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CN108847939B - A Quantum Network-Based MDI-QKD Method - Google Patents

A Quantum Network-Based MDI-QKD Method Download PDF

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CN108847939B
CN108847939B CN201811172809.7A CN201811172809A CN108847939B CN 108847939 B CN108847939 B CN 108847939B CN 201811172809 A CN201811172809 A CN 201811172809A CN 108847939 B CN108847939 B CN 108847939B
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alice
bob
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error rate
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CN108847939A (en
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刘金锁
于浩
冯宝
潘子春
胡倩倩
卓文合
贾玮
李振伟
张影
张璐
昝继业
吕超
卞宇翔
完颜绍澎
马亚妮
赵生妹
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Nanjing Nari Shield Technology Co Ltd
State Grid Corp of China SGCC
NARI Group Corp
Nari Information and Communication Technology Co
Information and Telecommunication Branch of State Grid Anhui Electric Power Co Ltd
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Nanjing Nari Shield Technology Co Ltd
State Grid Corp of China SGCC
NARI Group Corp
Nari Information and Communication Technology Co
Information and Telecommunication Branch of State Grid Anhui Electric Power Co Ltd
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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04BTRANSMISSION
    • H04B10/00Transmission systems employing electromagnetic waves other than radio-waves, e.g. infrared, visible or ultraviolet light, or employing corpuscular radiation, e.g. quantum communication
    • H04B10/80Optical aspects relating to the use of optical transmission for specific applications, not provided for in groups H04B10/03 - H04B10/70, e.g. optical power feeding or optical transmission through water
    • H04B10/85Protection from unauthorised access, e.g. eavesdrop protection
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0852Quantum cryptography
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04BTRANSMISSION
    • H04B10/00Transmission systems employing electromagnetic waves other than radio-waves, e.g. infrared, visible or ultraviolet light, or employing corpuscular radiation, e.g. quantum communication
    • H04B10/70Photonic quantum communication

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Abstract

本发明公开一种基于量子网络的MDI‑QKD协议,该协议将量子网络中的量子隐形传态应用于传统的单边MDI‑QKD协议中,一方面,保持了原始MDI‑QKD协议的优势,即保证了安全协议对测量设备的不依赖性,有效地避免了QKD系统中测量器端的所有攻击;另一方面,量子网络中的量子隐形传态能够大幅度的延长通信的安全距离;本发明将量子网络中的量子隐形传态应用到MDI‑QKD协议中,在保证通信安全性的同时,大幅度提升了MDI‑QKD协议的距离。

Figure 201811172809

The invention discloses a quantum network-based MDI-QKD protocol, which applies quantum teleportation in the quantum network to the traditional unilateral MDI-QKD protocol. On the one hand, the advantages of the original MDI-QKD protocol are maintained, That is to ensure that the security protocol is independent of the measuring equipment, and effectively avoid all attacks on the measuring device in the QKD system; on the other hand, the quantum teleportation in the quantum network can greatly extend the safe distance of communication; the present invention The application of quantum teleportation in the quantum network to the MDI‑QKD protocol greatly improves the distance of the MDI‑QKD protocol while ensuring communication security.

Figure 201811172809

Description

一种基于量子网络的MDI-QKD方法A Quantum Network-Based MDI-QKD Method

技术领域technical field

本发明属于量子通信技术领域,具体是一种基于量子网络的MDI-QKD协议。The invention belongs to the technical field of quantum communication, in particular to a quantum network-based MDI-QKD protocol.

背景技术Background technique

量子保密通信以量子物理与信息学为基础,其安全性是由量子力学基本原理来保证的,量子密钥分发是量子保密通信中最为重要的内容,被认为是安全性最高的加密方式。它使得通信双方能够产生并分享一个随机的、安全的密钥来加密和解密信息。1984年,Bennett等人首次提出了量子密码史上的QKD协议,BB84协议,而后经过三十多年的发展,各种新型的QKD协议相继出现,如:循环差分相移协议,基于脉冲调制的QKD协议,诱骗态双向QKD协议,等等。其中,Hoi-KwongLo等人于2012年提出了实用性更高的QKD协议,测量设备无关的量子密钥分发(Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key DistributionProtocol,MDI-QKD)协议。在MDI-QKD协议中,Alice和Bob为合法通信用户,只负责量子态的制备,而后将制备的量子态分别发送给协议运行的第三方Charlie,由Charlie完成对两个量子态的测量,并通过公共的经典信道将测量结果公布给Alice和Bob,Alice和Bob根据Charlie端的测量结果对各自手中的数据进行后续处理,最终获取安全密钥。MDI-QKD协议自2012年首次提出之后便受到科研爱好者的热捧,从理论和实验两方面都进行了深入的研究。Quantum secure communication is based on quantum physics and informatics, and its security is guaranteed by the basic principles of quantum mechanics. Quantum key distribution is the most important content in quantum secure communication and is considered to be the most secure encryption method. It enables communicating parties to generate and share a random, secure key to encrypt and decrypt messages. In 1984, Bennett et al. first proposed the QKD protocol in the history of quantum cryptography, the BB84 protocol. After more than 30 years of development, various new QKD protocols have appeared one after another, such as: cyclic differential phase shift protocol, QKD based on pulse modulation protocol, decoy two-way QKD protocol, etc. Among them, Hoi-KwongLo et al. proposed a more practical QKD protocol in 2012, the Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution Protocol (MDI-QKD) protocol. In the MDI-QKD protocol, Alice and Bob are legitimate communication users, and are only responsible for the preparation of quantum states, and then send the prepared quantum states to Charlie, a third-party running the protocol, and Charlie completes the measurement of the two quantum states. The measurement results are announced to Alice and Bob through the public classic channel, and Alice and Bob perform subsequent processing on the data in their respective hands according to the measurement results on Charlie's side, and finally obtain the security key. Since the MDI-QKD protocol was first proposed in 2012, it has been popular among scientific research enthusiasts, and in-depth research has been carried out from both theoretical and experimental aspects.

