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CN113329397A - Power terminal security access authentication method, device and system in 5G communication environment - Google Patents

Power terminal security access authentication method, device and system in 5G communication environment Download PDF

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Publication number
CN113329397A
CN113329397A CN202110765125.3A CN202110765125A CN113329397A CN 113329397 A CN113329397 A CN 113329397A CN 202110765125 A CN202110765125 A CN 202110765125A CN 113329397 A CN113329397 A CN 113329397A
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China
Prior art keywords
signcryption
aggregation
meter
calculating
key
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Chinese (zh)
Inventor
王海翔
朱朝阳
周亮
李仲青
缪思薇
朱亚运
张晓娟
张晓�
姜琳
曹靖怡
蒋帅
王琼
张梦迪
沈冰
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China Electric Power Research Institute Co Ltd CEPRI
State Grid Shanghai Electric Power Co Ltd
State Grid Corp of China SGCC
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China Electric Power Research Institute Co Ltd CEPRI
State Grid Shanghai Electric Power Co Ltd
State Grid Corp of China SGCC
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Priority to CN202110765125.3A priority Critical patent/CN113329397A/en
Publication of CN113329397A publication Critical patent/CN113329397A/en
Pending legal-status Critical Current

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/009—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity specially adapted for networks, e.g. wireless sensor networks, ad-hoc networks, RFID networks or cloud networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H04W12/033—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/08—Access security
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

本发明提供一种5G通信环境下电力终端安全接入认证方法、装置及系统，认证方法包括以下步骤：获取所有表计加密单元关于消息的签密密文；采用聚合签密方法计算得到所有表计加密单元的聚合签密密文；发送聚合签密密文用于验证聚合签密的合法性。该方法是5G通信环境下的电力终端安全接入认证方法，以实现高效认证，并同时保障数据的机密性及完整性，可广泛应用于大规模多对一和一对多的通信。

Figure 202110765125

The present invention provides a method, device and system for power terminal security access authentication in a 5G communication environment. The authentication method includes the following steps: obtaining the signcrypted ciphertext of all meter encryption units about messages; Calculate the aggregated signcrypted ciphertext of the encryption unit; send the aggregated signcrypted ciphertext to verify the legitimacy of the aggregated signcryption. This method is a secure access authentication method for power terminals in the 5G communication environment, to achieve efficient authentication, while ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of data, and can be widely used in large-scale many-to-one and one-to-many communications.

