CN111786789B - A Physical Layer Key Distribution Method Based on Random Beam and Edge Computing - Google Patents
A Physical Layer Key Distribution Method Based on Random Beam and Edge Computing Download PDFInfo
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- CN111786789B CN111786789B CN202010801243.0A CN202010801243A CN111786789B CN 111786789 B CN111786789 B CN 111786789B CN 202010801243 A CN202010801243 A CN 202010801243A CN 111786789 B CN111786789 B CN 111786789B
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
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- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
- Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
- Y02D30/70—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks
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Abstract
本发明公开了一种基于随机波束和边缘计算的物理层密钥分发方法，包括以下步骤：S1.设定保护区域；S2.信道估计：Bob向Alice发送信道估计序列，Alice根据接收到的信息估计出上行信道信息，并通过转置得下行信道信息；S3.随机波束生成：Alice根据下行信道信息生成随机波束；S4.密钥符号处理及发送：Alice在向Bob发送密钥符号s(n)时；S5.信号接收：Bob和Eve对Alice发送的信号进行接收S6.密钥估计：Bob在忽略白噪声向量nA的情况下对密钥符号进行估计，得到估计的密钥信息
The invention discloses a physical layer key distribution method based on random beams and edge computing, which includes the following steps: S1. Setting a protection area; S2. Channel estimation: Bob sends a channel estimation sequence to Alice, and Alice according to the received information Estimate the uplink channel information, and obtain the downlink channel information through transposition; S3. Random beam generation: Alice generates random beams according to the downlink channel information; S4. Key symbol processing and sending: Alice sends the key symbol s(n ); S5. Signal reception: Bob and Eve receive the signal sent by Alice. S6. Key estimation: Bob estimates the key symbol under the condition of ignoring the white noise vector n A , and obtains the estimated key information
Description
Technical Field
The present invention relates to key sharing, and more particularly, to a physical layer key distribution method based on random beam and edge computation.
Background
With the rapid development of the 5G internet of things and the edge computing network, various secret and sensitive data in the network are grown in mass, so that the information security problem is more and more prominent, and the security is becoming a precondition for various different business applications of edge computing. And the edge computing node is used as a small data center and a micro cloud center, and is reasonably scheduled, managed and controlled. In conventional wireless networks, cryptography-based encryption techniques are typically used at the network layer and upper layers to secure system communications. While performing various encryption authentications requires establishing a secure shared key between the two parties. In a large number of novel application scenarios of edge computing, such as a large-scale IoT network and a smart grid, a large number of resource-constrained sensor node terminals are accessed, so that the complexity, delay and even difficulty in realization of key distribution and management based on cryptography are high.
The key generation and distribution technology based on physical channels uses the randomness and reciprocity of fading channels to generate and distribute keys among legal users, and under the environment of rich multipath scattering, if an attacker is more than 1-2 physical signal wavelengths away from the legal users, the key information of legal users cannot be estimated. At present, there are some preliminary researches on physical layer key generation, but the current physical layer key generation rate is slow, and the rate and the channel variation speed are highly correlated. Experiments verify that a typical physical layer key distribution system of 3 transmit and receive antennas requires 10 seconds or more to achieve an AES symmetric encryption key with a 128 bit length in an indoor channel with a key error rate of orders of magnitude lower. Because the two parties need to perform more than 3 interactions (including the processes of sending pilot frequency, key negotiation, privacy amplification, final consistency confirmation and the like by the two parties) on the public channel in the process of establishing the key, the complexity of the communication protocol is higher, and the hidden danger of information leakage is improved. And because the normal communication process and the key distribution cannot be performed simultaneously, interruption of communication or increase of time delay is caused.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to overcome the defects of the prior art, and provides a physical layer key distribution method based on random beam and edge calculation, which reduces time delay and complexity caused by key sharing.
