CN105656897B - The method for detecting the method and apparatus of port loop and preventing port loop detection message attack - Google Patents
The method for detecting the method and apparatus of port loop and preventing port loop detection message attack Download PDFInfo
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- CN105656897B CN105656897B CN201610005061.6A CN201610005061A CN105656897B CN 105656897 B CN105656897 B CN 105656897B CN 201610005061 A CN201610005061 A CN 201610005061A CN 105656897 B CN105656897 B CN 105656897B
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1408—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic by monitoring network traffic
- H04L63/1416—Event detection, e.g. attack signature detection
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1475—Passive attacks, e.g. eavesdropping or listening without modification of the traffic monitored
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Abstract
A method of the method and apparatus of detection port loop and port loop detection message attack is prevented, belongs to data communication field, be to loop in the prior art or bogusware attack detecting, technical essential for solving the problems, such as：Have：Sa. the step of constructing loop detection message；And Sb. judges that there are loop free or the possible step of virus attack in port；And Sc. judges whether there is the step of physical rings or virus attack.Effect is：Realize the detection of loop or bogusware attack.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to data communication fields, particularly relate to a kind of side preventing port loop detection message attack
Method.
Background technology
The mistake of network connection or configuration can lead to occur loop in network.Once occurring loop in network, the network equipment
(interchanger) will carry out broadcasting packet, multicast message and unknown unicast message to repeat transmission, to cause broadcast storm, lead
Cause network paralysis.Caused by order to solve the problems, such as network loop this, may be used various Spanning-Tree Protocols (STP, RSTP,
MSTP), the agreements such as rapid ring protection protocol (RRPP) avoid the appearance of loop.However, Spanning-Tree Protocol can not detect list
Existing loop under port, when the network flow of looped network is excessive or it is unidirectional obstructed when above-mentioned agreement can also fail.Therefore, it is necessary to carry
For a kind of testing mechanism, the loop detection occurred in network can be come out.Then many network equipment vendors develop loop detection
Technology：The network equipment is by sending loop detection message and detecting whether it returns to this equipment, if loop detection message returns to this
Equipment is it is assumed that there are loops for the port.
But existing port loop detection can be attacked by bogusware：Bogusware oneself constructs loop detection message
Or the loop detection message of capture is sent to the network equipment, when loop may not had by causing the network equipment actually,
But wrong report has loop.Therefore the network equipment just needs to take precautions against attack of the bogusware to loop detection mechanism.
Such as the Chinese invention patent application of publication No. CN101005412A, disclosing one kind preventing port loop detection message
The realization method and system of attack, wherein the loop detection message implementation method based on random code, concrete scheme are " 1.
According to equipment rack MAC Address and system clock, 1 unique random code is generated within every 1 second；2. loop of the construction with random code is examined
Observe and predict text；3. intercept loop detection message, if at least received in 1 second 100 parts with random code it is matched if think that there are rings
Road, otherwise it is assumed that loop is not present.If not receiving loop detection message in 1 second, random code is reconfigured." this method is most
Pipe can reach certain detection result, but still have following defects or problem：I.e. if loop is not present on physical network,
But bogusware replicates the loop detection message containing random code received, repeats to send immediately after multiple
(more than 100 times), such network equipment can still be received in 1 second more than 100 parts and the matched loop detection report of random code
Text, to be mistaken for, there are loops.
Invention content
In view of defects in the prior art, the technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to：To loop in the prior art
Or bogusware attack detecting；And makes every effort to comprehensive, accurately distinguishes loop or bogusware.
To achieve the goals above, the present invention adopts the following technical scheme that：
A method of detection port loop has：Sa. the step of constructing loop detection message；And Sb. judges that port has
Loop free or the possible step of virus attack；And Sc. judges whether there is the step of physical rings or virus attack.
The invention further relates to a kind of devices of detection port loop, including：Constructing module constructs loop detection message；Ring
Road and the possible judgment module of virus attack, judge that port has loop free or virus attack may；Physical rings or virus attack are sentenced
Disconnected module, judges whether there is physical rings or virus attack.
