CN109787758A - Anti- quantum calculation MQV cryptographic key negotiation method and system based on private key pond and Elgamal - Google Patents
Anti- quantum calculation MQV cryptographic key negotiation method and system based on private key pond and Elgamal Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The present invention relates to a kind of anti-quantum calculation MQV cryptographic key negotiation method based on private key pond and Elgamal, participant is configured with key card, when implementing the anti-quantum calculation MQV cryptographic key negotiation method, it include: to generate corresponding temporary public key and temporary private in one's own side, shared key is generated with the encrypted public key of encryption key and other side, and obtains ciphertext using the temporary public key of shared key encryption one's own side；By the ciphertext, true random number and the static public key pointer address of one's own side for obtaining other side's encrypted public key are sent to other side with ciphertext form；Recipient generates shared key using the encryption key of one's own side and the encrypted public key of other side, the ciphertext, which is decrypted, using shared key obtains the temporary public key of other side, the static public key of other side is obtained using the static public key pointer address, and arranging key is generated using the temporary public key of other side, static public key and one's own side's temporary private, temporary public key, static private key and algorithm parameter.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to public-key cryptosystems and private key pool technology, and in particular to the key exchange in group between communicating pair
Technology.
Background technique
The Internet of rapid development brings huge convenience to people's lives, work, and people can be sitting in family
It sent and received e-mail, made a phone call by Internet, carrying out the activities such as shopping online, bank transfer.The network information security simultaneously
It is increasingly becoming a potential huge problem.In general the network information is faced with following several security risks: the network information
It is stolen, information is tampered, attacker palms off information, malicious sabotage etc..
The key technology of the current guarantee network information security is exactly cryptographic technique, and in field of cryptography of today, it is main
Will there are two types of cryptographic system, first is that symmetric key cryptosystem, i.e. encryption key and decruption key use it is same.The other is
Public key cryptosystem, i.e. encryption key and decruption key difference, one of them can be disclosed.
The safety of symmetric key cryptosystem relies on following two factor.First, Encryption Algorithm must be it is sufficiently strong,
Being based only on ciphertext itself and removing solution confidential information is impossible in practice；Second, the safety of encryption method is from key
Secret, rather than the secret of algorithm.The problem of symmetric encryption system maximum be key distribution and management it is extremely complex,
It is of a high price.Symmetric encipherment algorithm, which has another disadvantage that, is not easily accomplished digital signature.So in current mobile e-business
Encryption Algorithm realization in field depends primarily on RSA arithmetic.
The encryption key pair (public key) and decryption key (private key) that Public Key Cryptographic Systems uses are different.Due to encryption
Key be it is disclosed, the distribution of key and management are just very simple, and Public Key Cryptographic Systems can also be easily carried out number
Signature.
Since public key encryption comes out, scholars propose many kinds of public key encryption methods, their safety is all base
In complicated difficult math question.Classified according to the difficult math question being based on, have following three classes system be presently believed to be safety and
It is effective: big integer factorization system (representative to have RSA), Discrete log systems (representative to have DSA) and ellipse from
It dissipates Logarithmic system (ECC).
But with the development of quantum computer, classical asymmetric-key encryption algorithm will be no longer safe, no matter encryption and decryption
Or private key can be calculated in key exchange method, quantum computer by public key, therefore currently used asymmetric close
Key will become cannot withstand a single blow in the quantum epoch.
Summary of the invention
The present invention provides a kind of safety the higher anti-quantum calculation MQV key agreement based on private key pond and Elgamal
Method and system.
The present invention is based on the anti-quantum calculation MQV cryptographic key negotiation method in private key pond and Elgamal, participant is configured with key
Block, is stored with static public key pond, encryption key pond, encrypted public key pond group and static private key and algorithm parameter, institute in key card
It states encryption key pond and is stored with encryption key, encrypted public key pond group includes that quantity encryption corresponding with key card quantity is public
Key pond is stored with encrypted public key corresponding with the encryption key in each encrypted public key pond, stores in the static state public key pond
There is static public key corresponding with the static private key；
When implementing the anti-quantum calculation MQV cryptographic key negotiation method, comprising:
Corresponding temporary public key and temporary private are generated in one's own side, is generated with the encrypted public key of encryption key and other side shared
Key, and ciphertext is obtained using the temporary public key of shared key encryption one's own side；By the ciphertext, for obtaining other side's encrypted public key
True random number and the static public key pointer address of one's own side other side is sent to ciphertext form；
The ciphertext from other side, the true random number and the static public key pointer address are received, using described true
Random number obtains the encrypted public key of other side and the encryption key of one's own side, raw using the encryption key of one's own side and the encrypted public key of other side
At shared key, the ciphertext is decrypted using shared key and obtains the temporary public key of other side, using the static public key pointer
Location obtains the static public key of other side, and utilizes the temporary public key of other side, static public key and one's own side's temporary private, temporary public key, quiet
State private key and algorithm parameter generate arranging key.
