CN113965327B - Key grouping method and key grouping management system of hardware password equipment - Google Patents
Key grouping method and key grouping management system of hardware password equipment Download PDFInfo
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- CN113965327B CN113965327B CN202111205492.4A CN202111205492A CN113965327B CN 113965327 B CN113965327 B CN 113965327B CN 202111205492 A CN202111205492 A CN 202111205492A CN 113965327 B CN113965327 B CN 113965327B
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3234—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0853—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/10—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
- H04L67/1095—Replication or mirroring of data, e.g. scheduling or transport for data synchronisation between network nodes
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Abstract
The invention provides a key splitting method and a key splitting management system of hardware password equipment, wherein the system comprises a server, a client, the hardware password equipment to be backed up and the hardware password equipment, wherein the key splitting management system comprises the following steps: the server is a background server and is used for carrying out cloud backup in interaction with the client; the client is an intelligent terminal with a due program, and the hardware password equipment is connected with the client to be directly accessed to the client for data exchange, so as to provide a local backup space; the hardware cryptographic device to be backed up is in communication with the client primarily for the incoming backup protection key. The invention has the beneficial effects that: the problem that encrypted ciphertext data cannot be recovered due to the loss of hardware password equipment is solved; two key splitting modes improve the key backup efficiency; the request backup information is encrypted in double, so that the security is high; the identity verification information is enhanced, and the key leakage probability is reduced.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of information security, in particular to a key splitting method and a key management system of hardware password equipment.
Background
With the continuous development of mobile network and intelligent terminal technologies, various means for obtaining personal data and information of users are layered, so that encryption protection of data of users is particularly critical. The encryption algorithm is public for encryption, so key protection during encryption is critical. In order to prevent the loss of the user key, various protection methods are layered endlessly, and the backup and recovery of the key are mainly carried out on a key sharing segmentation algorithm, role verification and two-way identity authentication at present.
In the prior art, the key is generally divided and then encrypted and stored; or using a digital signature technology to authorize the key by using a device key and an administrator key, and then encrypting and backing up; the technology simply authenticates and authorizes the identity information in the backup process, if external force intervenes, the identity information is easy to steal, and thus the secret key is stolen. Or after backup, the file stored inside is subjected to plain text storage or simple encryption processing, so that the probability of key leakage is increased. In order to ensure that the key has higher security in the backup process and the storage after the backup, the invention adds the body-building authentication information on the cloud backup and the hardware backup of the key.
Disclosure of Invention
According to the characteristics of the prior art, the invention is innovation of the prior art, and based on the current key backup and recovery technology, the key backup and recovery technology mainly aims at processing the key or carrying out segmented sharing or addressing the physical address of the key, and the key management method is characterized in that the identity relation is processed, and the key in transmission is subjected to double encryption processing, so that the key confidentiality and the key security are better. The invention is realized by the following technical scheme.
The key body management system of the hardware password equipment comprises a server, a client, the hardware password equipment to be backed up and the hardware password equipment, wherein:
the server is a background server and comprises an application server and a password server, and is used for carrying out cloud backup and key verification in interaction with the client;
the client is an intelligent terminal with a due program, and the hardware password equipment is connected with the client to be directly accessed to perform data exchange with the client;
the hardware password equipment to be backed up is mainly used for inputting a backup protection key;
the new hardware cryptographic device is mainly used to provide a local backup space.
Based on the system, the invention also relates to a key splitting method of the hardware password equipment, and the hardware password equipment is backed up and restored from a cloud or a local place, wherein the cloud reply comprises the following steps:
firstly, a request of cloud backup is initiated at a client, the client determines whether the inserted hardware password equipment is the originally bound hardware password equipment according to the information of the hardware password issued by a server, and after the comparison is successful, the client sends the request of assembling the cloud backup message to the hardware password equipment, and the hardware password equipment assembles data to form a new message;
after receiving the transmitted message of the hardware password equipment, the client adds the message version and the time stamp element, and then sends the key backup data, the hardware SN and the user name assembly message to the server;
when the server receives key backup data transmitted by the client, firstly, verifying, after verification is successful, checking a public key of a personal identity SM2 key pair for a message main body, processing the key backup data of the server for responding to the message, signing, and returning to the client;
after receiving the server response message, the client side: firstly checking the correctness of the message format and version, if the correctness is checked, checking the message body, decrypting the message body parameters by using a temporary symmetric protection key after confirming that the signature is legal, and enabling the client to randomly select any two parameters for comparison, wherein the comparison is successful, the authentication is successful, and the key backup is completed.