The invention further relates to a kind of methods preventing port loop detection message attack：Include the following steps：
Step 1. constructs privately owned unicast mac address pond P；
Step 2. randomly selects 2 privately owned unicast mac address A0 and A1 from privately owned unicast mac address pond P；
Step 3. switch fabric loop detection message F0 and F1；
Loop detection message F0 passes through using the privately owned unicast mac address A0 that randomly selects as purpose MAC Address, source MAC
Location is that bridge MAC Address or interface mac address construct；Loop detection message F1 is by the way that using A1 as purpose MAC Address, A0 is source MAC
Address architecture；
Step 4. interchanger sends loop detection message F0；
Step 5. interchanger, which waits for, receives loop detection message F0；
If step 6. does not receive loop detection message F0, return to step 2 within the T0 times of setting；Otherwise confirm doubtful
There are loops, go to step 7；
If step 7. does not receive loop detection message F0 within the T1 times, step 8 is gone to；Otherwise, step 9 is gone to；
If the MAC Address number in step 8. switch mac address table under the port is 1 and is the source MAC of F0,
It is determined as the port from ring；Otherwise, then it is determined as bogusware single attack, after waiting for the T0 times, return to step 2；
Step 9. interchanger sends loop detection message F1；
Certain a period of time T2 to be set such as step 10.；
Step 11. exchanges function and receives loop detection message F0, then when being determined as the unlimited attack of bogusware or T1
Between do not rest attack in section；Otherwise, step 12 is gone to；
If step 12. can receive loop detection message F1, it is determined as under the interface that there are loops；Otherwise, it is determined that being
Bogusware limited number of time is attacked.
Compared with prior art, beneficial effects of the present invention：
1. since privately owned unicast mac address randomly selects, if bogusware is wanted to construct loop detection message hair
It is difficult that successfully (bogusware is difficult to guess which the privately owned unicast mac address that epicycle randomly selects is to play active attack to be
It is a).
2. bogusware is difficult to initiate passive attack by way of reflection, because the purpose MAC of loop detection message
Location is not fixed multicast address (broadcast address), and bogusware is difficult to judge received message which is loop detection report
Text.
3. if bogusware initiates passive attack (reception is judged after being loop detection message, replicates and sends), no matter
Bogusware initiates limited number of time attack (only hair 1 time or only hair is for several times within certain time) or initiates attack (or one infinitely
Do not rest attack in section of fixing time), this algorithm can identify.With single port from the complete of ring, physical rings or virus attack
Face and accurately detection and judgement.
Description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is the method for the present invention flow chart of steps.
Specific implementation mode
Below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and the technical solution that further illustrates the present invention of specific embodiment.
Embodiment 1:A method of prevent the port loop detection message attack, steps flow chart from being：
1. the privately owned unicast mac address pond P of construction.Privately owned unicast mac address refers to：Certain specific network equipment will not be distributed to
The unicast mac address that all-network equipment (interface) does not use in the unicast mac address or local network of (interface).Due to private
There is unicast mac address not used in the home network by miscellaneous equipment (interface), therefore, interchanger is receiving target MAC (Media Access Control) address
For the forwarding that floods will be carried out after the message of privately owned unicast mac address.
The privately owned unicast mac address pond of oneself company can be used in network equipment vendor, such as the privately owned MAC of Digital China Corporation
Location pond initial address is 00-30-0F-30-00-00；Our company Local Administrated Address can also be used to make
For privately owned unicast mac address pond, as OUI can be used to construct privately owned unicast mac address pond for 00-30-0F for Digital China Corporation
Initial address is 02-30-0F-00-00-00.The unicast address pond 00-00-5E-00-00-00 that IANA can also be used to retain is arrived
00-00-5E-FF-FF-FF。
Number of addresses in privately owned unicast mac address pond cannot very little also need not be too many, hundreds of to thousands of.
2. randomly selecting 2 privately owned unicast mac address A0 and A1 from privately owned unicast mac address pond.
3. constructing loop detection message F0 and F1.Using the privately owned unicast mac address A0 that randomly selects as purpose MAC Address,
Source MAC is that bridge MAC Address (or interface mac address) constructs a loop detection message F0.Using A1 as purpose MAC Address,
A0 is that source MAC constructs loop detection message F1.
Bogusware is identified according to the type field value of loop detection message in order to prevent, the type field of F0 and F1
Value can in defined value range random value.
4. sending loop detection message F0.Since the target MAC (Media Access Control) address A0 of F0 (is not connect in the home network by miscellaneous equipment
Mouthful) use, therefore, receiving the interchanger of F0 will flood.
Loop detection message F0 is received 5. waiting for.
