CN108629206B

CN108629206B - Secure encryption method, encryption machine and terminal equipment

Info

Publication number: CN108629206B
Application number: CN201711331236.3A
Authority: CN
Inventors: 李坚强; 郑任持; 刘绍海
Original assignee: PAX Computer Technology Shenzhen Co Ltd
Current assignee: PAX Computer Technology Shenzhen Co Ltd
Priority date: 2017-12-13
Filing date: 2017-12-13
Publication date: 2020-11-03
Anticipated expiration: 2037-12-13
Also published as: CN108629206A

Abstract

The invention is suitable for the technical field of information security, and provides a security encryption method, an encryption machine and terminal equipment, wherein the security encryption method is applied to the encryption machine, and the encryption machine comprises: the system comprises a safety processor CPU, a sensor, a battery backup Area BBL Area and a trigger circuit; the security encryption method comprises an encryption machine firmware security detection method: detecting the internal and external conditions of a CPU of the safety processor by a sensor; if the condition is detected to be abnormal, sending out an early warning signal; directly informing the early warning signal or informing a battery backup Area BBL Area through a trigger circuit to destroy the content of the backup Area; the secure encryption method further comprises: a software safe starting method and a safe storage method of a secret key. The invention realizes the hardware and structural design with low cost, and saves the machine purchasing expense; a layered software model is provided, a control mode of safe starting is provided, and the safe management of the key in the whole period is realized.

Description

Secure encryption method, encryption machine and terminal equipment

Technical Field

The invention belongs to the technical field of information security, and particularly relates to a security encryption method, an encryption machine and terminal equipment.

Background

With the development of information technology and the popularity of the internet, more and more data needs to be transmitted over the network, including interactive information, e-mails, identity information, transaction information, business data, and the like. However, at present, illegal activities such as illegal interception, stealing and tampering of data are increasing, and therefore, the security of data is also receiving more and more attention.

The encryption and retransmission of data by using a cryptographic algorithm are effective means for ensuring data security and data integrity, so that many IT manufacturers develop a plurality of encryption devices or encryption software, generate encryption keys by the encryption devices or software, and realize encryption of plaintext data, digital signature of files and the like.

Existing encryption techniques are generally divided into hardware and software forms. The software form generally depends on the encryption and decryption algorithm compiled in the host system to realize encryption, and a software tool or a network system is provided for users to use, but because the encryption software and the encryption system have very large potential safety hazards and are easy to be attacked illegally by hackers, the operation and maintenance management of the software system needs to construct a more complicated software system to protect the safety of a certificate key, a machine room with high specification and conforming to related safety certification needs to be established to ensure the host safety of the stored key, and an effective mechanism needs to be designed to carry out identity certification, authority certification and the like on the users, so that enterprises can not meet higher software development and operation and maintenance management requirements during software design through the prior art, and the corresponding cost is also higher. The hardware-form encryption equipment has various forms, the most common encryption equipment is that an independent host is used as an encryption machine, and only a network interface is provided for the outside to provide encryption and decryption services through specific commands, or an external hanging form such as a U disk is used, so that the hardware-form encryption equipment is mainly used in specific fields such as digital certificates or identity authentication, and the universal encryption and decryption services are difficult to provide; moreover, the existing hardware equipment has poor working stability and reliability, and needs to be additionally provided with a great number of protection designs or hardware circuits to ensure the working stability and reliability of the hardware equipment. Therefore, in the existing encryption technologies in hardware and software forms, the requirements of higher software development and operation and maintenance management and the requirements of stability, safety and reliability of equipment operation cannot be met, and in the aspects of hardware structure, software development and the like, general enterprises cannot complete the design and development of encryption equipment.

Disclosure of Invention

In view of this, embodiments of the present invention provide a secure encryption method, an encryption apparatus, and a terminal device, so as to solve the problems that the prior art cannot meet higher requirements for software development, operation and maintenance management, and higher requirements for stability, security, and reliability of device operation.

A first aspect of an embodiment of the present invention provides a secure encryption method, which is applied to an encryption apparatus, where a firmware of the encryption apparatus includes: the system comprises a safety processor CPU, a sensor, a battery backup Area BBL Area and a trigger circuit; the security encryption method comprises an encryption machine firmware security detection method:

detecting the internal and external conditions of a CPU of the safety processor by a sensor;

if the condition is detected to be abnormal, sending out an early warning signal;

and directly informing the early warning signal or informing a battery backup Area BBL Area through a trigger circuit to destroy the content of the backup Area.

The secure encryption method also comprises a software secure starting method, and comprises the following steps:

starting a Security Boot Loader in the CPU of the Security processor;

loading the Security Boot Loader and verifying and starting Boot firmware;

if the check is abnormal, the starting is failed;

and if the verification is successful, verifying and starting the firmware of the encryption machine.

The software security startup method further comprises a system self-check after the software security startup, wherein the system self-check comprises the following steps:

starting a system, and performing self-checking on firmware of an encryption machine;

if the abnormality exists, the system reports an error and exits; if the self-check is normal, reading a system encryption key SEK;

verifying the correctness of the system encryption key SEK;

if the system encryption key SEK is incorrect, the system reports an error and quits; if the system encryption key SEK is correct, reading a key to be detected;

judging the consistency of the key to be detected and the encrypted storage key by using a System Encryption Key (SEK);

if not, the system reports an error and exits, and if the system is consistent, the self-checking result is displayed, and the subsequent software module is continuously started.

