CN113645623B - A remote fee control system, security authentication method and fee control device - Google Patents

Abstract

The application provides a remote fee control system, a security authentication method and a fee control device. The remote fee control system includes a master station and a smart meter, and also includes an application agent and a fee control device. The application agent is located in the grid intranet, and the fee control device is located in the user terminal; among them: a two-way authentication security channel is established between the application agent and the fee control device , the cost control device and the smart meter establish a link through a local communication mechanism; the master station generates an authorization code for the smart meter, and sends the authorization code to the cost control device through a secure channel; the cost control device sends the authorization code to the smart meter through a local communication mechanism; The smart meter verifies the authorization code, opens the corresponding authorization after the verification is successful, and trusts and receives the data sent from the fee control device. The embodiment of the present invention deploys the application agent on the power grid side, provides the user with a fee control device on the user side, and realizes the secure transparent transmission of the fee control information from the main station to the smart meter, thereby solving the problem of manual on-site maintenance when a carrier line failure occurs question.

Description

A remote fee control system, security authentication method and fee control device

technical field

The application relates to the field of electric power communication, in particular to a remote fee control system, a security authentication method and a fee control device.

Background technique

In the current electricity consumption information collection system on the market, the cost control method of residents’ electric meters is increasingly using remote cost control. The fee control information is sent to the electric meter through communication methods such as wireless or wireless, and the whole process does not require human intervention, which brings an excellent user experience to users.

However, in actual operation, carrier communication or wireless communication will be affected by various uncertain factors, and there may be a situation where the communication line fails temporarily. This kind of problem requires maintenance personnel to arrive at the scene immediately to deal with it, which will lead to a series of problems such as consuming manpower and material resources, increasing time cost, and reducing service quality.

Contents of the invention

Aiming at the problems in the prior art, this application proposes a remote fee control system, a security authentication method and a fee control device.

In the first aspect, the embodiment of the present invention proposes a remote fee control system, including a master station and a smart meter. The system also includes an application agent and a fee control device. The application agent is located in the grid intranet, and the fee control device is located in User terminal; wherein: a two-way authenticated security channel is established between the application agent and the fee control device, and the fee control device and the smart meter establish a link through a local communication mechanism; the master station generates the smart meter authorization code, and send the authorization code to the fee control device through the secure channel; the fee control device sends the authorization code to the smart meter through the local communication mechanism; the smart meter verifies the Authorization code, open the corresponding authorization after successful verification, trust and receive the data sent from the fee control device.

In the second aspect, the embodiment of the present invention also proposes a security authentication method for a remote fee control system. The system includes a master station, a smart meter, an application agent, and a fee control device. The control device is located at the user terminal, and the security authentication method of the remote charge control system includes two-way authentication between the charge control device and the application agent, and two-way authentication between the charge control device and the smart meter; wherein: The two-way authentication between the fee control device and the smart meter includes: the master station generates an authorization code for the smart meter, and sends the authorization code to the fee control device through the secure channel; the fee control device Send the authorization code to the smart meter through the local communication mechanism; the smart meter verifies the authorization code, opens the corresponding authorization after the verification is successful, and trusts and receives the data sent from the fee control device.

In the third aspect, the embodiment of the present invention also proposes a fee control device. The fee control device is located at the user terminal, establishes a connection with an application agent located on the grid intranet and completes security authentication. The fee control device includes: TLS connection establishment module, for initiating a TLS connection to the application agent, during the TLS handshake process, use the preset application agent certificate to verify its signature, and establish a TLS channel for one-way authentication; the information collection module is used to collect the current mobile phone number, form ID and/or user number and/or transaction number are sent to the application agent through the TLS channel; the verification code receiving module is used to receive the verification code returned by the application agent through the operator's short message network, wherein the The verification code is generated in the following way: the application agent verifies that the user is legal and has a valid recharge operation in the power grid system, and the charge control information corresponding to the recharge has not been successfully sent to the smart meter. The device generates a verification code for this session; the verification code sending module is configured to send the verification code back to the application agent through the TLS channel.

In the remote fee control system, fee control device and security authentication method disclosed in the embodiments of the present invention, an application agent is added to the grid intranet on the grid side, and a fee control device is provided for the user on the user side, and the application agent and the fee control device realize fee control information Secure transparent transmission from the main station to the meter, so as to solve the problem of carrier line failure and the need to manually issue fee control information. This solution is an auxiliary solution for the exchange of fee control information between the meter and the main station, which can further reduce the cost of power services and improve user experience. In addition, this solution introduces the application agent and establishes a TLS channel between the fee control device and the application agent to realize the secure access of the fee control device on the master station side; the master station generates a time-sensitive authorization code for a specific meter and issues it to Corresponding to the charge control device of the mobile phone, the charge control device uses the authorization code to complete the authentication and authorization of the meter to the charge control device, thereby realizing the safe access of the user mobile phone charge control device on both sides of the communication link, and solving the problem of introducing user equipment to the charge control device. Security issues brought about by the grid system.