6. if (such as 1 second) does not receive loop detection message F0 within the T0 times of setting, return to the 2nd step；Otherwise it (doubts
Seemingly there is loop), turn the 7th step.
If (such as 0.1 second, T1 is less than the ageing time of switch mac address table) does not receive F0 7. within the T1 times,
Turn the 8th step；Otherwise, turn the 9th step.
If 8. MAC Address number in switch mac address table (content-addressable memory) under the port be 1 and be F0 source MAC
Location is then determined as the port from ring；Otherwise, then it is determined as bogusware single attack, after waiting for the T0 times, returns to the 2nd
Step.
9. sending loop detection message F1.Since the source MAC of F1 is A0, if there are physics loop F1 will clear up loop
In F0 (F0 will disappear in 1-2 seconds)；Since the target MAC (Media Access Control) address A1 of F1 is not in the home network by miscellaneous equipment (interface)
It uses, therefore, receiving the interchanger of F1 will flood.
10. etc. certain a period of time T2 to be set.T2 time value suggestions are set as from F0 is sent to receiving the time used in F0
1.1 times.
11. if F0 can be received, it is determined as that bogusware is attacked and (attacks or do not rest in the T1 periods infinitely and attack
It hits)；Otherwise, turn 12.
12. if F1 can be received, it is determined as under the interface that there are loops；Otherwise, it is determined that being attacked for bogusware (limited
Secondary attack).
Embodiment 2:A method of port loop detection message attack is prevented, is included the following steps：
Step 1. constructs privately owned unicast mac address pond P；
The privately owned unicast mac address refers to：With being not allocated to the unicast MAC of the arbitrary specific network equipment or interface
Location, or not by all-network equipment or interface use in local network unicast mac address.
Step 2. randomly selects 2 privately owned unicast mac address A0 and A1 from privately owned unicast mac address pond P；
Step 3. network equipment (interchanger) constructs loop detection message F0 and F1；
Loop detection message F0 passes through using the privately owned unicast mac address A0 that randomly selects as purpose MAC Address, source MAC
Location is that bridge MAC Address or interface mac address construct；
Loop detection message F1 is by the way that using A1 as purpose MAC Address, A0 constructs for source MAC；
Preferably, bogusware is identified according to the type field value of loop detection message in order to prevent, the loop
The type field value of detection messages F0 and F1 value range as defined in DIXEthernetv2 standards, IEEE802.3 standards
Interior random value.
Step 4. network equipment (interchanger) sends loop detection message F0；
Step 5. network equipment (interchanger), which waits for, receives loop detection message F0；
If step 6. does not receive loop detection message F0, return to step 2 within the T0 times of setting；Otherwise confirm doubtful
There are loops, go to step 7；
If step 7. does not receive F0 within the T1 times, step 8 is gone to；Otherwise, step 9 is gone to；
T1 must be less than the ageing time of switch mac address table, for example be set as 0.1s.
If the MAC Address number in step 8. switch mac address table under the port is 1 and is the source MAC of F0,
It is determined as the port from ring；Otherwise, then it is determined as bogusware single attack, after waiting for the T0 times, return to step 2；
Step 9. network equipment (interchanger) sends loop detection message F1；
Certain a period of time T2 to be set such as step 10.；
Preferably, the T2 time values are set as from F0 is sent to receiving 1.1 times of the time used in F0.
If step 11. network equipment (interchanger) can receive F0, be determined as bogusware attack (infinitely attack or
Attack is not rested in the T1 periods)；Otherwise, step 12 is gone to.
If step 12. can receive F1, it is determined as under the interface that there are loops；Otherwise, it is determined that being attacked for bogusware
(limited number of time attack).
Embodiment 3:A method of detection port loop has：Sa. the step of constructing loop detection message；And Sb. sentences
Interruptive port has loop free or the possible step of virus attack；And Sc. judges whether there is the step of physical rings or virus attack.
Embodiment 4:A method of detection port loop has：Sa. the step of constructing loop detection message；Sb. judge
There are loop free or the possible step of virus attack in port；Sbc. judge whether there is single port from ring the step of；Sc. it judges whether there is
The step of physical rings or virus attack.
Embodiment 5:A method of detection port loop has：SA1. privately owned unicast mac address pond is constructed；SA2. from
2 privately owned unicast mac address A0 and A1 are randomly selected in privately owned unicast mac address pond P.Sa. the step of loop detection message is constructed
Suddenly；And Sb. judges that there are loop free or the possible step of virus attack in port；And Sc. judges whether there is physical rings or virus is attacked
The step of hitting.
