CN110932851B - A key protection method for multi-party cooperative operation based on PKI - Google Patents

Abstract

The invention discloses a key protection method based on PKI (public key infrastructure) multi-party cooperative operation, which relates to the field of electronic authentication PKI (public key infrastructure) cryptographic technology integration innovation, combines various cryptographic technologies and combined authentication of various factors to ensure the safety of generation, calling and storage of a user private key, obtains a pseudo key by adding a user identity factor into a real key as a part of salt and converting the pseudo key after being confused with other data of a server, performs fragmentation processing on the pseudo key, and controls the storage of a part locally by a user, thereby realizing that the integrity and confidentiality of the real key of the user are not influenced by single key leakage through the mechanism.

Description

A Key Protection Method for Multi-Party Collaborative Operation Based on PKI

technical field

The invention relates to the field of electronic authentication PKI cryptographic technology integration innovation, in particular to a PKI-based multi-party cooperative operation key protection method.

Background technique

At present, the electronic authentication PKI password technology mainly uses the hardware medium smart password key USBkey (such as bank U-shield, IC card) on the terminal personal computer to generate, store and perform password operations, and control the user's password through the PIN code protection of the hardware medium. Authentication access, but the hardware currently mainly relies on PC application scenarios, which is not conducive to the convenient use of smart terminal application scenarios such as mobile Internet and Internet of Things. The traditional way of using the hardware medium USBkey as a password protection method is not conducive to convenient use in smart terminal application scenarios such as mobile Internet and Internet of Things. First, it is inconvenient to carry USBkey devices with you and easy to lose. Second, it is not suitable for some smart terminals. It has higher requirements on the hardware and software environment of the intelligent terminal.

At present, in order to conveniently use PKI digital authentication technology in smart terminal application scenarios such as mobile Internet and Internet of Things, the soft key method is mainly used during application integration, that is, the file key is generated by the smart terminal and called locally. There are great security risks. Every link in the process of key generation, storage, calculation, and transmission may be intercepted by malicious programs, resulting in key leakage.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The purpose of the present invention is to: provide a key protection method based on PKI multi-party cooperative operation, for the application scenario where it is inconvenient to use traditional UKEY, the method combines the combined authentication of multiple cryptographic techniques and multiple factors to ensure The generation, invocation, and storage of the user's private key are secure. The user's identity factor is added to the real key as a part of the salt, and the pseudo-key is obtained after being confused with other data of the server, and then the pseudo-key is segmented. The user controls and stores part of it locally. Through the above mechanism, the leakage of a single key does not affect the integrity and confidentiality of the user's real key. Every link of the network may be intercepted by malicious programs, resulting in the problem of key leakage.

The technical scheme adopted in the present invention is as follows:

A key protection method for PKI-based multi-party collaborative operation, comprising a user User, a client client, a server server and an external RA/CA/KMC server,

User User: User participation information entry, operation confirmation;

Client Client: Responsible for client key related operations;

Server-side Server: Responsible for server-side key segmentation and related operations. The key operation needs to be implemented by a hardware cryptographic component with high security. The certificate application request is sent to an external RA/CA/KMC server for applying for digital certificates and encryption encryption. key;

External RA/CA/KMC server: external third-party system service for applying for digital certificates and encryption keys;

The key protection method for the PKI-based multi-party cooperative operation mainly includes the following steps:

S1 user certificate registration: After the user User's real-name authentication is passed, the server encryption machine randomly generates the signature key and certificate request P10 for the user User, salts and confuses the real private key, and performs A, B, and C on the pseudo key. Three segments are divided, the user User protects and stores the two segments A and B through the identity ID and PIN code, and the server encrypts and stores the two segments B and C through the built-in key of the encryption machine; the certificate request P10 is used for external RA/CA. The /KMC server applies for a certificate, and the private key of the user's encrypted certificate is encrypted with the pseudo-key B segment and stored; the entire key generation, segmentation, transmission and storage are protected by PKI technology and multiple factors of people and equipment.

S2 digital signature application: use the identity ID and certificate PIN code as the unique certificate of the private key holder, decrypt the two-part keys d_A and d_B on the client side, and use one of the d_B as the symmetric key and the other as the symmetric key. After the share d_A is combined with the HASH value to be signed, it is symmetrically encrypted and sent to the server for synthetic pseudo-key, desalting and true key signature. The true key signature value is symmetrically encrypted with the symmetric key d_B and then returned. For the client client, the client client uses the same symmetric key d_B to decrypt the real key signature value of the server side; PKI technology is used in the entire key fragment decryption, pseudo key synthesis, truth seeking, encryption and data transmission process And the multi-factors of people and equipment have been correspondingly protected.

