CN108880795A - A kind of block chain security mechanism and device - Google Patents
A kind of block chain security mechanism and device Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN108880795A CN108880795A CN201810651605.5A CN201810651605A CN108880795A CN 108880795 A CN108880795 A CN 108880795A CN 201810651605 A CN201810651605 A CN 201810651605A CN 108880795 A CN108880795 A CN 108880795A
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- block
- hash value
- public key
- chain
- private key
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/10—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
- H04L67/1097—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network for distributed storage of data in networks, e.g. transport arrangements for network file system [NFS], storage area networks [SAN] or network attached storage [NAS]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0894—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
The present invention discloses a kind of novel block chain security authentication mechanism, the security mechanism recalled using needs, distorts so that block chain thoroughly be prevented to be had ultrahigh speed operational capability person or control the malice of 51% node person.In each block, while recording the HASH value C an of block and the encryption data C1 with the private key of N-K block to HASH value C；When examining this block, C1 is decrypted with the public key (being recorded in the N-K block) of N-K block, is compared with C, otherwise it is illegal block that the two, which unanimously confirms that this block is a legal block,.Additionally provide a kind of block chain safety device.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to the technical fields of block chain, more particularly to a kind of block chain security mechanism, and use the machine
The device of system.
Background technique
Currently, being linked between the block of all block chains with HASH value, if attacker wants to distort some block N's
Content needs to recalculate the random number of this block N, and generates the new block N ' after distorting, then be with this new block N '
Starting point continues original chain to be substituted, if distorting until generating a new chain followed by modification (N+1, N+2 ...) to chain
In the case that the operational capability of person is sufficiently large, it is possible to complete the modification of all subsequent blocks, and due to its new chain
Length long enough, it is likely that received by all other blocks chain users as new legal chain, to achieve the purpose that distort.
If chain length total length is M, interpolater distorts since n-th block, then he needs to distort M-N+1 block.
In brief, current any block chain, as long as can be all able to achieve to chain from the supper-fast modification backward of some block
Distort.
Summary of the invention
Technology of the invention solves the problems, such as：A kind of block chain security mechanism is overcome the deficiencies of the prior art and provide, benefit
The security mechanism recalled with needs, so that block chain thoroughly be prevented to be had ultrahigh speed operational capability person either to control 51%
The malice of node person is distorted.
The technical solution of the invention is as follows：This block chain security mechanism in each block, while recording one
Encryption data C1 of the private key of the N-K block of HASH value C and use of block to HASH value C；When examining this block, use
The public key decryptions C1 of N-K block, compares with C, and the two unanimously confirms that this block is that a substantially legal block (also needs
In addition original block chain authentication mechanism), otherwise it is determined as illegal block.
The present invention without modification, has only been superimposed a new security strategy, each to the original security system of block chain
History block (the N-K block) before block increase has recorded the public key of this block and uses a upper block cryptographic Hash
The value that private key is encrypted, if it is desired to distort wherein some block in block chain, then must modify the chain by modification mesh
Block, all blocks after it and all blocks before it are marked, needs is equivalent to and remodifies and establish entire chain.
It could modify the security mechanism of either block in chain using needing to recall modification, and block chain is thoroughly prevented to be had ultrahigh speed
It operational capability person or controls 51% malice of chain node person and distorts.
Additionally provide a kind of block chain safety device comprising logging modle, encrypting module, deciphering module, comparison module；
In each block, the HASH value that a upper block is recorded by logging modle is C, before being used by encrypting module
The private key of some block obtains encryption data C1 to the HASH value C；When examining this block, with that block (N-K before
Block) public key (being recorded in the N-K block) by deciphering module decrypt C1, compared by comparing module and C, two
Person unanimously confirms that this block is a legal block, is otherwise illegal block.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is the schematic diagram of block chain security mechanism according to the present invention.
Fig. 2 is the structure chart of traditional block chain.
Fig. 3 is block link composition of the present invention (by taking k=3 as an example).