量子网络,是新型的安全通信网络,其利用量子纠缠和量子隐形传态给网络带来真正意义上的安全,以及计算和科学领域质的飞跃。其中,量子隐形传态又称量子遥传、量子远距传输等,是一种利用量子纠缠和一些经典物理信息来传送未知量子态的全新通信技术。若Alice传送一个未知量子态至接收方Bob,首先Alice和Bob间要共享一个纠缠的量子通道,即EPR纠缠粒子对,然后Alice将原未知量子态分解为经典信息和量子信息分别经由经典信道和量子信道传送给Bob,Bob根据获取的信息将未知量子态还原。其中,经典信息是发送者Alice对待传送的未知量子态进行贝尔态测量而获知的测量结果,量子信息则是Alice在测量中未获取的有关未知量子态的其余信息。Quantum network is a new type of secure communication network, which uses quantum entanglement and quantum teleportation to bring real security to the network and a qualitative leap in the fields of computing and science. Among them, quantum teleportation, also known as quantum teleportation, quantum teleportation, etc., is a new communication technology that uses quantum entanglement and some classical physical information to transmit unknown quantum states. If Alice transmits an unknown quantum state to the receiver Bob, firstly, Alice and Bob must share an entangled quantum channel, that is, the EPR entangled particle pair, and then Alice decomposes the original unknown quantum state into classical information and quantum information through the classical channel and The quantum channel is transmitted to Bob, and Bob restores the unknown quantum state according to the obtained information. Among them, the classical information is the measurement result obtained from the Bell state measurement of the unknown quantum state to be transmitted by the sender Alice, and the quantum information is the remaining information about the unknown quantum state that Alice did not acquire in the measurement.

原始的MDI-QKD协议中,合法通信用户Alice和Bob不配备任何测量装置,只负责量子态的制备,而量子态的测量由一个不可信任的第三方Charlie进行。申请号为201510008068.9的专利公开了一种两节点测量设备无关量子密钥分发系统,将两个独立激光器和测量装置Charlie都放置在同一个节点上,即均放置在Alice端或Bob端,形成两节点双向传输的量子密钥分发系统。这种特殊的结构移除了协议运行过程中窃听者对测量设备的攻击,保证了通信的安全性,然而该协议的安全通信距离还不够长,需要进一步改进以延长安全通信的距离。In the original MDI-QKD protocol, legitimate communication users Alice and Bob are not equipped with any measurement devices, and are only responsible for the preparation of quantum states, which are measured by an untrusted third party, Charlie. The patent with the application number of 201510008068.9 discloses a two-node measurement device-independent quantum key distribution system. Two independent lasers and measurement device Charlie are placed on the same node, that is, placed on the Alice side or the Bob side, forming two A quantum key distribution system with bidirectional transmission of nodes. This special structure removes the eavesdropper's attack on the measurement equipment during the operation of the protocol and ensures the security of communication. However, the secure communication distance of the protocol is not long enough, and further improvement is needed to extend the secure communication distance.

发明内容SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

本发明的目的是针对现有技术存在的问题,提供一种基于量子网络的MDI-QKD协议,将量子隐形传态应用于MDI-QKD协议中,一方面,保证了安全协议对测量设备的不依赖性,有效地避免了QKD系统中测量器端的所有攻击;另一方面,量子网络中的量子隐形传态能够大幅度的延长通信的安全距离;故本发明的一种基于量子网络的MDI-QKD协议,能够实现在保证安全性的同时大幅度延长安全传输距离的效果。The purpose of the present invention is to provide a quantum network-based MDI-QKD protocol for the problems existing in the prior art, and apply quantum teleportation to the MDI-QKD protocol. On the other hand, quantum teleportation in the quantum network can greatly extend the safe distance of communication; therefore, a quantum network-based MDI- The QKD protocol can achieve the effect of greatly extending the safe transmission distance while ensuring security.

为实现上述目的,本发明采用的技术方案是:For achieving the above object, the technical scheme adopted in the present invention is:

一种基于量子网络的MDI-QKD协议,包括如下步骤:A quantum network-based MDI-QKD protocol, including the following steps:

S1,通信用户Alice通过量子路由的方法与处在同一量子网络的节点Alicel建立最优的路由路线;S1, the communication user Alice establishes an optimal routing route with the node Alice in the same quantum network by means of quantum routing;

S2,处于同一量子网络的通信用户Alice和Bob分别制备量子态,且通信用户Alice通过隐形传态的方式将自己制备的量子态传送至节点Alicel;S2, communication users Alice and Bob in the same quantum network prepare quantum states respectively, and communication user Alice transmits the quantum state prepared by himself to the node Alice through teleportation;

S3,Alicel接收到量子态后与Bob同步地通过量子信道将两个量子态发送给第三方量子测量设备Charlie进行测量;S3, after receiving the quantum state, Alice and Bob synchronously send the two quantum states to the third-party quantum measurement device Charlie through the quantum channel for measurement;

