CN104869116B - Telecommunications network signaling security active protection method - Google Patents
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Abstract
本发明涉及一种电信网信令安全主动防护方法,通过对信令数据在承载的协议种类、呼叫标识、携带参数和传送通道进行多维一体的动态等价变换,使得同一呼叫或不同呼叫中涉及的控制信令,在时空域上失去其固有的相似性和确定性,呈现出多样化、动态化和随机化,形成针对信令攻击的主动防护能力。本发明以获得网情信息和窃取用户隐私信息为目的的网络攻击行为或攻击前期准备行为具备了很好地提前发现和预防能力,在不改变信令协议格式规范的前提下,引入信令数据多层次动态等价变换机制,使信令数据对通信双方之外的第三方在时空域上呈现出无规律性和跳变性,加大网络攻击者截获和正确重组还原信令信息的难度,达到提升电信网信令安全防护能力的目的。
The invention relates to an active protection method for signaling security in a telecommunication network. By performing multi-dimensional and integrated dynamic equivalent transformation on signaling data carried by protocol types, call identifiers, carried parameters and transmission channels, the same call or different calls involve Control signaling loses its inherent similarity and certainty in the space-time domain and presents diversification, dynamics and randomization, forming an active defense capability against signaling attacks. The present invention has a good ability to detect and prevent network attacks or pre-attack preparations for the purpose of obtaining network information and stealing user privacy information in advance, and introduces signaling data without changing the specification of the signaling protocol format The multi-level dynamic equivalence transformation mechanism makes the signaling data irregular and jumping in the space-time domain to third parties other than the communication parties, making it more difficult for network attackers to intercept and correctly reassemble and restore the signaling information, achieving The purpose of improving the security protection capability of telecommunication network signaling.
Description
技术领域technical field
本发明涉及通信技术领域,特别涉及一种电信网信令安全主动防护方法。The invention relates to the field of communication technology, in particular to a method for actively protecting signaling security of a telecommunication network.
背景技术Background technique
针对当前基于事后统计规律被动地发现和阻断已经发生的信令攻击行为的电信网信令信息实施安全防护方法对以获得网情信息和窃取用户隐私信息为目的的网络攻击行为或攻击前期准备行为并不具备发现和预防能力的问题,本发明提供了一种电信网信令安全主动防护方法,用以解决上述技术问题。本发明为电信网信令安全防护提供一种新的解决方案。相关方法适用于采用PSTN、软交换等各种技术体制,具有高安全等级要求的专用电信网络的建设或安全性能升级。通信信令是电信网的控制信号,各类电信业务都是在信令的控制和引导下完成呼叫接续和通信过程。信令中携带大量与网络拓扑、通信个体行为密切相关的信息。以基本的电话呼叫为例,从呼叫开始到呼叫结束的过程中,电话交换设备间需要通过信令交互传递网络路由及信道地址、业务种类及媒体编解码格式、终端种类及身份标识、主叫用户号码、被叫用户号码、呼叫开始时间、结束时间等信息。对这些信息进行分析统计即可了解掌握电信网的核心网元配置分布、网络规模与拓扑结构、业务路由构成及资源配备、用户号段编配及用户数量等网络关键信息,还可掌握电信用户的通信地址、个人习惯与行为规律、社会关系等私密信息。网络攻击者一旦掌握这些信息,不仅有助于针对网络核心区域、关键节点设备实施扰乱致瘫等攻击活动,还可借助信令引导,针对目标电信用户实施通信窃听、业务劫持或拒绝服务攻击等不法网络行为。Implement security protection methods for the signaling information of the telecommunication network based on post-event statistical rules to passively discover and block signaling attacks that have occurred Behaviors do not have the ability to detect and prevent. The present invention provides an active protection method for telecommunication network signaling security to solve the above technical problems. The invention provides a new solution for the security protection of telecommunication network signaling. Relevant methods are applicable to the construction or security performance upgrade of private telecommunication networks with high security level requirements using various technical systems such as PSTN and softswitch. Communication signaling is the control signal of the telecommunication network, and all kinds of telecommunication services complete the call connection and communication process under the control and guidance of the signaling. Signaling carries a large amount of information closely related to network topology and communication individual behavior. Taking a basic telephone call as an example, in the process from the beginning of the call to the end of the call, the telephone exchange equipment needs to communicate the network route and channel address, service type and media codec format, terminal type and identity, and caller User number, called user number, call start time, end time and other information. By analyzing and counting these information, we can understand key network information such as configuration and distribution of core network elements of the telecom network, network scale and topology, service routing composition and resource allocation, user number segment allocation and number of users, as well as telecom user numbers. Private information such as mailing addresses, personal habits and behavior patterns, and social relations. Once a network attacker has access to this information, it will not only help attack activities such as disrupting and paralyzing the core area of the network and key node equipment, but also use signaling guidance to carry out communication eavesdropping, business hijacking, or denial of service attacks on target telecom users. Illegal Internet Behavior.
