CN111431723A - Zero-knowledge-proof-based authentication strategy for industrial environment mobile charging equipment - Google Patents
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Abstract
Description
技术领域technical field
本发明涉及一种基于零知识证明的工业环境移动充电设备的认证策略，属于工业无线可充电领域。The invention relates to an authentication strategy of a mobile charging device in an industrial environment based on zero-knowledge proof, and belongs to the field of industrial wireless charging.
背景技术Background technique
工业无线可充电传感器网络(Industrial Wireless Rechargeable SensorNetwork，IWRSN)的充电设备对传感器节点进行能量补充，充电设备需要与基站和待充电节点进行身份识别，而传感器节点计算和存储能力都较低，常用的加密技术由于计算量较大而不适用于传感器网络。2007年，Keith首次在传感器网络身份认证过程中使用零知识证明思想。而后几年，该思想得到了较快发展。所以设计一种证明过程更简单，安全性更高的传感器网络设备认证策略至关重要。The charging equipment of the Industrial Wireless Rechargeable Sensor Network (IWRSN) supplements the energy of the sensor nodes. The charging equipment needs to be identified with the base station and the node to be charged, while the computing and storage capabilities of the sensor nodes are low. Encryption technology is not suitable for sensor networks due to the large amount of computation. In 2007, Keith used the idea of zero-knowledge proof for the first time in the sensor network authentication process. In the following years, this idea has developed rapidly. Therefore, it is very important to design a sensor network device authentication strategy with simpler proof process and higher security.
发明内容SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
为了克服现有技术中的不足，本发明提出了一种基于零知识证明的工业环境移动充电设备的认证策略，可以解决工业无线可充电传感器网络中的设备认证问题，并有效的来抵抗假冒待充电节点及充电设备对网络的攻击。In order to overcome the deficiencies in the prior art, the present invention proposes an authentication strategy for mobile charging equipment in an industrial environment based on zero-knowledge proof, which can solve the equipment authentication problem in industrial wireless rechargeable sensor networks and effectively resist counterfeiting and waiting. Attacks on the network by charging nodes and charging equipment.
本发明中主要采用的技术方案为：The technical scheme mainly adopted in the present invention is:
一种基于零知识证明的工业环境移动充电设备的认证策略，以移动充电设备为核心，其包括两个认证过程，分别为待充电节点充电前对充电设备的身份认证和基站对充电设备的身份认证，所述身份认证过程的具步骤如下：An authentication strategy for mobile charging equipment in an industrial environment based on zero-knowledge proof, with mobile charging equipment as the core, which includes two authentication processes, namely, the identity authentication of the charging equipment before charging the node to be charged and the identity of the charging equipment by the base station. Authentication, the steps of the identity authentication process are as follows:
步骤1：设定初始条件为：证明者P与验证者V共享p,G,M，p为椭圆曲线循环子群的生成元，其中,G为给定椭圆曲线E上的一个基点，M为满足椭圆曲线离散对数的解；Step 1: Set the initial condition as: the prover P and the verifier V share p, G, M, where p is the generator of the elliptic curve cyclic subgroup, where G is a base point on the given elliptic curve E, and M is the A solution that satisfies the discrete logarithm of the elliptic curve;
步骤2：证明者P向验证者V发出认证请求；Step 2: The prover P sends an authentication request to the verifier V;
步骤3：所述验证者V生成随机数r∈K，K为有限域，计算X＝r·G，Y′＝r·M，并发送X给所述证明者P；Step 3: The verifier V generates a random number r∈K, where K is a finite field, calculates X=r·G, Y′=r·M, and sends X to the prover P;
步骤4：所述证明者P计算Y＝s·X，发送Y给所述验证者V；Step 4: The prover P calculates Y=s·X, and sends Y to the verifier V;
步骤5：所述验证者V检验Y＝Y'的等式是否成立，若等式成立则通过所述证明者P的认证，若等式不成立则拒绝所述证明者P的认证；Step 5: The verifier V checks whether the equation of Y=Y' is true, if the equation is true, the certification of the prover P is passed, and if the equation is not true, the certification of the prover P is rejected;
步骤6：当充电完成后，待充电节点向充电设备发送节点签名的工作量证明proof；当充电设备返回基站后，由基站验证节点签名的工作量证明proof。Step 6: When the charging is completed, the node to be charged sends the proof of workload signed by the node to the charging device; when the charging device returns to the base station, the base station verifies the proof of workload signed by the node.