S3 data encryption application: the encryptor uses the recipient's encryption certificate public key to encrypt the data to be sent, the decryptor uses the identity ID and certificate PIN code as the unique certificate of the private key holder, and decrypts the two-part signature on the client side. Keys d_A and d_B, use one of the d_B signature private keys as a symmetric key, decrypt the encrypted certificate private key (encrypted private key) encrypted and saved in the registration process, and then use the decrypted private key to decrypt the received ciphertext . In the process of key fragment decryption and data decryption, PKI technology and multiple factors of entity's identity and PIN code information are used for corresponding protection.

Using the above-mentioned PKI-based multi-party cooperative operation key protection method can ensure that the integrity and confidentiality of the user's real key will not be affected if any one of the client Client and the server-side Server is leaked, ensuring the user's private key. The security level of the key protection of the method can reach the high security level of the traditional hardware medium intelligent password key USB key (such as bank U shield, IC card).

Further, the step S1 user certificate registration mainly includes the following steps:

S101: The user User initiates a certificate registration application. First, the client client collects information such as the user's real name, evidence, and real person biometrics for authentication. After the authentication is passed, it enters the subsequent certificate registration link;

S102: The client Client generates a temporary SM2 asymmetric key, the private key is recorded as T_Pri, and the public key is recorded as T_Pub;

S103: The client client sends the real-name identity ID and public key T_Pub to the server server;

S104: The server-side Server allocates a session symmetric key session to the client, which is recorded as T_Session;

S105: The server-side Server invokes the key generation interface of the hardware cryptographic module to generate a formal SM2 asymmetric key pair for the client, the private key is denoted as d, and the public key is denoted as P;

S106: The server-side Server invokes the PKCS10 generation interface of the hardware cryptographic module to generate a certificate request P10 for the client;

S107: The server-side Server invokes the interface of the external RA/CA/KMC server system and uses the certificate request P10 to apply for the client for "SignCert, encryption certificate, EncryptCert, and encryption key plaintext EncryptKey";

S108: The server-side Server performs salting and data obfuscation processing on the client's private key d to obtain a pseudo-private key d'=Mix(salt,d);

S109: The server-side Server divides d' into three parts, A, B, and C in turn, which are respectively recorded as d_A, d_B, and d_C;

S110: The server-side Server calls the symmetric encryption interface of the hardware cryptographic module, uses T_Session as the symmetric key, and performs symmetric encryption output on "d_A+d_B, SignCert, EncryptCert, EncryptKey", which is recorded as client'=SM4_Enc(T_Session,d_A+d_B ,SignCert,EncryptCert,EncryptKey);

S111: The server-side Server uses T_Pub to perform SM2 asymmetric encryption on T_Session, which is recorded as T_Session'=SM2_Enc(T_Pub, T_Session);

S112: The server-side Server calls the symmetric encryption interface of the hardware cryptographic module, and uses the built-in device symmetric key to perform symmetric encryption output on "d_B+d_C, EncryptKey", which is recorded as Server'=SM4_Enc(d_B+d_C,EncryptKey);

S113: The server-side Server stores Server' in the database;

S114: The server-side Server returns client'+T_Session' to the client-side Client;

S115: The client Client uses T_Pri to perform SM2 asymmetric decryption on T_Session' to obtain a session symmetric key T_Session=SM2_Dec(T_Pri, T_Session');

S116: The client Client uses T_Session to perform SM4 symmetrical decryption on client', and obtains d_A+d_B, SignCert, EncryptCert, EncryptKey=SM4_Dec(T_Session, client');

S117: The client Client uses d_B to perform SM4 symmetric encryption on the EncryptKey, and obtains EncryptKey'=SM4_Enc(d_B, EncryptKey);

S118: The user inputs the certificate PIN code, which is recorded as Cert_PIN;

S119: The client Client performs a HASH operation on the real-name identity ID+Cert_PIN, and obtains Cert_PIN'=SM3 (identity ID+Cert_PIN);

S120: The client Client uses Cert_PIN' to perform SM4 symmetric encryption on d_A+d_B to obtain (d_A+d_B)'=SM4_Enc(Cert_PIN', d_A+d_B);

S121: Client Client Storage (d_A+d_B)',SignCert,EncryptCert,EncryptKey';

S122: User registration is completed.