Specific embodiment
As shown in Figure 1, this block chain security mechanism, in each block, while recording the HASH value an of block
For C and with the private key of N-K block to the encryption data C1 of HASH value C；When examining this block, with the public affairs of N-K block
Key (being recorded in the N-K block) decrypts C1, compares with C, the two unanimously confirms that this block is a legal block, no
It is then illegal block
The present invention without modification, has only been superimposed a new security strategy, each to the original security system of block chain
Block increases the value encrypted with private key an of public key and a cryptographic Hash, if it is desired to distort in block chain wherein some
Block, it is necessary to all blocks of the chain are modified, entire chain is re-established, so it is using the security mechanism recalled of needs, from
And block chain is thoroughly prevented to be had the malice of ultrahigh speed operational capability person to distort, also prevent the participation for controlling 51% node
Person distorts chain.
To a block on modification chain, then the HASH value C of the block is caused to be changed, becomes C' and next
C1 in block with the value after N-K block public key decryptions with regard to inconsistent, it is consistent to both make, must just find N-K
The private key of a block again encrypts C', if the private key of N-K block can not be found, can not carry out encryption and obtain C'1,
Block modification failure.Another amending method is also to change the public key of the N-K block, private key together, to give birth to again
Current block is written at C' and C'1, but so, when modifying some block, must just recall modification, that is to say, that
It to modify some block N, removes and needs to modify N, except N+1, N+2 ... block, it is necessary to N-K, N-K-1 ... 3 are modified,
2,1.In summary, core of the invention is, if it is desired to distort wherein some block in block chain, it is necessary to it is all to modify the chain
Block, re-establish entire chain, it is clear that just lose completely to chain modification meaning and possibility, as long as backtracking modification
More than certain citing (such as the 10th block of inverse before modification current block), then it will be found and be considered by all nodes
Block chain is distorted, the case where 51% node of control puts to the vote and modifies block chain has also just been taken precautions against.
Preferably, this approach includes the following steps：
(1) each block is equipped with a public key and a private key, public key are recorded in the block；
(2) after block N is generated, when generating new block N+1, the HASH value B of block N is recorded, while using this HASH value
The private key of N-K block is encrypted, and is obtained B1 and is recorded；The public affairs of data content and N+1 block that the needs of record N+1 block save
Key；Calculate the random number of N+2 block；
(3) according to step (1), (2), next block is generated；
(4) checkout procedure of block legitimacy：Whether the inspection to N+1 block examines the HASH value of B and block N consistent, will
Whether B1 obtains B2 with the public key decryptions of N-K block, and wherein K is the integer greater than 0 and less than N, examine B and B2 consistent；If no
Unanimously, illustrate that block is tampered with.
That is, examining the authenticity of N+1 block, N should be used, it is also necessary to shifted on again the public key of the N-K block into
Performing check.
Safety philosophy：
To distort the data of nth block, the HASH value (B) of new N block must be just recalculated.It also needs to regenerate new N
The secret value (B1) of the HASH value of block, this just needs to use the private key of N-K block, needs to find the owner of N-K block, to his rope
Private key is taken, this is with regard to difficult.If the private key is only abandoned with primary later, that can not just find and regenerate legal B1.
In order to regenerate legal B1, a method is to find the private key of N-K block, even if the people of N-K block is ready to cooperate
The private key is provided, legal B1 can be generated, then, he just needs to modify N+1 block, then he needs to obtain the private of N-K+2 block again
Key, and so on, unless he obtains N-K block, and N-K+1 block ..., until all private keys of N-1 block, can smoothly build
Found new chain.Obvious difficulty is too big.As long as this K private key has one can not obtain, or can not give for change than abandoning, then repairing
Change be cannot be successful.
Another way of interpolater does not remove the private key for obtaining N-K block exactly when distorting N block, but directly
N-K block is modified, the private key of N-K block is directly changed, then being exactly backtracking modification, if modification N-K block, he be will be seen that, modify again
N-K-K block continues backtracking modification ... .., it is clear that be the thing of an innumerable head.
In addition, any node, in spite of there is the new block for seeming legal, can be thought if discovery has backtracking to modify
It is illegal modifications.That is, even if N-K block of modification can succeed, it will not be received by other nodes, also just cannot achieve
The broadcast of chain after distorting can thus take precautions against controlling the user of 51% node and distort to chain.
For theoretically, the broadcast of chain can only broadcast several last blocks, old, " sizing " chain, be
It does not need to re-broadcast.