Optionally, the participant includes initiator and responder, includes: in the initiator
The first true random number is generated, generates the first temporary public key and the first temporary private using the first true random number；
The second true random number is generated, obtains the first encryption key of one's own side from the key card using the second true random number
With the first encrypted public key of other side；
The progress operation of the first encrypted public key of the first encryption key of one's own side and other side is obtained into the first shared key, and benefit
First temporary public key, which is encrypted, with the first shared key obtains the first ciphertext；
By first ciphertext, the second true random number, the static public key pointer address of one's own side and the encrypted public key pond of one's own side
Number is sent to responder with ciphertext form.
Optionally, include: in the responder
Using received second true random number obtained from the key card one's own side the first encryption key and other side
One encrypted public key；
The progress operation of the first encrypted public key of the first encryption key of one's own side and other side is obtained into the first shared key, and benefit
First ciphertext, which is decrypted, with the first shared key obtains the first temporary public key of other side；
The first static public key of other side is obtained from the key card using received static public key pointer address；
Third true random number is generated, generates the second temporary public key and the second temporary private using third true random number；
The second static private key of one's own side is obtained from key card, and accordingly calculates arranging key；
The 4th true random number is generated, obtains the second encryption key of one's own side from the key card using the 4th true random number
With the second encrypted public key of other side；
The progress operation of the second encrypted public key of the second encryption key of one's own side and other side is obtained into the second shared key, and benefit
Second temporary public key, which is encrypted, with the second shared key obtains the second ciphertext；
The static public key pointer address of second ciphertext, the 4th true random number, one's own side is sent to ciphertext form
Play side.
Optionally, in the responder, the mode of arranging key is calculated are as follows:
Arranging key be K andWherein:
H is the algorithm parameter in key card；
Kb is the second temporary private of responder；
Kb is the second temporary public key of responder；
B is the second static private key of responder；
Ka ' is the first temporary public key of initiator；
A is the first static public key of initiator.
Optionally, in the initiator further include:
Using received 4th true random number obtained from the key card one's own side the second encryption key and other side
Two encrypted public keys；
The progress operation of the second encrypted public key of the second encryption key of one's own side and other side is obtained into the second shared key, and benefit
Second ciphertext, which is decrypted, with the second shared key obtains the second temporary public key of other side；
The second static public key of other side is obtained from the key card using received static public key pointer address；
The first static private key that one's own side is obtained from key card, accordingly calculates arranging key.
Optionally, in the initiator, the mode of arranging key is calculated are as follows:
Arranging key be K ' andWherein:
H is the algorithm parameter in key card；
Ka is the first temporary private of initiator；
Ka is the first temporary public key of initiator；
A is the first static private key of initiator；
Kb ' is the second temporary public key of responder；
B is the second static public key of responder.
The present invention also provides a kind of anti-quantum calculation MQV key agreement system based on private key pond and Elgamal, participant
Configured with key card, static public key pond, encryption key pond, encrypted public key pond group and static private key and calculation are stored in key card
Method parameter, the encryption key pond are stored with encryption key, and encrypted public key pond group includes that quantity is opposite with key card quantity
The encrypted public key pond answered is stored with encrypted public key corresponding with the encryption key in each encrypted public key pond, described static public
Static public key corresponding with the static private key is stored in key pond；
The anti-quantum calculation MQV key agreement system, comprising:
First module, for generating corresponding temporary public key and temporary private in one's own side, with encryption key and other side's plus
Migong key generates shared key, and obtains ciphertext using the temporary public key of shared key encryption one's own side；By the ciphertext, it is used for
The static public key pointer address of true random number and one's own side to other side's encrypted public key is sent to other side with ciphertext form；
Second module, for receiving the ciphertext from other side, the true random number and the static public key pointer
Location obtains the encrypted public key of other side and the encryption key of one's own side using the true random number, utilizes the encryption key of one's own side and right
The encrypted public key of side generates shared key, decrypts the ciphertext using shared key and obtains the temporary public key of other side, using described
Static public key pointer address obtains the static public key of other side, and temporarily private using the temporary public key of other side, static public key and one's own side
Key, temporary public key, static private key and algorithm parameter generate arranging key.
The present invention also provides a kind of anti-quantum calculation MQV key agreement system based on private key pond and Elgamal, participant
Configured with key card, static public key pond, encryption key pond, encrypted public key pond group and static private key and calculation are stored in key card
Method parameter, the encryption key pond are stored with encryption key, and encrypted public key pond group includes that quantity is opposite with key card quantity
The encrypted public key pond answered is stored with encrypted public key corresponding with the encryption key in each encrypted public key pond, described static public
Static public key corresponding with the static private key is stored in key pond；
Participant includes memory and processor, is stored with computer program in memory, which executes computer
The anti-quantum calculation MQV cryptographic key negotiation method based on private key pond and Elgamal is realized when program.
