CN107750053A - Based on multifactor wireless sensor network dynamic trust evaluation system and method - Google Patents
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Abstract
本发明公开了一种基于多因素的无线传感器网络动态信任评价系统及方法,其特征在于,该系统包括信任因素获取模块(11)、信任度量模块(12)、信任计算模块(13)和信任评价模块(14);步骤一、获取各可能影响节点信任值的信任因素,步骤二、定义各信任因素的度量方式,步骤三、实现各信任计算,步骤四、比较信任计算过程得到的目标节点的综合信任值与信任阈值的大小关系来判断目标节点是否可信。与现有技术相比,本发明综合考虑了在节点传送传感数据时的行为,从而更加全面地监测节点的行为,保证及时、有效地处理网络中的不可信节点;另外,采用直接信任和间接信任综合的方式衡量节点的信任值,解决节点之间评价结果出现偏差问题的积极效果。
The invention discloses a multi-factor based wireless sensor network dynamic trust evaluation system and method, which is characterized in that the system includes a trust factor acquisition module (11), a trust measurement module (12), a trust calculation module (13) and a trust Evaluation module (14); step 1, obtain the trust factors that may affect the trust value of nodes, step 2, define the measurement methods of each trust factor, step 3, realize each trust calculation, step 4, compare the target nodes obtained by the trust calculation process The relationship between the comprehensive trust value and the trust threshold can be used to judge whether the target node is trustworthy. Compared with the prior art, the present invention comprehensively considers the behavior of nodes when they transmit sensing data, so as to monitor the behavior of nodes more comprehensively and ensure timely and effective processing of untrustworthy nodes in the network; in addition, direct trust and The indirect trust comprehensive method measures the trust value of nodes and solves the positive effect of the deviation of evaluation results between nodes.
Description
技术领域technical field
本发明属于物联网安全领域的无线通讯网络技术,特别是涉及一种基于多因素的无线传感器网络动态信任评价系统及方法。The invention belongs to the wireless communication network technology in the security field of the Internet of Things, and in particular relates to a multi-factor-based wireless sensor network dynamic trust evaluation system and method.
背景技术Background technique
随着物联网应用的普及,无线传感器网络作为物联网应用最广泛的底层感知设备,已经成功应用到了环境监测、空间监测、航天空间站、军事国防、智能家居、智慧城市、医疗监护等重要领域中。与此同时,由于传感节点自身条件的限制以及应用环境的多变性,无线传感器网络出现的安全问题也越来越严重。With the popularization of Internet of Things applications, wireless sensor networks, as the most widely used underlying sensing devices of the Internet of Things, have been successfully applied to important fields such as environmental monitoring, space monitoring, space stations, military defense, smart homes, smart cities, and medical monitoring. At the same time, due to the limitation of the sensor node itself and the variability of the application environment, the security problems of wireless sensor networks are becoming more and more serious.
无线传感器网络是一个动态性网络:网络节点是可以随处移动的;节点可能会因为电池能量耗尽或者其他原因而发生故障甚至失效,从而退出网络运行;新节点的不断加入等。无线传感器网络也是一个开放性网络,传感节点常常以随机投放的方式,部署在无人监管的、恶劣的环境中,节点与环境之间进行直接的接触。另一方面,由于节点资源有限,节点常常需要通过局部协作的方式进行数据传送,并且使用易被攻击破坏的无线通信方式进行通信。由于传感节点自身条件的限制以及应用环境的多变性,造成了无线传感器网络常常容易受到各种各样的攻击。包括选择性攻击、泛洪攻击、Wormhole 攻击、Sybil攻击、Sinkhole攻击、虚假路由、ACK假冒攻击、DOS攻击、引发冲突攻击、不公平占有资源攻击等。按照攻击方式可以将攻击分为外部攻击和内部攻击。外部攻击指的是来自系统外部的攻击,这种攻击的发起者的身份未能得到合法验证,攻击者只能采取分离网络或者引入大量的数据流的方式,干扰网络的正常通信。相对于外部攻击,内部攻击是通过俘获网络内部节点或者破解网络的密钥结构而实施的攻击,这种攻击方式更加不易察觉,对网络正常通信的威胁也更大。The wireless sensor network is a dynamic network: network nodes can move anywhere; nodes may fail or even fail due to battery energy exhaustion or other reasons, thus exiting the network operation; new nodes are constantly added, etc. The wireless sensor network is also an open network. The sensor nodes are often deployed randomly in an unsupervised and harsh environment, and the nodes are in direct contact with the environment. On the other hand, due to the limited resources of nodes, nodes often need to transmit data through local cooperation, and communicate using wireless communication methods that are vulnerable to attacks. Due to the limitation of the sensor node's own conditions and the variability of the application environment, the wireless sensor network is often vulnerable to various attacks. Including selective attacks, flood attacks, Wormhole attacks, Sybil attacks, Sinkhole attacks, false routing, ACK counterfeit attacks, DOS attacks, conflict-causing attacks, unfair resource possession attacks, etc. According to the attack mode, attacks can be divided into external attacks and internal attacks. An external attack refers to an attack from outside the system. The identity of the initiator of this attack has not been legally verified. The attacker can only separate the network or introduce a large amount of data flow to interfere with the normal communication of the network. Compared with external attacks, internal attacks are carried out by capturing the internal nodes of the network or cracking the key structure of the network. This attack method is more difficult to detect and poses a greater threat to the normal communication of the network.
传统的基于加密算法的安全机制,仅仅可以解决身份尚未得到认证的外部攻击,而无法解决由于节点被俘获而发生的内部攻击问题。研究发现,作为对传统加密机制的有效补充,信任评价机制能够很好地解决内部攻击问题。The traditional encryption algorithm-based security mechanism can only solve the external attack whose identity has not been authenticated, but cannot solve the internal attack problem caused by the capture of the node. The study found that, as an effective supplement to the traditional encryption mechanism, the trust evaluation mechanism can well solve the internal attack problem.
无线传感器网络信任评价研究主要集中在对影响节点信任值的因素进行建模与计算,并根据节点信任值对其进行控制管理,力求建立一个由可信节点组成的可信网络,从而保证网络能够长期安全可靠地运行。The research on trust evaluation of wireless sensor networks mainly focuses on modeling and calculating the factors that affect the trust value of nodes, and controls and manages them according to the trust value of nodes, and strives to establish a trusted network composed of trusted nodes, so as to ensure that the network can Long-term safe and reliable operation.
发明内容Contents of the invention
为了降低恶意节点对网络的影响、提高网络安全性,本发明提出了一种基于多因素的无线传感器网络动态信任评价系统及方法,并设计和实现了无线传感器网络的动态信任评价平台,利用设计的无线传感器网络动态信任评价平台,实现对无线传感器网络进行形式化分析,以及对多种协议通用的无线传感器网络安全检测。In order to reduce the influence of malicious nodes on the network and improve network security, the present invention proposes a multi-factor-based wireless sensor network dynamic trust evaluation system and method, and designs and implements a wireless sensor network dynamic trust evaluation platform. The dynamic trust evaluation platform for wireless sensor networks realizes the formal analysis of wireless sensor networks and the security detection of wireless sensor networks common to multiple protocols.