Embodiment 6:A method of detection port loop has：SA1. privately owned unicast mac address pond is constructed；SA2. from
2 privately owned unicast mac address A0 and A1 are randomly selected in privately owned unicast mac address pond P.Sa. the step of loop detection message is constructed
Suddenly；Sb. judge that there are loop free or the possible step of virus attack in port；Sbc. judge whether there is single port from ring the step of；And
Sc. the step of judging whether there is physical rings or virus attack.
Embodiment 7:With with embodiment 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 identical technical solutions, more specifically：The step Sa
In, construct detection messages F0, F1, and the Sb. judges that port has the loop free or the possible step of virus attack to be specially：
Sb1. the network equipment sends loop detection message F0；Sb2. the network equipment, which waits for, receives loop detection message F0；If Sb3. setting
Loop detection message F0 is received in the fixed T0 times, then judges that there are loop or the possibility of virus attack.
Embodiment 8:With with embodiment 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 identical technical solutions, more specifically：The Sc.
The step of judging whether there is physical rings or virus attack be specially：Sc1. the network equipment sends loop detection message F1；Sc2. etc.
Certain a period of time T2 to be set；If Sc3. in time T2, the network equipment receives loop detection message F0, then is determined as disease
Malicious attack infinitely or the attack that do not rest in the T1 periods；Otherwise, step Sc4 is gone to；Sc4. the network equipment receives loop inspection
Literary F1 is observed and predicted, then is determined as under the port that there are physics loops；Otherwise, it is determined that being attacked for bogusware limited number of time.
The purpose for sending message F1 is, clears up the F0 in loop, and the F0 cleared up remains to be received, and illustrates in the presence of disease
Poison attack, and this attack is unlimited number of attack, otherwise, is not received by F0, then it is assumed that there are physical rings, or there is disease
The limited number of time of malicious software is attacked, this when, then is judged in the T2 times, if F1 is received, if receiving F1, so that it may to say
Bright its is really a physical rings, and otherwise, explanation is the virus attack of a limited number of time.
Embodiment 9:With with embodiment 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 identical technical solutions, more specifically：In structure
When making loop detection message, loop detection message F0 by using the privately owned unicast mac address A0 that randomly selects as purpose MAC
Location, source MAC are that bridge MAC Address or interface mac address construct；Loop detection message F1 by using A1 as purpose MAC Address,
A0 constructs for source MAC.
Embodiment 10.A kind of device of detection port loop, including：
Constructing module constructs loop detection message；
Loop and the possible judgment module of virus attack, judge that port has loop free or virus attack may；
Physical rings or virus attack judgment module, judge whether there is physical rings or virus attack.
Embodiment 11.With technical solution same as in Example 10, more specifically：Further include：Single port is sentenced from ring
Disconnected module, judges whether there is single port from ring.
Embodiment 12.With technical solution same as in Example 10, more specifically：The constructing module, construction
Detection messages F0, F1, and the loop and the possible judgment module of virus attack, including：
F0 sending modules, the network equipment send loop detection message F0；
F0 receiving modules, the network equipment, which waits for, receives loop detection message F0；
First judgment module, if receiving loop detection message F0 within the T0 times of setting, judge there are loop or
The possibility of virus attack；
Embodiment 13.With with embodiment 10 or 11 or 12 identical technical solutions, more specifically：The physical rings
Or virus attack judgment module, including：
F1 sending modules, the network equipment send loop detection message F1；
Module is waited for, certain a period of time T2 to be set is waited；
Second judgment module, if in time T2, the network equipment receives loop detection message F0, then is determined as viral nothing
Limit time attack or the attack that do not rest in the T1 periods；
Third judgment module, the network equipment receive loop detection message F1, then are determined as under the port that there are physical rings
Road；Otherwise, it is determined that being attacked for bogusware limited number of time.
Embodiment 14.With with embodiment 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 identical technical solutions, more specifically：Single port is certainly
Ring judgment module, including：
T1 time F0 receiving modules, judge whether to receive detection messages F0 within the T1 times；
4th judgment module, when judging to receive detection messages F0 within the T1 times, if the end in switch mac address table
Mouthful lower MAC Address number is 1 and is the source MAC of detection messages F0, then is determined as that the port is single port from ring；Otherwise,
Then it is determined as bogusware single attack.