In the present invention, the key card used is independent hardware isolated equipment.Other phases such as public key, private key and true random number
It closes in the equal server of parameter and generates, reallocate to key card, corresponding pool of keys and private key and parameter are stored in specified safety
Region, a possibility that stealing key by Malware or malicious operation, substantially reduce, and will not be obtained and be broken by quantum computer
Solution.Since the public key transmitted in a network only has temporary public key, and temporary public key is to be encrypted transmission, is encrypted used public and private
Key is chosen from the group of unsymmetrical key pond, and the external world can not obtain, therefore the probability that the public key is cracked is extremely low.In a network
Other data of transmission are only the relevant parameters of cipher key location, and key, therefore key association of the invention can not independently be calculated
The relatively classical ECMQV cryptographic key negotiation method of the safety of quotient's method is much higher.Also ensure disappearing for subsequent communicating pair
The safety of breath.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is the distribution schematic diagram of pool of keys in the present invention；
Fig. 2 is the key agreement flow chart of embodiment；
Fig. 3 is the flow diagram for calculating private key and public key.
Specific embodiment
Following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and technical solution in the embodiment of the present invention carries out clear, complete
Site preparation description, it is clear that described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, instead of all the embodiments.It is based on
Embodiment in the present invention, it is obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without making creative efforts every other
Embodiment shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
In order to better describe and illustrate embodiments herein, one or more attached drawing can refer to, but attached for describing
The additional detail or example of figure are not construed as to present invention creation, current described embodiment or preferred side
The limitation of the range of any one in formula.
It should be understood that there is no stringent sequences to limit for the execution of each step unless expressly stating otherwise herein,
These steps can execute in other order.Moreover, at least part step may include multiple sub-steps or multiple ranks
Section, these sub-steps or stage are not necessarily to execute completion in synchronization, but can execute at different times, this
The execution sequence in a little step perhaps stage be also not necessarily successively carry out but can be with other steps or other steps
Sub-step or at least part in stage execute in turn or alternately.
The present invention realizes that scene is any two in the group of an asymmetric cryptography system to weevil, second.This hair
Each object has key card in group in bright, can store the key of big data quantity, also has the ability of processing information.Group
Each key card has multiple pool of keys in group, is static public key pond, encryption key pond and encrypted public key pond group respectively and quiet
State private key and relevant parameter.The number of encrypted public key pond group is the number of all members in group, encrypted public key Chi Zuji group
The set in the corresponding encrypted public key pond of interior each member.Distribution in specific key card is as shown in Figure 1.In the present invention, to weevil and
All there is the algorithm of corresponding demand in the local system of object second.
The description of key card is visible, and application No. is the patents of " 201610843210.6 ".When for mobile terminal, key card
Preferably key SD card；When for fixed terminal, key card is preferably key USBkey or host key board.
With application No. is compared with the patent of " 201610843210.6 ", key card to issue mechanism different.This patent
The key card side of issuing be key card supervisor side, the generally administrative department of group, such as the pipe of certain enterprise or public institution
Reason department；The member's that the key card side of being awarded is managed by the supervisor side of key card, generally certain enterprise or public institution is each
Grade employee.Supervisor side's application that user terminal arrives key card first is opened an account.After user terminal carries out registering granted, it will obtain close
Key card (has unique key card ID).Key card stores client enrollment register information.User side key in key card is all
Under be downloaded from the same cipher key management services station, and for the supervisor side of same group key card, each key card for issuing
The public-key cryptographic keys pond group of middle storage is completely the same.Preferably, the pool of keys size stored in key card can be 1G, 2G,
4G, 8G, 16G, 32G, 64G, 128G, 256G, 512G, 1024G, 2048G, 4096G etc..
Key card is developed from smart card techniques, is combined with real random number generator (preferably quantum random number
Generator), cryptological technique, the authentication of hardware security isolation technology and encryption and decryption product.The embedded chip of key card and
Operating system can provide the functions such as secure storage and the cryptographic algorithm of key.Due to it with independent data-handling capacity and
Good safety, key card become the safety barrier of private key and pool of keys.Each key card has the protection of hardware PIN code,
PIN code and hardware constitute two necessary factors that user uses key card.I.e. so-called " double factor authentication ", user is only simultaneously
The key card and user's PIN code for saving relevant authentication information are obtained, it just can be with login system.Even if the PIN code of user is let out
Dew, as long as the key card that user holds is not stolen, the identity of legitimate user would not be counterfeit；If the key card of user is lost
It loses, the person of picking up also cannot counterfeit the identity of legitimate user due to not knowing user's PIN code.