Further, the step S2 digital signature application mainly includes the following steps:

S201: digital signature starts;

S202: The client identifies the client to obtain the identity ID;

S203: The user inputs the certificate PIN code, which is recorded as Cert_PIN;

S204: The client Client performs a HASH operation on the real-name identity ID+Cert_PIN, and obtains Cert_PIN'=SM3 (identity ID+Cert_PIN);

S205: The client Client uses Cert_PIN' to perform SM4 symmetrical decryption on (d_A+d_B)', and obtains d_A+d_B=SM4_Dec(Cert_PIN',(d_A+d_B)');

S206: The client Client performs a HASH operation on the signature information P, and the obtained hash value is H=SM3(P);

S207: The client Client uses d_B to symmetrically encrypt d_A+H to obtain (d_A+H)'=SM4_Enc(d_B, d_A+H);

S208: The client client sends the identity ID, (d_A+H)' to the server server;

S209: The server-side server finds the user certificate according to the real-name identity ID, calls the external RA/CA/KMC server interface, and confirms the certificate status (if the certificate is invalid, the operation is terminated);

S210: The server-side server finds the corresponding server' value during registration according to the real-name identity ID;

S211: The server-side Server invokes the symmetric decryption interface of the hardware cryptographic module, and uses the built-in symmetric key of the device to perform symmetric decryption output on the server' to obtain d_B+d_C, EncryptKey=SM4_Dec(server');

S212: The server-side Server uses d_B to symmetrically decrypt (d_A+H)', and obtains d_A+H=SM4_Dec(d_B,(d_A+H)');

S213: the server-side Server synthesizes the obfuscated pseudo private key d'=d_A+d_B+d_C;

S214: The server-side Server performs impurity (desalting) processing on the pseudo private key d', and obtains the user's true private key d=UnMix(salt, d');

S215: The server-side Server uses the true private key d to encrypt H to generate a P1/P7 digital signature, which is recorded as SignData=P1(d,H)/P7(d,H,certificate);

S216: The server-side Server uses d_B as a symmetric key, and symmetrically encrypts SignData to obtain SignData'=SM4_Enc(d_B, SignData);

S217: The server-side Server returns SignData' to the client-side Client;

S218: The client Client uses d_B as a symmetric key, and decrypts SignData' symmetrically to obtain a digital signature SignData=SM4_Dec(d_B, SignData');

S219: The digital signature ends.

Further, the step S3 data encryption application mainly includes the following steps:

S301: User-A sends encrypted information to User-B, and data encryption starts;

S302: Client-A uses User-B's encryption certificate EncryptCert_B to encapsulate the data to be sent in a digital envelope, which is recorded as Envelope_B=Encrypt(EncryptCert_B, data);

S303: Client-A sends Envelope_B to client-B;

S304: Client-B identity identification obtains the identity ID of User-B;

S305: User-B enters the certificate PIN code, which is recorded as Cert_PIN;

S306: client-B performs HASH operation on the real-name identity ID+Cert_PIN, and obtains Cert_PIN'=SM3 (identity ID+Cert_PIN);

S307: client-B uses Cert_PIN' to perform SM4 symmetrical decryption on (d_A+d_B)', and obtains d_A+d_B=SM4_Dec(Cert_PIN',(d_A+d_B)');

S308: client-B uses d_B to decrypt EncryptKey' to obtain EncryptKey=SM4_Dec(d_B, EncryptKey');

S309: client-B decrypts Envelope_B using EncryptKey, and obtains plaintext data data=Decrypt(EncryptKey, Envelope_B);

S310: Data decryption ends.

The security problems existing in the existing soft key (file key) technology are as follows:

1. The key generation and operation of the client's conventional soft key are insecure, and it is inconvenient to use the hardware key;

2. Conventional soft keys lack enhanced security mechanisms in key storage and transmission, which may easily lead to key leakage;

3. Conventional soft key encryption uses the same salting factor, which is prone to global risks;

4. The key storage and transmission of conventional soft keys lack the security mechanism of key segmentation, which is easy to cause key leakage;

5. Conventional key negotiation involves multiple interactions of session key negotiation, and the efficiency is low;

6. There is a risk of data leakage after the key server database is dragged into the database;

And a kind of key protection method based on PKI multi-party cooperative operation of the present invention, in view of the above problem, adopts the aforementioned scheme, and the main benefits are as follows:

1. The generation and operation of the real key of the client client rely on the hardware cryptographic component (encryption machine or encryption card) of the server-side Server. The generation and operation of the key are more secure and easy to use;

2. Use salting and obfuscation to generate fake keys for real keys, and use fake keys for key storage and transmission to prevent real keys from being leaked;

3. The salting factor is associated with the user's identity information and PIN code, each user is exclusive, and each user's salting factor is different to prevent global risks in the desalting operation;

4. The transmission and storage of the pseudo key adopts the key segmentation technology. Both the client and the server only retain part of the ciphertext. This key segmentation and multiple encryption realize the high security of key transmission and storage. The disclosure does not affect the overall key security;

5. A certain shared segment in the pseudo key is cleverly used to realize session key sharing, so that the session key does not need to be negotiated, and the efficiency is high;

6. The fragment key stored on the server side is decrypted by the hardware cryptographic component (encryption machine or encryption card), and can only be decrypted and invoked inside the hardware cryptographic component (encryption machine or encryption card) to ensure that the real key does not fall, even if the database The towed library has no hardware password components (encryption machine or encryption card), and the key data cannot be unlocked, so the security is high.