The aim of the invention is realized by the following technical scheme: a physical layer key distribution method based on random beam and edge calculation comprises the following steps:
s1, setting a protection area:
setting edge side equipment Alice and legal terminal Bob to share a secret key, wherein Eve is an eavesdropper;
the edge equipment Alice and the legal terminal Bob respectively use a protection area with the radius of R to surround the edge equipment Alice and the legal terminal Bob, so that an eavesdropper Eve cannot enter the protection area to eavesdrop, namely the distance between Eve and Alice is ensured to be larger than R, and the distance between Eve and Bob is ensured to be larger than R;
N A and N B Respectively represent the antenna numbers of Alice and Bob, N A ＞N B =1; the key symbol to be shared is s (n), n=1, 2, … L, where L is the symbol length of the key;
s2, channel estimation: bob sends a channel estimation sequence to Alice, and Alice estimates uplink channel information according to the received information and transposes the uplink channel information to obtain downlink channel information
S3, random beam generation: alice is based on downlink channel information
Generating random beams
The step S3 includes:
s301.Alice first transmits downlink channel information
Randomly selects an element h larger than a set threshold value ab,i ，i＝1,2,…,N A The method comprises the steps of carrying out a first treatment on the surface of the Simultaneous random generation of beams->
Elements of (a)
N A And k is not equal to i;
s302, calculating wave beams
Element v in (a) i ：
Wherein A is a constant,
representing gaussian random numbers.
S4, key symbol processing and sending: when Alice sends a key symbol S (n) to Bob, a random beam v is generated according to step S3, and S (n) is processed by using the random beam v, so as to obtain a signal x (n) for sending so as to disturb the received signal of an eavesdropper:
x(n)＝v(n)s(n)；
s5, signal receiving: bob receives the signal sent by Alice and receives the signal y Bob (n) is expressed as:
y Bob (n)＝h ab v(n)s(n)+n A
meanwhile, an eavesdropper eavesdrops on a signal sent by Alice, and the received signal is expressed as:
y Eve (n)＝h E v(n)s(n)+n E ；
wherein n is A And n E White noise vectors corresponding to Bob and Eve received signals respectively, h E A channel that is Eve;
s6, key estimation: bob is ignoring the white noise vector n A In the case of (a), the key symbol is estimated to obtain estimated key information
The step S6 includes:
bob is ignoring the white noise vector n A The key symbol is estimated under the condition of (1) to obtain:
obtaining h from step S2 ab v (n) =a; bob estimates the transmitted key symbols as:
at the same time, due to signal information h of eavesdropper E And h ab So that an eavesdropper is obtaining y Eve (n) it is difficult to estimate the corresponding key symbol.
And S7, when n=1, 2 and … L, repeating the steps S3 to S6 until Bob obtains the keys with L symbol lengths. Preferably, in the step S7, bob has obtained the L symbol-length keys, and further includes a consistency confirmation step:
and (3) confirming the consistency of the key between Bob and Alice, if the key obtained by Bob is consistent with the Alice sharing key, completing the key sharing, and if the key obtained by Bob is inconsistent with the Alice sharing key, returning to the step S2, and re-executing the key sharing process according to the steps S2-S7.
Preferably, when Bob and Alice perform the key consistency confirmation, the adopted consistency confirmation method comprises the following steps:
alice generates a signature by using the shared secret key through a hash function, encrypts the digital signature by using the shared secret key to obtain a ciphertext signature to be transmitted, and transmits the ciphertext signature to Bob;
and (3) the Bob decrypts the ciphertext digital signature by using the obtained key, generates the digital signature by using the hash function through the obtained key, compares the solved digital signature with the digital signature, and if the solved digital signature is consistent with the digital signature, the consistency of the key is passed.
The beneficial effects of the invention are as follows: (1) The present patent only needs to perform channel estimation once during key distribution, which is helpful for saving the cost. (2) The key distribution process of the invention does not need the two parties to carry out key quantization, negotiation and privacy amplification, thus the two parties do not need to carry out multiple interactive negotiations related to the process on a public channel, and the complexity is reduced. (3) The current technology needs to perform interaction (including the processes of sending pilot frequency, key negotiation, privacy amplification, final consistency confirmation and the like) on a public channel for at least 3 times in the process of establishing a key, so that the complexity of a communication protocol is higher, hidden danger of information leakage is improved, and the process of negotiating on the public channel in key quantization, negotiation and privacy amplification is not needed, thereby avoiding hidden danger of information leakage and improving safety.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the method of the present invention;
fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of sharing keys with multiple bobs simultaneously by Alice in an embodiment.
Detailed Description
The technical solution of the present invention will be described in further detail with reference to the accompanying drawings, but the scope of the present invention is not limited to the following description.