S4,Charlie对接收到的两个量子态进行BELL态测量(BSM),然后通过经典信道将测量结果公布给通信用户Alice和Bob;Alice和Bob对获取到的测量结果进行判断;S4, Charlie performs BELL state measurement (BSM) on the received two quantum states, and then announces the measurement results to communication users Alice and Bob through the classical channel; Alice and Bob judge the obtained measurement results;

S5,若判断测量结果错误,则Alice和Bob都将本次通信过程中发送给Charlie测量的量子态数据丢弃;若判断测量结果正确,则Alice和Bob暂时保留该量子态数据,并通过对基操作得到筛后的密钥数据,Alice或者Bob任一方对自己的密钥做一次比特翻转;S5, if it is judged that the measurement result is wrong, Alice and Bob both discard the quantum state data sent to Charlie for measurement during this communication process; if it is judged that the measurement result is correct, Alice and Bob temporarily retain the quantum state data, and pass the basic After the operation obtains the sieved key data, either Alice or Bob performs a bit flip on its own key;

S6,重复步骤S2至S5,得到一串自然密钥比特;S6, repeat steps S2 to S5, obtain a string of natural key bits;

S7,检测量子信道是否存在窃听;S7, detect whether there is eavesdropping on the quantum channel;

S8,得到最终安全密钥。S8, get the final security key.

具体地,步骤S2中,所述通信用户Alice在传送量子态的过程中,会损失一定量的信息,即Alice将量子态传送到Alicel存在一定的保真度,所述保真度表示为:Specifically, in step S2, the communication user Alice will lose a certain amount of information in the process of transmitting the quantum state, that is, Alice transmits the quantum state to Alice with a certain fidelity, and the fidelity is expressed as:

Figure GDA0002283010350000021
Figure GDA0002283010350000021

其中,0≤x≤1,x表示量子隐形传态中W态的权重;当

Figure GDA0002283010350000022
时,W态可分离;当
Figure GDA0002283010350000023
时,W态不可分离;当x=1时,W态为纯态;n表示量子隐形传态的节点数;ρin和ρn-1分别表示输入量子态以及第n-1个节点的输出量子态的密度算法;Tr表示矩阵的迹。Among them, 0≤x≤1, x represents the weight of the W state in quantum teleportation; when
Figure GDA0002283010350000022
When , the W state is separable; when
Figure GDA0002283010350000023
When , the W state is inseparable; when x=1, the W state is a pure state; n represents the number of nodes in quantum teleportation; ρ in and ρ n-1 represent the input quantum state and the output of the n-1th node, respectively Density algorithm for quantum states; Tr represents the trace of the matrix.

具体地,步骤S4中,所述Alice和Bob对获取到的测量结果进行判断的方法为:Alice和Bob各自选取一部分密钥并公开,Alice和Bob根据公开的密钥来计算密钥的错误率,若错误率超过阈值,则判断测量结果错误;若错误率低于阈值,则判断测量结果正确。Specifically, in step S4, the method for Alice and Bob to judge the acquired measurement results is as follows: Alice and Bob each select a part of the key and disclose it, and Alice and Bob calculate the error rate of the key according to the public key , if the error rate exceeds the threshold, the measurement result is judged to be wrong; if the error rate is lower than the threshold, the measurement result is judged to be correct.

具体地,步骤S5中,所述通过对基操作得到筛后的密钥数据的方法为:Alice和Bob先公开各自制备每个量子态所使用的基,然后把使用相同基制备的量子态对应的密钥数据保留下来,舍弃使用不同基制备的量子态对应的密钥数据,从而得到筛后的密钥数据。Specifically, in step S5, the method of obtaining the sieved key data by operating on the basis is as follows: Alice and Bob first disclose the basis used to prepare each quantum state, and then correspond to the quantum state prepared by using the same basis. The key data of the sieve is retained, and the key data corresponding to the quantum states prepared using different bases is discarded, so as to obtain the sieved key data.

具体地,步骤S7中,检验量子信道是否存在窃听的方法为:Alice和Bob双方公示出部分原始密钥,并计算密钥的误码率;若误码率超过门限,说明存在窃听,舍弃此次协议过程,若误码率不超过门限,则保留未公示的原始密钥。Specifically, in step S7, the method of checking whether there is eavesdropping on the quantum channel is as follows: Alice and Bob both disclose part of the original key, and calculate the bit error rate of the key; if the bit error rate exceeds the threshold, it means that there is eavesdropping, and discard this In the second protocol process, if the bit error rate does not exceed the threshold, the unpublished original key is retained.

具体地,步骤S8中,得到最终安全密钥之前,需要对剩下的密钥串进行纠错和保密放大操作。Specifically, in step S8, before obtaining the final security key, error correction and encryption amplification operations need to be performed on the remaining key string.

进一步地,所述协议的密钥率计算公式为:Further, the key rate calculation formula of the protocol is:

其中,Qrect和Erect表示rect基下的增益和量子误码率;

Figure GDA0002283010350000032
Figure GDA0002283010350000033
f(Erect)为错误纠正率函数,H(x)=-xlog2(x)-(1-x)log2(1-x)为香农熵函数;
Figure GDA0002283010350000034
表示在MDI-QKD中斜极化基下的单光子脉冲的错误率;
Figure GDA0002283010350000035
表示水平垂直基的强度为uv的光脉冲的错误率,u为Alice发送的光脉冲的强度,v为Bob发送的光脉冲的强度。Among them, Q rect and E rect represent the gain and quantum bit error rate under the rect basis;
Figure GDA0002283010350000032
Figure GDA0002283010350000033
f(E rect ) is the error correction rate function, H(x)=-xlog 2 (x)-(1-x)log 2 (1-x) is the Shannon entropy function;
Figure GDA0002283010350000034
Indicates the error rate of single-photon pulses in MDI-QKD in the obliquely polarized basis;
Figure GDA0002283010350000035
It represents the error rate of the optical pulse whose intensity is uv on the horizontal and vertical basis, u is the intensity of the optical pulse sent by Alice, and v is the intensity of the optical pulse sent by Bob.