To sum up, due to the adoption of the above-mentioned technical solutions, the beneficial effects of the present invention are:

1. a kind of key protection method based on the multi-party cooperative operation of PKI of the present invention, the generation and operation of the real key of the client client rely on the hardware cipher component (encryption machine or encryption card) of the server server to realize, the generation of the key and the encryption card are realized. The operation is more secure and easy to use;

2. A kind of key protection method based on PKI multi-party cooperative operation of the present invention, adopts salting and obfuscation to generate pseudo-keys for real keys, and pseudo-keys are used for key storage and transmission to prevent real keys from being leaked ;

3. A key protection method based on PKI multi-party collaborative operation of the present invention, the salting factor is associated with user identity information and PIN code, each user is exclusive, and the salting factor of each user is different to prevent desalting operations. There is a global risk;

4. A kind of key protection method based on PKI multi-party cooperative operation of the present invention, the transmission and storage of the pseudo key adopts the key segmentation technology, and both the client and the server only retain the ciphertext of part of the fragment, this key fragmentation. 、Multiple encryption realizes high security of key transmission and storage, and a single leak does not affect the overall key security;

5. A kind of key protection method based on PKI multi-party cooperative operation of the present invention, cleverly uses a certain shared segment in the pseudo key to realize session key sharing, so that the session key does not need to be negotiated, and the efficiency is high;

6. a kind of key protection method based on PKI multi-party cooperative operation of the present invention, the fragment key stored on the server side adopts hardware cipher component (encryption machine or encryption card) to decrypt, and in the hardware cipher component (encryption machine or encryption card) Only the inside can be decrypted and called to ensure that the real key does not fall to the ground. Even if the database is dragged to the library and there is no hardware password component (encryption machine or encryption card), the key data cannot be decrypted, and the security is high.

Description of drawings

The invention will be described by way of example and with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:

Fig. 1 is the principle block diagram of the present invention;

Fig. 2 is the step S1 user certificate registration flow chart of the present invention;

Fig. 3 is the step S2 digital signature application flow chart of the present invention;

Fig. 4 is the step S3 data encryption application flow chart of the present invention;

Detailed ways

All features disclosed in this specification, or all disclosed steps in a method or process, may be combined in any way except mutually exclusive features and/or steps.

It should be noted that relational terms such as the terms "first" and "second" are only used to distinguish one entity or operation from another entity or operation, and do not necessarily require or imply any relationship between these entities or operations. any such actual relationship or sequence exists. Moreover, the terms "comprising", "comprising" or any other variation thereof are intended to encompass a non-exclusive inclusion such that a process, method, article or device that includes a list of elements includes not only those elements, but also includes not explicitly listed or other elements inherent to such a process, method, article or apparatus. Without further limitation, an element qualified by the phrase "comprising a..." does not preclude the presence of additional identical elements in a process, method, article or apparatus that includes the element.

The present invention will be described in detail below with reference to FIGS. 1 to 4 .

Example 1

A key protection method based on PKI multi-party cooperative operation, as shown in Figure 1, includes user User, client Client, server server and external RA/CA/KMC server,

User User: User participation information entry, operation confirmation;

Client Client: Responsible for client key related operations;

Server-side Server: Responsible for server-side key segmentation and related operations. The key operation needs to be implemented by a hardware cryptographic component with high security. The certificate application request is sent to an external RA/CA/KMC server for applying for digital certificates and encryption encryption. key;

External RA/CA/KMC server: external third-party system service for applying for digital certificates and encryption keys;

The key protection method for the PKI-based multi-party cooperative operation mainly includes the following steps:

S1 user certificate registration: After the user User's real-name authentication is passed, the server encryption machine randomly generates the signature key and certificate request P10 for the user User, salts and confuses the real private key, and performs A, B, and C on the pseudo key. Three segments are divided, the user User protects and stores the two segments A and B through the identity ID and PIN code, and the server encrypts and stores the two segments B and C through the built-in key of the encryption machine; the certificate request P10 is used for external RA/CA. The /KMC server applies for a certificate, and the private key of the user's encrypted certificate is encrypted with the pseudo-key B segment and stored; the entire key generation, segmentation, transmission and storage are protected by PKI technology and multiple factors of people and equipment.