目前,针对电信网信令信息实施安全防护的主要方法有异常信令监测、异常信令流量管控、信令黑白名单鉴权等,这些方法都是基于事后的统计规律被动地发现和阻断已经发生的信令攻击行为,对于以获得网情信息和窃取用户隐私信息为目的的网络攻击行为或攻击前期准备行为并不具备发现和预防能力。At present, the main methods for implementing security protection for signaling information in telecommunication networks include abnormal signaling monitoring, abnormal signaling traffic control, signaling black and white list authentication, etc. These methods are based on post-event statistical rules to passively discover and block existing The signaling attacks that occur do not have the ability to detect and prevent network attacks or pre-attack preparations for the purpose of obtaining network information and stealing user privacy information.
发明内容Contents of the invention
针对现有技术中的不足,本发明提供一种电信网信令安全主动防护方法,适用于采用PSTN、软交换等技术体制,具有高安全等级要求的专用电信网络的建设或安全性能升级等。Aiming at the deficiencies in the prior art, the present invention provides an active protection method for telecommunication network signaling security, which is suitable for the construction or security performance upgrade of dedicated telecommunication networks with high security level requirements using technical systems such as PSTN and softswitch.
按照本发明所提供的设计方案,一种电信网信令安全主动防护方法,包含如下步骤:According to the design scheme provided by the present invention, a method for active protection of telecommunication network signaling security includes the following steps:
步骤1.异构协议动态切换,信令数据在交互过程中,根据电信网异构呼叫控制协议的共性要素生成包含基本流程、消息和参数的伪协议,呼叫控制时,在呼叫控制逻辑上采用伪协议进行交互,在物理承载上随机动态选择电信网异构呼叫控制协议进行呼叫控制;Step 1. Dynamic switching of heterogeneous protocols. During the interaction process of signaling data, a pseudo-protocol including basic procedures, messages and parameters is generated according to the common elements of the heterogeneous call control protocols of the telecommunication network. During call control, the call control logic adopts Pseudo-protocols are used for interaction, and heterogeneous call control protocols of the telecommunications network are randomly and dynamically selected on the physical bearer for call control;
步骤2.呼叫标识虚拟化,建立与呼叫标识组相对应的虚拟呼叫标识,呼叫标识组包含多个具有不同源信令设备、目的信令设备及呼叫编号的呼叫标识,呼叫启动时,源信令设备与目的信令设备采用虚拟呼叫标识完成握手,其后则由源信令设备与目的信令设备根据虚拟呼叫标识所对应的呼叫标识组随机可变地选择呼叫标识组中某个呼叫标识进行后续的信令消息交互和呼叫识别;Step 2. call identity virtualization, set up a virtual call identity corresponding to the call identity group, the call identity group contains a plurality of call identities with different source signaling equipment, destination signaling equipment and call numbers, when calling, the source signal The command device and the destination signaling device use the virtual call ID to complete the handshake, and then the source signaling device and the destination signaling device randomly and variablely select a call ID in the call ID group according to the call ID group corresponding to the virtual call ID Perform subsequent signaling message interaction and call identification;
步骤3.用户信息打散携带,信令控制中强制将主叫用户信息和被叫用户信息分离并结合步骤2中的虚拟呼叫标识,解除同一呼叫信令流中不同信令消息间的耦合性;Step 3. The user information is scattered and carried. In the signaling control, the calling user information and the called user information are forcibly separated and combined with the virtual call identifier in step 2 to release the coupling between different signaling messages in the same call signaling flow. ;
步骤4.信令多通道传送,基于异构呼叫控制协议,信令节点间建立不同类型的信令传送通道,针对同一类型的信令传送通道,对其两端的信令设备配置多个信令地址,由信令设备双方建立信令通道动态切换机制,结合步骤1中的异构协议动态切换,在信令数据传送中依据预制策略随机改变同向呼叫或同源同宿呼叫的信令流所使用的信令通道类型及物理路径。Step 4. Signaling multi-channel transmission. Based on the heterogeneous call control protocol, different types of signaling transmission channels are established between signaling nodes, and multiple signaling devices are configured for the same type of signaling transmission channel. address, the signaling channel dynamic switching mechanism is established by both sides of the signaling device, combined with the dynamic switching of heterogeneous protocols in step 1, the signaling flow of the same-direction call or the same-source-same-destination call is randomly changed in the signaling data transmission according to the prefabricated strategy Signaling channel type and physical path used.
所述步骤3中还包含针对敏感用户,将主叫用户信息或被叫用户信息拆分多段,通过不同的信令消息携带传送。The step 3 also includes splitting the information of the calling user or the information of the called user into multiple pieces for sensitive users, and carrying and transmitting them through different signaling messages.
步骤1中所述电信网异构呼叫控制协议包含七号信令TUP和ISUP协议、BICC协议、SIP协议。The telecommunications network heterogeneous call control protocol in step 1 includes SS7 TUP and ISUP protocols, BICC protocol, and SIP protocol.