The secure encryption method also comprises a secure storage method of the secret key, and comprises the following steps:

defining the system encryption key SEK, and storing the system encryption key SEK in the battery backup Area BBL Area;

encrypting all keys by using the system encryption key SEK and storing the encrypted keys in External Flash memory External Flash;

all keys are read using the system encryption key SEK.

A second aspect of an embodiment of the present invention provides an encryption apparatus, including: the software module realizes function loading based on the hardware structure; the hardware structure comprises a safety processor CPU, a sensor and a trigger circuit; the sensor comprises an internal sensor and an external trigger sensor, wherein the internal sensor is arranged in the safety processor CPU, and the external trigger sensor is connected with the safety processor CPU through the trigger circuit; the safety processor CPU comprises a battery backup Area BBL Area;

the software module comprises: the device comprises a software security starting unit and a key processing unit, wherein the software security starting unit is used for security starting of a software layer, and the key processing unit is used for encrypting, decrypting and storing a key.

A third aspect of an embodiment of the present invention provides a secure encryption terminal device, including: a memory, a processor and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, the processor implementing the steps of the secure encryption method when executing the computer program.

A fourth aspect of embodiments of the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, wherein the computer program, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the secure encryption method.

Compared with the prior art, the embodiment of the invention has the following beneficial effects: the embodiment of the invention realizes the safe encryption of the encryption machine by combining the hardware structure and the software module, and well ensures the physical safety of the encryption machine by utilizing the characteristics of the hardware sensor, the matched trigger circuit and the CPU of the safety processor; based on physical security, the security of the core content is ensured by using the characteristics of a battery backup Area BBL Area in a security processor CPU and the protection of a sensor and a trigger circuit, the stronger security encryption function of the encryption machine is realized, and the higher requirements on stability, security and reliability in the working process of the confidential machine are further met.

Drawings

In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings needed to be used in the embodiments or the prior art descriptions will be briefly described below, and it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious for those skilled in the art to obtain other drawings based on these drawings without inventive exercise.

Fig. 1 is a schematic flow chart illustrating an implementation process of a method for detecting security of firmware of an encryption apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention;

fig. 2 is a schematic flow chart illustrating an implementation process of a secure startup method of encryption equipment software according to an embodiment of the present invention;

fig. 3 is a schematic flow chart illustrating an implementation of a self-checking method for an encryption engine system according to an embodiment of the present invention;

fig. 4 is a schematic flow chart of an implementation of a method for securely storing a secret key according to an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 5 is a logical representation of key storage provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

fig. 6 is a schematic diagram of a hardware structure of an encryption device according to an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 7 is a diagram illustrating a software module of an encryption engine according to an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 8 is a diagram illustrating a software hierarchy of an encryption engine according to an embodiment of the present invention;

fig. 9 is a schematic diagram of the overall workflow of the encryption apparatus according to the embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 10 is a schematic diagram of an encryptor function module provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 11 is a flowchart illustrating a login of an administrator of the encryption apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 12 is a key distribution diagram of an encryption engine according to an embodiment of the present invention;

fig. 13 is a schematic diagram of a secure encrypted terminal device according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Detailed Description

In the following description, for purposes of explanation and not limitation, specific details are set forth, such as particular system structures, techniques, etc. in order to provide a thorough understanding of the embodiments of the invention. It will be apparent, however, to one skilled in the art that the present invention may be practiced in other embodiments that depart from these specific details. In other instances, detailed descriptions of well-known systems, devices, circuits, and methods are omitted so as not to obscure the description of the present invention with unnecessary detail.

In order to explain the technical means of the present invention, the following description will be given by way of specific examples.

Referring to fig. 1, a schematic diagram of an implementation flow of a method for detecting security of firmware of an encryption apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown, where the method is applied to an encryption apparatus, and the encryption apparatus is a POS apparatus, a cloud server or a background server; the encryption equipment includes: the security processor CPU, the sensor, the battery backup Area BBL Area and the trigger circuit, as shown in the figure, the method for detecting the security of the firmware of the encryption machine may include the following steps:

in step S101, the internal and external conditions of the safety processor CPU are detected by the sensor.

In the embodiment of the invention, the sensor comprises an internal sensor and an external trigger TamperSensors; the internal sensor is positioned inside the safety processor CPU and is responsible for detecting the conditions of temperature, frequency and the like inside the safety processor CPU; the external trigger Tamper Sensors are arranged on a Printed Circuit Board (PCB) outside the safety processor CPU and connected with the safety processor CPU through a special matched trigger circuit, the external sensor also comprises a shell anti-disassembly sensor, a keyboard area sensor and the like, and whether the detection equipment is opened or not, whether a drilling hole exists or not, whether a chemical corrosion product exists or not and the like.

In addition, the encryption machine can be a sales terminal POS, the sales terminal POS is also matched with an anti-disassembly switch on a shell structure, a safety grid mesh is arranged in the safety processor CPU, and the safety conditions inside and outside the safety processor CPU are detected by a plurality of sensors simultaneously arranged.

And step S102, if the condition is detected to be abnormal, sending out an early warning signal.