S2 digital signature application: use the identity ID and certificate PIN code as the unique certificate of the private key holder, decrypt the two-part keys d_A and d_B on the client side, and use one of the d_B as the symmetric key and the other as the symmetric key. After the share d_A is combined with the HASH value to be signed, it is symmetrically encrypted and sent to the server for synthetic pseudo-key, desalting and true key signature. The true key signature value is symmetrically encrypted with the symmetric key d_B and then returned. For the client client, the client client uses the same symmetric key d_B to decrypt the real key signature value of the server side; PKI technology is used in the entire key fragment decryption, pseudo key synthesis, truth seeking, encryption and data transmission process And the multi-factors of people and equipment have been correspondingly protected.

S3 data encryption application: the encryptor uses the recipient's encryption certificate public key to encrypt the data to be sent, the decryptor uses the identity ID and certificate PIN code as the unique certificate of the private key holder, and decrypts the two-part signature on the client side. Keys d_A and d_B, use one of the d_B signature private keys as a symmetric key, decrypt the encrypted certificate private key (encrypted private key) encrypted and saved in the registration process, and then use the decrypted private key to decrypt the received ciphertext . In the process of key fragment decryption and data decryption, PKI technology and multiple factors of entity's identity and PIN code information are used for corresponding protection.

Using the above-mentioned PKI-based multi-party cooperative operation key protection method can ensure that the integrity and confidentiality of the user's real key will not be affected if any one of the client Client and the server-side Server is leaked, ensuring the user's private key. The security level of the key protection of the method can reach the high security level of the traditional hardware medium intelligent password key USB key (such as bank U shield, IC card).

Example 2

This embodiment is a further description of Embodiment 1. As shown in FIG. 2 , the step S1 user certificate registration mainly includes the following steps:

S101: The user User initiates a certificate registration application. First, the client client collects information such as the user's real name, evidence, and real person biometrics for authentication. After the authentication is passed, it enters the subsequent certificate registration link;

S102: The client Client generates a temporary SM2 asymmetric key, the private key is recorded as T_Pri, and the public key is recorded as T_Pub;

S103: The client client sends the real-name identity ID and public key T_Pub to the server server;

S104: The server-side Server allocates a session symmetric key session to the client, which is recorded as T_Session;

S105: The server-side Server invokes the key generation interface of the hardware cryptographic module to generate a formal SM2 asymmetric key pair for the client, the private key is denoted as d, and the public key is denoted as P;

S106: The server-side Server invokes the PKCS10 generation interface of the hardware cryptographic module to generate a certificate request P10 for the client;

S107: The server on the server side invokes the interface of the CA system and uses the certificate request P10 to apply for "SignCert for signing certificate, EncryptCert for encryption certificate, and EncryptKey for encryption key plaintext" for the client;

S108: The server-side Server performs salting and data obfuscation processing on the client's private key d to obtain a pseudo-private key d'=Mix(salt,d);

S109: The server-side Server divides d' into three parts, A, B, and C in turn, which are respectively recorded as d_A, d_B, and d_C;

S110: The server-side Server calls the symmetric encryption interface of the hardware cryptographic module, uses T_Session as the symmetric key, and performs symmetric encryption output on "d_A+d_B, SignCert, EncryptCert, EncryptKey", which is recorded as client'=SM4_Enc(T_Session,d_A+d_B ,SignCert,EncryptCert,EncryptKey);

S111: The server-side Server uses T_Pub to perform SM2 asymmetric encryption on T_Session, which is recorded as T_Session'=SM2_Enc(T_Pub, T_Session);

S112: The server-side Server calls the symmetric encryption interface of the hardware cryptographic module, and uses the built-in device symmetric key to perform symmetric encryption output on "d_B+d_C, EncryptKey", which is recorded as Server'=SM4_Enc(d_B+d_C,EncryptKey);

S113: The server-side Server stores Server' in the database;

S114: The server-side Server returns client'+T_Session' to the client-side Client;

S115: The client Client uses T_Pri to perform SM2 asymmetric decryption on T_Session' to obtain a session symmetric key T_Session=SM2_Dec(T_Pri, T_Session');

S116: The client Client uses T_Session to perform SM4 symmetrical decryption on client', and obtains d_A+d_B, SignCert, EncryptCert, EncryptKey=SM4_Dec(T_Session, client');

S117: The client Client uses d_B to perform SM4 symmetric encryption on the EncryptKey, and obtains EncryptKey'=SM4_Enc(d_B, EncryptKey);

S118: The user inputs the certificate PIN code, which is recorded as Cert_PIN;

S119: The client Client performs a HASH operation on the real-name identity ID+Cert_PIN, and obtains Cert_PIN'=SM3 (identity ID+Cert_PIN);

S120: The client Client uses Cert_PIN' to perform SM4 symmetric encryption on d_A+d_B to obtain (d_A+d_B)'=SM4_Enc(Cert_PIN', d_A+d_B);

S121: Client Client Storage (d_A+d_B)',SignCert,EncryptCert,EncryptKey';

S122: User registration is completed.