本发明的一种基于多因素的无线传感器网络动态信任评价系统,该系统包括信任因素获取模块11、信任度量模块12、信任计算模块13和信任评价模块14,其中A multi-factor based wireless sensor network dynamic trust evaluation system of the present invention, the system includes a trust factor acquisition module 11, a trust measurement module 12, a trust calculation module 13 and a trust evaluation module 14, wherein
所述信任因素获取模块11,获取信任评价过程涉及到的信任因素,包括直接信任因素、间接信任因素和综合信任因素;The trust factor acquisition module 11 acquires the trust factors involved in the trust evaluation process, including direct trust factors, indirect trust factors and comprehensive trust factors;
所述信任度量模块12,定义包括直接信任因素、间接信任因素和综合信任因素在内的各信任因素的度量方式;The trust measurement module 12 defines the measurement methods of each trust factor including direct trust factors, indirect trust factors and comprehensive trust factors;
所述信任计算模块13,实现按照上述的信任度量模块所定义的直接信任值、间接信任值以及综合信任值度量方式来进行各信任值的计算;The trust calculation module 13 realizes the calculation of each trust value according to the direct trust value, indirect trust value and comprehensive trust value measurement methods defined by the above-mentioned trust measurement module;
所述信任评价模块14,比较信任计算过程得到的目标节点的综合信任值与信任阈值的大小关系,依此来判断目标节点是否可信。The trust evaluation module 14 compares the relationship between the comprehensive trust value of the target node obtained in the trust calculation process and the trust threshold, and judges whether the target node is credible based on this.
本发明的一种基于多因素的无线传感器网络动态信任评价方法,该方法包括以下步骤:A kind of wireless sensor network dynamic trust evaluation method based on multiple factors of the present invention, this method comprises the following steps:
步骤一、获取各可能影响节点信任值的信任因素,即直接信任因素包括的当前直接信任因素和历史直接信任因素,当前直接信任因素由当前周期的通信信任因素和传感信任因素组成,且两者都是通过工作在混杂模式的节点监听与其他节点之间的直接交互过程而得到;间接信任因素来自于其他相邻节点的推荐;将直接信任因素和间接信任因素组成综合信任因素,将综合信任值作为评价节点可信性的最终依据;Step 1. Obtain the trust factors that may affect the trust value of nodes, that is, the current direct trust factors and historical direct trust factors included in the direct trust factors. The current direct trust factors are composed of the communication trust factors and sensing trust factors in the current cycle, and the two Both of them are obtained through the direct interaction process between the monitoring node working in promiscuous mode and other nodes; the indirect trust factor comes from the recommendation of other adjacent nodes; the direct trust factor and indirect trust factor are combined into a comprehensive trust factor, and the comprehensive The trust value is the ultimate basis for evaluating the credibility of nodes;
步骤二、定义包括直接信任因素、间接信任因素和综合信任因素在内的各信任因素的度量方式;Step 2. Define the measurement methods of each trust factor including direct trust factor, indirect trust factor and comprehensive trust factor;
步骤三、实现各信任计算,包括:Step 3. Realize various trust calculations, including:
直接信任计算,对计算过程中用到的通信信任因子w1、传感信任值因子w2、时间衰减因子f(t-t0)、历史影响因子θ进行分析和定义;Direct trust calculation, analyzing and defining communication trust factor w 1 , sensing trust value factor w 2 , time decay factor f(tt 0 ), and historical impact factor θ used in the calculation process;
间接信任计算,分析和定义了推荐信任分类算法;利用该算法将相邻节点的推荐意见分为确定推荐和不确定推荐两类,并分别定义了主观评价算法和偏离度测试算法用于信任计算过程的权重分配;Indirect trust calculation, analysis and definition of recommendation trust classification algorithm; use this algorithm to divide the recommendation opinions of adjacent nodes into two types: definite recommendation and uncertain recommendation, and define subjective evaluation algorithm and deviation test algorithm for trust calculation Process weight assignment;
综合信任计算,定义基于交互次数的动态权重分配算法,通过合成直接信任值和间接信任值得到的综合信任值来评价节点的可信性;Comprehensive trust calculation, which defines a dynamic weight distribution algorithm based on the number of interactions, and evaluates the credibility of nodes through the comprehensive trust value obtained by synthesizing direct trust value and indirect trust value;
步骤四、比较信任计算过程得到的目标节点的综合信任值与信任阈值的大小关系来判断目标节点是否可信;Step 4, comparing the relationship between the comprehensive trust value of the target node obtained in the trust calculation process and the trust threshold to determine whether the target node is credible;
若节点的信任值大于或等于信任阈值,则判定节点是可信的,可以继续与之交互;若节点的信任值小于信任阈值,则节点是不可信的,不再与之交互,并进行删除相关路由信息、标识不可信节点等后续处理工作。If the trust value of the node is greater than or equal to the trust threshold, it is judged that the node is credible and can continue to interact with it; if the trust value of the node is less than the trust threshold, the node is untrustworthy, no longer interacts with it, and will be deleted Related routing information, identification of untrusted nodes and other follow-up processing.
与现有技术相比,本发明不同于以前的无线传感器网络动态信任评价方法只关注节点在路由发现过程中的行为;综合考虑了在节点传送传感数据时的行为,从而更加全面地监测节点的行为,保证及时、有效地处理网络中的不可信节点;另外,本发明采用直接信任和间接信任综合的方式衡量节点的信任值,起到了解决节点之间因为交互记录少,证据不充分而导致评价结果出现偏差问题的积极效果。Compared with the prior art, the present invention is different from the previous wireless sensor network dynamic trust evaluation method, which only focuses on the behavior of nodes in the route discovery process; comprehensively considers the behavior of nodes when transmitting sensing data, so as to monitor nodes more comprehensively Behaviors to ensure timely and effective processing of untrustworthy nodes in the network; In addition, the present invention uses a comprehensive method of direct trust and indirect trust to measure the trust value of nodes, which solves the problem of lack of interaction records and insufficient evidence between nodes. Positive effects that lead to deviation problems in evaluation results.