优选地，所述步骤1中的初始条件如下：采用椭圆曲线加密方法，K为有限域，E为给定所述有限域K上的一条椭圆曲线，所述E的阶为order(E)，G为所述给定椭圆曲线E上的一个基点，M为满足椭圆曲线离散对数的解，秘密s为基站为认证过程所选择的整数，且满足关系式(1)：Preferably, the initial conditions in the step 1 are as follows: using an elliptic curve encryption method, K is a finite field, E is an elliptic curve on the given finite field K, and the order of E is order(E), G is a base point on the given elliptic curve E, M is a solution that satisfies the discrete logarithm of the elliptic curve, and the secret s is an integer selected by the base station for the authentication process, and satisfies the relational formula (1):
s·G＝Mmodp (1)。s·G=Mmodp(1).
优选地，所述步骤6中工作量证明proof为节点完成充电后为充电设备提供的工作量证明，节点将自身编号id与秘密s进行哈希运算得到工作量证明，满足下列公式：Preferably, the proof of workload in the step 6 is the proof of workload provided for the charging device after the node completes charging. The node performs a hash operation on its own number id and the secret s to obtain the proof of workload, which satisfies the following formula:
proof＝Hash(id,s) (2)。proof=Hash(id,s) (2).
优选地，证明过程通过零知识证明过程核心算法中引入椭圆曲线加密技术，证明过程符合单轮零知识证明过程，满足两个必要条件：认证过程选择的椭圆曲线函数为单向同态函数；椭圆曲线函数经过常量替换后为关于替换变量的可交换函数。Preferably, the proof process introduces elliptic curve encryption technology into the core algorithm of the zero-knowledge proof process, and the proof process conforms to the single-round zero-knowledge proof process and satisfies two necessary conditions: the elliptic curve function selected in the authentication process is a one-way homomorphic function; the ellipse The curve function is a commutative function with respect to the substitution variable after constant substitution.
优选地，所述待充电节点充电前对充电设备的身份认证过程中，证明者P为充电设备，验证者V为待充电节点；所述基站对充电设备的身份认证过程中，证明者P为充电设备，验证者V为基站。Preferably, during the identity authentication process of the charging device before the charging node is charged, the prover P is the charging device, and the verifier V is the node to be charged; during the identity authentication process of the charging device by the base station, the prover P is the charging device. Charging equipment, verifier V is the base station.
有益效果：本发明提供一种基于零知识证明的工业环境移动充电设备的认证策略，其针对工业环境的设备认证问题，研究了离散对数函数的特点与椭圆曲线相结合，并采用在零知识证明过程核心算法中引入椭圆曲线加密技术，解决了零知识证明的多轮迭代，将迭代次数减少到一次。Beneficial effects: The present invention provides an authentication strategy for mobile charging equipment in an industrial environment based on zero-knowledge proofs. For the equipment authentication problem in an industrial environment, the characteristics of discrete logarithmic functions are combined with elliptic curves, and the zero-knowledge method is adopted. Elliptic curve encryption technology is introduced into the core algorithm of the proof process, which solves the multi-round iteration of zero-knowledge proof and reduces the number of iterations to one.
附图说明Description of drawings
图1为实施例1节点对充电设备认证过程示意图；FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a node authentication process for charging equipment in Embodiment 1;
图2为实施例2基站对充电设备认证过程示意图。FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of an authentication process of a charging device by a base station in Embodiment 2. FIG.
具体实施方式Detailed ways
为了使本技术领域的人员更好地理解本申请中的技术方案，下面对本申请实施例中的技术方案进行清楚、完整地描述，显然，所描述的实施例仅仅是本申请一部分实施例，而不是全部的实施例。基于本申请中的实施例，本领域普通技术人员在没有做出创造性劳动前提下所获得的所有其他实施例，都应当属于本申请保护的范围。In order to make those skilled in the art better understand the technical solutions in the present application, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be described clearly and completely below. Obviously, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present application, and Not all examples. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without creative work shall fall within the scope of protection of the present application.
实施例1Example 1
如图1和2所示，采用本发明的基于零知识证明的工业环境移动充电设备的认证策略，在充电设备离开基站前，对认证过程进行初始化，包括椭圆曲线的选择，秘密s的选择，共享信息的生成与分发。在对待充电节点进行充电过程中，根据椭圆曲线离散对数零知识证明方案完成待充电节点对充电设备的身份验证。充电设备完成充电后，由待充电节点向充电设备发送带有节点签名的服务证明信息。充电设备在完成为规划好的所有节点充电的任务后，回到基站进行能量补充，基站对回归的充电设备根据椭圆曲线离散对数零知识证明方案进行身份验证，以及充电设备服务工作量的验证。As shown in Figures 1 and 2, using the zero-knowledge proof-based authentication strategy of the mobile charging device in an industrial environment of the present invention, before the charging device leaves the base station, the authentication process is initialized, including the selection of the elliptic curve, the selection of the secret s, Generation and distribution of shared information. During the charging process of the node to be charged, the identity verification of the charging device by the node to be charged is completed according to the elliptic curve discrete logarithm zero-knowledge proof scheme. After the charging device completes charging, the node to be charged sends the service certification information with the node signature to the charging device. After the charging equipment completes the task of charging all the planned nodes, it returns to the base station for energy replenishment. The base station performs identity verification on the returning charging equipment according to the elliptic curve discrete logarithmic zero-knowledge proof scheme, as well as the verification of the service workload of the charging equipment. .