进一步地,所述协议的增益和量子误码率表示为:Further, the gain and quantum bit error rate of the protocol are expressed as:

Figure GDA0002283010350000036
Figure GDA0002283010350000036

Figure GDA0002283010350000037
Figure GDA0002283010350000037

Figure GDA0002283010350000038
Figure GDA0002283010350000038

其中,

Figure GDA0002283010350000039
表示Alice和Bob在rect基下发送强度为u和v的光脉冲的增益;
Figure GDA00022830103500000310
表示Alice1和Bob在rect基下发送强度为u和v的光脉冲的增益;
Figure GDA00022830103500000311
表示Alice和Bob在rect基下发送强度为u和v的光脉冲的错误率;
Figure GDA00022830103500000312
表示Alice1和Bob在rect基下发送强度为u和v的光脉冲的错误率;
Figure GDA0002283010350000041
表示量子网络中斜极化基的单光子脉冲的错误率,其右上标xx’代表Alice和Bob同时使用斜极化基,该量子网络包括隐形传态和MDI-QKD;表示斜极化基的强度为uv的光脉冲的错误率,其右上标xx代表Alice1和Bob同时使用斜极化基;u为Alice发送的光脉冲的强度;v为Bob发送的光脉冲的强度;Fn表示Alice传送给Alice1的量子态的保真度;在相同纠缠度和密钥率的情况下,随着隐形传态的节点数n的增大,协议的相对传输距离在逐渐减小;在隐形传态的节点数n和密钥率相同的情况下,随着隐形传态时W态的纠缠度的降低,协议的相对传输距离也在逐渐减小。in,
Figure GDA0002283010350000039
represents the gain of Alice and Bob sending optical pulses with intensities u and v under the rect basis;
Figure GDA00022830103500000310
Represents the gain of Alice1 and Bob sending optical pulses with intensities u and v under the rect basis;
Figure GDA00022830103500000311
Represents the error rate of Alice and Bob sending light pulses with intensities u and v under the rect basis;
Figure GDA00022830103500000312
Represents the error rate of Alice1 and Bob sending light pulses with intensities u and v under the rect basis;
Figure GDA0002283010350000041
Indicates the error rate of the single-photon pulse of the obliquely polarized base in the quantum network, the superscript xx' on the right represents the simultaneous use of the obliquely polarized base by Alice and Bob, and the quantum network includes teleportation and MDI-QKD; Indicates the error rate of the optical pulse with the intensity of the oblique polarization base as uv, and the right superscript xx represents that Alice1 and Bob use the oblique polarization base at the same time; u is the intensity of the optical pulse sent by Alice; v is the intensity of the optical pulse sent by Bob ; Fn represents the fidelity of the quantum state transmitted by Alice to Alice1; in the case of the same entanglement degree and key rate, as the number of teleportation nodes n increases, the relative transmission distance of the protocol gradually decreases; When the number of nodes n and the key rate of teleportation are the same, with the decrease of the entanglement degree of the W state during teleportation, the relative transmission distance of the protocol is also gradually reduced.

具体地,所述量子网络包括量子网络源节点的两个合法通信用户Alice、Bob以及一个量子网络目的节点Alicel。Specifically, the quantum network includes two legitimate communication users Alice and Bob of the quantum network source node, and a quantum network destination node Alice.

与现有技术相比,本发明的有益效果是:本发明的通信协议采用的是MDI-QKD协议,因而具有原始MDI-QKD协议的优势,即保证了安全协议对测量设备的不依赖性,有效地避免了QKD系统中测量器端的所有攻击;本发明将量子网络中的量子隐形传态应用到MDI-QKD协议中,在保证通信安全性的同时,大幅度提升了MDI-QKD协议的距离。Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention are: the communication protocol of the present invention adopts the MDI-QKD protocol, so it has the advantages of the original MDI-QKD protocol, that is, the safety protocol is guaranteed to be independent of the measuring equipment, All attacks on the measuring device end in the QKD system are effectively avoided; the invention applies the quantum teleportation in the quantum network to the MDI-QKD protocol, which greatly improves the distance of the MDI-QKD protocol while ensuring communication security. .

附图说明Description of drawings

图1为本发明一种基于量子网络的MDI-QKD协议的流程图;1 is a flow chart of a quantum network-based MDI-QKD protocol of the present invention;

图2为本发明一种基于量子网络的MDI-QKD协议的通信网络示意图。FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a communication network of a quantum network-based MDI-QKD protocol of the present invention.

具体实施方式Detailed ways

下面将结合本发明中的附图,对本发明的技术方案进行清楚、完整地描述,显然,所描述的实施例仅仅是本发明一部分实施例,而不是全部的实施例。基于本发明中的实施例,本领域普通技术人员在没有做出创造性劳动条件下所获得的所有其它实施例,都属于本发明保护的范围。The technical solutions of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by persons of ordinary skill in the art without creative efforts shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.