Further, the method also comprises the specific steps of:
the client initiates a request of local backup;
extracting the original hardware password equipment to be restored, and then inserting the hardware password equipment to be restored;
the original recovery hardware cryptographic device derives key backup data.
The beneficial effects of the invention are as follows:
the problem that encrypted ciphertext data cannot be recovered due to the loss of hardware password equipment is solved;
the cloud and local two key splitting modes improve the key backup efficiency;
the request backup information is encrypted in double, so that the security is high;
the identity verification information is enhanced, and the key leakage probability is reduced.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is an overall relationship diagram of the key knock-out management system of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a key cloud backup flowchart of the key grouping method of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is a key cloud recovery flow chart of the key grouping method of the present invention.
Fig. 4 is a key local backup import flow timing diagram of the key splitting method of the present invention.
Fig. 5 is a key backup recovery server-side timing diagram of the key splitting method of the present invention.
Fig. 6 is a key backup recovery client timing diagram of the key splitting method of the present invention.
Detailed Description
Embodiments of the invention are described in detail below with reference to the attached drawings, but the invention can be implemented in a number of different ways, which are defined and covered by the claims.
Fig. 1 is a block diagram of a key knock-out management system for a hardware cryptographic device. Key backup and restoration are mainly divided into two types, one is cloud backup restoration and the other is local backup restoration. As shown in the above figure, the whole structure is divided into four parts, namely a server, a client, hardware password equipment to be backed up and new hardware password equipment. The server is a background server which is developed independently and is mainly used for carrying out cloud backup in interaction with the client; the client is an application program on the intelligent terminal, and the hardware password equipment is directly accessed to the client for data exchange; the hardware password equipment to be backed up is mainly used for inputting a backup protection key, and the new hardware password equipment is mainly used for providing a local backup space.
Fig. 2 is a key cloud backup flowchart of a key splitting method of a hardware cryptographic device. Firstly, a request of cloud backup is initiated at a client, at the moment, the client needs to register an account number and log in, a public key ciphertext value, a user name, a version number and the like of a personal identity SM2 key pair are uploaded to a server during logging in, then hardware password equipment is inserted, and the client determines whether the inserted hardware password equipment is the originally bound hardware password equipment or not according to various information (including hardware SN, BIOS version number and the like) of the hardware password issued by the server. After the comparison is successful, the client sends a request for assembling the cloud backup message to the hardware password equipment, and the hardware password equipment assembles data.
The format of the backup data original text of the hardware password equipment is as follows: the personal identity SM2 key encrypts the SM3 value of X+Y+D (without preprocessing), and then encrypts the SM3 value by using the SM2 public key of the server to obtain an SM3 ciphertext value. At this time, a random number is generated by a true random number generator in the hardware cryptographic device, and is used as a temporary symmetric protection key, and SM4ECB encryption is performed on the ciphertext value of SM 3. In addition, the server SM2 public key encrypts the temporary symmetric protection key, signs the re-encrypted SM3 ciphertext value and the temporary symmetric protection key by using the private key of the personal identity SM2 key pair uploaded by the client, and returns the private key to the client.
After receiving the transmitted message of the hardware cipher device, the client adds the message version, the time stamp and other elements, and then sends the key backup data, the hardware SN and the user name assembled message to the server.
When the server receives the key backup data transmitted by the client, verification is performed first. Checking message version, time stamp, message format, etc., checking error and directly losing packets, if both are correct, checking the public key of the message body by using the personal identity SM2 key pair. After the signature verification is correct, the private key of the server is used for decryption to obtain a temporary symmetric protection key, then the temporary symmetric protection key is used for decrypting the parameters of the message main body, parameters such as a user name, a version number and the like in the SM3 ciphertext value are obtained, the obtained parameters are compared with the data which is backed up in the server originally, a backup binding management relationship is established if the obtained parameters are consistent with the data which is backed up in the server, and the hardware SN number and the SM3 ciphertext value are stored.
In order to respond to the message, the server processes the server key backup data: firstly, responding to a message issuing process or a data process error response message feedback response error code. If the verification passes, the data validity verification passes, the following operations are performed: and generating a temporary symmetric protection key SM4ECB, and encrypting response message body parameters, wherein the body parameters comprise a loading identifier, hardware SN and a user name. And encrypts the temporary symmetric protection key with the client public key. And then signing the message body by using a private key of the server asymmetric SM2 key pair, and returning the message body to the client.