In the embodiment of the present invention, the abnormal condition includes an internal abnormal condition and an external abnormal condition; the internal abnormal condition comprises that the temperature, the frequency and the like detected by the internal sensor reach threshold values, and the equipment is considered to be abnormal; the external abnormal conditions comprise that the front shell and the rear shell of the equipment detected by the external sensor are opened, the equipment is drilled, and the equipment is corroded by chemicals and other external illegal attack phenomena, so that an early warning signal can be sent.

Optionally, the early warning signal may be subjected to sound control warning through an alarm or flashing warning through an early warning lamp.

And step S103, directly informing the early warning signal or informing a battery backup Area BBL Area through a trigger circuit to destroy the key data of the backup Area.

In the embodiment of the invention, the early warning signal comprises an internal early warning signal and an external early warning signal; the internal early warning signal can be directly sent to a battery backup Area BBL Area in the safety processor CPU, and the battery backup Area is informed to destroy or erase the key data stored in the battery backup Area; the external early warning signal transmits early warning information through a specially matched external trigger circuit, and informs the battery backup Area BBL Area to destroy or erase the key data or other data stored inside.

It should be noted that the button cell is arranged in the encryption device to continuously supply power to the hardware device of the encryption device, so that the encryption device can detect an abnormal phenomenon even in a shutdown state.

By the embodiment of the invention, the safety detection based on hardware can be realized, and the physical safety of the encryption machine is ensured by utilizing the characteristics of the hardware sensor, the matched trigger circuit and the safety processor CPU; based on the protection of hardware, the security of the core data of the encryption machine is ensured, and the strong security and confidentiality functions of the encryption machine are realized.

Referring to fig. 2, which is a schematic flow chart of an implementation of a secure boot method for encryption equipment software according to an embodiment of the present invention, as shown in the figure, the method may include the following steps:

step S201, starting a Security Boot Loader inside the secure processor CPU.

In the embodiment of the invention, the secure Boot Loader has irreplaceability, and the content of the secure Boot Loader comprises a code (Resident ROMCode) residing in a read-only memory; the Code Resident ROM Code residing in the read-only memory can be an identification ID number or a string of data, and is solidified in the ROM space of the internal memory when the safety processor CPU leaves a factory.

It should be noted that the ID number or a string of data, once written into the ROM of the internal memory of the CPU of the secure processor, will never be changed, preventing a lawless person from using the firmware of another vendor.

Step S202, the Security Boot Loader is loaded and the Boot firmware is checked and started.

In the embodiment of the invention, the verification and Boot firmware needs to be added with a digital signature technology at the same time, the digital signature is a section of digital string which can be generated only by a sender of information and cannot be forged by others, and the section of digital string is also an effective proof of the authenticity of the information sent by the sender of the information, so that the Security Boot Loader can be loaded by means of safe Boot Loader and irreplaceable by using the digital signature technology, and the Security of the whole software system is further ensured.

In addition, if the digital signature is successfully verified, the next software level is started continuously, a Boot program is operated, the states of all sensors are checked in the Boot firmware starting process, and the next safe starting of the encryption machine firmware can be continued under the condition that no abnormity occurs.

In step S203, if there is an abnormality in the verification, the start fails.

In the embodiment of the invention, the check that the exception exists comprises that the digital signature is wrong or the result of checking the digital signature by the Code of the Code Resident ROM residing in the read-only memory is not matched, the check fails, the starting of the software is also stopped, and the starting of the system fails, so that the safety of the whole software system is ensured.

And step S204, if the verification is successful, verifying and starting the firmware of the encryption machine.

In the embodiment of the invention, the Boot program is guided to load and simultaneously the firmware of the encryption machine is verified, including the steps of verifying whether the firmware of the encryption machine, such as a trigger circuit, a sensor, an internal memory and the like, is complete and whether the function is intact.

In addition, the verification result shows that some part of the firmware of the encryption machine has an exception, such as: the problem that the detection precision of the sensor and the setting of the threshold value are inaccurate, the problem that information transmission cannot be realized due to the fact that a circuit of the trigger circuit breaks down, and the like, the starting of the software layer is stopped, and meanwhile, the starting of the encryption firmware is failed; and if the verification result shows that the state of the encryption machine firmware is all normal, starting to run the encryption machine firmware.

According to the embodiment of the invention, the software is layered in the process of safely starting the software, the safety control and the control of the system function are considered, and the legality and integrity of the firmware are ensured by using the digital signature technology; the states of each sensor and other firmware can be checked in the starting process of the software layer, the starting of the firmware of the encryption machine can be realized under the condition that no abnormity exists, the safety of the whole software system is ensured step by step, and the safety of the encryption machine is ensured.

Referring to fig. 3, it is a schematic diagram of an implementation flow of a self-checking method of an encryption engine system according to an embodiment of the present invention, and as shown in the figure, the method includes the following steps:

and S301, starting the system and self-checking the firmware of the encryption machine.

In the embodiment of the invention, after the system is started and the encryption machine firmware is verified, the self-check of the encryption machine firmware is also needed, including whether the self-check of the sensor is normal or not, whether the trigger circuit and other firmware are normal in function or not and the like. Through self-checking, the encryption machine can detect whether hardware or structure has security risk or not, whether the hardware or structure has damage or eavesdropping or not, and the like, can verify the legality and integrity of system firmware, and is one of important means for ensuring the security of the encryption machine and a secret key.

Step S302, if the abnormality exists, the system reports an error and exits; and if the self-check is normal, reading the system encryption key SEK.

