribution method for encrypted communication in rail transit, according to an exemplary embodiment, the method includes the following steps:
step 201, a first ground control terminal obtains a first random key and a second random key.
The first ground control terminal is a control terminal of a station corresponding to a driving range where the train is located at the current stage, and the first ground control terminal obtains the first random key and the second random key before the train drives into the range corresponding to the first ground control terminal. Wherein the first random key and the second random key are keys used for encryption keys. When the VOBC on the train communicates with the ground control terminal, the communication data needs to be encrypted through a secret key to ensure the safety. The secret key used for encrypting the communication data is a communication secret key, and different ground control terminals adopt different communication secret keys. When the train runs to the range corresponding to different stations, the VOBC on the train adopts different communication keys to communicate with the ground control terminals of different stations. Therefore, before the train enters the range corresponding to the first ground control terminal, the first ground control terminal needs to obtain the first random key and the second random key to encrypt the first communication key and send the encrypted first communication key to the VOBC.
Alternatively, the key management server set generates the first random key if the first ground control terminal is not the ground control terminal of the first station of the plurality of stations corresponding to the VOBC. Each platform is provided with a key management server, and the key management servers of adjacent platforms establish communication links to jointly form a key management server group. The key management server group includes at least one key management server. The key management server comprises a quantum key transmitter and a quantum key receiver. And the key management servers of the adjacent stations negotiate to generate the quantum key. When the first ground control terminal is not used as the ground control terminal of the starting station of the train, the first key management server of the station corresponding to the first ground control terminal negotiates the quantum key with the key management server of the previous station through which the train passes. The quantum key serves as a first random key. The first key management server sends a first random key, and accordingly, the first ground control terminal receives the first random key. The key management server group generates a second random key. And the first key management server and a second key management server of a station corresponding to the second ground control terminal negotiate the quantum key. The quantum key serves as a second random key. And the first ground control terminal receives the second random key sent by the first key management server. It should be noted that the first ground control terminal may obtain the first random key and the second random key at the same time, or may generate the first random key and the second random key sequentially, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment of the application.
Optionally, if the first ground control terminal is a ground control terminal of a first station of the plurality of stations corresponding to the VOBC, the predetermined random number is used as the first random key. The ground control terminals of each station are configured with pre-generated random numbers, and correspondingly, the VOBC stores the pre-set random numbers of the ground control terminals of each station in advance. When the first ground control terminal is used as the ground control terminal of the starting station of the train, the first ground control terminal takes the preset random number as the first random key. And the first key management server and a second key management server of a station corresponding to the second ground control terminal negotiate the quantum key. The quantum key serves as a second random key. And the first ground control terminal receives the second random key sent by the first key management server, and the second ground control terminal receives the second random key sent by the second key management server.
Before the VOBC drives into the range of the corresponding station of the first ground control terminal along with the train, the first ground control terminal encrypts the first communication key and the second random key according to the first random key. The first communication key is used for encrypting communication data of the Automatic Train Control (ATC) system.
And step 203, the second ground control terminal acquires a second random key and a third random key.
The method for the second ground control terminal to obtain the second random key and the third random key is the same as the method for the first ground control terminal to obtain the first random key and the second random key. The second ground control terminal does not act as a ground control terminal for the origination station of the train. And the second key management server of the station corresponding to the second ground control terminal negotiates the quantum key with the first key management server. The quantum key serves as a second random key. And the second key management server sends a second random key, and accordingly, the second ground control terminal receives the second random key. The key management server group generates a third random key. And the second key management server negotiates the quantum key with a third key management server of a next site of sites corresponding to the second ground control terminal. The quantum key serves as a third random key. And the second ground control terminal receives the second random key sent by the second key management server, and the third ground control terminal receives the second random key sent by the third key management server. It should be noted that step 203 may occur simultaneously with step 201 or after step 201, and the embodiment of the present application is not particularly limited.
And step 204, the second ground control terminal encrypts the second communication key and the third random key according to the second random key.
And before the VOBC drives into the range of the corresponding station of the second ground control terminal along with the train, the second ground control terminal encrypts the second communication key and the third random key according to the second random key. The second communication key is used for encrypting communication data of the Automatic Train Control (ATC) system.
In step 205, the first ground control terminal sends the encrypted first communication key and the encrypted second random key.
And before the VOBC drives into the range of the corresponding station of the first ground control terminal along with the train, the first ground control terminal sends the encrypted first communication key and the encrypted second random key. The first ground control terminal may simultaneously transmit the encrypted first communication key and the encrypted second random key, or may separately encrypt and transmit the first communication key and the second random key.
The VOBC receives and decrypts the encrypted first communications key and the second random key, step 206.
And the VOBC receives the encrypted first communication key and the second random key and obtains the first communication key and the second random key by decryption according to the first random key. And after the train enters the driving range of the station corresponding to the first ground control terminal and the VOBC acquires the first communication key, the VOBC performs encrypted communication with the first ground control terminal by adopting the first communication key.
And step 207, when the VOBC is located in the preset position interval, the second ground control terminal sends the encrypted second communication key and the encrypted third random key.