Description of drawings

FIG. 1 is a schematic structural diagram of a remote fee control system according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Fig. 2 is a flow chart of implementing security authentication between the fee control App and the application agent according to the embodiment of the present invention.

Fig. 3 is a schematic diagram of two states of the local connection of the smart meter according to the embodiment of the present invention.

Fig. 4 is a flow chart of the security authentication of the fee control App by the smart meter according to the embodiment of the present invention.

Fig. 5 is a schematic diagram of an authorization code according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Fig. 6 is a schematic structural diagram of a fee control device according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Fig. 7 is a schematic structural diagram of a fee control device according to another embodiment of the present invention.

Detailed ways

The following will clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the application with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the application. Apparently, the described embodiments are only some, not all, embodiments of the application. Based on the embodiments in this application, all other embodiments obtained by persons of ordinary skill in the art without making creative efforts belong to the scope of protection of this application.

FIG. 1 is a schematic structural diagram of a remote fee control system according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 1 , the remote fee control system of this embodiment includes four nodes (subsystems), a master station 1 , an application agent 2 , a fee control device 3 and a smart meter 4 . Among them, the main station 1 and the application agent 2 are deployed on the grid intranet, the cost control device 3 is installed on the user terminal (such as the user's mobile phone), and the smart meter 4 is deployed at the entrance of the user's home.

Master station 1 is a power load management system deployed on the grid intranet, and is one of the core management systems of the grid. The main functions of the main station include meter reading, load control, grid monitoring, etc. After the user purchases electricity, the cost control information can be automatically sent from the main station to the smart meter through the concentrator.

The application proxy 2 is mapped to a service with a public network IP and a specific port through the port mapping function of the power grid firewall, and the mobile phone App can access the application proxy through the public network. On the one hand, the application agent can transparently transmit the data between the main station and the smart meter. On the other hand, the application agent is also an application layer (level) firewall, which prevents the main station from directly exposing the user's fee control device and avoids additional attacks on the main station. , you can set the black and white list of users, and provide log and audit functions. The application agent can be deployed on an existing server in the grid intranet, or independently deployed on a new server.

The tariff control device 3 can be a mobile app provided by the power grid to obtain tariff control information, or it can be a server device with a data communication function, which communicates with the application agent in the uplink and communicates with the smart meter locally. The tariff control device 3 and the application agent jointly complete the billing Secure transparent transmission of control information from the master station to the smart meter. In fact, the fee control device 3 and the security agent can be further expanded to carry other data interactions between the power grid and users. In the present invention, it should be noted that the fee control device, the fee control APP, and the mobile phone fee control APP are different expressions in different embodiments, but actually refer to the same concept.

The smart meter 4 is a device for collecting, measuring and transmitting user electric energy data, and has the function of performing local communication with a user terminal (such as a mobile phone). Make specific requirements.

The embodiment of the present invention deploys the application agent on the power grid side, and provides the user with a charge control device (such as a mobile phone charge control App) on the user side. The application agent and the charge control device realize the secure transparent transmission of charge control information from the main station to the smart meter. , thereby solving the problem of manual on-site maintenance required for carrier line failures.

In the current fare control remote system, the communication link between the master station and the smart meter includes three nodes, the master station, the concentrator and the smart meter. From the perspective of the concentrator, the entire link can be divided into the concentrator and the master The uplink between the stations and the local link between the concentrator and the smart meter, in which the uplink is mainly based on the wireless virtual private network provided by the telecom operator, and the local link is mainly based on the power line carrier network. The master station, concentrator and smart meter are all grid equipment. The wireless virtual private network and the power line carrier network are relatively closed networks. At the same time, in order to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the data, the sensitive data transmitted on it will be encrypted and verified. , so the data transmission based on this link is relatively safe.

In the remote fee control scheme disclosed in the embodiment of the present invention, the original three-node link is changed into a four-node link, and the four nodes are respectively a main station, an application agent, a fee control device located at a user terminal, and a smart meter. Among them, the main station, the application agent and the smart meter are grid equipment, and the fee control device is located at the user terminal, which is the user equipment, and the public network of the telecom operator is used between the fee control device and the application agent. Therefore, how to connect the user equipment It is one of the technical problems to be solved by the present invention that the (fee control device) is safely connected to the power grid system.