After receiving the server response message, the client side: firstly checking the correctness of the format and version of the message, if the correctness is checked, checking the public key of the server asymmetric SM2 key pair for the message main body, decrypting the temporary symmetric protection key by using the private key of the personal identity SM2 key pair after confirming that the signature is legal, decrypting the parameters of the message main body by using the temporary symmetric protection key to obtain a loading identifier, a hardware SN and a user name, and if the comparison is successful, the authentication is successful and the key backup is completed by the client.
Fig. 3 is a key cloud recovery flow chart of a key splitting method of a hardware cryptographic device.
The cloud backup request is initiated by the client, an account registered and logged in by the client is detected, a public key ciphertext value, a loading identifier, a hardware SN and a user name of the personal identity SM2 key pair are uploaded during login, and after the hardware key is accessed to the client, the account is selected for binding. And the client sends the message of the assembly recovery request to the hardware cipher key.
And after the hardware cipher key receives the message from the client assembly recovery request, assembling the key backup data. Firstly, a personal identity key public key is obtained, then a temporary symmetric protection key is generated by a hardware cipher key in hardware cipher equipment, and SM4ECB encryption is carried out on a message main body (comprising a loading identifier, original restoration hardware SN, hardware SN to be restored, a user name and the personal identity key public key). The temporary symmetric protection key is then encrypted with the public key of the server. And finally, signing the private key by using the personal identity SM2 key pair, and then returning message information to the client.
After the client receives the key recovery request message, elements such as a message version, a time stamp and the like are added to the key recovery request message to prevent the key recovery request message from being tampered in the transmission process, and then the key recovery request message is forwarded to the server.
And the server receives the verification key backup data and checks the version and format of the message. The message main body uses the public key of the personal identity SM2 key pair to carry out signature verification, after confirming that the signature is legal, uses the private key of the server to carry out decryption, obtains a temporary symmetric protection key, uses the key to decrypt the message main body parameters, judges the loading identifier and the original recovery hardware SN, and waits for the validity of the hardware SN, the user name and the personal identity key public key to be recovered
And after the server verifies, transmitting the information of the response message to the client, wherein the response message comprises the following components: and issuing an error in the verification process or the data process, and feeding back a response error code in response to the message. If the verification is passed, the following operations are performed when the data validity is passed: obtaining corresponding backup key SM3 ciphertext data from a database, decrypting by using a server private key, encrypting by using a restoring hardware corresponding SM2 public key (SM 3 ciphertext conversion process), generating a temporary symmetric protection key by using a true random number generator, encrypting in response to a message body parameter, and encrypting a loading identifier, a hardware SN and a user name in the message body parameter by using an SM4 ECB. The private key of the server asymmetric SM2 key pair is then signed and then returned to the client.
The client receives the post-verification server response message: firstly checking the correctness of the version and format of the message, after the correctness of the version and format of the message passes, checking the private key of the message body by using the server asymmetric SM2 key pair, after the success of the checking, decrypting by using the private key of the personal identity key SM2 key pair to obtain a temporary symmetric protection key, decrypting the parameters of the message body by using the temporary symmetric protection key, and comparing the information such as the loading identifier, the hardware SN and the user name. And after success, carrying out cloud restoration of the secret key.
Fig. 4 is a key local backup import flow timing diagram of a key splitting method of a hardware cryptographic device.
The client initiates a request of local backup, firstly prompts the insertion of the hardware password equipment to be restored, binds and locally stores the personal identity key public key of the hardware password equipment to be restored, in the process, limits the uploading time, and deletes the information in the hardware password equipment to be restored when the uploading time is overtime. And then the client side prompts to insert the original recovery hardware password equipment to carry out local backup. And finally, inserting the hardware password equipment to be restored, and locally restoring and importing.
And extracting the original hardware password equipment to be restored, and then inserting the hardware password equipment to be restored. And the hardware cipher equipment to be recovered derives the public key of the personal identity key, the new hardware SN number is encrypted by using the temporary symmetric protection key produced by the hardware cipher equipment, and then the protection key format is assembled and transmitted back to the client. The client verifies whether the serial number and the hardware are bound or not, the backup data is stored locally, and the local backup is completed within a specified time according to the timeout time limit. And extracting the hardware password equipment to be recovered, and inserting the original hardware password equipment to be recovered. And the backup protection key is transmitted in and used for SM3 value ciphertext exchange.