For key card when supplementing pool of keys with money, Key Management server can specify one group identities of key card, and give group
ID in group.Server can define a prime number p when creating a group, and p meets p > 3.And it generates two and is less than the non-of p
Negative integer, parameter alpha and parameter beta, for constructing elliptic curve E: γ2=χ3+αχ+β.In addition the rank of elliptic curve is set as n,
And assume that h is confactor, it is Q that the member point of the elliptic curve, which is basic point,.If group member number is N.Server can generate N
Corresponding public key is calculated as static private key in a true random number, these public keys are written in same file and are formed
Static public key file, i.e. static public key pond.The above-mentioned public and private key of gained is used for the public and private key of static state as ECMQV algorithm.Server
It can recycle and generate effective description that member g generates a q rank cyclic group G.The cyclic group needs to meet certain security property.Together
When generate big data quantity the random number in { 1 ..., q-1 } range as encryption key, and form encryption key pond, produced
Raw encryption key pond number is N.And corresponding encrypted public key is calculated according to encryption key, and it is public to form corresponding encryption
Key pond.The position phase of encryption key is corresponded in each encrypted public key pond in the position of encrypted public key and corresponding encryption key pond
Together.
In key card registration, server can be by static public key file, unappropriated encryption key pond and encrypted public key
Pond group is stored in key card together.One will be randomly selected in unappropriated static private key simultaneously to distribute to the key card and incite somebody to action
It is corresponding static state public key pointer address be stored in key card, static public key pointer address be used for searches with static private key in pairs
Public key.In addition, also storage has one's own side's encrypted public key pond number and relevant algorithm parameter elliptic curve domain parameter in key card
{ p, α, β, Q, n, h } and { g, q, G }.
If the object of this system key agreement is respectively to weevil and object second.It is the masters of key agreement to weevil
(initiator), object second are the cooperation side (responder) of key agreement.If it is corresponding to weevil static state public private key pair be (A, a),
Public key is A, private key a；If the corresponding static public private key pair of object second is (B, b), public key B, private key b；If to weevil
Encrypting encryption public private key pair corresponding to unsymmetrical key pond is (Ki, ki), public key Ki, private key ki, the calculating of public key Ki
Mode is Ki=gkimod q；If encryption public private key pair corresponding to the encryption unsymmetrical key pond of object second is (Kj, kj), public
Key is Kj, and the calculation of private key kj, public key Kj are Kj=gkjmod q.In the present invention, Encryption Algorithm is Elgamal encryption
Algorithm.
Wherein in an embodiment, a kind of key agreement side anti-quantum calculation MQV based on private key pond and Elgamal is provided
Method, participant are configured with key card, and static public key pond, encryption key pond, encrypted public key pond group and quiet are stored in key card
State private key and algorithm parameter, the encryption key pond are stored with encryption key, and encrypted public key pond group includes quantity and key
The corresponding encrypted public key pond of card quantity is stored with encrypted public key corresponding with the encryption key in each encrypted public key pond,
Static public key corresponding with the static private key is stored in the static state public key pond；
When implementing the anti-quantum calculation MQV cryptographic key negotiation method, comprising:
Corresponding temporary public key and temporary private are generated in one's own side, is generated with the encrypted public key of encryption key and other side shared
Key, and ciphertext is obtained using the temporary public key of shared key encryption one's own side；By the ciphertext, for obtaining other side's encrypted public key
True random number and the static public key pointer address of one's own side other side is sent to ciphertext form；
The ciphertext from other side, the true random number and the static public key pointer address are received, using described true
Random number obtains the encrypted public key of other side and the encryption key of one's own side, raw using the encryption key of one's own side and the encrypted public key of other side
At shared key, the ciphertext is decrypted using shared key and obtains the temporary public key of other side, using the static public key pointer
Location obtains the static public key of other side, and utilizes the temporary public key of other side, static public key and one's own side's temporary private, temporary public key, quiet
State private key and algorithm parameter generate arranging key.
The participant includes initiator and responder, and the detailed process of arranging key mainly divides three phases.
First stage includes: in the initiator
The first true random number is generated, generates the first temporary public key and the first temporary private using the first true random number；
The second true random number is generated, obtains the first encryption key of one's own side from the key card using the second true random number
With the first encrypted public key of other side；
The progress operation of the first encrypted public key of first encryption key and other side is obtained into the first shared key, and utilizes first
Shared key encrypts first temporary public key and obtains the first ciphertext；
By first ciphertext, the second true random number, the static public key pointer address of one's own side and the encrypted public key pond of one's own side
Number is sent to responder with ciphertext form.
Second stage includes: in the responder
Using received second true random number obtained from the key card one's own side the first encryption key and other side
One encrypted public key；
The progress operation of the first encrypted public key of first encryption key and other side is obtained into the first shared key, and utilizes first
Shared key decrypts first ciphertext and obtains the first temporary public key of other side；
The first static public key of other side is obtained from the key card using received static public key pointer address；
Third true random number is generated, generates the second temporary public key and the second temporary private using third true random number；
The second static private key of one's own side is obtained from key card, and accordingly calculates arranging key, calculates arranging key
Mode are as follows:
Arranging key be K andWherein:
H is the algorithm parameter in key card；
Kb is the second temporary private of responder；
Kb is the second temporary public key of responder；
B is the second static private key of responder；
Ka ' is the first temporary public key of initiator；
A is the first static public key of initiator；
The 4th true random number is generated, obtains the second encryption key of one's own side from the key card using the 4th true random number
With the second encrypted public key of other side；
The progress operation of the second encrypted public key of second encryption key and other side is obtained into the second shared key, and utilizes second
Shared key encrypts second temporary public key and obtains the second ciphertext；
The static public key pointer address of second ciphertext, the 4th true random number, one's own side is sent to ciphertext form
Play side.