In the embodiment of the present invention, if there is an exception after the firmware of the encryption apparatus performs self-check, for example: if the hardware structure of the encryption machine is abnormal, or the internal parameters exceed the threshold value, or the structure is not complete due to illegal attack, and the like, the system can provide error reporting information and quit at the same time.

If the firmware self-check of the encryption machine is normal, reading a system encryption key SEK, wherein the system encryption key SEK can be generated by a true random number generator in a CPU (central processing unit) of the security processor when the encryption machine is initialized, and the length of the SEK can be 24 bytes. Because the encryption key SEK is a true random number, the unpredictable of the system encryption key SEK can be ensured, and the uniqueness of the system encryption key SEK can also be ensured; the reading of the system encryption key SEK is specifically that the encryptor firmware reads the system encryption key SEK from the battery backup BBL Area.

Step S303, verifying the correctness of the system encryption key SEK.

In the embodiment of the invention, the encryption machine firmware reads the system encryption key SEK from the battery backup BBL Area, if the read results are all 0, the encryption machine firmware is triggered, the battery backup BBL Area performs self-destruction erasing on the content data, and prompts that the system encryption key goes wrong; if the obtained system encryption key results are not all 0, further calculating a key check value KCV, wherein the key check value KCV is a cyclic redundancy CRC check value of the key, comparing the key check value KCV with a key check value KCV value stored in a battery backup Area BBL Area, and if the key check value KCV is consistent with the key check value KCV value stored in the battery backup Area BBL Area. It indicates that the read system encryption key SEK is correct.

Step S304, if the system encryption key SEK is incorrect, the system reports an error and exits; and if the system encryption key SEK is correct, reading the key to be detected.

In the embodiment of the invention, when the results of the read system encryption keys are all 0, the self-destruction is triggered, error information is prompted, and if the system encryption key SEK is incorrect, the system reports an error and exits.

And when the read result of the system encryption key is not 0 and the key check value KCV of the system encryption key is consistent with the key check value stored in the BBL Area of the battery backup Area, the SEK of the system encryption key is correct, and the next step is continued to read the key to be detected.

In addition, the key to be detected may be a key generated inside the encryption equipment, or a key injected into the encryption equipment, or a password of an administrator of the encryption equipment.

Step S305, the system encryption key SEK is used for judging the consistency of the key to be detected and the encrypted storage key.

In the embodiment of the invention, the consistency of the key to be detected and the encrypted and stored key is judged by using the system encryption key SEK, and whether the stored key is encrypted by the system encryption key SEK is mainly judged; the method comprises the following specific steps: and decrypting the key to be detected by using the system encryption key SEK to obtain a plaintext, calculating a key check value KCV of the plaintext, comparing the obtained key check value KCV with a key check value stored in the battery backup Area BBL Area, and judging the consistency of the key to be detected and the encrypted key according to the comparison result of the key to be detected and the encrypted key.

And S306, if the software modules are not consistent, the system reports an error and exits, and if the software modules are consistent, the self-checking result is displayed, and the subsequent software modules are continuously started.

In the embodiment of the invention, through calculation, when the key check value KCV of the key to be detected is equal to the key check value stored in the battery backup area BBLArea, the key to be detected is consistent with the data stored in the initial encryption, the self-checking result of the whole process is further displayed, and the subsequent software module is continuously started; if the two are not equal, the key to be detected is inconsistent with the data stored in the initial encryption, and the system displays error reporting and quitting.

According to the embodiment of the invention, through the power-on self-test of the encryption machine, the existence of risks or damage or eavesdropping on hardware or a structure is detected, the legality and integrity of the firmware of the encryption machine can be verified, and the safety of the encryption machine and a secret key is ensured.

Referring to fig. 4, it is a schematic diagram of an implementation flow of a secure storage method for a secret key provided in an embodiment of the present invention, where the method includes the following steps:

step S401, defining the system encryption key SEK, and storing the system encryption key SEK in the battery backup Area BBL Area.

In the embodiment of the invention, the encryption machine defines a system encryption key SEK, the SEK is generated by a true random number generator in a safety processor CPU when the encryption machine is initialized, the SEK is 24 bytes in length, and a plaintext is stored in an internal static memory SRAM attached to a battery backup Area BBL Area; because the system encryption key is a true random number, the unpredictable of the system encryption key SEK can be ensured, and the uniqueness of the system encryption key SEK can also be ensured.

It should be noted that the encryption engine is initialized only once, and then generates the system encryption key, and is not initialized any more later.

Step S402, all keys are encrypted by using the system encryption key SEK and the encrypted keys are stored in External Flash memory External Flash.

In the embodiment of the present invention, the system encryption key SEK is used to encrypt all keys that need to be protected, and this step further includes:

and reading the system encryption key SEK, encrypting the plaintext data by using the system encryption key SEK to obtain a corresponding ciphertext, and storing the ciphertext in an External Flash memory External Flash.

In the embodiment of the present invention, the all keys include, but are not limited to, a key generated inside the encryption apparatus, a key injected into the encryption apparatus from outside, and a key logged in by the administrator of the encryption apparatus. Since the system encryption key SEK is also a string of data, the result of encrypting all keys using the system encryption key SEK is in the form of a ciphertext and is stored in a Flash External to the CPU External to the secure processor.

The system encryption key SEK is used for encrypting the key, and the adopted encryption algorithm is a triple data encryption standard TDES algorithm.

In step S403, all keys are read using the system encryption key SEK.