In the present invention, since the fee control device communicates with the application agent through the public network of the telecom operator on the one hand, and communicates with the smart meter through a local connection on the other hand, the secure access of the fee control device in the embodiment of the present invention includes the fee control device and the smart meter. Security between application agents, and security between tariff control devices and smart meters.

Security between fee control device and application agent

The security between the fee control device and the application agent includes the authentication of both parties and the establishment of a secure channel, that is, the fee control device must authenticate the application agent on the opposite end, and the application agent must perform identity authentication on the fee control device. After the authentication is successful , establishing a secure channel between the fee control device and the application agent, and the secure channel ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the data transmitted thereon. In this embodiment, the fee control device may also be a fee control APP installed in the user's mobile phone, and a secure channel between the fee control App and the application agent is established through the security authentication method shown in FIG. 2 .

Step S201, the fee control App initiates a TLS (Transport Layer Security, transport layer security protocol) connection to the application proxy. During the TLS handshake process, the fee control App uses the preset application proxy certificate to verify its signature and establish a one-way authentication TLS Connection, wherein the application proxy certificate is issued by a CA and pre-installed in the mobile phone fee control APP. In this process, the authentication of the mobile phone fee control App to the application agent is completed, and an encrypted channel (TLS channel) between the mobile phone fee control App and the application agent is established at the same time. All subsequent data transmissions between the mobile phone fee control App and the application agent are protected by this encrypted channel.

Step S202, the mobile phone fee control App collects information such as the current mobile phone number, smart meter ID and/or user number and/or transaction number, and sends them to the application agent through a TLS channel.

Step S203, the application agent verifies that the user is legal and has a valid recharge operation in the power grid system, and the charge control information corresponding to the recharge has not been successfully delivered to the smart meter. After the verification is successful, generate a verification of this session for the mobile phone charge control app code.

Step S204, the application agent sends the verification code to the mobile phone fee control App through the operator's SMS network.

In step S205, the mobile phone fee control App sends the verification code back to the application agent through the TLS channel, and the application agent completes the authentication of the mobile phone fee control App. So far, the two-way authentication security channel between the mobile phone fee control App and the application agent has been successfully established.

Security between tariff control device and smart meter

The security between the fee control device and the smart meter includes the security authentication of both parties and the security of data transmission.

The fee control app and the smart meter can communicate through NFC, Bluetooth, infrared, etc. For NFC and infrared, there are very strict relative position requirements between the communication devices, so the data transmission is naturally safe For Bluetooth, its underlying mechanism already includes the protection of the security of data transmission. Therefore, the security between the fee control App and the smart meter is mainly the identity security authentication between the two.

1. Access security for local connections of smart meters

The smart meter is an authoritative metering device, which is directly related to the electricity fee income of the grid and the electricity fee expenditure of the user. Usually, the user's equipment or other third-party equipment is not allowed to directly access to avoid the metering data and metering software. tamper. The NFC/Bluetooth/infrared communication module of the smart meter provides a local communication method, so that mobile devices such as handhelds and mobile phones can communicate with the smart meter, but this communication method also brings certain security risks.

As shown in FIG. 3 , the embodiment of the present invention divides the local connection of the smart meter into two states of pre-connection and connection, so as to solve the aforementioned potential safety hazard.

In the pre-connection state, the local connection of the smart meter can exchange authorization verification messages with the mobile device, and the local connection of the smart meter discards other messages.

The smart meter receives the authorization verification message in the pre-connection state, and after completing the authorization verification, starts the authorized service and enters the connection state.

In the connected state, the local connection of the smart meter can exchange authorized messages with the mobile device and further authorization verification messages, and the local connection of the smart meter discards other messages.

After the authorization ends, the smart meter closes the relevant authorization, and the local connection of the meter enters the pre-connection state.

Through the above implementation manner, the potential safety hazard of the smart electric meter in the local communication mode can be avoided.

2. Smart meter authentication of fee control app

The fee control app can only be effectively connected to the corresponding electric meter through local connections such as NFC/Bluetooth/infrared if it is authorized by the master station. At the same time, the charge control app is only used by the user when the carrier network fails, and the smart meter is already offline. Unable to receive the master station authorization, this brings a problem, that is, how to verify the authorization of the fee control app by the offline meter.

In the embodiment of the present invention, the main station issues an authorization code for the fee control App to access a specific smart meter, which stipulates the access authority of the fee control App to the smart meter, that is, in what time period the fee control App can obtain the authorization code. What permission to access the smart meter. At the same time, since the fee control app has obtained the authorization code, it means that it has been authenticated by the master station, so if the fee control app's authorization code is verified by the smart meter, it also means that the fee control app's own identity is verified by the smart meter.