附图说明Description of drawings
图1为本发明的基于多因素的无线传感器网络动态信任评价系统框架图;Fig. 1 is the frame diagram of the wireless sensor network dynamic trust evaluation system based on multiple factors of the present invention;
图2为信任因素的获取方式图;Figure 2 is a diagram of how to obtain trust factors;
图3为间接信任值计算流程图;Fig. 3 is a flow chart of indirect trust value calculation;
图4为推荐信任关系图;Figure 4 is a recommended trust relationship diagram;
图5为动态信任评价流程图;Figure 5 is a flow chart of dynamic trust evaluation;
图6为节点部署示例图;Figure 6 is an example diagram of node deployment;
图7为实验效果比较图;(a)、10%恶意节点网络吞吐量;(b)、10%恶意节点网络正常投递率;(c)、20%恶意节点网络吞吐量;(d)、20%恶意节点网络正常投递率;(e)、30%恶意节点网络吞吐量;(f)、30%恶意节点网络正常投递率;(g)、原始网络的开销;(h)、基于信任机制的网络的开销。Figure 7 is a comparison diagram of experimental results; (a), 10% malicious node network throughput; (b), 10% malicious node network normal delivery rate; (c), 20% malicious node network throughput; (d), 20% %Malicious node network normal delivery rate; (e), 30% malicious node network throughput; (f), 30% malicious node network normal delivery rate; (g), original network overhead; (h), trust mechanism-based Network overhead.
具体实施方式Detailed ways
下面结合附图对本发明作进一步详细描述。The present invention will be described in further detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.
如图1所示,基于多因素的无线传感器网络动态信任评价系统主要包括四个部分:As shown in Figure 1, the multi-factor based WSN dynamic trust evaluation system mainly includes four parts:
一、信任因素获取模块11:主要用来获取信任评价过程涉及到的信任因素,包括直接信任因素(当前直接信任因素、历史直接信任因素)、间接信任因素和综合信任因素。如图2所示,为信任因素的获取方式示意图。直接信任因素又分为通信信任因素和传感信任因素,都是通过节点工作在混杂模式下监听直接交互过程得到的。当前直接信任因素由当前周期的通信信任因素和传感信任因素组成,且两者都是通过工作在混杂模式的节点监听与其他节点之间的直接交互过程而得到的。历史直接信任因素就是历史周期的直接信任因素。间接信任因素来自于其他相邻节点的推荐。直接信任因素和间接信任因素组成综合信任因素,综合信任值是评价节点可信性的最终依据。利用该模块分析和总结了可能影响节点信任值的因素及其获取方式。以上所说的交互是指当节点向下一跳节点发送数据包时,通过对比节点在本地缓存的数据包与监听到的下一跳节点转发的数据包是否一致来判断下一跳节点是否正确转发了数据包。监听实现的基础是设置节点工作在混杂模式。若正确转发视为一次成功交互,否则为失败交互。信任因素来自于主实体(指无线传感网络源节点)与目标实体(指无线传感网络目的节点)之间的历史交互行为记录、目标实体当前的行为特征以及其他实体的推荐意见等。1. Trust factor acquisition module 11: mainly used to acquire trust factors involved in the trust evaluation process, including direct trust factors (current direct trust factors, historical direct trust factors), indirect trust factors and comprehensive trust factors. As shown in FIG. 2 , it is a schematic diagram of a manner of obtaining trust factors. Direct trust factors are further divided into communication trust factors and sensing trust factors, which are obtained by monitoring the direct interaction process of nodes working in promiscuous mode. The current direct trust factor is composed of the communication trust factor and the sensing trust factor of the current period, and both of them are obtained through the direct interaction process between the nodes working in promiscuous mode and other nodes. The historical direct trust factor is the direct trust factor of the historical cycle. The indirect trust factor comes from the recommendation of other neighboring nodes. The direct trust factor and the indirect trust factor constitute the comprehensive trust factor, and the comprehensive trust value is the ultimate basis for evaluating the credibility of nodes. This module is used to analyze and summarize the factors that may affect the node trust value and how to obtain it. The interaction mentioned above means that when a node sends a data packet to the next hop node, it judges whether the next hop node is correct by comparing the data packet cached locally by the node with the data packet forwarded by the monitored next hop node. The packet was forwarded. The basis of monitoring implementation is to set the node to work in promiscuous mode. If it is forwarded correctly, it is regarded as a successful interaction, otherwise it is a failed interaction. Trust factors come from the historical interaction behavior records between the main entity (referring to the wireless sensor network source node) and the target entity (referring to the wireless sensor network destination node), the current behavior characteristics of the target entity, and the recommendations of other entities.
二、信任度量模块12,用来定义各信任因素的度量方式:2. The trust measurement module 12 is used to define the measurement mode of each trust factor:
定义1、当前直接信任值CDTi,j(t)定义为:Definition 1. The current direct trust value CDT i,j (t) is defined as:
其中,RSCFi,j(t)、DSCFi,j(t)分别表示当前周期t内主节点i关于目标节点j的通信信任值和传感信任值,w1,w2分别表示通信信任因子和传感信任值因子。Among them, RSCF i,j (t) and DSCF i,j (t) represent the communication trust value and sensing trust value of the master node i with respect to the target node j in the current period t respectively, w 1 and w 2 represent the communication trust factor and the sensing trust value factor.
定义2、历史直接信任值HDTi,j(t)定义为:Definition 2. The historical direct trust value HDT i,j (t) is defined as:
HDTi,j(t)=f(t-t0)*CDTi,j(t0) (2)HDT i,j (t)=f(tt 0 )*CDT i,j (t 0 ) (2)
其中,t CDTi,j(t0)表示历史周期t0内主节点i关于目标节点j的直接信任值,时间衰减因子f(t-t0)表示关于当前周期t与历史周期t0的时间间隔的线性函数。Among them, t CDT i,j (t 0 ) represents the direct trust value of the master node i on the target node j in the historical period t 0 , and the time decay factor f(tt 0 ) represents the time interval between the current period t and the historical period t 0 linear function of .
定义3、直接信任值DTi,j(t)定义为:Definition 3. The direct trust value DT i,j (t) is defined as:
DTi,j(t)=θ*HDTi,j(θ)+(1-θ)*CDTi,j(t) (3)DT i,j (t)=θ*HDT i,j (θ)+(1-θ)*CDT i,j (t) (3)
其中,HDTi,j(t)、CDTi,j(t)分别表示当前周期t内主节点i关于目标节点j的历史直接信任值和当前直接信任值,θ表示历史影响因子;Among them, HDT i,j (t) and CDT i,j (t) represent the historical direct trust value and the current direct trust value of the master node i on the target node j in the current period t, respectively, and θ represents the historical impact factor;
定义4、间接信任值ITi,j(t)定义为:Definition 4. The indirect trust value IT i,j (t) is defined as:
其中,DTi,k(t)表示当前周期t内主节点i关于邻居节点k的直接信任值,主节点i与邻居节点k的交互次数为m,Tk,j(t)表示当前周期t内目标节点j关于邻居节点k的的综合信任值为Tk,j(t),邻居节点k的推荐信任合成权重为w'k(t);Among them, DT i,k (t) represents the direct trust value of master node i on neighbor node k in the current period t, the number of interactions between master node i and neighbor node k is m, and T k,j (t) represents the current period t The comprehensive trust value of internal target node j with respect to neighbor node k is T k,j (t), and the recommended trust synthesis weight of neighbor node k is w' k (t);
定义5、综合信任值Ti,j(t)定义为:Definition 5. The comprehensive trust value T i,j (t) is defined as:
Ti,j(t)=β′*DTi,j(t)+(1-β′)*ITi,j(t) (5)T i,j (t)=β′*DT i,j (t)+(1-β′)*IT i,j (t) (5)
DTi,j(t)、ITi,j(t)和Ti,j(t)分别表示周期t内主节点i关于目标节点j的直接信任值、间接信任值和综合信任值;β′表示直接信任值DTi,j(t)在综合信任值Ti,j(t)合成过程中的权重。DT i,j (t), IT i,j (t) and T i,j (t) respectively represent the direct trust value, indirect trust value and comprehensive trust value of master node i on target node j in period t; β′ Indicates the weight of the direct trust value DT i,j (t) in the synthesis process of the comprehensive trust value T i,j (t).