As shown in fig. 1, a physical layer key distribution method based on random beam and edge calculation includes the following steps:
s1, setting a protection area:
setting edge side equipment Alice and legal terminal Bob to share a secret key, wherein Eve is an eavesdropper;
the edge equipment Alice and the legal terminal Bob respectively use a protection area with the radius R to surround the edge equipment Alice and the legal terminal Bob, wherein the protection area is an area which can not be accessed by an eavesdropper Eve, so that the eavesdropper Eve can not access the protection area to eavesdrop, and the eavesdropping can be realized through a fence or an enclosing wall on a physical level or can be a forbidden area on an artificial duty; namely, ensuring that the distance between Eve and Alice is larger than R, and ensuring that the distance between Eve and Bob is larger than R; the radius length R of the guard area is generally greater than the uncorrelated distance of the channel, and in the embodiment of the present application, the length R is determined by the propagation environment of the channel and the carrier frequency, and the scattering is generally 10cm-100cm in a sufficient environment.
N A And N B Respectively represent the antenna numbers of Alice and Bob, N A ＞N B =1; the key symbol to be shared is s (n), n=1, 2, … L, where L is the symbol length of the key;
s2, channel estimation: bob sends a channel estimation sequence to Alice,alice estimates the uplink channel information according to the received information and transposes the uplink channel information to obtain the downlink channel information
S3, random beam generation: alice is based on downlink channel information
Generating random beams
The step S3 includes:
s301.Alice first transmits downlink channel information
A sufficiently large (greater than a set threshold) element h is randomly selected ab,i ，i＝1,2,…,N A The method comprises the steps of carrying out a first treatment on the surface of the Simultaneous random generation of beams->
Elements of (a)
k＝1,2,…,N A And k is not equal to i;
s302, calculating wave beams
Element v in (a) i ：
Wherein A is a constant,
representing gaussian random numbers.
S4, key symbol processing and sending: when Alice sends a key symbol S (n) to Bob, a random beam v is generated according to step S3, and S (n) is processed by using the random beam v, so as to obtain a signal x (n) for sending so as to disturb the received signal of an eavesdropper:
x(n)＝v(n)s(n)；
s5, signal receiving: bob receives the signal sent by Alice and receives the signal y Bob (n) is expressed as:
y Bob (n)＝h ab v(n)s(n)+n A
meanwhile, an eavesdropper eavesdrops on a signal sent by Alice, and the received signal is expressed as:
y Eve (n)＝h E v(n)s(n)+n E ；
wherein n is A And n E White noise vectors corresponding to Bob and Eve received signals respectively, h E A channel that is Eve; it can be seen that while the beam vector v (n) hops randomly, bob's accepted key symbols remain stable, while Eve's key symbols change rapidly at random.
S6, key estimation: bob is ignoring the white noise vector n A In the case of (a), the key symbol is estimated to obtain estimated key information
The step S6 includes:
bob is ignoring the white noise vector n A The key symbol is estimated under the condition of (1) to obtain:
obtaining h from step S2 ab v (n) =a; bob estimates the transmitted key symbols as:
at the same time, due to signal information h of eavesdropper E And h ab So that an eavesdropper is obtaining y Eve (n) it is difficult to estimate the corresponding key symbol.
And S7, when n=1, 2 and … L, repeating the steps S3 to S6 until Bob obtains the keys with L symbol lengths.
In the step S7, bob, after having obtained the L symbol-length keys, further includes a consistency confirmation step:
and (3) confirming the consistency of the key between Bob and Alice, if the key obtained by Bob is consistent with the Alice sharing key, completing the key sharing, and if the key obtained by Bob is inconsistent with the Alice sharing key, returning to the step S2, and re-executing the key sharing process according to the steps S2-S7.
In the embodiment of the application, when Bob and Alice perform the key consistency confirmation, the adopted consistency confirmation method includes:
alice generates a signature by using the shared secret key through a hash function, encrypts the digital signature by using the shared secret key to obtain a ciphertext signature to be transmitted, and transmits the ciphertext signature to Bob;
and (3) the Bob decrypts the ciphertext digital signature by using the obtained key, generates the digital signature by using the hash function through the obtained key, compares the solved digital signature with the digital signature, and if the solved digital signature is consistent with the digital signature, the consistency of the key is passed.