The original recovery hardware cipher device derives key backup data, firstly generates a temporary symmetric protection key, and encrypts the backup data by using the temporary symmetric protection key, wherein the temporary symmetric protection key comprises an SM3 value, a new hardware serial number, an old hardware serial number and the like. And then encrypting the temporary symmetric protection key by using the public key of the to-be-recovered hardware SM2, adding the ciphertext of the public key of the original recovery hardware SM2 (which can be replaced by the exclusive or value of the public key of the new and old hardware SM 2) in the main body part, and then signing the main body content by using the private key of the original recovery hardware cryptographic equipment. And after the completion, carrying out format assembly on the key backup file.
The client resumes the key flow: firstly, clock detection is carried out, the operation from the initiation of backup to the restoration is completed within a limited time, and the backup protection key and the key backup file are deleted when the time is overtime. And then prompting to pull out the original hardware password equipment to be restored and inserting the hardware password equipment to be restored. Obtaining the serial number of the hardware password equipment to be recovered and judging whether the hardware password equipment to be recovered is the first inserted hardware password equipment to be recovered. And then the temporary stored key backup file is used for being issued to the hardware password equipment to be restored.
After the hardware cipher equipment to be restored receives the key backup file, the public key of the hardware cipher equipment to be restored is used for exclusive or to obtain the public key of the original hardware cipher equipment to be restored, then the public key is used for checking and signing the key backup data, and the private key of the hardware cipher equipment to be restored is used for decrypting and obtaining the temporary symmetric protection key. And decrypting the SM3 value, comparing the hardware serial numbers, and writing the SM3 value into the hardware password equipment to be restored after judging the hardware serial numbers are correct, so as to finish local backup.
Fig. 5 is a timing diagram of a server-side key backup recovery of a key splitting method of a hardware cryptographic device.
The key backup needs to report the public key of the hardware password device in advance at a certain moment before the key backup operation, usually, the public key of the hardware password device is detected and obtained when a user logs in, and the public key and the serial number SN of the device are reported to an application server.
When the key is backed up, the original hardware password equipment is needed to be inserted first, and the sequence number SN and SM3 key main body in the APP acquisition equipment are uploaded to the application server. The application server submits the public key and the SM3 key body corresponding to the serial number SN storage to a password server isolated from the outside. The cryptographic server calculates whether SM3 and public key PublicKey are paired or not, and then returns the verification result to the application server. If the cryptographic server verifies successfully, the application server will bind the sequence number SN, public key publicKey and SM3 key body. And finally, returning the verification result to the client.
The key recovery requires that the client side simultaneously provides the serial number SN of the original hardware password device and the serial number SN of the new hardware password device, an application server obtains the SN numbers of the two devices, respectively takes out the public key publicKey and the SM3 key main body of the original device, submits the five parameters to the password server, and the password server calculates the SM3 of the new device according to the five parameters, and the SM3 and the public key publicKey of the new device can be unlocked to the data encrypted by the original device. The cryptographic server returns SM3 of the new device, the application server returns the result to the client, and the client writes SM3 into the hardware cryptographic device. The new hardware cipher device has the data encrypted by the original device and the data encrypted by the new device can be unlocked by the original device.
Fig. 6 is a timing diagram of a client for recovering a key backup of a key splitting method of a hardware cryptographic device.
The client initiates the hardware device Key splitting, and uploads the SM2 Key pair public Key of the original hardware Key when logging in. The hardware cipher device obtains the SN unique identification code of the new hardware Key and the SM2 Key pair public Key. The server judges whether the new hardware Key is bound by other account numbers, if so, the Key cannot be split, otherwise, the hardware cipher device acquires the SN number of the original hardware Key, the SM2 Key pair public Key and the backup data, and caches the SN number, the SM2 Key pair public Key and the backup data. And switching the new Key, and writing the backup data of the original Key into the new Key. And transmitting the SN numbers of the two keys to a server, and inputting the backup relationship of the keys. And (5) finishing the input of the server, informing the client of the backup relation of the storage Key and finishing the hardware Key separation.