Phase III, in the initiator further include:
Using received 4th true random number obtained from the key card one's own side the second encryption key and other side
Two encrypted public keys；
The progress operation of the second encrypted public key of second encryption key and other side is obtained into the second shared key, and utilizes second
Shared key decrypts second ciphertext and obtains the second temporary public key of other side；
The second static public key of other side is obtained from the key card using received static public key pointer address；
The first static private key that one's own side is obtained from key card, accordingly calculates arranging key, calculates arranging key
Mode are as follows:
Arranging key be K ' andWherein:
H is the algorithm parameter in key card；
Ka is the first temporary private of initiator；
Ka is the first temporary public key of initiator；
A is the first static private key of initiator；
Kb ' is the second temporary public key of responder；
B is the second static public key of responder.
Below in conjunction with 2~Fig. 3 of attached drawing, another embodiment is provided, the anti-quantum calculation MQV based on private key pond and Elgamal
Cryptographic key negotiation method, comprising:
Step 1: interim public and private key being generated to weevil and relevant parameter is sent to object second
1.1 pairs of weevils generate temporary private: generating a true random number ka (the first true random number) conduct at random to weevil
The temporary private ka (the first temporary private) of this key agreement, and temporary public key Ka=(ka) Q (the first interim public affairs are calculated
Key), Q is one of elliptic curve domain parameter.
1.2 pairs of weevils take encryption key and Party B's encrypted public key: generating a true random number r1 to weevil, (second is truly random
Number).Ri1 and rj1 are split by assignment algorithm by random number r1 to weevil.Key indicator algorithm fkp is passed through by ri1 to weevil
Obtain encryption key pointer address kpi1.Object nail root is according to encryption key pointer address kpi1 from the encryption key pond of local system
It is middle to take out corresponding encryption key ki1 (the first encryption key of Party A).
Meanwhile weevil being calculated to by unsymmetrical key pointer function fkp the encrypted public key pointer of object second by rj1
Address kpj1.Object nail root according to encrypted public key pointer address kpj1 and object second encrypted public key pond number Pj, from local system
In encrypted public key pool of keys group in take out Party B's encrypted public key Kj1 (the first encrypted public key of Party B).The encryption of object second is public
Key pond number Pj is obtained by access server or to object second direct request.
1.3 pairs of weevils encrypt temporary public key: generating shared key s1=Kj1^ki1 (the first shared key) to weevil.It is right
Weevil obtains first ciphertext c1={ Ka } s1 after encrypting to temporary public key Ka.
Key negotiation information is sent object second by 1.4 pairs of weevils: to weevil by temporary public key ciphertext c1, random number r1,
Static public key pointer address ra to weevil and object second is sent to the encrypted public key pond number Pi encryption of weevil.
Step 2: object second decryption parsing message is calculated arranging key and relevant parameter is sent to weevil
2.1 object second receive message and decrypt parsing: object second is received from the message to weevil, it is decrypted
Parsing obtain the static public key pointer address ra ' to weevil, encrypted public key pond number Pi ', the random number r1 ' to weevil and temporarily
Public key cryptography c1 '.
2.2 object second obtain encryption key and Party A's encrypted public key: object second splits random number r1 ' by assignment algorithm
At ri1 ' and rj1 '.Rj1 ' is obtained encryption key pointer address kpj1 ' by key indicator algorithm fkp by object second.Object second
Taken out from the encryption key pond of local system according to encryption key pointer address kpj1 ' corresponding encryption key kj1 (Party B's
First encryption key).
Meanwhile ri1 ' is calculated by unsymmetrical key pointer function fkp and is referred to the encrypted public key of weevil by object second
Needle address kpi1 '.Object second is according to encrypted public key pointer address kpi1 ' and to the encrypted public key pond number Pi ' of weevil from local
Party A's public key Ki1 (the first encrypted public key of Party A) is taken out in encrypted public key pool of keys group in system.
2.3 object second decrypt to obtain Party A's temporary public key and take out Party A's static state public key: object second calculates shared key s1 '
=Ki1^kj1.Object second using shared key s1 ' to temporary public key ciphertext c1 ' decryption obtain the first temporary public key of Party A Ka '=
c1'·s1'-1.S1-1 is inverse element of the s1 on cyclic group G.Object second utilize to the static public key pointer address ra ' of weevil from
The static public key A (the first static public key) to weevil is taken out in static public key pond.