In the embodiment of the present invention, the encryption key is also used through the system encryption key SEK when the encryption device reads the key, and the step specifically includes:

and reading the system encryption key SEK, reading the ciphertext stored in the External Flash memory External Flash, decrypting the ciphertext by using the system encryption key, and providing the obtained corresponding plaintext for a subsequent software process.

In the embodiment of the invention, when the encryption machine reads the key, the encryption key SEK is also used to decrypt the ciphertext stored in the External Flash to obtain the original text of the ciphertext, and the adopted decryption algorithm is also the algorithm of the triple data encryption standard TDES.

In addition, the system encryption key SEK can also protect the password of the encryption machine administrator.

It should be noted that, since the battery backup Area BBL Area is protected by the hardware protection circuit, once the encryptor is attacked, all internal data including the system encryption key SEK will be erased, and all keys encrypted by using the system encryption key SEK will not be decrypted, thereby ensuring the security of the keys.

As shown in fig. 5, the logic diagram of key storage provided in the embodiment of the present invention is that the system encryption key SEK defined when the encryptor is initialized is stored in the battery backup Area BBL Area, and the clear text is stored in the static memory SRAM attached to the battery backup Area BBL Area. The system encryption key SEK is used for encrypting all keys by a triple data encryption standard TDES algorithm to obtain encrypted key data, and the obtained key data comprise asymmetric key data and symmetric key data which are respectively stored in an external Flash.

Through the embodiment of the invention, the system encryption key SEK is used for encrypting all keys needing protection, such as keys generated inside the encryption machine, keys injected from the outside and the like. All the keys are encrypted by the system encryption key SEK, so that the encryption machine can ensure the safety of all the keys only by protecting the safety of the system encryption key SEK, and even if someone illegally obtains the key data, the obtained data are all in a ciphertext form, and the data are safe from the perspective of cryptography.

It should be understood that, the sequence numbers of the steps in the foregoing embodiments do not imply an execution sequence, and the execution sequence of each process should be determined by its function and inherent logic, and should not constitute any limitation to the implementation process of the embodiments of the present invention.

Fig. 6 is a schematic diagram of a hardware structure of an encryption apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention, and for convenience of description, only a part related to the embodiment of the present invention is shown. The security secret machine provided by the embodiment of the invention comprises a hardware structure and a software module, wherein the software module realizes the loading of functions based on the hardware structure.

As shown in fig. 6, the hardware structure includes a secure processor CPU 601, a sensor, and a trigger circuit; the sensor comprises an internal sensor and an external trigger sensor Tampers 602, the internal sensor is arranged in the safety processor CPU, and the external trigger sensor Tampers is connected with the safety processor CPU through a trigger circuit; the safety processor CPU comprises a battery backup Area BBL Area 603;

the security processor comprises a read only memory ROM 604 and an Internal static memory Internal SRAM 605, wherein the read only memory ROM and the Internal static memory Internal SRAM are arranged in a security processor CPU, and a code Resident ROM code in the read only memory is stored in the read only memory;

further comprises one or more of a Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) 606, a keyboard 607, a smart card reader 608, an external memory 609, an external memory 610, a battery 611, a serial port (universal serial bus) 612, a printer 613, a magnetic stripe card reader 614 and is connected with the secure processor CPU 601;

an ethernet network interface 615 and/or a generic serial module network interface 616 are also included, and the ethernet network interface 615 and/or the generic serial module network interface 616 are connected to the security processor CPU.

As shown in fig. 7, which is a schematic diagram of a software module 7 of an encryption apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention, the software module includes:

a software security starting unit 71 and a key processing unit 72, wherein the software security starting unit is used for the security starting of the software hierarchy, and the key processing unit is used for encrypting, decrypting and storing the key; a data communication unit 73 for receiving and transmitting data.

The software security Boot unit realizes security guarantee of a software Boot process through a structural schematic diagram 8 of a software hierarchy, as shown in fig. 8, a Boot firmware is verified and started according to codes in a read-only memory inside a security processor CPU, and meanwhile, the Boot firmware is verified and started in a loading process by means of a signature technology, so that the legality and integrity of the encryption machine firmware are guaranteed.

The external interface supported by the data communication unit of the encryption machine comprises: the serial data interface of the recommended standard RS-232 and a universal serial bus USB 2.0 full-speed port are provided; the serial data interface of the recommended standard RS-232 supports the baud rate of 115200 at the maximum, and a Universal Serial Bus (USB) driver matched with a Universal Serial Bus (USB) 2.0 interface is installed at the host end.

The confidential machine is connected to the host machine through a serial port or a universal serial bus, and receives a data packet sent by the host machine to encrypt the data packet; the format of the host data packet is shown in table 1, the start character, the packet serial number and the check word all occupy one byte, the start character is represented as 0x02, and the check word is an exclusive or value of other data except the start character; the command word and the length both occupy two bytes, the command word further includes a command type (represented as 0x90) and a sub-command code corresponding to one byte respectively, the first byte in the length packet is an integer obtained by dividing the length of the data packet by 256, and the second byte is a remainder obtained by dividing the length of the data packet by 256. The encryptor receives the data packet from the host and generates a response packet, and the format of the data packet responded by the confidential machine is shown in table 2, and is the same as the format of table 1 except that the data packet has a return code for notifying the host of the result of each command, which is defined as table 3.