初始条件：充电设备与待充电节点共享p,G,M，在充电设备离开基站前，基站为认证过程选取运算参数：选取椭圆曲线，使其满足以下关系式：Initial conditions: The charging device shares p, G, and M with the node to be charged. Before the charging device leaves the base station, the base station selects operation parameters for the authentication process: select the elliptic curve to satisfy the following relationship:
s·G＝Mmodp (1)；s·G=Mmodp(1);
M为满足椭圆曲线离散对数的解，秘密s为基站为认证过程所选择的整数，生成共享信息G,M,p，并将信息G,M,p共享给待充电节点，充电设备离开基站前，获得基站发送的秘密s。M is the solution that satisfies the discrete logarithm of the elliptic curve, the secret s is the integer selected by the base station for the authentication process, and the shared information G, M, p is generated, and the information G, M, p is shared with the node to be charged, and the charging device leaves the base station. Before, obtain the secret s sent by the base station.
待充电节点对充电设备的认证过程如下：The authentication process of the charging device by the node to be charged is as follows:
1)充电设备生成随机数r，将其发送给待充电节点，请求与待充电节点建立联系；1) The charging device generates a random number r, sends it to the node to be charged, and requests to establish contact with the node to be charged;
2)待充电节点计算X＝r·G，Y′＝r·M，将X发送给充电设备；2) The node to be charged calculates X=r·G, Y′=r·M, and sends X to the charging device;
3)充电设备计算Y＝s·X，将Y发送给待充电节点；3) The charging device calculates Y=s·X, and sends Y to the node to be charged;
4)待充电节点比较Y＝Y′的等式是否成立，若等式成立则证明充电设备合法，进入充电阶段，否则拒绝充电设备的认证；4) The node to be charged compares whether the equation of Y=Y′ is established. If the equation is established, it proves that the charging device is legal and enters the charging stage, otherwise the authentication of the charging device is rejected;
5)当完成充电后，待充电节点向充电设备发送节点签名的充电证明proof，用于证明其工作量，所述工作量证明公式如下：5) When the charging is completed, the node to be charged sends the charging proof signed by the node to the charging device to prove its workload. The workload proof formula is as follows:
proof＝Hash(id,s) (2)。proof=Hash(id,s) (2).
待充电节点对充电设备的认证过程通过在零知识证明过程核心算法中引入椭圆曲线加密技术，证明过程符合单轮零知识证明过程，满足两个必要条件：认证过程选择的椭圆曲线函数为单向同态函数；椭圆曲线函数经过常量替换后为关于替换变量的可交换函数。The authentication process of the charging device by the node to be charged is by introducing elliptic curve encryption technology into the core algorithm of the zero-knowledge proof process. The proof process conforms to the single-round zero-knowledge proof process and satisfies two necessary conditions: the elliptic curve function selected in the authentication process is one-way Homomorphic functions; elliptic curve functions are commutative functions with respect to the substitution variables after constant substitution.
待充电节点对充电设备认证过程符合零知识交互：The authentication process of the charging device by the node to be charged conforms to zero-knowledge interaction:
完备性分析：由证明过程可知，若充电设备确实掌握验证所需的秘密s，并且按照步骤进行验证，那么待充电节点总能验证充电设备的身份，即方案是完备的。Completeness analysis: It can be seen from the proof process that if the charging device does master the secret s required for verification and performs the verification according to the steps, then the node to be charged can always verify the identity of the charging device, that is, the scheme is complete.
有效性分析：假设充电设备不知道秘密s，在收到X后，基于ECDLP问题，充电设备无法从X＝r·G中推算出G的值，也就无法计算得到M而通过Y′＝r·M对节点进行欺骗，如果设备使用假的s′构造Y＝s′·X，那么待充电节点在步骤4中会验证失败并拒绝设备。Validity analysis: Assuming that the charging device does not know the secret s, after receiving X, based on the ECDLP problem, the charging device cannot infer the value of G from X=r·G, so it cannot calculate M and pass Y′=r ·M deceives the node, if the device uses a fake s' to construct Y=s'·X, then the node to be charged will fail the verification in step 4 and reject the device.