As shown in fig. 2, in the embodiment of the present application, if Alice needs to share the key with multiple bobs at the same time, only the Alice needs to distribute the key to each Bob according to the scheme of the present application.
The foregoing is a preferred embodiment of the invention, and it is to be understood that the invention is not limited to the form disclosed herein, but is not to be construed as limited to other embodiments, but is capable of other combinations, modifications and environments and is capable of changes or modifications within the scope of the inventive concept, either as a result of the foregoing teachings or as a result of the knowledge or knowledge of the relevant art. And that modifications and variations which do not depart from the spirit and scope of the invention are intended to be within the scope of the appended claims.
Claims (2)
1.A physical layer key distribution method based on random beam and edge calculation is characterized in that: the method comprises the following steps:
s1, setting a protection area:
setting edge side equipment Alice and legal terminal Bob to share a secret key, wherein Eve is an eavesdropper;
the edge equipment Alice and the legal terminal Bob respectively use a protection area with the radius of R to surround the edge equipment Alice and the legal terminal Bob, so that an eavesdropper Eve cannot enter the protection area to eavesdrop, namely the distance between Eve and Alice is ensured to be larger than R, and the distance between Eve and Bob is ensured to be larger than R;
N A and N B Respectively represent the antenna numbers of Alice and Bob, N A ＞N B =1; the key symbol to be shared is s (n), n=1, 2, … L, where L is the symbol length of the key;
s2, channel estimation: bob sends a channel estimation sequence to Alice, and Alice estimates uplink channel information according to the received information and transposes the uplink channel information to obtain downlink channel information
S3, random beam generation: alice is based on downlink channel information
Generating random beams
The step S3 includes:
s301.Alice first transmits downlink channel information
Randomly selects an element h larger than a set threshold value ab,i ，i＝1,2,…,N A The method comprises the steps of carrying out a first treatment on the surface of the Simultaneous random generation of beams->
Elements of (a)
And k is not equal to i;
s302. at i=1, 2, …, N A Each of which takes a value, a beam is calculated
Element v in (a) i ：
Wherein A is a constant,
representing gaussian random numbers;
s4, key symbol processing and sending: when Alice sends a key symbol S (n) to Bob, a random beam v is generated according to step S3, and S (n) is processed by using the random beam v, so as to obtain a signal x (n) for sending so as to disturb the received signal of an eavesdropper:
x(n)＝v(n)s(n)；
s5, signal receiving: bob receives the signal sent by Alice and receives the signal y Bob (n) is expressed as:
y Bob (n)＝h ab v(n)s(n)+n A
meanwhile, an eavesdropper eavesdrops on a signal sent by Alice, and the received signal is expressed as:
y Eve (n)＝h E v(n)s(n)+n E ；
wherein n is A And n E White noise vectors corresponding to Bob and Eve received signals respectively, h E A channel that is Eve;
s6, key estimation: bob is ignoring the white noise vector n A In the case of (a), the key symbol is estimated to obtain estimated key information
The step S6 includes:
bob is ignoring the white noise vector n A The key symbol is estimated under the condition of (1) to obtain:
obtaining h from step S2 ab v (n) =a; bob estimates the transmitted key symbols as:
at the same time, due to signal information h of eavesdropper E And h ab So that an eavesdropper is obtaining y Eve (n) it is difficult to estimate the corresponding key symbol;
and S7, when n=1, 2 and … L, repeating the steps S3 to S6 until Bob obtains the keys with L symbol lengths.
2. The physical layer key distribution method based on random beam and edge calculation according to claim 1, wherein: in the step S7, bob, after having obtained the L symbol-length keys, further includes a consistency confirmation step:
and (3) confirming the consistency of the key between Bob and Alice, if the key obtained by Bob is consistent with the Alice sharing key, completing the key sharing, and if the key obtained by Bob is inconsistent with the Alice sharing key, returning to the step S2, and re-executing the key sharing process according to the steps S2-S7.
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| CN116828458A (en) * | 2023-07-17 | 2023-09-29 | 中国电信股份有限公司技术创新中心 | Key generation method and related devices in MIMO system |
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| KR102771301B1 (en) * | 2017-02-24 | 2025-02-24 | 삼성전자주식회사 | Apparatus and method for generating secure key in wireless communication system |
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