三、信任计算模块13,用来实现按照上述的信任度量模块所定义的直接信任值、间接信任值以及综合信任值度量方式来进行各信任值的计算:3. The trust calculation module 13 is used to realize the calculation of each trust value according to the direct trust value, indirect trust value and comprehensive trust value measurement methods defined by the above-mentioned trust measurement module:
(一)、直接信任计算(1) Direct Trust Computing
直接信任计算,对计算过程中用到的通信信任因子w1、传感信任值因子w2、时间衰减因子f(t-t0)、历史影响因子θ进行了分析和定义,依据公式(1)-(3)进行直接信任值的计算。For direct trust calculation, the communication trust factor w 1 , sensor trust value factor w 2 , time decay factor f(tt 0 ), and historical impact factor θ are analyzed and defined in the calculation process, according to the formula (1)- (3) Calculate the direct trust value.
直接信任值是通过分别计算在建立路径过程中和传送传感数据过程中,节点成功交互的概率,并对其进行加权平均得到的。The direct trust value is obtained by calculating the probability of successful interaction between nodes in the process of establishing the path and transmitting the sensory data, and performing a weighted average on it.
在周期t内,t表示在建立路径过程中,节点i与节点j成功交互的概率,设成功交互次数为rsci,j(t),失败交互次数为rfci,j(t),则In period t, t represents the probability of successful interaction between node i and node j in the process of establishing the path. Let the number of successful interactions be rsc i,j (t), and the number of failed interactions be rfc i,j (t), then
在周期t内,DSCFi,j(T)表示在传送传感数据过程中,节点i与节点j成功交互的概率,设成功交互次数为dsci,j(t),失败交互次数为dfci,j(t),则In period t, DSCF i,j (T) represents the probability of successful interaction between node i and node j in the process of transmitting sensor data, let the number of successful interactions be dsc i,j (t), and the number of failed interactions be dfc i ,j (t), then
通信信任因子w1和传感信任因子w2的取值是由节点交互过程中,节点的恶意行为对网络可能造成的影响范围决定。建立路径时节点的一次恶意行为可能影响多条路径的正常构建,而传送传感数据时的一次恶意行为只会影响本次转发的数据包的正常传送,所以通常定义,0≤w2≤w1≤1。The values of the communication trust factor w 1 and the sensing trust factor w 2 are determined by the possible impact range of the node’s malicious behavior on the network during the node interaction process. A malicious behavior of a node when establishing a path may affect the normal construction of multiple paths, and a malicious behavior when transmitting sensing data will only affect the normal transmission of the data packet forwarded this time, so it is usually defined that 0≤w 2 ≤w 1 ≤ 1.
直接信任值是由历史周期内的直接信任值与当前周期内的直接信任值以一定的历史影响因子组合而成的。其中,历史直接信任值是由历史周期内的直接信任值衰减之后得到的。为了避免出现本来可信的节点因为长时间的没有进行交互而被误认为成不可信节点,造成资源浪费的情况,本文定义衰减是有界的。假设,CDTi,j(t0)表示周期t0内节点i关于节点j的历史直接信任值,时间衰减因子f(t-t0),区分可信与不可信的信任阈值Th,CDTi,j(t0)经过衰减之后变成HDTi,j(t),表示为:The direct trust value is a combination of the direct trust value in the historical cycle and the direct trust value in the current cycle with a certain historical impact factor. Among them, the historical direct trust value is obtained after the direct trust value decays in the historical period. In order to avoid the situation that originally trusted nodes are mistaken for untrusted nodes because they have not interacted for a long time, resulting in waste of resources, this paper defines the attenuation as bounded. Assume, CDT i,j (t 0 ) represents the historical direct trust value of node i on node j in period t 0 , the time decay factor f(tt 0 ), the trust threshold Th for distinguishing credible and untrustworthy, CDT i,j (t 0 ) becomes HDT i,j (t) after attenuation, expressed as:
另外,考虑到信任的“易失难得性”,定义在公式(22)中的历史影响因子θ:In addition, considering the "volatile and hard-to-get" of trust, the historical impact factor θ defined in formula (22):
其中0<θ2<0.5<θ1<1。Wherein 0<θ 2 <0.5<θ 1 <1.
上述θ1,θ2,Th,f的取值都是由实际的应用环境决定的。The values of θ 1 , θ 2 , Th, and f above are all determined by the actual application environment.
(二)、间接信任计算(2) Indirect Trust Computing
间接信任计算,分析和定义了推荐信任分类算法;为了解决推荐信任分类粒度粗糙的问题,利用该算法将相邻节点的推荐信任划为确定推荐和不确定推荐两类,并分别定义了主观评价算法和偏离度测试算法用于信任计算过程的权重分配,依据公式(4)进行间接信任值的计算。Indirect trust calculation, analysis and definition of recommendation trust classification algorithm; in order to solve the problem of coarse granularity of recommendation trust classification, use this algorithm to divide the recommendation trust of adjacent nodes into two categories: definite recommendation and uncertain recommendation, and define subjective evaluation respectively Algorithm and Deviation Test Algorithm is used in the weight distribution of the trust calculation process, and the indirect trust value is calculated according to formula (4).