如图2所示,本实施例提供了一种基于量子网络的MDI-QKD协议,本实施例的协议主要包括四大部分:量子网络源节点的合法通信用户Alice和量子网络目的节点的目的节点Alice1、合法通信用户Bob以及第三方测量设备;其中源节点和目的节点同处于同一个量子网络。源节点与目的节点通过网络路由的方式选择一条最优的通信线路,并采用量子隐形传态的方式进行量子态的传输。由于量子密码通信的距离是受限的,Alice与Bob之间距离较远,无法实现量子密码通信。Alice1与Bob之间距离较短,可以实现测量设备无关的量子密码通信。本实施例给出借助于隐形传态技术如何实现Alice与Bob之间的量子密码通信方法。As shown in Figure 2, this embodiment provides a quantum network-based MDI-QKD protocol. The protocol in this embodiment mainly includes four parts: the legitimate communication user Alice of the quantum network source node and the destination node of the quantum network destination node Alice1, legal communication user Bob, and third-party measurement equipment; the source node and the destination node are in the same quantum network. The source node and the destination node select an optimal communication line through network routing, and use quantum teleportation to transmit quantum states. Since the distance of quantum cryptographic communication is limited, the distance between Alice and Bob is too far to realize quantum cryptographic communication. The distance between Alice1 and Bob is short, which can realize quantum cryptographic communication independent of measurement equipment. This embodiment shows how to realize the quantum cryptographic communication method between Alice and Bob by means of teleportation technology.

如图1所示,该协议的具体流程如下:As shown in Figure 1, the specific process of the protocol is as follows:

S1,合法的通信用户Alice通过量子智能优化算法在量子网络中路由出一条最优的线路至Alice1节点,在Alice与Alice1节点间有n个中间节点,每个节点间会通过量子隐形传态的方式将量子态传送至Alice1节点;S1, the legitimate communication user Alice routes an optimal line in the quantum network to the Alice1 node through the quantum intelligent optimization algorithm. There are n intermediate nodes between Alice and Alice1 nodes, and each node will be transmitted through quantum teleportation. way to transmit the quantum state to the Alice1 node;

S2,在量子隐形传态的过程中,若合法通信用户Alice要传送一个未知量子态至节点Alice1,首先Alice和Alice附近的节点共享一个纠缠的量子通道,即EPR纠缠粒子对,然后Alice将原未知量子态分解为经典信息和量子信息分别经由经典信道和量子信道传送给该中间节点,该节点根据获取的信息将未知量子态还原;S2, in the process of quantum teleportation, if the legitimate communication user Alice wants to transmit an unknown quantum state to the node Alice1, firstly, Alice and the nodes near Alice share an entangled quantum channel, that is, the EPR entangled particle pair, and then Alice transfers the original quantum state to the node Alice1. The unknown quantum state is decomposed into classical information and quantum information is transmitted to the intermediate node through the classical channel and quantum channel respectively, and the node restores the unknown quantum state according to the obtained information;

S3,Alice1获取到Alice端传送的量子态后与另一合法通信用户Bob同步地通过量子信道将各自的量子态发送给第三方Charlie进行贝尔态测量;S3, after Alice1 obtains the quantum state transmitted by Alice, and synchronously with another legal communication user Bob, sends their respective quantum states to the third party Charlie through the quantum channel for Bell state measurement;

S4,测量完成后,由Charlie通过公共信道将测量结果公布给Alice和Bob,Alice和Bob判断Charlie方测量的测量结果是否为正确结果;S4, after the measurement is completed, Charlie announces the measurement result to Alice and Bob through the public channel, and Alice and Bob judge whether the measurement result measured by the Charlie side is the correct result;

S5,若判断测量结果错误,则Alice和Bob都将本次通信过程中发送给Charlie测量的量子态数据丢弃;若判断测量结果正确,则Alice和Bob暂时保留该量子态数据,并通过对基操作得到筛后的密钥数据,Alice或者Bob任一方对自己的密钥做一次比特翻转;S5, if it is judged that the measurement result is wrong, Alice and Bob both discard the quantum state data sent to Charlie for measurement during this communication process; if it is judged that the measurement result is correct, Alice and Bob temporarily retain the quantum state data, and pass the basic After the operation obtains the sieved key data, either Alice or Bob performs a bit flip on its own key;

S6,重复步骤S2至S5,直到得到足够的原始密钥,即得到一串自然密钥比特;S6, repeat steps S2 to S5, until obtain enough original key, namely obtain a string of natural key bits;

S7,检测量子信道是否存在窃听;S7, detect whether there is eavesdropping on the quantum channel;

S8,得到最终安全密钥。S8, get the final security key.

具体地,步骤S2中,所述经典信息是发送者Alice对待传送的未知量子态进行贝尔态测量而获知的测量结果,所述量子信息则是Alice在测量中未获取的有关未知量子态的其余信息。重复n-1次隐形传态后,可将合法用户Alice制备的量子态传送至Alicel节点。Specifically, in step S2, the classical information is the measurement result obtained by the sender Alice performing Bell state measurement on the unknown quantum state to be transmitted, and the quantum information is the rest of the unknown quantum state that Alice did not acquire in the measurement. information. After repeating the teleportation for n-1 times, the quantum state prepared by the legitimate user Alice can be transmitted to the Alice node.