Example 3

This embodiment is a further description of Embodiment 1. As shown in FIG. 3 , the digital signature application of step S2 mainly includes the following steps:

S201: digital signature starts;

S202: The client identifies the client to obtain the identity ID;

S203: The user inputs the certificate PIN code, which is recorded as Cert_PIN;

S204: The client Client performs a HASH operation on the real-name identity ID+Cert_PIN, and obtains Cert_PIN'=SM3 (identity ID+Cert_PIN);

S205: The client Client uses Cert_PIN' to perform SM4 symmetrical decryption on (d_A+d_B)', and obtains d_A+d_B=SM4_Dec(Cert_PIN',(d_A+d_B)');

S206: The client Client performs a HASH operation on the signature information P, and the obtained hash value is H=SM3(P);

S207: The client Client uses d_B to symmetrically encrypt d_A+H to obtain (d_A+H)'=SM4_Enc(d_B, d_A+H);

S208: The client client sends the identity ID, (d_A+H)' to the server server;

S209: The server on the server side finds the user certificate according to the real-name identity ID, calls the CA interface, and confirms the certificate status (if the certificate is invalid, the operation is terminated);

S210: The server-side server finds the corresponding server' value during registration according to the real-name identity ID;

S211: The server-side Server invokes the symmetric decryption interface of the hardware cryptographic module, and uses the built-in symmetric key of the device to perform symmetric decryption output on the server' to obtain d_B+d_C, EncryptKey=SM4_Dec(server');

S212: The server-side Server uses d_B to symmetrically decrypt (d_A+H)', and obtains d_A+H=SM4_Dec(d_B,(d_A+H)');

S213: the server-side Server synthesizes the obfuscated pseudo private key d'=d_A+d_B+d_C;

S214: The server-side Server performs impurity (desalting) processing on the pseudo private key d', and obtains the user's true private key d=UnMix(salt, d');

S215: The server-side Server uses the true private key d to encrypt H to generate a P1/P7 digital signature, which is recorded as SignData=P1(d,H)/P7(d,H,certificate);

S216: The server-side Server uses d_B as a symmetric key, and symmetrically encrypts SignData to obtain SignData'=SM4_Enc(d_B, SignData);

S217: The server-side Server returns SignData' to the client-side Client;

S218: The client Client uses d_B as a symmetric key, and decrypts SignData' symmetrically to obtain a digital signature SignData=SM4_Dec(d_B, SignData');

S219: The digital signature ends.

Example 4

This embodiment is a further description of Embodiment 1. As shown in Figure 4, the step S3 data encryption application mainly includes the following steps:

S301: User-A sends encrypted information to User-B, and data encryption starts;

S302: Client-A uses User-B's encryption certificate EncryptCert_B to encapsulate the data to be sent in a digital envelope, which is recorded as Envelope_B=Encrypt(EncryptCert_B, data);

S303: Client-A sends Envelope_B to client-B;

S304: Client-B identity identification obtains the identity ID of User-B;

S305: User-B enters the certificate PIN code, which is recorded as Cert_PIN;

S306: client-B performs HASH operation on the real-name identity ID+Cert_PIN, and obtains Cert_PIN'=SM3 (identity ID+Cert_PIN);

S307: client-B uses Cert_PIN' to perform SM4 symmetrical decryption on (d_A+d_B)', and obtains d_A+d_B=SM4_Dec(Cert_PIN',(d_A+d_B)');

S308: client-B uses d_B to decrypt EncryptKey' to obtain EncryptKey=SM4_Dec(d_B, EncryptKey');

S309: client-B decrypts Envelope_B using EncryptKey, and obtains plaintext data data=Decrypt(EncryptKey, Envelope_B);

S310: Data decryption ends.

The above are only the preferred embodiments of the present invention, but the protection scope of the present invention is not limited to this. Any person skilled in the art may, within the technical scope disclosed by the present invention, think of changes or changes without creative work. Substitutions should be covered within the protection scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention should be based on the protection scope defined by the claims.