间接信任的获取过程是由主节点定期向相邻节点单跳广播关于某个目标节点的推荐信任请求开始的。设置可信阈值Th,并确定推荐n'min,步骤301;节点i广播关于目标节点j的推荐请求包RequestTrust,步骤302;邻居节点k收到节点i发来的推荐请求包RequestTrust,步骤303;查找自身维护的信任表Trust,步骤304;判断信任表Trust 中是否存在节点j的综合信任值,步骤305;如果不存在,则丢弃推荐请求包RequestTrust,流程结束,步骤306;如果存在,则邻居节点k向节点发送推荐回复ReplyTrust,步骤 307;节点j收到邻居节点k的推荐回复ReplyTrust,步骤308;查找自身维护的信任表 Trust,步骤309;判断存在邻居节点k的直接信任值且信任值大于Th,步骤310;如果不存在,则丢弃ReplyTrust,步骤311;如果存在,进一步判断与节点k的交互次数是否大于n'min,步骤312;如果大于,则邻居节点k为确定推荐信任类,步骤313;执行主观评价算法确定合成权重,步骤314;确定推荐类合成的简接信任值,步骤315;若不大于,则邻居节点k为不确定推荐信任类,步骤316;执行偏离度测试算法确定合成权重,步骤317;不确定推荐类合成的间接信任值,步骤318;加权得到最终间接信任值,步骤319。上述计算流程简述为:相邻节点接收到主节点发来的推荐请求数据包之后,查找自身所维护的信任表,判断是否存在目标节点信任值。若存在,则向主节点发送推荐回复数据包;否则,不予处理。主节点在允许的延迟内收到推荐回复数据包之后,查找缓存的推荐请求数据包,判断是否发送过该推荐请求。若存在,则查找信任表,继续判断推荐节点的信任值是否大于推荐信任阈值,若大于,则接受该推荐,否则不接受。The process of indirect trust acquisition starts with the master node periodically broadcasting a recommendation trust request about a target node to the adjacent nodes in a single hop. Set the credible threshold Th, and determine the recommendation n'min , step 301; node i broadcasts the recommendation request packet RequestTrust about the target node j, step 302; neighbor node k receives the recommendation request packet RequestTrust from node i, step 303; Search the trust table Trust maintained by itself, step 304; judge whether there is a comprehensive trust value of node j in the trust table Trust, step 305; if not, discard the recommendation request packet RequestTrust, and the process ends, step 306; Node k sends a recommended reply ReplyTrust to the node, step 307; node j receives the recommended reply ReplyTrust from neighbor node k, step 308; finds the trust table Trust maintained by itself, step 309; judges that there is a direct trust value of neighbor node k and the trust value is greater than Th, step 310; if it does not exist, then discard ReplyTrust, step 311; if it exists, further judge whether the number of interactions with node k is greater than n'min , step 312; if greater, then neighbor node k is to determine the recommended trust class, Step 313; Execute the subjective evaluation algorithm to determine the composite weight, step 314; determine the indirect trust value of the recommended class synthesis, step 315; if not greater, then the neighbor node k is an uncertain recommended trust class, step 316; execute the deviation test algorithm Determine the composition weight, step 317 ; determine the indirect trust value of the recommended category synthesis, step 318 ; obtain the final indirect trust value by weighting, step 319 . The above calculation process is briefly described as follows: after the adjacent node receives the recommendation request packet sent by the master node, it searches the trust table maintained by itself to determine whether there is a trust value of the target node. If it exists, send a recommendation reply packet to the master node; otherwise, it will not be processed. After receiving the recommendation reply data packet within the allowable delay, the master node looks up the cached recommendation request data packet to determine whether the recommendation request has been sent. If it exists, look up the trust table, continue to judge whether the trust value of the recommended node is greater than the recommended trust threshold, if it is greater, accept the recommendation, otherwise not accept it.
为了解决由信任链引发的计算过程复杂,收敛速度慢,无法适应大规模网络的问题,在本文中,主节点i只参考主节点i与目标节点j的共同邻居节点k1,k2,...,kn-1,kn的推荐意见来计算目标节点j的间接信任值。In order to solve the problems caused by trust chains, such as complex calculation process, slow convergence speed, and inability to adapt to large-scale networks, in this paper, the master node i only refers to the common neighbor nodes k 1 , k 2 , of the master node i and the target node j. .., k n-1 , k n recommendations to calculate the indirect trust value of target node j.
如图4所示,为节点i与节点j之间的推荐信任关系图。其中,单向实线表示直接信任关系,双向实线表示综合信任关系,虚线表示推荐信任关系。为了解决恶意推荐以及共谋攻击问题,定义节点i根据自身对相邻节点k的信任评价结果即直接信任值来判断是否接受邻居节点k的推荐意见。若邻居节点的直接信任值小于信任阈值,则邻居节点为不可信节点,节点i不接受其提供的推荐信任值。对于可接受的推荐信任值,为了避免节点i与相邻节点k因为交互次数少、证据不充分而对节点j综合信任评价结果造成二次影响,本文综合考虑交互次数与直接信任值两个因素确定推荐信任合成权重。As shown in Figure 4, it is a recommended trust relationship graph between node i and node j. Among them, the one-way solid line indicates the direct trust relationship, the two-way solid line indicates the comprehensive trust relationship, and the dotted line indicates the recommendation trust relationship. In order to solve the problem of malicious recommendation and collusion attack, it is defined that node i judges whether to accept the recommendation of neighbor node k according to its own trust evaluation result of neighbor node k, that is, the direct trust value. If the direct trust value of the neighbor node is less than the trust threshold, the neighbor node is an untrustworthy node, and node i does not accept the recommended trust value provided by it. For an acceptable recommended trust value, in order to avoid the secondary impact on the comprehensive trust evaluation result of node j due to the small number of interactions and insufficient evidence between node i and adjacent node k, this paper comprehensively considers two factors: the number of interactions and the direct trust value Determine the recommendation trust composition weight.
设节点i与邻居节点k交互总次数为m,节点i关于节点k的直接信任值为DTi,k(t),则由公式(3-4)可知,合成权重w′k为:Assuming that the total number of interactions between node i and neighbor node k is m, and the direct trust value of node i with respect to node k is DT i,k (t), then it can be known from formula (3-4) that the composite weight w′ k is:
w′k(t)=f″(DTi,k(t),m) (10)w′ k (t)=f″(D Ti,k (t),m) (10)
根据节点之间的交互次数将推荐信任划分为确定推荐和不确定推荐两大类,并分别定义主观评价算法和偏离度测试算法用于间接信任合成过程中的权重分配。According to the number of interactions between nodes, the recommendation trust is divided into two categories: definite recommendation and uncertain recommendation, and the subjective evaluation algorithm and deviation test algorithm are respectively defined for the weight distribution in the process of indirect trust synthesis.
正如在扩展的Hoeffding’s不等式中所说:“在可接受的误差范围t内,当且仅当节点交互次数至少为时nmin,通过监听直接交互过程得到的信任值的可信度至少满足α″。假设在可接受的某个误差范围t′和可信度α′内的最少交互次数为n′min,n′min即为确定推荐阈值,并据此划分确定推荐类和不确定推荐类。As stated in the extended Hoeffding's inequality: "Within the acceptable error range t, if and only if the number of node interactions is at least n min , the credibility of the trust value obtained by monitoring the direct interaction process satisfies at least α" . Assuming that the minimum number of interactions within an acceptable error range t' and reliability α' is n'min , n'min is the threshold for determining the recommendation, and based on this, the definite recommendation class and the uncertain recommendation class are divided.