Table 1

Table 2

Macro	Value of	Of significance
			PCI_OK	0x00	Correction of
PCI_UNSPT_CMD	0xff	Illegal commands

Table 3

After the encryption machine communicates with the host, after both parties obtain the anti-return code, fault-tolerant processing can be carried out according to the situation, for example: if the length is not the same, the data format is rechecked; the absence of a key prompts for a key query, etc.

Referring to fig. 9, which is a schematic diagram of an overall work flow of the encryption apparatus according to the embodiment of the present invention, as shown in the figure, after the encryption apparatus is powered on and powered on, an administrator logs in, and after the administrator logs in successfully, the administrator starts to select a corresponding functional operation, where the achievable functions include: injecting a private key, a signature service, a system administrator function, and diffusing an asymmetric algorithm key, wherein the system administrator function comprises: modifying login password, switching languages, uploading log files and the like. The schematic diagram of the functional modules of the encryption device shown in fig. 10 includes: the system comprises a system management module, a key generation and distribution module, a key injection module and an encryption and decryption service module.

Wherein, the system management module includes: administrator management, password modification management, multi-language support, log management and system self-checking.

Administrator management, in the embodiment of the present invention, two administrators are set for encryption, each administrator holds a respective password, and only two administrators Enter a system management module when inputting the respective password in the field, as shown in fig. 11, which is a schematic flow diagram of administrator login of an encryption apparatus provided in the embodiment of the present invention, after the encryption apparatus is powered on and started up, a long press is made to Enter an Enter key to Enter an administrator login step; the system prompts an administrator password; firstly, inputting a password by an administrator A; the system verifies whether the password of the administrator A is correct or not, if not, the system exits, and if so, the next step is carried out; and the administrator B inputs the password, verifies whether the password of the administrator B is correct or not, exits the system if the password of the administrator B is wrong, and enters a function menu if the password of the administrator B is correct.

In addition, the password of the administrator is stored in the file system after being encrypted by the system encryption key SEK.

And (4) password modification management, wherein after entering a system management module, an administrator is allowed to modify own password, and the modified new password is encrypted by a system encryption key SEK and then stored.

The invention provides multi-language support, and in the embodiment of the invention, the encryption machine supports two languages of Chinese and English.

LOG management, including management events such as administrator login ADMIN LOG, UPLOAD LOG, switching languages SWITCH LANG, injection of private key injection PVK FROM ICC FROM card, signing file signature, administrator LOGOFF, modifying login password MODIFY LOG PWD, etc. All the events are recorded in log files in the encryption machine, as shown in table 4; the Data structure of the record in the corresponding log file includes Index, Data/Time, Event, Result, End, and the corresponding byte number and specific information format, and the log file as shown in table 5 summarizes the Data structure of each record.

Table 4

Table 5

And the key generation and distribution module is used for generating and distributing the system key.

In the embodiment of the invention, the encryption machine realizes the generation of the public and private key pair of the asymmetric key through a function RSAKeyPairGen, wherein the RSAKeyPairGen is the algorithm realization of RSA.

After the asymmetric public and private key pair is generated, in order to ensure the validity of the generated public and private keys, the encryption machine verifies each group of public and private key pairs, and the verification of the public and private keys is completed through a function RSAKeyPair verify.

In the embodiment of the invention, the principle of key dispersion is that a random number is obtained through a random number generating function, a string of random data with the length larger than or equal to the size of a private key structure (the size of the private key data structure is 1163 bytes) is generated through multiple times of cyclic calling, the first 1162 bytes of the random number (namely the size of one private key structure) is taken as a dispersion factor, and the dispersion factor is subjected to exclusive or with the data of the private key structure in a public and private key pair generated by an encryption machine to obtain another 1162 bytes (namely the size of one private key structure) dispersion result.

And finally, respectively storing the dispersion factor and the dispersion result into two IC cards, wherein the two IC cards become an A card and a B card, and the A card stores a key component A and the B card stores a key component B as shown in FIG. 12.

In the embodiment of the present invention, the algorithm supported by the encryption equipment includes: the data symmetric encryption and decryption algorithm adopts the following data symmetric encryption and decryption steps: a data encryption standard DES algorithm, a triple data encryption standard 3DES algorithm and an advanced encryption standard AES algorithm; the digital signature and the signature verification adopt the following steps: public key cryptographic RSA algorithm (comprising 1024/2048/4096 bits); the personal identification code protection adopts: a DES (data encryption standard) algorithm, a triple data encryption standard 3DES algorithm, an AES (advanced encryption standard) algorithm, a SM1 algorithm and a SM4 algorithm; the message integrity protection adopts the following steps: calculating and verifying a message authentication code MAC, a data encryption standard DES algorithm, a triple data encryption standard 3DES algorithm and an advanced encryption standard AES algorithm; the message digest includes: hash SHA1 algorithm, Hash SHA-256 algorithm message digest fifth edition MD5 algorithm.

According to the embodiment of the invention, the hardware and the structural design with low cost save the machine purchasing expense; in hardware, a trigger sensor and a matched hardware circuit are used, and a battery backup Area BBL Area of a CPU (Central processing Unit) is used for storing sensitive data (keys and the like); in terms of software, the digital signature technology is utilized step by step from a CODE ROM CODE in a read-only memory to ensure that the firmware is safe, the firmware of the encryption machine has a self-checking function and the like, and the physical and appearance structural design with safety and stability is provided through the hardware circuit, the software hierarchical structure, the starting flow design, the digital signature and the like, and the related safety design can meet the requirement of the highest safety certification of the PCI in the payment card industry; a layered software model is provided, and a safe starting control mode is provided; and a key security management system with a full life cycle of key generation, storage, distribution, injection, destruction and the like is also provided.