The embodiment of the present invention is based on the existing trust chain of the mining system. As shown in Figure 4, the master station generates an authorization code with time-limited requirements for a specific meter, and issues it to the fee control App of the corresponding mobile phone. Use the authorization code to complete the verification of the authorization of the smart meter, thereby solving the problem of how to verify the authorization of the fee control App by the offline smart meter.

Step S401, the master station generates the authorization code of the smart meter

As shown in Figure 5, the time-limited authorization code generated by the master station for a specific meter consists of an authorization part, an authorization type, an authorization lifetime and a random part. in:

Authorization type, that is, the type of this authorization, can be the authorization issued by the fee control information or other authorizations, and the authorization type is 1 byte. The authorization type is determined by the master station and spliced into the authorization code in plain text. At the same time, the authorization type is also used to calculate the authorization part of the authorization code. The integrity of the authorization type is protected through the authorization part of the authorization code.

Authorization life cycle, that is, the life time of this authorization. The smart meter starts counting when the authorization verification is successful, and the unit is minutes. When the life time expires, the smart meter closes the authorization. The life cycle of authorization is set by the master station and spliced into the authorization code in plain text. At the same time, the life cycle is also used to calculate the authorization part of the authorization code, and the integrity of the life cycle is protected through the authorization part of the authorization code.

The random part is generated by the master station and spliced into the authorization code in the form of plain text. At the same time, the random part is also used to calculate the authorization part of the authorization code, and its integrity is protected through the authorization part of the authorization code. The introduction of a random part can enhance the protection of the key material, and the random part can be incremented in the form of accumulation to realize the anti-replay of the authorization code.

The authorization part is calculated and generated by the master station. After being spliced into an authorization code, the expense control app is issued to the smart meter. The smart meter uses the authorization part of the authorization code to perform authorization verification. After the verification is successful, the corresponding authorization is opened.

In the embodiment of the present invention, the authorization code can be realized through the following three stages.

1) Splicing authorization information

Authorization Information = Table ID||Current Date Timestamp||Authorization Type||Authorization Lifetime||Random Part

in:

√|| is a string concatenation operator

√ The authorization code specified by the meter ID is valid for that meter.

√The current day-level timestamp, such as 20210128, that is, January 28, 2021, is used to ensure the timeliness of the authorization code. The master station takes out the current day-level time stamp from the system and calculates the authorization part of the authorization code. The meter uses its own current day-level time stamp to verify the authorization part. If the verification is unsuccessful, the authorization code is invalid.

2) Calculate the authorization part of the authorization code

a) Option 1, calculate the authorization code directly through HASH,

Authorization part = first x bytes of HASH(key material||authorization information)

in:

HASH is a one-way hash (hash) algorithm, which is used to calculate the authorization code in this solution. The algorithm can choose ESAM built-in hash algorithm, or choose general algorithms such as SHA1, SHA256, and DM5.

The key material, the shared key between the master station and the smart meter, can be the shared key in the ESAM system, or other shared keys between the master station and the smart meter maintained by the master station side outside the ESAM system .

b) Scheme 2, first calculate the integrity summary (MAC) of the authorization information, and then perform HASH on the summary

For situations where the shared key is built into the ESAM and cannot be directly accessed by the system, use option two.

First send the authorization information to ESAM, calculate the integrity summary of the authorization information, and then perform HASH on the summary.

Authorization part = the first x bytes of HASH (MAC (authorization information))

The Integrity Check Algorithm (MAC) in ESAM calculates a digest of the authorization information using the shared secret key built into ESAM. Scheme 2 uses ESAM to calculate the integrity digest and then calculates its HASH, which replaces the direct calculation of the HASH of the shared key material splicing authorization information in scheme 1.

3) Concatenate the authorization part, authorization type, authorization lifetime and random part to generate an authorization code.

for example:

The x, y, and z in the authorization code are 20, 4, and 8 respectively, that is, the authorization part, authorization lifetime, and random part are 20 bytes, 4 bytes, and 8 bytes, respectively. The HASH algorithm is MD5, and scheme 1 is used to calculate the authorization part.

The master station needs to issue authorization to the meter (table ID: 000000000012). The key material shared by the master station and the meter is 3288AC56U8, the current day-level timestamp is 20210128, and the authorization type is 1 (delivery of fee control information). The period is 60 (ie 1 hour) and the random part is 00000088.

Using scheme one for calculation, then:

1) Calculate authorization information

Authorization information = table ID||current day-level timestamp||authorization type||authorization lifetime||random part, that is, 000000000012||20210128||1||0060||00000088, and the result is "000000000012202101281006000000088".

2) Splice the key material and authorization information, calculate its HASH, and obtain the authorization part of the authorization code:

MD5("3288AC56U8000000000012202101281006000000088") = 0x5e9ef7f960ad440da4d54188d7fdc5e4.