进一步地,步骤S2中,所述通信用户Alice在传送量子态的过程中,会损失一定量的信息,即Alice将量子态传送到Alicel存在一定的保真度,所述保真度表示为:Further, in step S2, the communication user Alice will lose a certain amount of information in the process of transmitting the quantum state, that is, Alice transmits the quantum state to Alice with a certain fidelity, and the fidelity is expressed as:

Figure GDA0002283010350000051
Figure GDA0002283010350000051

其中,0≤x≤1,x表示量子隐形传态中W态的权重;当

Figure GDA0002283010350000052
时,W态可分离;当
Figure GDA0002283010350000053
时,W态不可分离;当x=1时,W态为纯态;n表示量子隐形传态的节点数;ρin和ρn-1分别表示输入量子态以及第n-1个节点的输出量子态的密度算法。Among them, 0≤x≤1, x represents the weight of the W state in quantum teleportation; when
Figure GDA0002283010350000052
When , the W state is separable; when
Figure GDA0002283010350000053
When , the W state is inseparable; when x=1, the W state is a pure state; n represents the number of nodes in quantum teleportation; ρ in and ρ n-1 represent the input quantum state and the output of the n-1th node, respectively Density algorithm for quantum states.

具体地,步骤S4中,所述Alice和Bob对获取到的测量结果进行判断的方法为:Alice和Bob各自选取一部分密钥并公开,Alice和Bob根据公开的密钥来计算密钥的错误率,若错误率超过阈值,则判断测量结果错误;若错误率低于阈值,则判断测量结果正确;在传输量子态为单光子情况下,该阈值为11%。Specifically, in step S4, the method for Alice and Bob to judge the acquired measurement results is as follows: Alice and Bob each select a part of the key and disclose it, and Alice and Bob calculate the error rate of the key according to the public key , if the error rate exceeds the threshold, the measurement result is judged to be wrong; if the error rate is lower than the threshold, the measurement result is judged to be correct; when the transmission quantum state is a single photon, the threshold is 11%.

具体地,步骤S5中,所述通过对基操作得到筛后的密钥数据的方法为:Alice和Bob先公开各自制备每个量子态所使用的基,然后把使用相同基制备的量子态对应的密钥数据保留下来,舍弃使用不同基制备的量子态对应的密钥数据,从而得到筛后的密钥数据。Specifically, in step S5, the method of obtaining the sieved key data by operating on the basis is as follows: Alice and Bob first disclose the basis used to prepare each quantum state, and then correspond to the quantum state prepared by using the same basis. The key data of the sieve is retained, and the key data corresponding to the quantum states prepared using different bases is discarded, so as to obtain the sieved key data.

具体地,步骤S7中,检验量子信道是否存在窃听的方法为:Alice和Bob双方公示出部分原始密钥,并计算密钥的误码率;若误码率超过门限,说明存在窃听,舍弃此次协议过程,若误码率不超过门限,则保留未公示的原始密钥。Specifically, in step S7, the method of checking whether there is eavesdropping on the quantum channel is as follows: Alice and Bob both disclose part of the original key, and calculate the bit error rate of the key; if the bit error rate exceeds the threshold, it means that there is eavesdropping, and discard this In the second protocol process, if the bit error rate does not exceed the threshold, the unpublished original key is retained.

具体地,步骤S8中,得到最终安全密钥之前,需要对剩下的密钥串进行纠错和保密放大操作。Specifically, in step S8, before obtaining the final security key, error correction and encryption amplification operations need to be performed on the remaining key string.

进一步地,原始的MDI-QKD协议的密钥率计算公式为:Further, the key rate calculation formula of the original MDI-QKD protocol is:

其中,Qrect和Erect表示rect基下的增益和量子误码率;

Figure GDA0002283010350000062
Figure GDA0002283010350000063
Figure GDA0002283010350000064
可以通过诱骗态的方法估计其值,f(Erect)>1为错误纠正率函数,H(x)=-xlog2(x)-(1-x)log2(1-x)为香农熵函数;
Figure GDA0002283010350000066
表示在MDI-QKD中斜极化基下的单光子脉冲的错误率;
Figure GDA0002283010350000067
表示水平垂直基的强度为uv的光脉冲的错误率,u为Alice发送的光脉冲的强度,v为Bob发送的光脉冲的强度。Among them, Q rect and E rect represent the gain and quantum bit error rate under the rect basis;
Figure GDA0002283010350000062
Figure GDA0002283010350000063
Figure GDA0002283010350000064
and Its value can be estimated by the method of decoy state, f(E rect )>1 is the error correction rate function, H(x)=-xlog 2 (x)-(1-x)log 2 (1-x) is Shannon entropy function;
Figure GDA0002283010350000066
Indicates the error rate of single-photon pulses in MDI-QKD in the obliquely polarized basis;
Figure GDA0002283010350000067
It represents the error rate of the optical pulse whose intensity is uv on the horizontal and vertical basis, u is the intensity of the optical pulse sent by Alice, and v is the intensity of the optical pulse sent by Bob.