Figure 202110765125

Description

Power terminal security access authentication method, device and system in 5G communication environment
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of security authentication, in particular to a method, a device and a system for authenticating the security access of a power terminal in a 5G communication environment.
Background
In various communication network environments, the danger that network information is monitored is greatly increased, meanwhile, a distributed network environment is formed by access of a large amount of terminal data and corresponding data processing equipment, the traditional user identity authentication and key distribution and management mechanism has a great safety loophole, and when a large amount of data are processed concurrently, an attacker can easily find and crack key modules of the key, so that key information is cracked, for example, the key modules are illegally invaded to access the network, and potential safety hazards are caused.
In the 5G era, a power terminal side, a user side and system nodes at all levels deploy massive terminals and 5G network interfaces, so that the attack surface of a malicious attacker on the physical layer of a power grid is rapidly expanded, and comprehensive and real-time monitoring is difficult. The comprehensive perceived service requirement promotes the generalization of the terminal, and generates greater impact on the existing terminal access protection strategy, and under such conditions, the performance of the boundary protection structure and the protection equipment aiming at wireless access at present cannot completely meet the requirements.
Therefore, in a 5G network environment, a large number of IoT devices access the network, and the issue of security authentication is an important issue to be considered in the 5G network. The access of a huge amount of IoT devices to the network not only brings high authentication cost, but also greatly affects authentication efficiency. At present, in an electric power information communication environment mainly based on communication technologies such as GPRS, CDMA, LTD and the like, the traditional authentication mode of signing first and then encrypting is low in efficiency, and cannot meet the communication safety requirements that the 5G technology is mature day by day and the electric power 5G is rapidly applied and popularized. And the traditional aggregation signcryption is based on a complex bilinear mapping structure, so that the consumption of computing resources is huge.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention provides a method, a device and a system for authenticating the safe access of a power terminal under a 5G communication environment, aiming at the problem of the communication safety of power 5G application in the prior art.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention adopts the following technical scheme:
a safety access authentication method for a power terminal in a 5G communication environment comprises the following steps:
acquiring signed cipher texts of all meter encryption units about the message;
calculating by adopting a polymerization signcryption method to obtain polymerization signcryption ciphertexts of all meter encryption units;
and sending the aggregation signcryption text for verifying the validity of the aggregation signcryption.
As a further improvement of the present invention, the table meter encryption unit obtains the signed cipher text of the message by calculating the system parameter and the secret key, and the specific calculation steps include:
the meter encryption unit participating in signing and encrypting selects a random number ai∈Z* q；
Calculating Ti＝aiP, P is a system parameter generator;
calculating Ci＝Vi⊕miWherein V isi＝H3(IDB，Ti，Qi)，Qi＝ai(XB+RB+PpubH1(IDB，XB，RB))，IDBAnd PKBThe identity and the public key of the aggregated signcryption recipient are respectively;
calculating Si＝Di+hixi+h'iaiWherein the hash value hi＝H2(Ti，Ci，IDi，Xi) Hash value h'i＝H2(Ti，Ci，IDi，Ri)；IDiTo meter the identity information of the encryption unit for participation in the signcryption,
get meter encryption unit on message miIs signed and encryptedi＝(Ti，Si，Ci)；1≤i≤n。
As a further improvement of the present invention, the generating step of the system parameter specifically includes:
acquiring a safety parameter k, generating two large prime numbers p and q, and meeting q | p-1;
constructing a Hash function H1:{0，1}*×G→Z* q，H2:{0，1}*→Z* q，H3:G→Z* q(ii) a G is a cyclic group on the elliptic curve, P is a generator with any order of G as q, and Z* qIs a key set;
randomly selecting master key Z belonging to Z* qAnd secretly stores and calculates the system public key PpubzP and the system parameter params is obtained (P, q, P)pub，H1，H2，H3)。
As a further improvement of the present invention, the key generating step specifically includes:
random selection of secret value x by meter encryption uniti∈Z* qCalculating the median value Xi＝xiP, and then obtains a random private key (ID)i，Xi)，IDiThe identity value of the encryption unit is counted for the meter;
random selection of ri∈Z* qCalculating Ri＝riP、di＝ri+zH1(IDi，Ri，Xi)+H3(zXi) Sending (R)i，di) A meter-giving encryption unit;
the meter encryption unit verifies the validity of the private key, i.e. verifies equation Ri+PpubH1(IDi，Ri，Xi)+PH3(xiPpub)＝diIf P is true, then calculate part of private key Di＝di-H3(xiPpub)；
Obtaining the private key of the meter encryption unit as SKi＝(Di，xi) The public key is PKi＝(Ri，Xi) (ii) a The private key of the concentrator is SKB＝(DB，xB) The public key is PKB＝(RB，XB)。