若m≥n′min,则认为邻居节点k的推荐信任属于确定推荐信任类,采取基于主观评价的权重分配算法合成确定推荐信任值(节点i根据邻居节点k的直接信任值DTi,k(t)的大小来确定合成权重),否则为不确定推荐信任类,同时采用基于偏离度的权重分配算法合成不确定推荐信任值(节点i根据邻居节点k提供的推荐信任值与其他邻居节点提供的推荐信任值DTi,k(t)之间的偏离程度来确定合成权重)。If m≥n′min , it is considered that the recommendation trust of neighbor node k belongs to the definite recommendation trust category, and the weight distribution algorithm based on subjective evaluation is adopted to synthesize the definite recommendation trust value (node i is based on the direct trust value DT i,k of neighbor node k ( t) to determine the synthetic weight), otherwise it is an uncertain recommendation trust class, and at the same time adopts a deviation-based weight distribution algorithm to synthesize an uncertain recommended trust value (node i is based on the recommended trust value provided by neighbor node k and other neighbor nodes provide The degree of deviation between the recommended trust values DT i,k (t) to determine the synthetic weight).
最后对确定推荐信任值和不确定推荐信任值进行加权平均运算即得节点i关于节点 j的间接信任值。Finally, the weighted average operation is performed on the confirmed recommended trust value and the uncertain recommended trust value to obtain the indirect trust value of node i on node j.
算法1:主观评价权重分配Algorithm 1: Subjective evaluation weight distribution
输入:节点i关于邻居节点k1,k2,...,km的直接信任值DTi,1(t),DTi,2(t),...,DTi,m(t)。Input: node i's direct trust value DT i,1 (t), DT i,2 (t),...,DT i,m (t) of neighbor nodes k 1 ,k 2 ,...,k m .
输出:邻居节点k1,k2,...,km的权重。Output: weights of neighbor nodes k 1 , k 2 ,...,k m .
①计算节点i关于所有属于确定推荐类的邻居节点的直接信任值之和。①Calculate the sum of the direct trust values of node i with respect to all neighbor nodes belonging to the determined recommendation class.
其中,DTi,k(t)表示输入节点为i,邻居节点kk的直接信任值;k表示邻居节点的个数;Among them, DT i,k (t) represents the direct trust value of input node i and neighbor node k k ; k represents the number of neighbor nodes;
②计算邻居节点k的权重w′k(t);② Calculate the weight w′ k (t) of the neighbor node k;
w'k(t)=DTi,k(t)/S'(t) (12)w'k (t)=DT i,k ( t)/S'(t) (12)
其中,DTi,k(t)表示输入节点为i,邻居节点kk的直接信任值;Among them, DT i,k (t) represents the direct trust value of input node i and neighbor node k k ;
算法2:偏离度测试权重分配Algorithm 2: Deviation test weight distribution
输入:邻居节点km+1,km+2,...,kn关于目标节点j的综合信任值 Tm+1,j(t),Tm+2,j(t),...,Tn,j(t);Input: neighbor nodes k m+1 ,k m+2 ,...,k n 's comprehensive trust value T m+1,j (t), T m+2,j (t), .. .,T n,j (t);
输出:邻居节点km+1,km+2,...,kn的权重。Output: weights of neighbor nodes k m+1 ,k m+2 ,...,k n .
①计算邻居节点k提供的推荐信任值与其他节点提供的推荐信任值之间的偏离程度。① Calculate the degree of deviation between the recommended trust value provided by neighbor node k and the recommended trust value provided by other nodes.
其中,Tk,j(t)表示由公式(5)计算得出的是周期t内主节点k关于目标节点j的综合信任值;Tr,j(t)表示由公式(5)计算得出的是周期t内主节点r关于目标节点j的综合信任值;n表示邻居节点的个数;Among them, T k,j (t) means that calculated by formula (5) is the comprehensive trust value of master node k with respect to target node j in period t; T r,j (t) means that calculated by formula (5) The output is the comprehensive trust value of the master node r with respect to the target node j in the period t; n represents the number of neighbor nodes;
②计算不确定信任推荐类的总偏离值。②Calculate the total deviation value of the uncertain trust recommendation class.
其中,sk(t)表示由公式(13)计算邻居节点k提供的推荐信任值与其他节点提供的推荐信任值之间的偏离程度;Among them, s k (t) represents the degree of deviation between the recommended trust value provided by neighbor node k calculated by formula (13) and the recommended trust value provided by other nodes;
③计算总偏离值与邻居节点k的偏离值sk(t)的比例关系。③ Calculate the proportional relationship between the total deviation value and the deviation value s k (t) of the neighbor node k.
dk(t)=S(t)/sk(t) (15)d k (t) = S (t) / s k (t) (15)
其中,sk(t)表示由公式(13)计算邻居节点k提供的推荐信任值与其他节点提供的推荐信任值之间的偏离程度;S(t)表示由公式(14)计算得出的不确定信任推荐类的总偏离值;Among them, s k (t) represents the degree of deviation between the recommended trust value provided by neighbor node k calculated by formula (13) and the recommended trust value provided by other nodes; S(t) represents the degree of deviation calculated by formula (14) The total deviation value of the uncertain trust recommendation class;
④对dk(t)进行归一化处理,即得节点k的权重w′k(t)。④ Normalize d k (t) to get the weight w′ k (t) of node k.
其中,dk(t)即由公式(15)计算得出的总偏离值。Among them, d k (t) is the total deviation value calculated by formula (15).
(三)、综合信任计算方法(3) Comprehensive trust calculation method
综合信任计算,定义了基于交互次数的动态权重分配算法,通过合成直接信任值和间接信任值得到的综合信任值来评价节点的可信性;另外,信任值需要进行周期更新,以便及时地观察节点的行为变化。Comprehensive trust calculation, which defines a dynamic weight distribution algorithm based on the number of interactions, and evaluates the credibility of nodes by synthesizing the comprehensive trust value obtained by direct trust value and indirect trust value; in addition, the trust value needs to be updated periodically in order to observe in time The behavior of the node changes.
当主节点与目标节点交互次数较少时,可能会因为证据不充分而使得主节点无法完全依靠自身的认识对目标节点进行准确的评价。为了保证评价结果的准确性,本文采用直接信任与间接信任综合的方式来评价节点的信任值。另外,信任值需周期更新,从而达到实时监控节点行为的目的。When the number of interactions between the master node and the target node is small, the master node may not be able to fully rely on its own knowledge to make an accurate evaluation of the target node due to insufficient evidence. In order to ensure the accuracy of the evaluation results, this paper uses a combination of direct trust and indirect trust to evaluate the trust value of nodes. In addition, the trust value needs to be updated periodically, so as to achieve the purpose of real-time monitoring of node behavior.