Claims (4)

1. a key protection method based on the multi-party cooperative operation of PKI, comprises user User, client Client, server side Server and external RA/CA/KMC server, it is characterized in that: User User: User participation information entry, operation confirmation; Client Client: Responsible for client key related operations; Server-side Server: Responsible for server-side key segmentation and related operations. The key operation needs to be implemented by hardware cryptographic components, and the certificate application request is sent to the external RA/CA/KMC server for applying for digital certificates and encryption keys; External RA/CA/KMC server: external third-party system service for applying for digital certificates and encryption keys; The key protection method for the PKI-based multi-party cooperative operation comprises the following steps: S1 user certificate registration: After the user User's real-name authentication is passed, the server encryption machine randomly generates a signature key and a certificate request P10 for the user User, and salts and confuses the user's real private key to obtain the user's pseudo-private key. The key is divided into three segments A, B, and C. The user User uses the identity ID and PIN code to protect, encrypt and store the A and B segments. The server encrypts and stores the B and C segments through the built-in key of the encryption machine. Certificate request P10 It is used to apply for a certificate from an external RA/CA/KMC server, and the private key in the user encryption certificate is encrypted with the user's pseudo private key B segment and stored; S2 digital signature application: use the identity ID and certificate PIN code as the unique certificate of the private key holder, decrypt the two-part keys d_A and d_B on the client side, and use one of the d_B as the symmetric key and the other as the symmetric key. After the d_A is combined with the HASH value to be signed, it is symmetrically encrypted, and then sent to the server for the synthesis of the user's pseudo-private key. The user's pseudo-private key is desalted to obtain the user's real private key. The private key signature value is symmetrically encrypted with the symmetric key d_B and then returned to the client client. The client client uses the same symmetric key d_B to decrypt to obtain the user's true private key signature value on the server side; S3 data encryption application: the encryptor uses the recipient's encryption certificate public key to encrypt the data to be sent, the decryptor uses the identity ID and certificate PIN code as the unique certificate of the private key holder, and decrypts the two-part signature on the client side. Keys d_A and d_B, use one of the d_B signature private keys as a symmetric key to decrypt the private key in the user encryption certificate encrypted and saved in the registration process, and then use the decrypted private key to decrypt the received ciphertext. 2. a kind of key protection method based on PKI multi-party cooperative operation according to claim 1, is characterized in that: described step S1 user certificate registration comprises the following steps: S101: The user User initiates a certificate registration application. First, the client client collects the user's real name, evidence, and real person biometric information for authentication. After the authentication is passed, the subsequent certificate registration link is entered; S102: The client Client generates a temporary SM2 asymmetric key, the private key is recorded as T_Pri, and the public key is recorded as T_Pub; S103: The client client sends the real-name identity ID and public key T_Pub to the server server; S104: The server on the server side allocates a session symmetric key session to the Client, which is recorded as T_Session; S105: The server-side Server invokes the key generation interface of the hardware cryptographic module to generate a formal SM2 asymmetric key pair for the Client, the user's real private key is recorded as d, and the public key is recorded as P; S106: The server-side Server invokes the PKCS10 generation interface of the hardware cryptographic module to generate a certificate request P10 for the Client; S107: The server on the server side invokes the interface of the external RA/CA/KMC server system and uses the certificate request P10 to apply for the signing certificate SignCert, the encryption certificate EncryptCert, and the private key EncryptKey in the user encryption certificate for the Client; S108: The server-side Server performs salting and data obfuscation processing on the user's real private key d, and obtains the user's pseudo-private key d'=Mix(salt, d); S109: The server-side Server divides d' into three parts, A, B, and C in turn, which are respectively recorded as d_A, d_B, and d_C; S110: The server-side Server calls the symmetric encryption interface of the hardware cryptographic module, uses T_Session as a symmetric key, and performs symmetric encryption output on d_A+d_B, SignCert, EncryptCert, and EncryptKey, which is recorded as Client'=SM4_Enc(T_Session,d_A+d_B,SignCert ,EncryptCert,EncryptKey); S111: The server-side