在通信双方Alice1和Bob准备相位随机化的弱相关脉冲时(WCP),且通信过程中不存在窃听者,总增益与QBER可以写成如下形式:When Alice1 and Bob are preparing phase-randomized weak correlation pulses (WCP), and there is no eavesdropper in the communication process, the total gain and QBER can be written in the following form:

Figure GDA0002283010350000068
Figure GDA0002283010350000068

Figure GDA0002283010350000069
Figure GDA0002283010350000069

Figure GDA00022830103500000611
Figure GDA00022830103500000611

其中,

Figure GDA00022830103500000612
Figure GDA00022830103500000613
分别表示正确和错误贝尔态测量下的增益,I0(·)是一阶修正贝塞尔函数,ed是误差率,pd是暗计数率,e0=1/2,ω=μηα+νηb
Figure GDA00022830103500000614
y=(1-pd)e-ω/4,ηα=ηb=10-αL/10为信道的传输效率。in,
Figure GDA00022830103500000612
and
Figure GDA00022830103500000613
are the gains under correct and incorrect Bell state measurements, respectively, I 0 (·) is the first-order modified Bessel function, ed is the error rate, p d is the dark count rate, e 0 =1/2, ω = μη α +νη b ,
Figure GDA00022830103500000614
y=(1-p d )e -ω/4 , η αb =10 -αL/10 is the transmission efficiency of the channel.

进一步地,结合量子隐形传态传送过程中的保真度,基于量子网络的MDI-QKD协议的增益和量子误码率可表示为:Further, combined with the fidelity in the quantum teleportation process, the gain and quantum bit error rate of the quantum network-based MDI-QKD protocol can be expressed as:

Figure GDA0002283010350000071
Figure GDA0002283010350000071

Figure GDA0002283010350000072
Figure GDA0002283010350000072

Figure GDA0002283010350000073
Figure GDA0002283010350000073

其中,

Figure GDA0002283010350000074
表示Alice和Bob在rect基下发送强度为u和v的光脉冲的增益;表示Alice1和Bob在rect基下发送强度为u和v的光脉冲的增益;
Figure GDA0002283010350000076
表示Alice和Bob在rect基下发送强度为u和v的光脉冲的错误率;
Figure GDA0002283010350000077
表示Alice1和Bob在rect基下发送强度为u和v的光脉冲的错误率;
Figure GDA0002283010350000078
表示量子网络中斜极化基的单光子脉冲的错误率,其右上标xx’代表Alice和Bob同时使用斜极化基,该量子网络包括隐形传态和MDI-QKD;
Figure GDA0002283010350000079
表示斜极化基的强度为uv的光脉冲的错误率,其右上标xx代表Alice1和Bob同时使用斜极化基;u为Alice发送的光脉冲的强度;v为Bob发送的光脉冲的强度;Fn表示Alice传送给Alice1的量子态的保真度;由上述公式可以看出,针对于量子隐形传态中的保真度Fn,隐形传态数目n及纠缠度会影响该协议的性能。在相同纠缠度和密钥率的情况下,随着隐形传态的节点数n的增大,协议的相对传输距离在逐渐减小;在隐形传态的节点数n和密钥率相同的情况下,随着隐形传态时W态的纠缠度的降低,协议的相对传输距离也在逐渐减小。in,
Figure GDA0002283010350000074
represents the gain of Alice and Bob sending optical pulses with intensities u and v under the rect basis; Represents the gain of Alice1 and Bob sending optical pulses with intensities u and v under the rect basis;
Figure GDA0002283010350000076
Represents the error rate of Alice and Bob sending light pulses with intensities u and v under the rect basis;
Figure GDA0002283010350000077
Represents the error rate of Alice1 and Bob sending light pulses with intensities u and v under the rect basis;
Figure GDA0002283010350000078
Indicates the error rate of the single-photon pulse of the obliquely polarized base in the quantum network, the superscript xx' on the right represents the simultaneous use of the obliquely polarized base by Alice and Bob, and the quantum network includes teleportation and MDI-QKD;
Figure GDA0002283010350000079
Indicates the error rate of the optical pulse with the intensity of the oblique polarization base as uv, and the right superscript xx represents that Alice1 and Bob use the oblique polarization base at the same time; u is the intensity of the optical pulse sent by Alice; v is the intensity of the optical pulse sent by Bob ; Fn represents the fidelity of the quantum state transmitted by Alice to Alice1; it can be seen from the above formula that for the fidelity Fn in quantum teleportation, the number of teleportation states n and the degree of entanglement will affect the performance of the protocol. In the case of the same entanglement degree and key rate, as the number of teleportation nodes n increases, the relative transmission distance of the protocol gradually decreases; when the number of teleportation nodes n and the key rate are the same As the entanglement degree of the W state decreases during teleportation, the relative transmission distance of the protocol also decreases gradually.

本发明在将量子网络中量子隐形传态应用到MDI-QKD协议后,在较小牺牲密钥率的情况下可以大幅度的提升MDI-QKD协议合法通信用户的安全通信距离。After the quantum teleportation in the quantum network is applied to the MDI-QKD protocol, the invention can greatly improve the safe communication distance of the legal communication users of the MDI-QKD protocol under the condition of less sacrifice of the key rate.

尽管已经示出和描述了本发明的实施例,对于本领域的普通技术人员而言,可以理解在不脱离本发明的原理和精神的情况下可以对这些实施例进行多种变化、修改、替换和变型,本发明的范围由所附权利要求及其等同物限定。Although embodiments of the present invention have been shown and described, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that various changes, modifications, and substitutions can be made in these embodiments without departing from the principle and spirit of the invention and modifications, the scope of the present invention is defined by the appended claims and their equivalents.