现有的无线传感器网络信任评价方法大多采用直接信任值和间接信任值静态合成的方法来计算节点的综合信任值,这不符合无线传感器网络的动态变化特征。在合成权重的确定问题上,基于Hoeffding’s不等式建立交互次数与合成权重之间的动态对应关系,解决了以往无线传感器网络信任评价方法中的权重静态分配,不符合无线传感器网络动态变化特性等问题;因此,本文定义了一个基于Hoeffding’s不等式的动态权重分配算法:在误差允许范围t内,节点交互次数为n时,所得评价结果的最小可信度即为综合信任合成过程中直接信任值的合成权重。Most of the existing trust evaluation methods for wireless sensor networks use the method of static synthesis of direct trust value and indirect trust value to calculate the comprehensive trust value of nodes, which does not conform to the dynamic characteristics of wireless sensor networks. On the determination of the composite weight, based on the Hoeffding's inequality, the dynamic corresponding relationship between the number of interactions and the composite weight is established, which solves the problem that the static weight distribution in the previous wireless sensor network trust evaluation method does not conform to the dynamic change characteristics of the wireless sensor network; Therefore, this paper defines a dynamic weight assignment algorithm based on Hoeffding's inequality: within the allowable range of error t, when the number of node interactions is n, the minimum credibility of the evaluation results obtained is the composite weight of the direct trust value in the comprehensive trust synthesis process .
另外,为了最大范围地监控节点的行为,我们定义直接信任值的合成权重是有界的,也就是说节点i或多或少都应该参考其他相邻节点的推荐意见。直接信任值在综合信任合成过程中的权重取值范围由实际应用环境决定,假定取值范围为[c,d],其中 0<c<d<1。In addition, in order to monitor the behavior of nodes to the greatest extent, we define that the synthetic weight of the direct trust value is bounded, that is to say, node i should more or less refer to the recommendations of other adjacent nodes. The weight value range of the direct trust value in the process of comprehensive trust synthesis is determined by the actual application environment. It is assumed that the value range is [c,d], where 0<c<d<1.
算法3:综合信任权重分配,即动态权重分配算法:Algorithm 3: Comprehensive trust weight distribution, that is, dynamic weight distribution algorithm:
输入:当前环境可接受的误差范围e,交互次数m。Input: the acceptable error range e of the current environment, and the number of interactions m.
输出:直接信任值的合成权重β。Output: synthetic weight β of direct trust value.
①权重β、误差范围e和交互次数m满足等式。①The weight β, the error range e and the number of interactions m satisfy the equation.
2exp(-2t2m)=1-β (17)2exp(-2t 2 m)=1-β (17)
其中,权重β表示直接信任值的合成权重;m表示交互次数;Among them, the weight β represents the composite weight of the direct trust value; m represents the number of interactions;
②变换等式。② Transformation equation.
β=1-2exp(-2t2m) (18)β=1-2exp(-2t 2 m) (18)
其中,权重β表示直接信任值的合成权重;m表示交互次数;Among them, the weight β represents the composite weight of the direct trust value; m represents the number of interactions;
③对β进行有界处理。③ Bounded treatment of β.
其中,直接信任值在综合信任合成过程中的权重取值范围由实际应用环境决定,假定取值范围为[c,d],其中0<c<d<1。Among them, the weight range of the direct trust value in the comprehensive trust synthesis process is determined by the actual application environment, and the value range is assumed to be [c,d], where 0<c<d<1.
在此之前,节点i已经分别通过直接信任计算和间接信任计算获得节点j的直接信任值和间接信任值,再结合本节定义的动态权重分配算法,即可得在周期t内,节点i 关于节点j的综合信任值。Prior to this, node i has obtained the direct trust value and indirect trust value of node j through direct trust calculation and indirect trust calculation respectively, and combined with the dynamic weight distribution algorithm defined in this section, it can be obtained that in period t, node i is about The comprehensive trust value of node j.
有关Hoeffding’s不等式的定义与扩展描述如下:The definition and extension of Hoeffding's inequality are described as follows:
在概率论中,Hoeffding’s不等式用来定义一组随机变量的均值与其期望值之间的绝对差的概率上界。In probability theory, Hoeffding's inequality is used to define an upper bound on the probability of the absolute difference between the mean of a set of random variables and its expected value.
设有两两独立的一系列随机变量X1,X2,...,Xn-1,Xn,假设对所有Xi都是几乎有界的变量,即满足Assume a series of independent random variables X 1 , X 2 ,...,X n-1 ,X n , assuming that all X i are almost bounded variables, that is, satisfy
P(Xi∈[a,b])=1,1≤i≤n (20)P(X i ∈ [a,b])=1,1≤i≤n (20)
定义这n个随机变量的经验期望(估算值)为:Define the empirical expectation (estimated value) of these n random variables as:
为的期望(真实值)且满足下面的不等式: for The expectation (true value) of and satisfies the following inequality:
本文定义,随机变量Xi表示节点之间第i次交互的结果,若成功交互,Xi=1,否则Xi=0。As defined in this paper, the random variable Xi represents the result of the ith interaction between nodes. If the interaction is successful, Xi = 1, otherwise Xi = 0.
因此,本文满足P(r*Xi∈(a,b))=1,且a=0,b=1。即:Therefore, this article satisfies P(r*X i ∈(a,b))=1, and a=0, b=1. which is:
其中,r为调整因子。在本文中,调整因子与通信信任因子、传感信任因子、时间衰减因子、历史影响因子有关。Among them, r is the adjustment factor. In this paper, the adjustment factor is related to communication trust factor, sensing trust factor, time decay factor, and historical impact factor.
在给定数量n的用户交易评价结果的前提下,私有信誉的估算误差大于某一个给定阈值t的概率上界满足:Under the premise of a given number n of user transaction evaluation results, the estimation error of private reputation is greater than the upper bound of the probability of a given threshold t Satisfy:
即得:That is:
也就是:That is:
在本文中,公式(26)描述为:在可接受的误差t范围内,当且仅当节点交互次数最少为nmin时,通过监听直接交互过程得到的信任值的可信度至少满足α。In this paper, formula (26) is described as: within the acceptable error t range, if and only if the node interaction times are at least n min , the credibility of the trust value obtained by monitoring the direct interaction process satisfies at least α.
四、信任评价模块14,用来比较信任计算过程得到的目标节点的综合信任值与信任阈值的大小关系来判断目标节点是否可信。4. The trust evaluation module 14 is used to compare the relationship between the comprehensive trust value of the target node obtained in the trust calculation process and the trust threshold to determine whether the target node is trustworthy.