The above is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and is not intended to limit the present invention, but various modifications and variations can be made to the present invention by those skilled in the art. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (7)
1. A key splitting method for a hardware cryptographic device, comprising the steps of:
firstly, a request of cloud backup is initiated at a client, the client determines whether the inserted hardware password equipment is the originally bound hardware password equipment according to the information of the hardware password issued by a server, and after the comparison is successful, the client sends the request of assembling the cloud backup message to the hardware password equipment, and the hardware password equipment assembles data to form a new message;
after receiving the message transmitted by the hardware password equipment, the client adds the message version and the time stamp element, and then sends the key backup data, the hardware SN and the user name assembly message to the server;
when the server receives key backup data transmitted by the client, firstly, verifying, after verification is successful, checking a public key of a personal identity SM2 key pair for a message main body, processing the key backup data of the server for responding to the message, signing and returning to the client;
after receiving the server response message, the client side: firstly checking the correctness of the format and version of the message, if the correctness is checked, checking the signature of the message main body, decrypting the parameters of the message main body by using a temporary symmetric protection key after confirming that the signature is legal, and enabling a client to randomly select any two parameters for comparison, wherein the comparison is successful, the authentication is successful, and the key backup is completed;
the key grouping method also comprises a method for recovering the key by the client, and comprises the following steps:
firstly, clock detection is carried out, the operation from the initiation of backup to the restoration is required to be completed within a limited time, a backup protection key and a key backup file are deleted when overtime occurs, then the original hardware password equipment to be restored is prompted to be pulled out, the hardware password equipment to be restored is inserted, the serial number of the hardware password equipment to be restored is obtained, whether the hardware password equipment to be restored is the first inserted hardware password equipment to be restored is judged, and then the temporary stored key backup file is used for being issued to the hardware password equipment to be restored;
after the hardware cipher equipment to be restored receives the key backup file, the public key of the hardware cipher equipment to be restored is used for exclusive or to obtain the public key of the original hardware cipher equipment to be restored, then the public key is used for checking and signing the key backup data, the private key of the hardware cipher equipment to be restored is used for decrypting to obtain a temporary symmetric protection key, the SM3 value is decrypted, the hardware serial number is compared, after judging to be correct, the SM3 value is written into the hardware cipher equipment to be restored, and the local backup is completed;
the key grouping method also comprises a method for backing up the key grouping in the server, and comprises the following steps:
reporting a public key public Key of the hardware password device before the key backup operation;
when the key is backed up, the original hardware password equipment is needed to be inserted first, and the sequence number SN and SM3 key main body in the APP acquisition equipment are uploaded to the application server;
the application server submits the public key and SM3 key main body corresponding to the serial number SN storage to a password server isolated from the outside;
the password server calculates whether SM3 and public key publicKey are paired or not, and then returns a verification result to the application server;
if the password server is successfully verified, the application server returns a verification result to the client by binding the sequence number SN, the public key publicKey and the SM3 key body;
the key grouping method also comprises a method for updating the key grouping by the server, and the method comprises the following steps of:
the client initiates a hardware device Key splitting instruction, and uploads an SM2 Key pair public Key of the original hardware Key when logging in;
the hardware cipher device obtains the SN unique identification code of the new hardware Key and the SM2 Key pair public Key;
the server judges whether the new hardware Key is bound by other account numbers, if so, the Key cannot be split, otherwise, the hardware password equipment acquires the SN number of the original hardware Key, the SM2 Key pair public Key and the backup data, and caches the SN number, the SM2 Key pair public Key and the backup data;
the hardware cipher device switches and writes the backup data of the original Key into the new Key, the SN numbers of the two keys are transmitted to the server, and the server performs backup relation entry of the new Key.
2. The key grouping method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the authentication method after the server receives the message comprises the steps of:
firstly checking a message version, a time stamp, a message format, checking error and directly losing packets, and if both are correct, checking a signature on a public key of a message main body by using a personal identity SM2 key pair;
after verification is correct, decrypting by using a private key of a server to obtain a temporary symmetric protection key, and then decrypting the main message parameter by using the temporary symmetric protection key to obtain a user name and a version number parameter in an SM3 ciphertext value;
and comparing the acquired parameters with the data which is backed up in the server originally, if the acquired parameters are consistent with the data which is backed up in the server, establishing a backup binding management relationship, and storing the SN number of the hardware password equipment and the SM3 ciphertext value.
3. The key grouping method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the server, in order to respond to the message, comprises the steps of:
firstly, responding to a message issuing process or a data process error response message feedback response error code, and if the verification is passed, executing: generating a temporary symmetric protection key SM4ECB, encrypting the response message body parameters, encrypting the temporary symmetric protection key by using a client public key, signing the message body by using a private key of a server asymmetric SM2 key pair, and returning to the client.