As a further improvement of the present invention, the step of calculating the aggregate signcryption of all meter encryption units by using the aggregate signcryption method specifically includes:
according to signcryption character deltai＝(Ti，Si，Ci) I is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n, and calculating an accumulated value
Figure BDA0003150780990000031
δ＝(T1，T2，…，Tn，C1，C2，…，CnAnd S) is an aggregate signcryption ciphertext.
As a further improvement of the present invention, verifying the validity of the aggregated signcryption specifically includes:
calculate hi＝H2(Ti，Ci，IDi，Xi)，h'i＝H2(Ti，Ci，IDi，Ri)；
Verify whether the following equation holds:
Figure BDA0003150780990000032
if the equation is true, the aggregate signcryption is valid and receipt is denied otherwise.
As a further improvement of the present invention, the step of decrypting the aggregate signcryption after the aggregate signcryption is received further comprises the step of decrypting the aggregate signcryption, wherein the step of decrypting the aggregate signcryption comprises:
calculating Q'i＝Ti(xB+DB) And V'i＝H3(IDB,Ti,Q′i)；
Restore out message mi＝Ci⊕V′i。
The utility model provides a power terminal safety access authentication device under 5G communication environment, includes:
the acquisition module is used for acquiring signed cipher texts of all the meter encryption units about the message;
the aggregation signcryption module is used for calculating by adopting an aggregation signcryption method to obtain aggregation signcryption ciphertexts of all the meter encryption units;
and the sending module is used for sending the aggregation signcryption text for verifying the legality of the aggregation signcryption.
A power terminal security access authentication system in a 5G communication environment comprises a power terminal security access authentication device in the 5G communication environment.
A power terminal security access authentication system in a 5G communication environment comprises an aggregation signcryptor; the aggregation signcrypter performs the method.
The invention has the beneficial effects that:
according to the method for authenticating the safe access of the power terminal in the 5G communication environment, the certificateless aggregation signcryption technology without bilinear pairwise mapping is introduced between the terminal and the network, batch verification of the signature and the password of the power 5G terminal is realized by using the aggregation signcryption technology, the signcryption can realize signature and encryption of messages at the same time, confidentiality and integrity can be simultaneously ensured in a single logic step, and the method is more efficient compared with the traditional mode of firstly signing and then encrypting. The traditional aggregation signcryption is based on a complex bilinear pairmapping structure, and the consumption of computing resources is huge.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a flowchart of a method for authenticating secure access of an electric power terminal in a 5G communication environment according to the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a block diagram of a secure access authentication module of an electric power terminal in a 5G communication environment according to the present invention.
FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of an authentication process of the present invention;
fig. 4 is a safe access process of the power internet of things terminal.
Fig. 5 is a schematic diagram of a system for authenticating a secure access of an electric power terminal in a 5G communication environment according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
The present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the embodiments with reference to the attached drawings. It should be noted that the embodiments and features of the embodiments in the present application may be combined with each other without conflict.
The following detailed description is exemplary in nature and is intended to provide further details of the invention. Unless otherwise defined, all technical terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this application belongs. The terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of exemplary embodiments according to the invention.
In the scene of power utilization information acquisition, when the power utilization peak is in the peak, 1 front-end server generally needs to process the station area information of tens of thousands of concentrators at the same time, and the gathering signcryption technology can be utilized to carry out batch verification on signcryption information from a large number of concentrators in a short time. The invention provides a certificate-free aggregation signcryption scheme without bilinear pairs, and the implementation process of the scheme is described in detail by combining a power utilization information acquisition scene.
The related noun explanation is given based on the content of the invention:
IoT: the Internet of things;
GPRS, CDMA, LTD: key technologies for 2G, 3G, 4G;
5G: 5 th generation communication technologies;
electric power 5G terminal: an internet of things meter and a meter.
As shown in fig. 1, a first object of the present invention is to provide a method for authenticating secure access of a power terminal in a 5G communication environment, an application and an aggregator, including the following steps:
the aggregation signcryptor CYR passes through a meter encryption unit SMUiAcquiring signed cipher texts of all meter encryption units about the message;
the aggregation signcryption device CYR calculates to obtain aggregation signcryption ciphertexts of all meter encryption units by adopting an aggregation signcryption method;