Claims (8)

1. An MDI-QKD method based on a quantum network is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s1, the communication user Alice establishes an optimal routing route by the method of quantum routing and the node Alicel in the same quantum network;
s2, communication users Alice and Bob in the same quantum network respectively prepare quantum states, and the communication users Alice transmit the prepared quantum states to a node Alicel in a hidden state transmission mode;
s3, after receiving the quantum state, Alicel sends the two quantum states to third-party quantum measurement equipment Charlie through a quantum channel synchronously with Bob for measurement;
s4, Charlie carries out BELL state measurement on the two received quantum states, and then publishes the measurement result to communication users Alice and Bob through a classical channel; the obtained measurement results are judged by Alice and Bob;
s5, if the measurement result is judged to be wrong, then both Alice and Bob discard the quantum state data sent to Charlie measurement in the communication process; if the measurement result is judged to be correct, then Alice and Bob temporarily reserve the quantum state data, and obtain the screened key data through the base pair operation, and either Alice or Bob performs one-time bit reversal on the own key;
s6, repeating the steps S2 to S5 to obtain a string of key bits;
s7, detecting whether the quantum channel has wiretap, if yes, abandoning the protocol process; if there is no eavesdropping, go to step S8;
and S8, obtaining the final security key through error correction and secret amplification.
2. The quantum-network-based MDI-QKD method according to claim 1, wherein in step S2, said communication user Alice loses a certain amount of information in the process of transferring quantum states, that is, there is a certain fidelity in transferring quantum states to Alicel by Alice, said fidelity is expressed as:
wherein x is more than or equal to 0 and less than or equal to 1, and x represents the weight of the W state in the quantum invisible state; when in use
Figure FDA0002283010340000012
Then, the W state can be separated; when in use
Figure FDA0002283010340000013
When the temperature of the water is higher than the set temperature,the W state can not be separated; when x is 1, the W state is a pure state; n represents the node number of the quantum invisible state; rhoinAnd ρn-1Density algorithms representing input quantum states and output quantum states of the (n-1) th node, respectively; tr denotes the traces of the matrix.
3. The quantum-network-based MDI-QKD method according to claim 1, wherein in step S4, the method for Alice and Bob to determine the obtained measurement results comprises: respectively selecting and disclosing a part of secret keys by Alice and Bob, calculating the error rate of the secret keys by the Alice and the Bob according to the public secret keys, and judging that the measurement result is wrong if the error rate exceeds a threshold value; and if the error rate is lower than the threshold value, judging that the measurement result is correct.
4. The quantum-network-based MDI-QKD method according to claim 1, wherein in step S5, said method for obtaining the filtered key data by the base-pair operation is: and firstly disclosing bases used for preparing each quantum state by Alice and Bob, then reserving key data corresponding to the quantum states prepared by using the same base, and discarding the key data corresponding to the quantum states prepared by using different bases, thereby obtaining the screened key data.
5. The quantum network-based MDI-QKD method according to claim 1, wherein in step S7, the method for checking whether there is eavesdropping on the quantum channel is: both Alice and Bob publicly show part of the original secret key, and calculate the error rate of the secret key; if the error rate exceeds the threshold, it shows that there is eavesdropping, abandon the protocol process, if the error rate does not exceed the threshold, then keep the original key not disclosed.
6. The quantum-network-based MDI-QKD method according to claim 1, wherein the key rate calculation formula of said protocol is:
Figure FDA0002283010340000021
wherein Q isrectAnd ErectRepresenting the gain and the quantum bit error rate under the rect base;
Figure FDA0002283010340000022
Figure FDA0002283010340000023
f(Erect) H (x) xlog as a function of error correction rate2(x)-(1-x)log2(1-x) is a Shannon entropy function;
Figure FDA0002283010340000024
represents the error rate of a single-photon pulse under the oblique polarization base in MDI-QKD;indicating the error rate of the optical pulses with the intensity of the horizontal and vertical basis uv, u being the intensity of the optical pulses transmitted by Alice and v being the intensity of the optical pulses transmitted by Bob.
7. The quantum network-based MDI-QKD method according to claim 1, wherein the gain and quantum bit error rate of said protocol are expressed as:
Figure FDA0002283010340000026
Figure FDA0002283010340000028
wherein,
Figure FDA0002283010340000029
represents the sending intensity of Alice and Bob under rect baseThe gain of the optical pulse at u and v;
Figure FDA00022830103400000210
represents the gain at which Alice1 and Bob send optical pulses of intensities u and v on the rect basis;representing the error rate of sending light pulses with the intensity u and v by Alice and Bob under the rect base;
Figure FDA00022830103400000212
representing the error rate of Alice1 and Bob sending light pulses of intensities u and v on the rect basis;
Figure FDA00022830103400000213
representing the error rate of single-photon pulses of an oblique polarization base in a quantum network, wherein the upper right label xx' represents that Alice and Bob use the oblique polarization base simultaneously, and the quantum network comprises an invisible state and MDI-QKD;
Figure FDA00022830103400000214
indicating the error rate of the optical pulse with the intensity uv of the oblique polarization base, and the upper right label xx represents that Alice1 and Bob use the oblique polarization base simultaneously; u is the intensity of the optical pulse transmitted by Alice; v is the intensity of the light pulse sent by Bob; fn represents the fidelity of the quantum states communicated by Alice to Alice 1; under the condition of the same entanglement and key rate, the relative transmission distance of the protocol is gradually reduced along with the increase of the number n of nodes in the invisible transmission state; under the condition that the number n of nodes in the invisible transmission state is the same as the key rate, the relative transmission distance of the protocol is gradually reduced along with the reduction of the entanglement degree of the W state in the invisible transmission state.
8. The quantum network-based MDI-QKD method according to claim 1, wherein the quantum network comprises two legal communication users Alice and Bob of source nodes of the quantum network and one destination node Alicel of the quantum network.
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