4. The key-splitting method of claim 1, further comprising a key local backup import flow method comprising the steps of:
the client initiates a request of local backup, binds and locally stores a personal identity key public key of the hardware password equipment to be restored, prompts the client to insert the original hardware password equipment to be restored, performs local backup, and finally inserts the hardware password equipment to be restored, and performs local restoration and import;
extracting the original hardware password equipment to be restored, and then inserting the hardware password equipment to be restored;
the original recovery hardware cryptographic device derives key backup data.
5. The key splitting method as defined in claim 4, further comprising a method for recovering a key backup of a hardware cryptographic device to be recovered, comprising the steps of:
deriving a public key of the personal identity key, a new hardware SN number, encrypting by using a temporary symmetric protection key produced by the new hardware SN number, then assembling a protection key format, and transmitting back to the client;
the client verifies whether the serial number and the hardware are bound;
the backup data is stored locally, and the local backup is completed within a set time;
extracting the hardware password equipment to be recovered and inserting the original hardware password equipment to be recovered;
and the backup protection key is transmitted in and used for SM3 value ciphertext exchange.
6. The key grouping method as claimed in claim 4, wherein the specific steps of deriving the key backup data from the original restoring hardware cryptographic device are:
firstly, generating a temporary symmetric protection key, and encrypting backup data by using the temporary symmetric protection key; the method comprises the steps of including SM3 value, new and old hardware serial numbers;
and then encrypting the temporary symmetric protection key by using the public key of the hardware SM2 to be restored, adding the ciphertext of the public key of the original restoring hardware SM2 in the main body part, signing the main body content by using the private key of the original restoring hardware password equipment, and carrying out format assembly on the key backup file after the completion.
7. The key body management system of the hardware password equipment is characterized by comprising a server, a client, the hardware password equipment to be backed up and the hardware password equipment, wherein:
the server is a background server and comprises an application server and a password server, wherein the application server is used for interacting with the client to carry out cloud backup, and the password server is used for verifying the secret key;
the client is an intelligent terminal with a due program, and the hardware password equipment is connected with the client to be directly accessed to the client for data exchange, so as to provide a local backup space;
the hardware password equipment to be backed up is communicated with the client and is mainly used for inputting a backup protection key;
the method for restoring the key by the client comprises the following steps:
firstly, clock detection is carried out, the operation from the initiation of backup to the restoration is required to be completed within a limited time, a backup protection key and a key backup file are deleted when overtime occurs, then the original hardware password equipment to be restored is prompted to be pulled out, the hardware password equipment to be restored is inserted, the serial number of the hardware password equipment to be restored is obtained, whether the hardware password equipment to be restored is the first inserted hardware password equipment to be restored is judged, and then the temporary stored key backup file is used for being issued to the hardware password equipment to be restored;
after the hardware cipher equipment to be restored receives the key backup file, the public key of the hardware cipher equipment to be restored is used for exclusive or to obtain the public key of the original hardware cipher equipment to be restored, then the public key is used for checking and signing the key backup data, the private key of the hardware cipher equipment to be restored is used for decrypting to obtain a temporary symmetric protection key, the SM3 value is decrypted, the hardware serial number is compared, after judging to be correct, the SM3 value is written into the hardware cipher equipment to be restored, and the local backup is completed;
the method for backing up the secret key in the server comprises the following steps:
reporting a public key public Key of the hardware password device before the key backup operation;
when the key is backed up, the original hardware password equipment is needed to be inserted first, and the sequence number SN and SM3 key main body in the APP acquisition equipment are uploaded to the application server;
the application server submits the public key and SM3 key main body corresponding to the serial number SN storage to a password server isolated from the outside;
the password server calculates whether SM3 and public key publicKey are paired or not, and then returns a verification result to the application server;
if the password server is successfully verified, the application server returns a verification result to the client by binding the sequence number SN, the public key publicKey and the SM3 key body;
a method for server update key splitting, comprising the steps of:
the client initiates a hardware device Key splitting instruction, and uploads an SM2 Key pair public Key of the original hardware Key when logging in;
the hardware cipher device obtains the SN unique identification code of the new hardware Key and the SM2 Key pair public Key;
the server judges whether the new hardware Key is bound by other account numbers, if so, the Key cannot be split, otherwise, the hardware password equipment acquires the SN number of the original hardware Key, the SM2 Key pair public Key and the backup data, and caches the SN number, the SM2 Key pair public Key and the backup data;
the hardware cipher device switches and writes the backup data of the original Key into the new Key, the SN numbers of the two keys are transmitted to the server, and the server performs backup relation entry of the new Key.
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