若节点的信任值大于或等于信任阈值,则判定节点是可信的,可以继续与之交互;若节点的信任值小于信任阈值,则节点是不可信的,不再与之交互,并进行删除相关路由信息、标识不可信节点等后续处理工作。If the trust value of the node is greater than or equal to the trust threshold, it is judged that the node is credible and can continue to interact with it; if the trust value of the node is less than the trust threshold, the node is untrustworthy, no longer interacts with it, and will be deleted Related routing information, identification of untrusted nodes and other follow-up processing.
如图6所示,为本例的节点部署示例图。其中以在第6个计算周期,节点27计算节点9的综合信任值的过程为例,对本文的动态信任评价方法进行说明。Figure 6 is an example diagram of node deployment in this example. Taking the process of node 27 calculating the comprehensive trust value of node 9 in the sixth calculation cycle as an example, the dynamic trust evaluation method in this paper is described.
在现有的信任评价方法中,设置节点的初始信任值分为三种情况:最大值,中间值和最小值。为了防止资源浪费,我们认为在没有监测到节点表现恶意行为的情况下,节点应该被认为是可信的。因此,在实验中,我们将节点的初始信任值定义为1,信任阈值设置为0.5。In the existing trust evaluation methods, the initial trust value of the setting node is divided into three situations: the maximum value, the middle value and the minimum value. In order to prevent resource waste, we believe that a node should be considered trustworthy if no malicious behavior is detected by the node. Therefore, in the experiment, we define the initial trust value of the node as 1, and set the trust threshold as 0.5.
其他参数的设置:通信信任因子和传感信任因子分别为w1=1,w2=0.5,历史影响因子θ1=0.6,θ2=0.4,时间衰减因子f(t-t0)=0.9*(t-t0),可接受的误差范围e=0.1。关于推荐分类,可接受的最小可信度α=Th=0.5,也就是说确定推荐类的最少交互次数 n'm=70。在综合信任合成过程中,直接信任值的权重的取值范围定义为c=0.2,d=0.8。具体数据如表1所示。Setting of other parameters: communication trust factor and sensing trust factor are respectively w 1 =1, w 2 =0.5, historical impact factors θ 1 =0.6, θ 2 =0.4, time decay factor f(tt 0 )=0.9*( tt 0 ), the acceptable error range e=0.1. Regarding the recommended classification, the minimum acceptable reliability is α=Th=0.5, that is to say, the minimum number of interactions n' m =70 for determining the recommended class. In the comprehensive trust synthesis process, the value range of the weight of the direct trust value is defined as c=0.2, d=0.8. The specific data are shown in Table 1.
表1、计算数据和结果Table 1. Calculation data and results
从上表中可知,在第6个周期,节点9的历史直接信任值为0.856744,当前直接信任值为0.649879,由公式(22)可知,直接信任值为0.732625。由确定推荐分类算法确定的交互次数70可知,节点40、节点14、节点35、节点16、节点2、节点39、节点22属于确定推荐类。节点26、节点43、节点1、节点10、节点33属于不确定推荐类。另外,由于节点12和节点5的信任值小于信任阈值0.5,因此,节点27不参考这两个节点的推荐意见。It can be seen from the above table that in the sixth cycle, the historical direct trust value of node 9 is 0.856744, and the current direct trust value is 0.649879. From formula (22), the direct trust value is 0.732625. From the number of interactions 70 determined by the determined recommendation classification algorithm, it can be seen that the node 40, the node 14, the node 35, the node 16, the node 2, the node 39, and the node 22 belong to the determined recommendation category. Node 26, node 43, node 1, node 10, and node 33 belong to the uncertain recommendation category. In addition, since the trust values of node 12 and node 5 are less than the trust threshold 0.5, node 27 does not refer to the recommendations of these two nodes.
由综合信任值0.582219大于信任阈值0.5可知:在第6个周期,节点9对于节点 27来说是可信的。It can be known from the comprehensive trust value 0.582219 greater than the trust threshold 0.5: in the sixth cycle, node 9 is credible to node 27.
实验结果分析Analysis of results
如图7所示,(a)、(b)表示当恶意节点占所有节点的10%时,在吞吐量、正确投递率方面,添加信任机制的无线传感器网络与原始的无线传感器网络基本相同。这是因为在实验中,网络节点是随机部署的,所以可能当恶意节点数目较少时,恶意节点在整个网络中影响范围较小,而导致信任机制的效果不明显。As shown in Figure 7, (a) and (b) indicate that when malicious nodes account for 10% of all nodes, the wireless sensor network with added trust mechanism is basically the same as the original wireless sensor network in terms of throughput and correct delivery rate. This is because in the experiment, the network nodes are randomly deployed, so it may be that when the number of malicious nodes is small, the influence of malicious nodes in the entire network is small, and the effect of the trust mechanism is not obvious.
如图7中(c)、(d)所示,随着恶意节点数量的增加,信任机制的效果也更加明显。当恶意节点占所有节点的20%时,相对于原始无线传感器网络,基于信任的无线传感器网络的吞吐量和正确投递率分别平均增长15.4%、27.6%。As shown in (c) and (d) in Figure 7, as the number of malicious nodes increases, the effect of the trust mechanism is also more obvious. When malicious nodes account for 20% of all nodes, compared to the original WSN, the throughput and correct delivery rate of the trust-based WSN increase by an average of 15.4% and 27.6%, respectively.
如图7中(e)、(f)所示,当恶意节点占所有节点的30%时,基于信任机制的无线传感器网络明显优于运行原始AODV协议的无线传感器网络,吞吐量和正确投递率分别平均增长30.6%、54.8%。As shown in (e) and (f) in Figure 7, when malicious nodes account for 30% of all nodes, the wireless sensor network based on the trust mechanism is significantly better than the wireless sensor network running the original AODV protocol, in terms of throughput and correct delivery rate The average growth rate was 30.6% and 54.8% respectively.
如图7中(g)、(h)所示,基于信任机制的无线传感器网络的网络开销要高于原始的无线传感器网络,这是因为添加信任机制的无线传感器网络可能会因为处理不可信节点而引起的新的路由发现过程而增加一些网络开销,而且信任计算过程,特别是推荐信任获取过程都需要一些额外的网络开销。但是,可以发现,当恶意节点数量不断增加时,原始的无线传感器网络开销迅速增长,而基于信任机制的无线传感器网络开销则基本保持不变。As shown in (g) and (h) in Figure 7, the network overhead of the wireless sensor network based on the trust mechanism is higher than that of the original wireless sensor network, because the wireless sensor network with the added trust mechanism may have problems due to the processing of untrusted nodes However, the new route discovery process will increase some network overhead, and the trust calculation process, especially the recommended trust acquisition process will require some additional network overhead. However, it can be found that when the number of malicious nodes continues to increase, the original wireless sensor network overhead increases rapidly, while the trust mechanism-based wireless sensor network overhead remains basically unchanged.
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| CN114666795A (en) * | 2022-04-01 | 2022-06-24 | 西北工业大学 | Node behavior-based underwater acoustic sensing network node reliability evaluation method |
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