2.4 object second generate temporary private and take out itself static private key: object second generates a true random number kb at random
The temporary private of (third true random number) as this key agreement, temporary public key Kb=(kb) Q is calculated, and (second is interim public
Key).Object second takes out itself static private key b (the second static private key).
Arranging key is calculated in 2.5 object second: object second is calculated using existing parameter WhereinAndNegotiation is obtained by calculation in object second
Key
2.6 object second obtain encryption key and Party A's encrypted public key: object second generate a true random number r2 (the 4th very with
Machine number).Random number r2 is split into ri2 and rj2 by assignment algorithm by object second.Rj2 is passed through key indicator algorithm by object second
Fkp obtains encryption key pointer address kpj2.Object second is private according to the encryption of encryption key pointer address kpj2 from local system
Corresponding encryption key kj2 (the second encryption key of Party B) is taken out in key pond.
Meanwhile the encrypted public key pointer to weevil is calculated in ri2 by object second by unsymmetrical key pointer function fkp
Address kpi2.Object second is according to encrypted public key pointer address kpi2 and to the public key pond number Pi ' of weevil from local system
Party A's public key Ki2 (the second encrypted public key of Party A) is taken out in encrypted public key pool of keys group.
2.6 object second encrypt temporary public key: object second generates shared key s2=Ki2^kj2 (the second shared key).It is right
Second ciphertext c2={ Kb } s2 is obtained after encrypting as second to temporary public key Kb.
2.7 object second send key negotiation information to weevil: object second by temporary public key ciphertext c2, random number r2 and
The public key pointer address rb encryption of object second is sent to weevil.
Step 3: parsing message being decrypted to weevil and calculates arranging key
3.1 pairs of weevils receive message and decrypt parsing: receiving the message from object second to weevil, it is decrypted
Parsing obtains public key pointer address rb ', the random number r2 ' and temporary public key ciphertext c2 ' of object second.
3.2 pairs of weevils obtain encryption key and Party B's encrypted public key: splitting random number r2 ' by assignment algorithm to weevil
At ri2 ' and rj2 '.Encryption key pointer address kpi2 ' is obtained by key indicator algorithm fkp by ri2 ' to weevil.To weevil
Taken out from the encryption key pond of local system according to encryption key pointer address kpi2 ' corresponding encryption key ki2 (Party A's
Second encryption key).
Meanwhile weevil is referred to rj2 ' by the encrypted public key that object second is calculated in unsymmetrical key pointer function fkp
Needle address kpj2 '.Object nail root is according to encrypted public key pointer address kpj2 ' and the public key pond number Pj of object second from local system
Encrypted public key pool of keys group in take out Party B's public key Kj2 (the second encrypted public key of Party B).
3.3 pairs of weevils are decrypted to obtain Party B's temporary public key and take out Party B's static state public key: object second calculates shared key s2 '
=Kj2^ki2.Kb '=c2 ' s2 ' -1 is obtained to temporary public key ciphertext c2 ' decryption using shared key s2 ' to weevil.s2-1
It is inverse element of the s2 on cyclic group G.Object is taken out from static public key pond using the public key pointer address rb ' of object second to weevil
The static public key B (the second static public key) of second.
Arranging key is calculated in 3.4 pairs of weevils: taking out itself static private key a (the first static private key) to weevil.Object
First is calculated using existing parameterWhereinAndArranging key is obtained by calculation to weevil:
The arranging key of weevil is developed to obtain:
The arranging key of object second develops to obtain:
So the arranging key obtained to weevil and object second is identical, key agreement success.
Wherein in an embodiment, a kind of anti-quantum calculation MQV key agreement system based on private key pond and Elgamal is provided
System, participant are configured with key card, and static public key pond, encryption key pond, encrypted public key pond group and quiet are stored in key card
State private key and algorithm parameter, the encryption key pond are stored with encryption key, and encrypted public key pond group includes quantity and key
The corresponding encrypted public key pond of card quantity is stored with encrypted public key corresponding with the encryption key in each encrypted public key pond,
Static public key corresponding with the static private key is stored in the static state public key pond；
The anti-quantum calculation MQV key agreement system, comprising:
First module, for generating corresponding temporary public key and temporary private in one's own side, with encryption key and other side's plus
Migong key generates shared key, and obtains ciphertext using the temporary public key of shared key encryption one's own side；By the ciphertext, it is used for
The static public key pointer address of true random number and one's own side to other side's encrypted public key is sent to other side with ciphertext form；
Second module, for receiving the ciphertext from other side, the true random number and the static public key pointer
Location obtains the encrypted public key of other side and the encryption key of one's own side using the true random number, utilizes the encryption key of one's own side and right
The encrypted public key of side generates shared key, decrypts the ciphertext using shared key and obtains the temporary public key of other side, using described
Static public key pointer address obtains the static public key of other side, and temporarily private using the temporary public key of other side, static public key and one's own side
Key, temporary public key, static private key and algorithm parameter generate arranging key.