The authorization part of the authorization code takes the first 20 bytes of the hash value, that is, 5e9ef7f960ad440da4d5,

3) Concatenate the authorization part, authorization type, authorization life cycle and random part to generate an authorization code,

The full authorization code is 5e9ef7f960ad440da4d51006000000088.

Step S402, the master station sends the authorization code to the fee control device through a secure channel; Step S403, the fee control device sends the authorization code to the smart meter through the local communication mechanism;

After the master station generates the authorization code, it issues the authorization code for accessing the specific smart meter to the fee control app through the TLS channel. The fee control app sends the authorization code to the smart meter through local communication mechanisms such as NFC/Bluetooth/infrared, and the smart meter verifies the authorization. code.

Step S404, the smart meter verifies the authorization code, opens the corresponding authorization after the verification is successful, trusts and receives the data sent from the fee control device.

After the smart meter obtains the authorization code to be verified, it verifies whether the authorization code is legal through the following steps.

1) Splicing authorization information

The smart meter takes out the current day-level time stamp and meter ID from its own system, and combines the authorization type, authorization lifetime and random part in the authorization code to be verified to obtain the authorization information.

2) Use the authorization information obtained in the previous step to calculate the authorization part of the authorization code

a) If the authorization code to be verified uses Scheme 1, directly calculate the authorization part of the authorization code through HASH,

Authorization part = first x bytes of HASH(key material||authorization info).

b) If scheme 2 is used for the authorization code to be verified, first send the authorization information to the ESAM, calculate the integrity digest of the authorization information, and then perform HASH on the digest.

Authorization part = the first x bytes of HASH (MAC (authorization information))

3) Authorization Verification

Comparing the calculated authorization part of the authorization code with the authorization part of the authorization code to be verified, if the two are the same, the authorization code to be verified is legal.

Continuing the above example, if the electric meter (the meter ID is 000000000012, and the shared key material is 3288AC56U8) receives the authorization code to be verified at the day-level timestamp 20210128, then:

1) Use the meter's own data to splice authorization information

Authorization information = table ID||current day-level timestamp||authorization type of authorization code to be verified||authorization lifetime of authorization code to be verified||random part of authorization code to be verified, namely 000000000012||20210128||1| |0060||00000088, the result is "000000000012202101281006000000088".

2) According to scheme 1, calculate the authorization part of the authorization code

MD5("3288AC56U8000000000012202101281006000000088") = 0x5e9ef7f960ad440da4d54188d7fdc5e4

The authorization part of the authorization code takes the first 20 bytes of the hash value, that is, 5e9ef7f960ad440da4d5.

3) Authorization Verification

Compare the authorization part of the calculated authorization code with the authorization part of the authorization code to be verified, and if the two are the same, the authorization verification is successful.

After the smart meter is authorized successfully, the corresponding authority is opened within the authorized life period, and the corresponding authority is closed after the authorized life period ends. For the authorization of fee control information distribution, after the authorization is successful, the smart meter can exchange fee control information with the main station through the fee control App.

In the embodiment of the present invention, the authorization code is simple in design, flexible and safe, and at the same time takes into account the granularity and timeliness of authorization.

1) The master station uses the shared key material and meter ID of the authorized meter in the process of generating the authorization code. Therefore, the authorization granularity of the authorization code can be accurate to a single meter.

2) The master station uses the current day-level timestamp in the process of generating the authorization code, which ensures the timeliness of the authorization code.

3) The authorization lifetime is used in the process of generating the authorization code by the master station, which further ensures the timeliness of the authorization.

4) The authorization code includes the authorization type, which can extend the authorization authority and apply to other scenarios other than the issuance of fee control information.

5) The authorized objects can be extended to other devices such as energy controllers and edge IoT agents.

6) Through the authorization code, the unified management of authorization by the master station can be realized to avoid the overflow of authorization capabilities.

7) The design of the authorization code is simple. For devices with high security requirements and equipped with LCD buttons or touch screens, the authorization code can be manually entered through the buttons or touch screen. After the verification is successful, the device will then enable the corresponding authorization.

3. Authentication of Smart Meter by Fee Control App

The fee control App reads the meter ID from the smart meter. If it is the same as its own meter ID, the smart meter verification is successful.

In the remote fee control system of the embodiment of the present invention, an application agent is added to the grid intranet on the grid side, and a fee control device is provided for the user on the user side, and the application agent and the fee control device realize the security of the fee control information from the main station to the smart meter Transparent transmission, so as to solve the problem of carrier line failure and the need to manually issue fee control information.