In addition, by the embodiment of the invention, the average fault-free running time of the system reaches 2400 hours, and the maximum time consumption of a pair of public key encryption algorithm RSA 1024bit keys generated by verification of PCI 4.x standard in the payment card industry is 12 seconds, the maximum time consumption of the RSA2048bit keys is 38 seconds, and the communication of 115200 serial port baud rate and the USB full rate of a common serial port bus can be supported at the highest.

Fig. 13 is a schematic diagram of a secure encrypted terminal device according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in fig. 13, the secure encrypted terminal device 13 of this embodiment includes: a processor 130, a memory 131 and a computer program 132 stored in said memory 131 and operable on said processor 130, such as a data structure program of a key asymmetric algorithm key or a generation program of a public-private key pair. The processor 130, when executing the computer program 132, implements the steps in the various secure encryption method embodiments described above, such as the steps 101 to 103 shown in fig. 1. Alternatively, the processor 130 implements the functions of the modules/units in the above device embodiments when executing the computer program 132.

Illustratively, the computer program 132 may be partitioned into one or more modules/units that are stored in the memory 131 and executed by the processor 130 to implement the present invention. The one or more modules/units may be a series of computer program instruction segments capable of performing specific functions, which are used to describe the execution of the computer program 62 in the secure encrypted terminal device 13. For example, the computer program 132 may be partitioned into a synchronization module, a summarization module, an acquisition module, a return module (a module in a virtual appliance), and so forth.

The terminal device 13 for security encryption may be a desktop computer, a notebook, a palm computer, a cloud server, or other computing devices. The secure encrypted terminal device may include, but is not limited to, a processor 130, a memory 131. It will be understood by those skilled in the art that fig. 13 is merely an example of a secure encrypted terminal device 13, and does not constitute a limitation of the secure encrypted terminal device 13, and may include more or less components than those shown, or combine some components, or different components, for example, the secure encrypted terminal device may also include an input-output device, a network access device, a bus, etc.

The Processor 130 may be a Central Processing Unit (CPU), other general purpose Processor, a Digital Signal Processor (DSP), an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), an off-the-shelf Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) or other Programmable logic device, discrete Gate or transistor logic, discrete hardware components, etc. A general purpose processor may be a microprocessor or the processor may be any conventional processor or the like.

The storage 131 may be an internal storage unit of the secure encrypted terminal device 13, such as a hard disk or a memory of the secure encrypted terminal device 13. The memory 131 may also be an external storage device of the Secure encrypted terminal device 13, such as a plug-in hard disk, a Smart Memory Card (SMC), a Secure Digital (SD) Card, a Flash memory Card (Flash Card), and the like, which are equipped on the Secure encrypted terminal device 13. Further, the memory 131 may also include both an internal storage unit of the secure encrypted terminal device 13 and an external storage device. The memory 131 is used for storing the computer programs and other programs and data required by the securely encrypted terminal device. The memory 131 may also be used to temporarily store data that has been output or is to be output.

Still another embodiment of the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium, which may be the computer-readable storage medium contained in the memory in the above-described embodiments; or it may be a separate computer-readable storage medium not incorporated in the terminal. The computer-readable storage medium stores one or more programs, which are used by one or more processors to execute an information processing method.

It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that, for convenience and brevity of description, only the above-mentioned division of the functional units and modules is illustrated, and in practical applications, the above-mentioned function distribution may be performed by different functional units and modules according to needs, that is, the internal structure of the apparatus is divided into different functional units or modules to perform all or part of the above-mentioned functions. Each functional unit and module in the embodiments may be integrated in one processing unit, or each unit may exist alone physically, or two or more units are integrated in one unit, and the integrated unit may be implemented in a form of hardware, or in a form of software functional unit. In addition, specific names of the functional units and modules are only for convenience of distinguishing from each other, and are not used for limiting the protection scope of the present application. The specific working processes of the units and modules in the system may refer to the corresponding processes in the foregoing method embodiments, and are not described herein again.

In the above embodiments, the descriptions of the respective embodiments have respective emphasis, and reference may be made to the related descriptions of other embodiments for parts that are not described or illustrated in a certain embodiment.

Those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that the various illustrative elements and algorithm steps described in connection with the embodiments disclosed herein may be implemented as electronic hardware or combinations of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether such functionality is implemented as hardware or software depends upon the particular application and design constraints imposed on the implementation. Skilled artisans may implement the described functionality in varying ways for each particular application, but such implementation decisions should not be interpreted as causing a departure from the scope of the present invention.

In the embodiments provided in the present invention, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus/terminal device and method may be implemented in other ways. For example, the above-described embodiments of the apparatus/terminal device are merely illustrative, and for example, the division of the modules or units is only one logical division, and there may be other divisions when actually implemented, for example, a plurality of units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be omitted, or not executed. In addition, the shown or discussed mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection may be an indirect coupling or communication connection through some interfaces, devices or units, and may be in an electrical, mechanical or other form.

The units described as separate parts may or may not be physically separate, and parts displayed as units may or may not be physical units, may be located in one place, or may be distributed on a plurality of network units. Some or all of the units can be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of the embodiment.