Specific restriction about anti-quantum calculation MQV key agreement system may refer to above for anti-quantum calculation
The restriction of MQV key agreement system, details are not described herein.Above-mentioned modules can fully or partially through software, hardware and its
Combination is to realize.Above-mentioned each module can be embedded in the form of hardware or independently of in the processor in computer equipment, can also be with
It is stored in the memory in computer equipment in a software form, in order to which processor calls the above modules of execution corresponding
Operation.
In one embodiment, a kind of computer equipment, i.e., a kind of anti-quantum based on private key pond and Elgamal are provided
MQV key agreement system is calculated, which can be terminal, and internal structure may include connecting by system bus
Processor, memory, network interface, display screen and input unit.Wherein, the processor of the computer equipment is based on providing
Calculation and control ability.The memory of the computer equipment includes non-volatile memory medium, built-in storage.The non-volatile memories
Media storage has operating system and computer program.The built-in storage is the operating system and calculating in non-volatile memory medium
The operation of machine program provides environment.The network interface of the computer equipment is used to communicate with external terminal by network connection.
To realize above-mentioned anti-quantum calculation MQV cryptographic key negotiation method when the computer program is executed by processor, the computer equipment
Display screen can be liquid crystal display or electric ink display screen, and the input unit of the computer equipment can be on display screen
The touch layer of covering is also possible to the key being arranged on computer equipment shell, trace ball or Trackpad, can also be external
Keyboard, Trackpad or mouse etc..
Wherein in an embodiment, a kind of anti-quantum calculation MQV key agreement system based on private key pond and Elgamal is provided
System, participant are configured with key card, and static public key pond, encryption key pond, encrypted public key pond group and quiet are stored in key card
State private key and algorithm parameter, the encryption key pond are stored with encryption key, and encrypted public key pond group includes quantity and key
The corresponding encrypted public key pond of card quantity is stored with encrypted public key corresponding with the encryption key in each encrypted public key pond,
Static public key corresponding with the static private key is stored in the static state public key pond；
Participant includes memory and processor, is stored with computer program in memory, which executes computer
The anti-quantum calculation MQV cryptographic key negotiation method based on private key pond and Elgamal is realized when program.
Each technical characteristic of embodiment described above can be combined arbitrarily, for simplicity of description, not to above-mentioned reality
It applies all possible combination of each technical characteristic in example to be all described, as long as however, the combination of these technical characteristics is not deposited
In contradiction, all should be considered as described in this specification.
The embodiments described above only express several embodiments of the present invention, and the description thereof is more specific and detailed, but simultaneously
The limitation to invention scope therefore cannot be interpreted as.It should be pointed out that for those of ordinary skill in the art,
Under the premise of not departing from present inventive concept, various modifications and improvements can be made, and these are all within the scope of protection of the present invention.
Therefore, protection scope of the present invention should be determined by the appended claims.
Claims (8)
1. the anti-quantum calculation MQV cryptographic key negotiation method based on private key pond and Elgamal, which is characterized in that participant is configured with
Key card is stored with static public key pond, encryption key pond, encrypted public key pond group and static private key and algorithm ginseng in key card
Number, the encryption key pond are stored with encryption key, and encrypted public key pond group includes that quantity is corresponding with key card quantity
Encrypted public key pond is stored with encrypted public key corresponding with the encryption key, the static state public key pond in each encrypted public key pond
In be stored with static public key corresponding with the static private key；
When implementing the anti-quantum calculation MQV cryptographic key negotiation method, comprising:
Corresponding temporary public key and temporary private are generated in one's own side, is shared with the generation of the encrypted public key of encryption key and other side close
Key, and ciphertext is obtained using the temporary public key of shared key encryption one's own side；By the ciphertext, for obtaining other side's encrypted public key
True random number and the static public key pointer address of one's own side are sent to other side with ciphertext form；
The ciphertext from other side, the true random number and the static public key pointer address are received, using described truly random
Number obtains the encrypted public key of other side and the encryption key of one's own side, is generated altogether using the encryption key of one's own side and the encrypted public key of other side
Key is enjoyed, the ciphertext is decrypted using shared key and obtains the temporary public key of other side, is obtained using the static public key pointer address
To the static public key of other side, and utilize the temporary public key of other side, static public key and one's own side's temporary private, temporary public key, static private
Key and algorithm parameter generate arranging key.
2. the anti-quantum calculation MQV cryptographic key negotiation method based on private key pond and Elgamal as described in claim 1, feature
It is, the participant includes initiator and responder, includes: in the initiator
The first true random number is generated, generates the first temporary public key and the first temporary private using the first true random number；
The second true random number is generated, obtains the first encryption key of one's own side and right from the key card using the second true random number
First encrypted public key of side；
The progress operation of the first encrypted public key of the first encryption key of one's own side and other side is obtained into the first shared key, and utilizes the
One shared key encrypts first temporary public key and obtains the first ciphertext；
By first ciphertext, the second true random number, the static public key pointer address of one's own side and the encrypted public key pond number of one's own side
Responder is sent to ciphertext form.