零知识性分析：在认证过程中，充电设备获得的信息仅有X，其中X＝r·G，充电设备求得Y′的困难性等价于在有限域上计算椭圆曲线的难度。所以，在本方案中，充电设备无法通过认证过程获得待充电节点的其余信息，待充电节点也无法获得充电设备的更多信息。Zero-knowledge analysis: During the authentication process, the information obtained by the charging device is only X, where X=r·G, and the difficulty of obtaining Y′ by the charging device is equivalent to the difficulty of calculating an elliptic curve on a finite field. Therefore, in this solution, the charging device cannot obtain the remaining information of the node to be charged through the authentication process, and the node to be charged cannot obtain more information of the charging device.
基站对回归的充电设备认证过程如下：The certification process for the returned charging equipment by the base station is as follows:
1)充电设备向基站发出认证请求；1) The charging device sends an authentication request to the base station;
2)基站生成随机数r，计算X＝r·G，Y′＝r·M并发送X至充电设备，并要求该充电设备发送充电服务待充电节点的工作量证明proof；2) The base station generates a random number r, calculates X=r·G, Y′=r·M and sends X to the charging device, and asks the charging device to send the proof of workload proof of the node to be charged for charging service;
3)充电设备计算Y＝s·X，将Y发送给基站，并将待充电节点发送给其的工作量证明proof发送给基站；3) The charging device calculates Y=s·X, sends Y to the base station, and sends the proof of workload sent to it by the node to be charged to the base station;
4)基站比较Y＝Y'等式是否成立，并对充电设备提供的待充电节点的工作量证明proof与基站预留信息进行对比验证，进行身份认证以及工作量认证后，判定该设备是否为合法设备。4) The base station compares whether the Y=Y' equation is established, and compares and verifies the proof of workload of the node to be charged provided by the charging device with the reserved information of the base station. After identity authentication and workload authentication, it is determined whether the device is a legal device.
5)证明过程通过零知识证明过程核心算法中引入椭圆曲线加密技术，证明过程符合单轮零知识证明过程，满足两个必要条件：函数为单向同态函数；函数经过常量替换后为关于替换变量的可交换函数。5) The proof process The elliptic curve encryption technology is introduced into the core algorithm of the zero-knowledge proof process. The proof process conforms to the single-round zero-knowledge proof process and meets two necessary conditions: the function is a one-way homomorphic function; after the function is replaced by a constant, it is about the replacement A commutative function for variables.
基站对充电设备认证过程符合零知识交互：The base station's authentication process for charging equipment conforms to zero-knowledge interaction:
完备性分析：由证明过程可以看出，若充电设备确实拥有验证所需的秘密s，并按照设计进行验证，那么基站总是接收充电设备正确的证明。若基站向充电设备进行工作量挑战认证，设备总能给出正确的应答，那么证明设备确实为这些节点进行了充电服务，即方案是完备的。Completeness analysis: It can be seen from the proof process that if the charging device does have the secret s required for verification and is verified as designed, the base station always receives the correct proof of the charging device. If the base station authenticates the workload challenge to the charging device, and the device can always give a correct response, it proves that the device has indeed performed charging services for these nodes, that is, the solution is complete.
有效性分析：假设设备不知道秘密s，在收到X后，基于椭圆曲线离散对数问题，设备无法从X＝r·G中推算出G的值，也就无法计算得到M而通过Y＝r·M对基站进行欺骗。如果设备使用假的s′构造Y＝s′·X，那么基站在步骤4中会验证失败并拒绝设备。若设备并没用为规划的节点进行充电服务并得到节点的认证，在基站进行工作量验证时，设备将不能提供基站所需要的节点证明，基站将拒绝设备的进入。Validity analysis: Assuming that the device does not know the secret s, after receiving X, based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, the device cannot infer the value of G from X=r·G, so it cannot calculate M and pass Y= r·M spoofs the base station. If the device constructs Y=s'·X with a false s', then the base station will fail the verification in step 4 and reject the device. If the device is not used for charging the planned node and is certified by the node, when the base station performs workload verification, the device will not be able to provide the node certificate required by the base station, and the base station will refuse the entry of the device.
零知识性分析：在认证过程中，充电设备从基站获得的信息仅有X，其中X＝r·G，充电设备求得Y的困难性等价于在有限域上计算椭圆曲线的难度。所以，在本方案中，充电设备无法通过认证过程获得更多的信息。Zero-knowledge analysis: During the authentication process, the information obtained by the charging device from the base station is only X, where X=r·G, and the difficulty of obtaining Y by the charging device is equivalent to the difficulty of calculating an elliptic curve on a finite field. Therefore, in this solution, the charging device cannot obtain more information through the authentication process.
以上所述仅是本发明的优选实施方式，应当指出，对于本技术领域的普通技术人员来说，在不脱离本发明原理的前提下，还可以做出若干改进和润饰，这些改进和润饰也应视为本发明的保护范围。The above are only the preferred embodiments of the present invention. It should be pointed out that for those skilled in the art, without departing from the principles of the present invention, several improvements and modifications can be made. It should be regarded as the protection scope of the present invention.
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