In addition, functional units in the embodiments of the present invention may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist alone physically, or two or more units are integrated into one unit. The integrated unit can be realized in a form of hardware, and can also be realized in a form of a software functional unit.

The integrated modules/units, if implemented in the form of software functional units and sold or used as separate products, may be stored in a computer readable storage medium. Based on such understanding, all or part of the flow of the method according to the embodiments of the present invention may also be implemented by a computer program, which may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the method embodiments may be implemented. Wherein the computer program comprises computer program code, which may be in the form of source code, object code, an executable file or some intermediate form, etc. The computer-readable medium may include: any entity or device capable of carrying the computer program code, recording medium, usb disk, removable hard disk, magnetic disk, optical disk, computer Memory, Read-Only Memory (ROM), Random Access Memory (RAM), electrical carrier wave signals, telecommunications signals, software distribution medium, and the like. It should be noted that the computer readable medium may contain other components which may be suitably increased or decreased as required by legislation and patent practice in jurisdictions, for example, in some jurisdictions, computer readable media which may not include electrical carrier signals and telecommunications signals in accordance with legislation and patent practice.

The above-mentioned embodiments are only used for illustrating the technical solutions of the present invention, and not for limiting the same; although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, it will be understood by those of ordinary skill in the art that: the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments may still be modified, or some technical features may be equivalently replaced; such modifications and substitutions do not substantially depart from the spirit and scope of the embodiments of the present invention, and are intended to be included within the scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A secure encryption method is applied to an encryption machine, and is characterized in that firmware of the encryption machine comprises: the system comprises a safety processor CPU, a sensor, a battery backup Area BBL Area and a trigger circuit; the security encryption method comprises an encryption machine firmware security detection method:

directly informing the early warning signal or informing a battery backup Area BBL Area through a trigger circuit to destroy the content of the backup Area;

starting a Security Boot Loader in the CPU of the Security processor, and checking an identity ID (identity) residing in a read-only memory; the ID is solidified in an internal memory ROM space when the CPU of the safety processor leaves a factory and is used for preventing a user from using firmware of other manufacturers;

loading the Security Boot Loader, verifying and starting Boot firmware, and verifying a digital signature; the digital signature is used for verifying the authenticity of information sent by a sender of the information before Boot firmware is started;

detecting whether the state of each sensor is abnormal or not in the process of safely starting the software;

if the check is abnormal, the starting is failed;

2. The secure encryption method according to claim 1, further comprising a system self-test after the software secure boot, the system self-test comprising the steps of:

verifying the correctness of the system encryption key SEK;

the system encryption key SEK is used for judging the consistency of the key to be detected and the encrypted storage key;

3. The secure encryption method of claim 2, wherein the encryption engine further comprises: external Flash, the secure encryption method also includes a secure storage method of the secret key, including the following steps:

defining the system encryption key SEK and storing the system encryption key SEK in the battery backup area BBLArea;

all keys are read using the system encryption key SEK.

4. The secure encryption method of claim 3, wherein said encrypting all keys using the system encryption key SEK and saving the encrypted keys in External Flash comprises:

5. The secure encryption method of claim 4, wherein said reading all keys using a System Encryption Key (SEK) comprises:

6. An encryption engine, comprising: the software module realizes function loading based on the hardware structure; the hardware structure comprises a safety processor CPU, a sensor and a trigger circuit; the sensor comprises an internal sensor and an external trigger sensor, wherein the internal sensor is arranged in the safety processor CPU, and the external trigger sensor is connected with the safety processor CPU through the trigger circuit; the safety processor CPU comprises a battery backup Area BBL Area;

the software module comprises: the system comprises a software security starting unit and a key processing unit, wherein the software security starting unit is used for the security starting of a software layer, and the key processing unit is used for encrypting, decrypting and storing a key;

the software security starting unit is specifically used for starting a security bootstrap Loader in the CPU of the security processor and verifying an identity ID residing in a read-only memory; loading the secure Boot Loader, verifying and starting Boot firmware, and verifying a digital signature; detecting whether the state of each sensor is abnormal or not in the process of safely starting the software; if the check is abnormal, the starting is failed; if the verification is successful, verifying and starting the firmware of the encryption machine; the ID is solidified in an internal memory ROM space when the CPU of the safety processor leaves a factory and is used for preventing a user from using firmware of other manufacturers; the digital signature is used for verifying the authenticity of the information sent by a sender of the information before Boot firmware is started.

7. The encryption engine of claim 6, wherein said hardware structure further comprises:

the safety processor CPU comprises a read only memory ROM and an Internal static memory Internal SRAM, wherein the read only memory ROM and the Internal static memory Internal SRAM are arranged inside the safety processor CPU, and a code Resident ROM code in the read only memory is stored in the read only memory;

one or more of a Liquid Crystal Display (LCD), a keyboard, a smart card reader, an external memory, a battery, a serial port, a printer and a magnetic stripe card reader are connected with the security processor CPU;

the Ethernet network interface and/or the common serial module network interface are/is connected with the safety processor CPU;

the software module further comprises: and the data communication unit is used for receiving and sending data.

8. A secure encrypted terminal device comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that the processor implements the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 5 when executing the computer program.

9. A computer-readable storage medium, in which a computer program is stored which, when being executed by a processor, carries out the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 5.