This solution is an auxiliary solution for the exchange of fee control information between the smart meter and the main station, which can further reduce the cost of power services and improve user experience. In addition, this solution introduces the application agent and establishes a TLS channel between the fee control device and the application agent to realize the secure access of the fee control device on the master station side; the master station generates a time-limited authorization code for a specific smart meter and issues To the charge control device of the corresponding mobile phone, the charge control device uses the authorization code to complete the authentication and authorization of the smart meter to the charge control device, thereby realizing the safe access of the user's mobile phone charge control device on both sides of the communication link, and solving the problem of introducing user Safety issues brought by equipment to the power grid system.

Based on the same inventive concept, an embodiment of the present application further provides a fee control device, which can be used to implement the method described in the above embodiment, as described in the following embodiment. Since the problem-solving principle of the fee control device is similar to the remote fee control method, the implementation of the fee control device can refer to the implementation of the method based on software performance benchmark determination, and the repetition will not be repeated. As used below, the term "unit" or "module" may be a combination of software and/or hardware that realizes a predetermined function. Although the systems described in the following embodiments are preferably implemented in software, implementations in hardware, or a combination of software and hardware are also possible and contemplated.

Fig. 6 is a schematic structural diagram of a fee control device according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in Figure 6, the fee control device is located at the user terminal, establishes a connection with the application agent located in the grid intranet and completes security authentication, and the fee control device includes:

The TLS connection establishment module 601 is used for initiating a TLS connection to the application agent, during the TLS handshake process, using the preset application agent certificate to verify its signature, and establishing a one-way authenticated TLS channel;

An information collection module 602, configured to collect the current mobile phone number, table ID and/or user number and/or transaction number, and send them to the application agent through the TLS channel;

The verification code receiving module 603 is used to receive the verification code returned by the application agent through the operator's SMS network, wherein the verification code is generated in the following manner: the application agent verifies that the user is legal and has valid recharge in the power grid system operation, and the fee control information corresponding to the recharge has not been successfully sent to the smart meter, after the verification is successful, generate a verification code for this session for the fee control device;

A verification code sending module 604, configured to send back the verification code to the application agent through the TLS channel.

In another embodiment, as shown in Figure 7, the fee control device establishes a link with the smart meter through a local communication mechanism and performs security identity verification, and the fee control device further includes:

An authorization code receiving module 605, configured to receive the authorization code of the smart meter sent by the master station;

The authorization code sending module 606 sends the authorization code to the smart meter through the local communication mechanism, the smart meter verifies the authorization code, opens the corresponding authorization after the verification is successful, and trusts and receives the authorization code sent from the fee control device. incoming data;

The meter authentication module 607 is configured to read the meter ID of the smart meter. If it is the same as the meter ID stored in the cost control device, the verification of the smart meter is successful.

In some embodiments, the fee control device can be App software installed in the user terminal, or a server with mobile network and local communication functions. The present invention does not limit the implementation form of the fee control device. It can be understood that the above-mentioned user terminals may include smart phones, tablet electronic devices, network set-top boxes, portable computers, desktop computers, personal digital assistants (PDAs), vehicle-mounted devices, smart wearable devices, and the like. Wherein, the smart wearable device may include smart glasses, smart watches, smart bracelets and the like. The above-mentioned user terminal also has a communication module (that is, a communication unit), which can communicate with a remote server to realize data transmission with the server. The server may include a server on the side of the task scheduling center, and may also include a server of an intermediate platform in other implementation scenarios, such as a server of a third-party server platform that has a communication link with the server of the task scheduling center. The server may include a single computer device, or a server cluster composed of multiple servers, or a server structure of a distributed device.

To sum up, the remote fee control system and the fee control device disclosed in the above embodiments of the present invention can solve the problem of carrier line failure and the need to manually issue fee control information, and can solve the problem of introducing user equipment through a series of security authentications. Security issues brought about by the grid system.

The following is the deployment of the overall solution for realizing the delivery of the fee control information from the main station to the smart meter by using the remote fee control system of the embodiment of the present invention.

1) An application proxy software service is added to the grid intranet, and the user's mobile phone can access the application proxy through the telecom operator's public network. The application agent applies for a certificate from the CA, and communicates with the user mobile phone on behalf of the grid master station.

2) The user installs the fee control app on the mobile phone, and the fee control app presets the certificate of the application agent.