Server uses T_Pub to perform SM2 asymmetric encryption on T_Session, which is recorded as T_Session'=SM2_Enc(T_Pub, T_Session); S112: The server-side Server calls the symmetric encryption interface of the hardware cryptographic module, and uses the built-in device symmetric key to perform symmetric encryption output on "d_B+d_C, EncryptKey", which is recorded as Server'=SM4_Enc(d_B+d_C,EncryptKey); S113: The server-side Server stores Server' in the database; S114: The server-side Server returns Client'+T_Session' to the client-side Client; S115: The client Client uses T_Pri to perform SM2 asymmetric decryption on T_Session' to obtain a session symmetric key T_Session=SM2_Dec(T_Pri, T_Session'); S116: The client Client uses T_Session to perform SM4 symmetrical decryption on Client' to obtain d_A+d_B, SignCert, EncryptCert, EncryptKey=SM4_Dec(T_Session, Client'); S117: The client Client uses d_B to perform SM4 symmetric encryption on the EncryptKey, and obtains EncryptKey'=SM4_Enc(d_B, EncryptKey); S118: The user inputs the certificate PIN code, which is recorded as Cert_PIN; S119: The client Client performs a HASH operation on the real-name identity ID+Cert_PIN, and obtains Cert_PIN'=SM3 (identity ID+Cert_PIN); S120: The client Client uses Cert_PIN' to perform SM4 symmetric encryption on d_A+d_B to obtain (d_A+d_B)'=SM4_Enc(Cert_PIN', d_A+d_B); S121: Client Client stores (d_A+d_B)', SignCert, EncryptCert, EncryptKey'; S122: User registration is completed. 3. the key protection method of a kind of PKI-based multi-party cooperative operation according to claim 1, is characterized in that: described step S2 digital signature application comprises the following steps: S201: digital signature starts; S202: The client identifies the client to obtain the identity ID; S203: The user inputs the certificate PIN code, which is recorded as Cert_PIN; S204: The client Client performs a HASH operation on the real-name identity ID+Cert_PIN, and obtains Cert_PIN'=SM3 (identity ID+Cert_PIN); S205: The client Client uses Cert_PIN' to perform SM4 symmetrical decryption on (d_A+d_B)', and obtains d_A+d_B=SM4_Dec(Cert_PIN',(d_A+d_B)'); S206: The client Client performs a HASH operation on the signature information P, and the obtained hash value is H=SM3(P); S207: The client Client uses d_B to symmetrically encrypt d_A+H to obtain (d_A+H)'=SM4_Enc(d_B, d_A+H); S208: The client client sends the identity ID, (d_A+H)' to the server server; S209: The server on the server side finds the user certificate according to the real-name identity ID, and calls the external RA/CA/KMC server interface to confirm the certificate status. If the certificate is invalid, the operation is terminated; S210: The server-side Server finds the corresponding Server' value during registration according to the real-name identity ID; S211: The server-side Server calls the symmetric decryption interface of the hardware cryptographic module, and uses the built-in symmetric key of the device to perform symmetric decryption output on the Server' to obtain d_B+d_C, EncryptKey=SM4_Dec(Server'); S212: The server-side Server uses d_B to symmetrically decrypt (d_A+H)', and obtains d_A+H=SM4_Dec(d_B,(d_A+H)'); S213: The server-side Server synthesizes the obfuscated user pseudo private key d'=d_A+d_B+d_C; S214: The server-side Server de-salts the user's pseudo private key d' to obtain the user's true private key d=UnMix(salt, d'); S215: The server-side Server uses the user's real private key d to encrypt H to generate a P1/P7 digital signature, which is recorded as SignData=P1(d,H)/P7(d,H,certificate); S216: The server-side Server uses d_B as a symmetric key, and symmetrically encrypts SignData to obtain SignData'=SM4_Enc(d_B, SignData); S217: The server-side Server returns SignData' to the client-side Client; S218: The client Client uses d_B as a symmetric key, and decrypts SignData' symmetrically to obtain a digital signature SignData=SM4_Dec(d_B, SignData'); S219: The digital signature ends. 4. a kind of key protection method based on PKI multi-party cooperative operation according to claim 1, is characterized in that: described step S3 data encryption application comprises the following steps: S301: User-A sends encrypted information to User-B, and data encryption starts; S302: Client-A uses User-B's encryption certificate EncryptCert_B to encapsulate the data to be sent in a digital envelope, which is recorded as Envelope_B=Encrypt(EncryptCert_B, data); S303: Client-A sends Envelope_B to Client-B; S304: Client-B obtains the identity ID of User-B through identity identification; S305: User-B enters the certificate PIN code, which is recorded as Cert_PIN; S306: Client-B performs HASH operation on the real-name identity ID+Cert_PIN to obtain Cert_PIN'=SM3 (identity ID+Cert_PIN); S307: Client-B uses Cert_PIN' to perform SM4 symmetrical decryption on (d_A+d_B)', and obtains d_A+d_B=SM4_Dec(Cert_PIN',(d_A+d_B)'); S308: Client-B uses d_B to decrypt EncryptKey', and obtains EncryptKey=SM4_Dec(d_B, EncryptKey'); S309: Client-B uses EncryptKey to decrypt Envelope_B, and obtains data to be sent data=Decrypt(EncryptKey, Envelope_B); S310: Data decryption ends.

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