The foregoing is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, but scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto,
Any one skilled in the art in the technical scope disclosed by the present invention, according to the technique and scheme of the present invention and its
Inventive concept is subject to equivalent substitution or change, should be covered by the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (1)
1. a kind of method preventing port loop detection message attack, it is characterised in that：Include the following steps：
Step 1. constructs privately owned unicast mac address pond P；
Step 2. randomly selects 2 privately owned unicast mac address A0 and A1 from privately owned unicast mac address pond P；
Step 3. switch fabric loop detection message F0 and F1；
Loop detection message F0 by being as purpose MAC Address, source MAC using the privately owned unicast mac address A0 randomly selected
Bridge MAC Address or interface mac address construction；Loop detection message F1 is by the way that using A1 as purpose MAC Address, A0 is source MAC
Construction；
Step 4. interchanger sends loop detection message F0；
Step 5. interchanger, which waits for, receives loop detection message F0；
If step 6. does not receive loop detection message F0, return to step 2 within the T0 times of setting；Otherwise confirm doubtful presence
Loop goes to step 7；
If step 7. does not receive loop detection message F0 within the T1 times, step 8 is gone to；Otherwise, step 9 is gone to；
If the MAC Address number in step 8. switch mac address table under the port is 1 and is the source MAC of F0, judge
It is the port from ring；Otherwise, then it is determined as bogusware single attack, after waiting for the T0 times, return to step 2；
Step 9. interchanger sends loop detection message F1；
Certain a period of time T2 to be set such as step 10.；
Step 11. exchanges function and receives loop detection message F0, then is determined as the unlimited attack of bogusware or T1 periods
Attack is not rested inside；Otherwise, step 12 is gone to；
If step 12. can receive loop detection message F1, it is determined as under the interface that there are loops；Otherwise, it is determined that for virus
Software limited number of time is attacked.
Priority Applications (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201810384916.XA CN108418838B (en) | 2016-01-05 | 2016-01-05 | A Method for Detecting Port Loops |
| CN201610005061.6A CN105656897B (en) | 2016-01-05 | 2016-01-05 | The method for detecting the method and apparatus of port loop and preventing port loop detection message attack |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201610005061.6A CN105656897B (en) | 2016-01-05 | 2016-01-05 | The method for detecting the method and apparatus of port loop and preventing port loop detection message attack |
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| CN201810384916.XA Division CN108418838B (en) | 2016-01-05 | 2016-01-05 | A Method for Detecting Port Loops |
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| CN201810384916.XA Expired - Fee Related CN108418838B (en) | 2016-01-05 | 2016-01-05 | A Method for Detecting Port Loops |
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Citations (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN101005412A (en) * | 2007-01-29 | 2007-07-25 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Realizing method and system for preventing port loop detection message attack |
| CN101179455A (en) * | 2007-12-07 | 2008-05-14 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Method and system for implementing VLAN based port loop detection |
| US8107382B2 (en) * | 2006-03-31 | 2012-01-31 | Avaya Holdings Limited | Loop detection in a communications network |
Family Cites Families (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JP3947146B2 (en) * | 2003-09-18 | 2007-07-18 | 富士通株式会社 | Routing loop detection program and routing loop detection method |
| US20050076140A1 (en) * | 2003-09-24 | 2005-04-07 | Hei Tao Fung | [topology loop detection mechanism] |
| CN101707538B (en) * | 2009-11-25 | 2011-09-14 | 烽火通信科技股份有限公司 | Method for detecting and automatically recovering Ethernet loopback |
| TWI424713B (en) * | 2009-12-02 | 2014-01-21 | Realtek Semiconductor Corp | Loop detection method and network device applying the same |
-
2016
- 2016-01-05 CN CN201610005061.6A patent/CN105656897B/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
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Patent Citations (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US8107382B2 (en) * | 2006-03-31 | 2012-01-31 | Avaya Holdings Limited | Loop detection in a communications network |
| CN101005412A (en) * | 2007-01-29 | 2007-07-25 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Realizing method and system for preventing port loop detection message attack |
| CN101179455A (en) * | 2007-12-07 | 2008-05-14 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | Method and system for implementing VLAN based port loop detection |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN108418838B (en) | 2020-08-07 |
| CN105656897A (en) | 2016-06-08 |
| CN108418838A (en) | 2018-08-17 |
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