3) Establish a two-way authentication security channel between the fee control App and the application agent, the specific steps are:

a) The fee control app initiates a TLS connection to the application proxy. During the TLS handshake process, the fee control app uses the preset application proxy certificate to verify its signature and establish a one-way authenticated TLS connection. The authentication of the agent, at the same time establishes an encrypted channel (TLS channel) between the fee control App and the application agent, and all subsequent data transmissions between the fee control App and the application agent are protected by this encrypted channel;

b) The fee control app collects information such as the current mobile phone number, table ID and/or user number and/or transaction number, and sends it to the application agent through the TLS channel;

c) The application agent verifies that the user is legal and has a valid recharge operation in the power grid system, and the fee control information corresponding to the recharge has not been successfully delivered to the smart meter. After the verification is successful, a verification code for this session is generated for the fee control App;

d) The application agent sends the verification code to the fee control App through the operator's SMS network;

e) The fee control app sends the verification code back to the application agent through the TLS channel to complete the authentication of the fee control app by the application agent. So far, the two-way authentication security channel between the fee control App and the application agent has been successfully established;

4) The master station generates the authorization code of the user's electric meter, and sends the authorization code to the fee control App through the TLS channel.

5) The fee control App sends the authorization code to the smart meter through local communication mechanisms such as NFC/Bluetooth/Infrared.

6) The smart meter verifies the authorization code. After the verification is successful, open the corresponding authorization, trust and receive the corresponding data sent from the fee control App. So far, through the user's fee control app, based on the telecom operator's public network, a secure communication link from the master station to the meter is constructed.

7) Based on this communication link, the master station and the smart meter complete the distribution of fee control information.

8) After the fee control information is issued, the smart meter closes the authorization.

In summary, the remote fee control system, fee control device and security authentication method disclosed in the embodiments of the present invention add application agents to the grid intranet on the grid side, and provide users with fee control devices, application agents and fee control devices on the user side. The device realizes the secure transparent transmission of fee control information from the main station to the meter, thereby solving the problem of carrier line failure requiring manual delivery of fee control information. This solution is an auxiliary solution for the exchange of fee control information between the meter and the main station, which can further reduce the cost of power services and improve user experience. In addition, this solution introduces the application agent and establishes a TLS channel between the fee control device and the application agent to realize the secure access of the fee control device on the master station side; the master station generates a time-sensitive authorization code for a specific meter and issues it to Corresponding to the charge control device of the mobile phone, the charge control device uses the authorization code to complete the authentication and authorization of the meter to the charge control device, thereby realizing the safe access of the user mobile phone charge control device on both sides of the communication link, and solving the problem of introducing user equipment to the charge control device. Security issues brought about by the grid system.

Those skilled in the art should understand that the embodiments of the present invention may be provided as methods, apparatuses, or computer program products. Accordingly, the present invention can take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present invention may take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) having computer-usable program code embodied therein.

The present invention is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (apparatus), and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. It should be understood that each procedure and/or block in the flowchart and/or block diagram, and a combination of procedures and/or blocks in the flowchart and/or block diagram can be realized by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions may be provided to a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, embedded processor, or processor of other programmable data processing equipment to produce a machine such that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing equipment produce a An apparatus for realizing the functions specified in one or more procedures of the flowchart and/or one or more blocks of the block diagram.

These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory capable of directing a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to operate in a specific manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture comprising instruction means, the instructions The device realizes the function specified in one or more procedures of the flowchart and/or one or more blocks of the block diagram.

These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device, causing a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby The instructions provide steps for implementing the functions specified in the flow chart or blocks of the flowchart and/or the block or blocks of the block diagrams.

In the present invention, specific examples have been applied to explain the principles and implementation methods of the present invention, and the descriptions of the above examples are only used to help understand the method of the present invention and its core idea; meanwhile, for those of ordinary skill in the art, according to this The idea of the invention will have changes in the specific implementation and scope of application. To sum up, the contents of this specification should not be construed as limiting the present invention.

Claims (6)

1. The remote fee control system comprises a master station and a smart electric meter, and is characterized by further comprising an application agent and a fee control device, wherein the application agent is positioned in an electric network, and the fee control device is positioned in a user terminal; wherein:

a bidirectional authentication safety channel is established between the application agent and the fee control device, and the fee control device and the intelligent ammeter establish a link through a local communication mechanism;

the master station generates an authorization code of the intelligent ammeter and sends the authorization code to the charge control device through the safety channel;

the fee control device sends the authorization code to the intelligent ammeter through the local communication mechanism;

the intelligent ammeter verifies the authorization code, opens corresponding authorization after verification is successful, trusts and receives data sent from the fee control device;

establishing a secure channel of bidirectional authentication between the application proxy and the fee control device, comprising:

the bidirectional authentication security channel established between the application proxy and the fee control device is an encrypted TLS channel;

establishing a bidirectional authenticated TLS channel between the application proxy and the fee control device by:

1) The charge control device initiates TLS connection to the application agent, and in the TLS handshake process, the charge control device verifies the signature by using a preset application agent certificate and establishes a unidirectional authentication TLS connection;

2) The charge control device collects the current mobile phone number, the table ID and/or the user number and/or the transaction number and sends the current mobile phone number, the table ID and/or the user number and/or the transaction number to the application agent through the TLS channel;

3) The application agent verifies that the user is legal and effective in recharging operation in the power grid system, and the charging corresponding fee control information is not successfully issued to the intelligent ammeter, and after verification is successful, a verification code of the session is generated for the fee control device;

4) The application agent sends the verification code to the fee control device through an operator short message network;

5) And the cost control device returns the verification code to the application agent through the TLS channel to finish the authentication of the application agent to the cost control device.