3. the anti-quantum calculation MQV cryptographic key negotiation method based on private key pond and Elgamal as claimed in claim 2, feature
It is, includes: in the responder
Using received second true random number obtained from the key card one's own side the first encryption key and other side first plus
Migong key；
The progress operation of the first encrypted public key of the first encryption key of one's own side and other side is obtained into the first shared key, and utilizes the
One shared key decrypts first ciphertext and obtains the first temporary public key of other side；
The first static public key of other side is obtained from the key card using received static public key pointer address；
Third true random number is generated, generates the second temporary public key and the second temporary private using third true random number；
The second static private key of one's own side is obtained from key card, and accordingly calculates arranging key；
The 4th true random number is generated, obtains the second encryption key of one's own side and right from the key card using the 4th true random number
Second encrypted public key of side；
The progress operation of the second encrypted public key of the second encryption key of one's own side and other side is obtained into the second shared key, and utilizes the
Two shared keys encrypt second temporary public key and obtain the second ciphertext；
The static public key pointer address of second ciphertext, the 4th true random number, one's own side is sent to initiator with ciphertext form.
4. the anti-quantum calculation MQV cryptographic key negotiation method based on private key pond and Elgamal as claimed in claim 3, feature
It is, in the responder, calculates the mode of arranging key are as follows:
Arranging key be K andWherein:
H is the algorithm parameter in key card；
Kb is the second temporary private of responder；
Kb is the second temporary public key of responder；
B is the second static private key of responder；
Ka ' is the first temporary public key of initiator；
A is the first static public key of initiator.
5. the anti-quantum calculation MQV cryptographic key negotiation method based on private key pond and Elgamal as claimed in claim 3, feature
It is, in the initiator further include:
Using received 4th true random number obtained from the key card one's own side the second encryption key and other side second plus
Migong key；
The progress operation of the second encrypted public key of the second encryption key of one's own side and other side is obtained into the second shared key, and utilizes the
Two shared keys decrypt second ciphertext and obtain the second temporary public key of other side；
The second static public key of other side is obtained from the key card using received static public key pointer address；
The first static private key that one's own side is obtained from key card, accordingly calculates arranging key.
6. the anti-quantum calculation MQV cryptographic key negotiation method based on private key pond and Elgamal as claimed in claim 5, feature
It is, in the initiator, calculates the mode of arranging key are as follows:
Arranging key be K ' andWherein:
H is the algorithm parameter in key card；
Ka is the first temporary private of initiator；
Ka is the first temporary public key of initiator；
A is the first static private key of initiator；
Kb ' is the second temporary public key of responder；
B is the second static public key of responder.
7. the anti-quantum calculation MQV key agreement system based on private key pond and Elgamal, which is characterized in that participant is configured with
Key card is stored with static public key pond, encryption key pond, encrypted public key pond group and static private key and algorithm ginseng in key card
Number, the encryption key pond are stored with encryption key, and encrypted public key pond group includes that quantity is corresponding with key card quantity
Encrypted public key pond is stored with encrypted public key corresponding with the encryption key, the static state public key pond in each encrypted public key pond
In be stored with static public key corresponding with the static private key；
The anti-quantum calculation MQV key agreement system, comprising:
First module, it is public with the encryption of encryption key and other side for generating corresponding temporary public key and temporary private in one's own side
Key generates shared key, and obtains ciphertext using the temporary public key of shared key encryption one's own side；By the ciphertext, for obtaining pair
The true random number of square encrypted public key and the static public key pointer address of one's own side are sent to other side with ciphertext form；
Second module, for receiving the ciphertext from other side, the true random number and the static public key pointer address,
Obtain the encrypted public key of other side and the encryption key of one's own side using the true random number, encryption key and other side using one's own side
Encrypted public key generates shared key, decrypts the ciphertext using shared key and obtains the temporary public key of other side, utilizes the static state
Public key pointer address obtains the static public key of other side, and using the temporary public key of other side, static public key and one's own side's temporary private,
Temporary public key, static private key and algorithm parameter generate arranging key.
8. the anti-quantum calculation MQV key agreement system based on private key pond and Elgamal, which is characterized in that participant is configured with
Key card is stored with static public key pond, encryption key pond, encrypted public key pond group and static private key and algorithm ginseng in key card
Number, the encryption key pond are stored with encryption key, and encrypted public key pond group includes that quantity is corresponding with key card quantity
Encrypted public key pond is stored with encrypted public key corresponding with the encryption key, the static state public key pond in each encrypted public key pond
In be stored with static public key corresponding with the static private key；
Participant includes memory and processor, is stored with computer program in memory, which executes computer program
The described in any item anti-quantum calculation MQV cryptographic key negotiation methods based on private key pond and Elgamal of Shi Shixian claim 1~6.
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