and sending the aggregation signcryption ciphertext to an aggregation signcryption receiver (acquisition front-end server) UR, and verifying the validity of the aggregation signcryption by the aggregation signcryption receiver (acquisition front-end server) UR.
And the meter encryption unit calculates the signed cipher text of the message through system parameters and a secret key.
As a preferred embodiment, the meter encryption unit comprises a single-phase meter, a three-phase meter, an Internet of things meter and the like.
The method of the invention has the following advantages:
1. the traditional aggregation signcryption is based on a complex bilinear pairwise mapping structure, the consumption of computing resources is huge, the operation process of the scheme does not contain bilinear pairwise and exponential operation, the consumption of the computing resources is low, and the method is suitable for large-scale, many-to-one and one-to-many communication of an electric power electricity utilization information acquisition system acquisition terminal with limited computing resources.
2. The signcryption can realize message signing and encryption at the same time, and the aggregation signcryption can realize simultaneous authentication of multiple devices, so that the efficiency is higher.
3. And a safety channel is not needed for generating part of the private keys, so that the computing resources are saved, and the authentication efficiency is improved.
Specific examples are given below to illustrate the invention in detail:
as shown in FIG. 2, the legal participants of the scheme have a key service center CC, a meter encryption unit SMUiI is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n, a gathering signcrypter CYR, a concentrator (special transformer acquisition terminal) ACUM and a gathering signcrypter receiver (acquisition front server) UR. The key generation stage integrates the selection of the key and the extraction of part of the private key.
The ACUM of the concentrator (dedicated transformer acquisition terminal) needs to design the CYR for receiving the aggregate signcryption ciphertext or expanding the existing communication module according to the concentrators of different models and different manufacturers and the dedicated transformer acquisition terminal. With a certain technical complexity and effort.
As shown in fig. 2 to 4, the specific implementation process is as follows:
1) system parameter generation
According to the input security parameter k, two large prime numbers p and q are generated, and q | p-1 is satisfied. G is a cyclic group on the elliptic curve, P is a generator with any order of G as q, and Z* qFor a set of keys, a hash function H1:{0，1}*×G→Z* q，H2:{0，1}*→Z* q，H3:G→Z* q. CC selects a master key Z ∈ Z randomly* qAnd secretly stores, and then calculates the system public key PpubzP and the system parameters params (P, q, P)pub，H1，H2，H3)。
2) Key generation phase
a. Meter encryption unit SMUiRandomly selecting a secret value xi∈Z* qCalculating the median value Xi＝xiP, send (ID)i，Xi) To CC. Wherein, IDiEncrypting a unit SMU for a meteriThe identity value of (2).
CC random selection of ri∈Z* qCalculating the intermediate value Ri＝riP、di＝ri+zH1(IDi，Ri，Xi)+H3(zXi) Sending (R)i，di) For SMUi(transmission need not be by means of a secure channel).
c. To ensure (R)i，di) Effectiveness of, SMUiFirst, verify equation Ri+PpubH1(IDi，Ri，Xi)+PH3(xiPpub)＝diIf P is true, then calculate part of private key Di＝di-H3(xiPpub)；
If necessary, CC can also calculate SMUiPart of the private key Di＝ri+zH1(IDi，Ri，Xi)。
d. Thus, the SMUiHas a private key of SKi＝(Di，xi) The public key is PKi＝(Ri，Xi). Similarly, the private key of ACUM is SKB＝(DB，xB) The public key is PKB＝(RB，XB)。
In the key generation phase, the CC first calculates the SMUiA partial private key source d corresponding to the partial private key ofiAnd then sent to the SMU over the open channeliThen SMUiCalculating DiObtain own partial private key Di. If d isiThe attacker monitors and obtains D through two methodsi. Calculating Di＝di-H3(xiPpub) But xiThe attacker cannot obtain the secret random value. ② calculating Di ═ ri+zH1(IDi，Ri，Xi) Also, the master key r cannot be obtainediAnd fails. So that no secure channel is required for this transmission.
3) Signcryption
Meter encryption unit SMU assuming participation in signcryptioniIs IDiThe identity and the public key of the aggregate signcryption recipient UR are ID's, respectivelyBAnd PKBThe message to be signed is mi(i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n). The method comprises the following specific steps:
a)SMUiselecting a random number ai∈Z* qSequentially calculating intermediate values Ti＝aiP, median value Qi＝ai(XB+RB+PpubH1(IDB，XB，RB) Middle value V)i＝H3(IDB，Ti，Qi) Middle value Ci＝Vi⊕mi；
b) Calculate h sequentiallyi＝H2(Ti，Ci，IDi，Xi)，h'i＝H2(Ti，Ci，IDi，Ri)，Si＝Di+hixi+h'iaiThen SMUiAbout message miThe signed cipher text is deltai＝(Ti，Si，Ci)。
4) Polymeric signcryption
Reception of δ by the polymeric signcrypter CYRi＝(Ti，Si，Ci) (i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n), calculating an accumulated value
Figure BDA0003150780990000071
δ＝(T1，T2，…，Tn，C1，C2，…，CnAnd S) is the aggregated signcryption ciphertext, which is sent to the receiver UR.
5) Verifying aggregate signcryption
Given n SMUsiIdentity-public key pair (ID)i，PKi) And system disclosure parameter, UR verifies δ ═ T1，T2，…，Tn，C1，C2，…，CnAnd S) validity, comprising the following steps:
a) calculating a hash value hi＝H2(Ti，Ci，IDi，Xi) Hash value h'i＝H2(Ti，Ci，IDi，Ri)；
b) Verify whether the following equation holds:
Figure BDA0003150780990000081