When the train runs in the running range of the station corresponding to the first ground control terminal, the train is gradually far away from the first ground control terminal and gradually approaches the second ground control terminal. The driving range of the station corresponding to the first ground control terminal and the driving range of the station corresponding to the second ground control terminal have an overlapping area, namely the overlapping area of the signal coverage areas of the first ground control terminal and the second ground control terminal. The position interval of the train travelling track in the overlapping area is a preset position interval. And when the VOBC is positioned in the preset position interval, the second ground control terminal sends the encrypted second communication key and the encrypted third random key. The second ground control terminal may simultaneously send the encrypted second communication key and the encrypted third random key, or may separately encrypt and send the second communication key and the third random key.
The vobc receives and decrypts the encrypted second communication key and the third random key, step 207.
And the VOBC receives the encrypted second communication key and the third random key and obtains the second communication key and the third random key by decryption according to the second random key. When entering the preset position interval, although the second ground control terminal transmits the encrypted second communication key and the third random key, time is required for transmitting and receiving data and decrypting the key by the VOBC. Therefore, after entering the preset position interval and when the VOBC does not obtain the decrypted second communication key, the VOBC still performs encrypted communication with the first ground control terminal by using the first communication key. And after the VOBC enters the preset position interval and the VOBC acquires the second communication key, the VOBC adopts the second communication key to carry out encryption communication with the second ground control terminal.
Alternatively, if the first ground control terminal is the ground control terminal of the last station in the plurality of stations corresponding to the VOBC, the last two key management servers in the key management server group generate the first random key. And the last key management server in the key management server group sends the first random key, and correspondingly, the first ground control terminal receives the first random key. The first ground control terminal encrypts a first communication key according to a first random key and sends the encrypted first communication key, and the VOBC receives and decrypts the encrypted first communication key.
In the method provided by the embodiment of the application, the communication key encrypts the communication data, and the random key encrypts the communication key and the random key of the next site, so that the security of the communication between the VOBC and the ground terminal is improved through double encryption.
The above-mentioned embodiments are intended to illustrate the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the embodiments of the present application in further detail, and it should be understood that the above-mentioned embodiments are only specific embodiments of the present application, and are not intended to limit the scope of the embodiments of the present application, and any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements and the like made on the basis of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application should be included in the scope of the embodiments of the present application.
Claims (4)
1. A secret key distribution method for encrypted communication in rail transit is characterized by comprising the following steps:
a first ground control terminal acquires a first random key and a second random key, wherein the first random key and the second random key are keys used for encrypting keys;
the first ground control terminal encrypts a first communication key and the second random key according to the first random key, wherein the first communication key is used for encrypting communication data of an Automatic Train Control (ATC) system;
the second ground control terminal acquires the second random key and the third random key;
the second ground control terminal encrypts a second communication key and the third random key according to the second random key, wherein the second communication key is used for encrypting communication data of the ATC system;
the first ground control terminal sends the encrypted first communication key and the encrypted second random key;
the vehicle-mounted controller VOBC receives and decrypts the encrypted first communication key and the encrypted second random key;
when the VOBC is located in a preset position interval, the second ground control terminal sends the encrypted second communication key and the encrypted third random key, wherein the preset position interval is a superposition area of respective signal coverage areas of the first ground control terminal and the second ground control terminal;
the VOBC receives and decrypts the encrypted second communication key and the third random key.
2. The method according to claim 1, wherein the first ground control terminal obtaining the first random key and the second random key comprises:
if the first ground control terminal is the ground control terminal of the first station among the plurality of stations corresponding to the VOBC, using a preset random number as a first random key;
if the first ground control terminal is not the ground control terminal of the first station in the plurality of stations corresponding to the VOBC, a key management server group generates the first random key, wherein the key management server group comprises at least one key management server;
a first key management server corresponding to the first ground control terminal in the key management server group sends the first random key;
the first ground control terminal receives the first random secret key;
the key management server group generates the second random key;
the first key management server in the key management server group sends the second random key;
and the first ground control terminal receives the second random secret key.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the first ground control terminal and the second ground control terminal are ground control terminals of two adjacent stations of a plurality of stations corresponding to the VOBC.
4. The method of claim 2, wherein the method comprises:
if the first ground control terminal is the ground control terminal of the last station in the plurality of stations corresponding to the VOBC, the last two key management servers in the key management server group generate the first random key;
the last key management server in the key management server group sends the first random key;
the first ground control terminal receives the first random secret key;
the first ground control terminal encrypts the first communication key according to the first random key;
the first ground control terminal sends the encrypted first communication key;
the VOBC receives and decrypts the encrypted first communication key.
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| CN202211186141.8A CN115297475B (en) | 2022-09-28 | 2022-09-28 | Quantum key distribution method for rail transit system |
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| DE102011006772A1 (en) * | 2011-04-05 | 2012-10-11 | Siemens Aktiengesellschaft | System and method for key management of a train protection system |
| CN109005028A (en) * | 2018-11-02 | 2018-12-14 | 美的集团股份有限公司 | Cryptographic key negotiation method, Cloud Server, equipment, storage medium and system |
| CN109688585B (en) * | 2018-12-28 | 2023-10-13 | 卡斯柯信号有限公司 | Train-ground wireless communication encryption method and device applied to train monitoring system |
| CN112799379A (en) * | 2021-01-04 | 2021-05-14 | 中车青岛四方车辆研究所有限公司 | Distributed automatic test system based on OPC UA architecture Pub-Sub mode |
| CN113225179A (en) * | 2021-04-07 | 2021-08-06 | 卡斯柯信号有限公司 | Encryption method for train controller |
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