2. The remote fee control system of claim 1, wherein the fee control device establishes a link with the smart meter via a local communication mechanism comprising:

the local communication mechanism includes, but is not limited to, NFC, bluetooth links, infrared links.

3. The remote fee control system of claim 1, wherein the master station generates an authorization code for the smart meter comprising:

the authorization code comprises an authorization part, an authorization type, an authorization life cycle and a random part; wherein,,

the authorization part mixes the authorization ammeter ID, the current day time stamp, the authorization type, the authorization life cycle, the random part and the key material, and then generates the mixed data through a hash algorithm.

4. The remote fee control system of claim 1, wherein the fee control device reads a meter ID of the smart meter, and if the same as the meter ID stored in the fee control device, the smart meter verification is successful.

5. The safety authentication method of the remote fee control system is characterized in that the system comprises a master station, a smart meter, an application agent and a fee control device, wherein the application agent is positioned in a power grid intranet, the fee control device is positioned in a user terminal, and the safety authentication method of the remote fee control system comprises bidirectional authentication between the fee control device and the application agent and bidirectional authentication between the fee control device and the smart meter; wherein:

the bidirectional authentication of the fee control device and the intelligent ammeter comprises the following steps:

the master station generates an authorization code of the intelligent ammeter and sends the authorization code to the charge control device through a safety channel;

the fee control device sends the authorization code to the intelligent ammeter through a local communication mechanism;

the intelligent ammeter verifies the authorization code, and the authentication of the fee control device is completed after the verification is successful, and meanwhile, corresponding authorization is opened, and data sent from the fee control device are trusted and received;

a method of mutual authentication between the fee control device and the application proxy, comprising:

1) The charge control device initiates TLS connection to the application proxy server, and in the TLS handshake process, the charge control device verifies the signature by using a preset application proxy certificate and establishes a unidirectional authentication TLS connection;

2) The charge control device collects the current mobile phone number, the table ID and/or the user number and/or the transaction number and sends the current mobile phone number, the table ID and/or the user number and/or the transaction number to the application proxy server through a TLS channel;

3) The application proxy server verifies legal and effective recharging operation of the user in the power grid system, and the charging corresponding fee control information is not successfully issued to the intelligent ammeter, and after verification is successful, a verification code of the session is generated for the fee control device;

4) The application proxy server sends the verification code to the fee control device through an operator short message network;

5) And the cost control device returns the verification code to the application proxy server through the TLS channel to finish the authentication of the application proxy server on the cost control device.

6. The cost control device is characterized in that the cost control device is positioned at a user terminal, establishes connection with an application agent positioned in an electric network and completes security authentication, and comprises:

the TLS connection establishment module is used for initiating TLS connection to the application proxy, verifying the signature of the TLS connection by using a preset application proxy certificate in the TLS handshake process, and establishing a TLS channel of one-way authentication;

the information collection module is used for collecting the current mobile phone number, the table ID and/or the user number and/or the transaction number and sending the current mobile phone number, the table ID and/or the user number and/or the transaction number to the application agent through the TLS channel;

the verification code receiving module is used for receiving the verification code returned by the application agent through the short message network of the operator, wherein the verification code is generated by the following modes: the application agent verifies that the user is legal and effective in recharging operation in the power grid system, and the charging corresponding fee control information is not successfully issued to the intelligent ammeter, and after verification is successful, a verification code of the session is generated for the fee control device;

the verification code sending module is used for sending the verification code back to the application agent through the TLS channel;

the fee control device establishes a link with the intelligent ammeter through a local communication mechanism, and the fee control device further comprises:

the authorization code receiving module is used for receiving the authorization code of the intelligent ammeter sent by the master station;

the authorization code sending module is used for sending the authorization code to the intelligent electric meter through the local communication mechanism, the intelligent electric meter verifies the authorization code, opens corresponding authorization after verification is successful, trusts and receives data sent from the fee control device;

and the ammeter authentication module is used for reading the ammeter ID of the intelligent ammeter, and if the ammeter ID is the same as the ammeter ID stored in the fee control device, the intelligent ammeter is successfully authenticated.