if the equation is true, the aggregate signcryption is validated, otherwise acceptance is denied.
6) Disaggregated signcryption
If the aggregate signcryption verification passes, UR utilizes its own private key SKBAnd decrypting the message, wherein i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n. The execution steps are as follows:
a) calculating an intermediate value Q'i＝Ti(xB+DB) And V'i＝H3(IDB,Ti,Q′i)
b) Restore out messagemi＝Ci⊕V′i。
The invention can realize signature and encryption of the message at the same time, can simultaneously ensure confidentiality and integrity in a single logic step, and is more efficient compared with the traditional mode of firstly signing and then encrypting. The certificateless aggregation signcryption technology is introduced between the terminal and the network, so that high-efficiency authentication can be realized, and the problems are effectively solved.
As shown in fig. 5, another object of the present invention is to provide an authentication apparatus for secure access of a power terminal in a 5G communication environment, including:
the acquisition module is used for acquiring signed cipher texts of all the meter encryption units about the message;
the aggregation signcryption module is used for obtaining an aggregation signcryption ciphertext through aggregation signcryption calculation;
and the sending module is used for sending the aggregation signcryption text for verifying the legality of the aggregation signcryption.
With reference to fig. 2 and fig. 4, the present invention further provides a system for authenticating a secure access of an electric power terminal in a 5G communication environment, including the apparatus for authenticating a secure access of an electric power terminal in a 5G communication environment.
With reference to fig. 1 and 4, an electric power terminal secure access authentication system in a 5G communication environment includes a key service center CC and a meter encryption unit SMUiI is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n, a gathering signcrypter CYR, a concentrator (special transformer acquisition terminal) ACUM and a gathering signcrypter receiver (acquisition front server) UR. The ACUM of the concentrator (special transformer acquisition terminal) is connected with a plurality of meter encryption units SMUiAnd designing a gathering signcryption device CYR for concentrators of different models and different manufacturers and a special transformer acquisition terminal to receive the gathering signcryption ciphertext or expanding the existing communication module. The key service center CC is connected with a plurality of meter encryption units SMUiThe system parameter and the key are generated, the signcryption ciphertext of the meter encryption unit about the message is calculated, and the signcryption ciphertext is sent to the aggregation signcrypter CYR.
The aggregation signcrypter CYR performs the method, which comprises:
the aggregation signcryptor CYR passes through a meter encryption unit SMUiAcquiring signed cipher texts of all meter encryption units about the message;
the aggregation signcryption device CYR calculates to obtain aggregation signcryption ciphertexts of all meter encryption units by adopting an aggregation signcryption method;
and sending the aggregation signcryption ciphertext to an aggregation signcryption receiver (acquisition front-end server) UR, and verifying the validity of the aggregation signcryption by the aggregation signcryption receiver (acquisition front-end server) UR.
The certificateless aggregation signcryption technology is introduced between the terminal and the network, so that high-efficiency authentication can be realized, confidentiality and integrity can be simultaneously ensured in a single logic step, and the method is more efficient compared with the traditional mode of firstly signing and then encrypting.
As will be appreciated by one skilled in the art, embodiments of the present invention may be provided as a method, system, or computer program product. Accordingly, the present invention may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present invention may take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, and the like) having computer-usable program code embodied therein.
The present invention is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. It will be understood that each flow and/or block of the flow diagrams and/or block diagrams, and combinations of flows and/or blocks in the flow diagrams and/or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions may be provided to a processor of a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, create means for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.
These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture including instruction means which implement the function specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.
These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable apparatus to produce a computer implemented process such that the instructions which execute on the computer or other programmable apparatus provide steps for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.
Finally, it should be noted that: the above embodiments are only for illustrating the technical solutions of the present invention and not for limiting the same, and although the present invention is described in detail with reference to the above embodiments, those of ordinary skill in the art should understand that: modifications and equivalents may be made to the embodiments of the invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention, which is to be covered by the claims.