If N-K node is ganged up between N number of node, respective private key is all provided, theoretically sees, is that can repair
Change all nodes backward from N node, so K must be sufficiently large, can be set as needed its value, this value is bigger, collusion
Possibility is fewer, but when generating block chain, the cooperation difficulty needed is also suitably increased, because generating N+1 block, needs
The generator of nth block generates B value (the HASH value of nth block) and the generator of N-K block generates the (private of B value N-K block of B1 value
Key encryption) and nth block public key, be put into togerther N+1 block.
Preferably, B is obtained with SHA256 algorithm in the step (2).
Preferably, K >=3 in the step (4).
Additionally provide a kind of block chain safety device comprising logging modle, encrypting module, deciphering module, comparison module；
It is C by the HASH value that logging modle records a upper block in each block, uses one by encrypting module
The private key of a block obtains encryption data C1 to the HASH value C；When examining this block, pass through solution with the public key of a block
Close module decrypts C1, compares by comparing module and C, the two unanimously confirms that this block is a legal block, otherwise
For illegal block.
Preferably, the logging modle configures to record public key, the HASH value B, encryption data B1 of block N；The encryption
Module configures to be encrypted to HASH value B with the private key of N-K block；The deciphering module is configured the B1 public affairs of N-K block
Key is decrypted to obtain B2, and wherein K is the integer greater than 0 and less than N；The comparison module configures the HASH value to examine B Yu block N
It is whether consistent, it examines B and B2 whether consistent, if inconsistent, illustrates that block is tampered with.
The above is only presently preferred embodiments of the present invention, is not intended to limit the present invention in any form, it is all according to
According to technical spirit any simple modification, equivalent change and modification to the above embodiments of the invention, still belong to the present invention
The protection scope of technical solution.
Claims (6)
1. a kind of block chain security mechanism, it is characterised in that：In each block, while the HASH value for recording N-K block is C
With the encryption data C1 with the private key of N-K block to HASH value C；When examining this block, with the public key solution of N-K block
Close C1, compares with C, otherwise it is illegal block that the two, which unanimously confirms that this block is a legal block,.
2. block chain security mechanism according to claim 1, it is characterised in that：This approach includes the following steps：
(1) each block is equipped with a public key and a private key, public key are recorded in the block；
(2) after block N is generated, when generating new block N+1, the HASH value B of block N is recorded, while to this HASH value N-K block
Private key encrypted, obtain B1 and record；The public key of data content and N+1 block that the needs of record N+1 block save；Meter
Calculate the random number of N+2 block；
(3) according to step (1), (2), next block is generated；
(4) checkout procedure of block legitimacy：Whether the inspection to N+1 block examines the HASH value of B and block N consistent, B1 is used
Whether the public key decryptions of N-K block obtain B2, and wherein K is the integer greater than 0 and less than N, examine B and B2 consistent；If inconsistent,
Illustrate that block is tampered with.
3. block chain security mechanism according to claim 2, it is characterised in that：SHA256 algorithm is used in the step (2)
Obtain B.
4. block chain security mechanism according to claim 2, it is characterised in that：K >=3 in the step (4).
5. a kind of block chain safety device, it is characterised in that：It includes logging modle, encrypting module, deciphering module, compares mould
Block；
It is C by the HASH value that logging modle records a upper block in each block, by encrypting module with N-K
The private key of block obtains encryption data C1 to the HASH value C；When examining this block, pass through solution with the public key of the N-K block
Close module decrypts C1, compares by comparing module and C, the two unanimously confirms that this block is a legal block, otherwise
For illegal block.
6. block chain safety device according to claim 5, it is characterised in that：The logging modle configuration is to record block
Public key, the HASH value B, encryption data B1 of N；The encrypting module configuration is to encrypt HASH value B with the private key of N-K block；
B1 is obtained B2 with the public key decryptions of N-K block by the deciphering module configuration, and wherein K is the integer greater than 1 and less than N；Institute
Comparison module configuration is stated to examine the HASH value of B and block N whether consistent, examines B and B2 whether consistent, if inconsistent, explanation
Block is tampered with.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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| CN201810651605.5A CN108880795A (en) | 2018-06-22 | 2018-06-22 | A kind of block chain security mechanism and device |
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| CN201810651605.5A CN108880795A (en) | 2018-06-22 | 2018-06-22 | A kind of block chain security mechanism and device |
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| CN201810651605.5A Pending CN108880795A (en) | 2018-06-22 | 2018-06-22 | A kind of block chain security mechanism and device |
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Application publication date: 20181123 |