Claims (10)

1. A method for authenticating the safe access of a power terminal in a 5G communication environment is characterized by comprising the following steps:
acquiring signed cipher texts of all meter encryption units about the message;
calculating by adopting a polymerization signcryption method to obtain polymerization signcryption ciphertexts of all meter encryption units;
and sending the aggregation signcryption text for verifying the validity of the aggregation signcryption.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein:
the table meter encryption unit obtains the signed cipher text of the message through system parameter and key calculation, and the specific calculation steps comprise:
the meter encryption unit participating in signing and encrypting selects a random number ai∈Z* q；
Calculating Ti＝aiP, P is a system parameter generator;
computing
Figure FDA0003150780980000011
Wherein, Vi＝H3(IDB，Ti，Qi)，Qi＝ai(XB+RB+PpubH1(IDB，XB，RB))，IDBAnd PKBThe identity and the public key of the aggregated signcryption recipient are respectively;
calculating Si＝Di+hixi+h′iaiWherein the hash value hi＝H2(Ti，Ci，IDi，Xi) Hash value h'i＝H2(Ti，Ci，IDi，Ri)；IDiTo meter the identity information of the encryption unit for participation in the signcryption,
get meter encryption unit on message miIs signed and encryptedi＝(Ti，Si，Ci)；1≤i≤n。
3. The method of claim 2, wherein:
the generating step of the system parameters specifically comprises:
acquiring a safety parameter k, generating two large prime numbers p and q, and meeting q | p-1;
constructing a Hash function H1:{0，1}*×G→Z* q，H2:{0，1}*→Z* q，H3:G→Z* q(ii) a G is a cyclic group on the elliptic curve, P is a generator with any order of G as q, and Z* qIs a key set;
randomly selecting master key Z belonging to Z* qAnd secretly stores and calculates the system public key PpubzP and the system parameter params is obtained (P, q, P)pub，H1，H2，H3)。
4. The method of claim 1, wherein:
the key generating step specifically includes:
random selection of secret value x by meter encryption uniti∈Z* qCalculating the median value Xi＝xiP, and then obtains a random private key (ID)i，Xi)，IDiThe identity value of the encryption unit is counted for the meter;
random selection of ri∈Z* qCalculating Ri＝riP、di＝ri+zH1(IDi，Ri，Xi)+H3(zXi) Sending (R)i，di) A meter-giving encryption unit;
the meter encryption unit verifies the validity of the private key, i.e. verifies equation Ri+PpubH1(IDi，Ri，Xi)+PH3(xiPpub)＝diIf P is true, then calculate part of private key Di＝di-H3(xiPpub)；
Obtaining the private key of the meter encryption unit as SKi＝(Di，xi) The public key is PKi＝(Ri，Xi) (ii) a The private key of the concentrator is SKB＝(DB，xB) The public key is PKB＝(RB，XB)。
5. The method of claim 1, wherein:
the method for calculating and obtaining the polymerization signcryption texts of all the meter encryption units by adopting the polymerization signcryption method specifically comprises the following steps:
according to signcryption character deltai＝(Ti，Si，Ci) I is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n, and calculating an accumulated value
Figure FDA0003150780980000021
δ＝(T1，T2，…，Tn，C1，C2，…，CnAnd S) is an aggregate signcryption ciphertext.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein:
verifying the validity of the aggregate signcryption specifically includes:
calculate hi＝H2(Ti，Ci，IDi，Xi)，h′i＝H2(Ti，Ci，IDi，Ri)；
Verify whether the following equation holds:
Figure FDA0003150780980000022
if the equation is true, the aggregate signcryption is valid and receipt is denied otherwise.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein:
if the aggregation signcryption is valid, the method further comprises a step of decrypting the aggregation signcryption after receiving, and the step of decrypting the aggregation signcryption comprises the following steps:
calculating Q'i＝Ti(xB+DB) And Vi′＝H3(IDB,Ti,Q′i)；
Restore out message
Figure FDA0003150780980000023
8. The utility model provides a power terminal safety access authentication device under 5G communication environment which characterized in that includes:
the acquisition module is used for acquiring signed cipher texts of all the meter encryption units about the message;
the aggregation signcryption module is used for calculating by adopting an aggregation signcryption method to obtain aggregation signcryption ciphertexts of all the meter encryption units;
and the sending module is used for sending the aggregation signcryption text for verifying the legality of the aggregation signcryption.
9. A power terminal security access authentication system in a 5G communication environment, characterized by comprising the power terminal security access authentication device in the 5G communication environment according to claim 8.
10. A power terminal security access authentication system under a 5G communication environment is characterized by comprising an aggregation signcryptor; the polymeric signcrypter performs the method of any of claims 1-7.
CN202110765125.3A 2021-07-06 2021-07-06 Power terminal security access authentication method, device and system in 5G communication environment Pending CN113329397A (en)

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