步骤2中呼叫标识虚拟化依据七号信令多点码和IP端口多地址建立与呼叫标识组相对应的虚拟呼叫标识,虚拟呼叫标识与呼叫标识组具有相同的编码及分配方式。In step 2, the call identity virtualization establishes a virtual call identity corresponding to the call identity group according to the SS7 multi-point code and the IP port multi-address, and the virtual call identity and the call identity group have the same coding and distribution method.
本发明的有益效果:Beneficial effects of the present invention:
1.本发明通过对信令数据在承载的协议种类、呼叫标识、携带参数和传送通道等方面进行多维一体的动态等价变换,使得同一呼叫或不同呼叫中涉及的控制信令,无论从信令消息本身的参数结构、语义等方面,还是从信令流的构成、传送模式等方面,都在时空域上失去其固有的相似性和确定性,呈现出多样化、动态化和随机化,使攻击者即便截获了信令数据,也很难对大量离散、无规律的数据进行正确的重组和还原,从而形成针对信令攻击的主动防护能力,提高网络信息安全保障水平。1. The present invention performs multi-dimensional and integrated dynamic equivalent transformation on the signaling data in terms of the type of protocol carried, the call identifier, the carried parameters, and the transmission channel, so that the control signaling involved in the same call or different calls, no matter from the signaling data In terms of the parameter structure and semantics of the message itself, or from the composition of the signaling flow and the transmission mode, etc., it loses its inherent similarity and certainty in the space-time domain, and presents diversification, dynamics and randomization. Even if the attacker intercepts the signaling data, it is difficult to correctly reorganize and restore a large amount of discrete and irregular data, thereby forming an active defense capability against signaling attacks and improving the level of network information security.
2.本发明针对既有的电信业务在信令生成与传送机制上面向所有网络角色呈现出有序性和规律性及容易被网络攻击者加以利用的特性,在不改变信令协议格式规范的前提下,引入信令数据多层次动态等价变换机制,使信令数据对通信双方之外的第三方在时空域上呈现出无规律性和跳变性,从而加大网络攻击者有效截获和正确重组还原信令信息的难度,达到提升电信网信令安全防护能力的目的,适用于研制各类安全型电信网呼叫控制设备、信令网关设备等。2. The present invention aims at presenting orderliness and regularity to all network roles in the signaling generation and transmission mechanism of the existing telecommunication services, and is easy to be exploited by network attackers, without changing the specification of the signaling protocol format Under the premise, the multi-level dynamic equivalent transformation mechanism of signaling data is introduced, so that the signaling data presents irregularities and jumps in the space-time domain to third parties other than the two parties in communication, thereby increasing the effective interception and correctness of network attackers. The difficulty of recombining and restoring signaling information achieves the purpose of improving the security protection capability of telecommunication network signaling, and is suitable for the development of various types of secure telecommunication network call control equipment, signaling gateway equipment, etc.
3.本发明以获得网情信息和窃取用户隐私信息为目的的网络攻击行为或攻击前期准备行为具备了很好地提前发现和预防能力。该方法针对既有的电信业务在信令生成与传送机制上面向所有网络角色呈现出有序性和规律性,容易被网络攻击者加以利用的特性,在不改变信令协议格式规范的前提下,引入信令数据多层次动态等价变换机制,使信令数据对通信双方之外的第三方在时空域上呈现出无规律性和跳变性,从而加大网络攻击者有效截获和正确重组还原信令信息的难度,达到提升电信网信令安全防护能力的目的。3. The present invention has a good ability to detect and prevent network attacks or pre-attack preparations for the purpose of obtaining network information and stealing user privacy information. This method aims at the orderliness and regularity of all network roles in the signaling generation and transmission mechanism of the existing telecommunication services, which is easy to be exploited by network attackers. , introducing a multi-level dynamic equivalent transformation mechanism for signaling data, so that the signaling data presents irregularity and jumps in the space-time domain to third parties other than the two parties in communication, thereby increasing the effective interception and correct recombination and restoration of network attackers The difficulty of signaling information achieves the purpose of improving the security protection capability of telecommunication network signaling.
附图说明:Description of drawings:
图1为本发明电信网信令安全主动防护方法工作原理示意图。FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of the working principle of the active protection method for signaling security of a telecommunication network according to the present invention.
具体实施方式:detailed description:
下面结合附图和技术方案对本发明作进一步详细的说明,并通过优选的实施例详细说明本发明的实施方式,但本发明的实施方式并不限于此。The present invention will be described in further detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and technical solutions, and the implementation of the present invention will be described in detail through preferred embodiments, but the implementation of the present invention is not limited thereto.
异构协议动态切换、呼叫标识虚拟化、用户信息打散携带和信令通道动态切换技术,对信令数据在承载的协议种类、呼叫标识、携带参数和传送通道等方面进行多层次动态等价变换,以建立电信网信令控制与传送动态性和第三方视图上无序性的技术原理。常用的电信网呼叫控制协议包括七号信令TUP和ISUP协议、BICC协议、SIP协议等,它们有不同的消息集、不同的消息结构、不同的参数种类以及不同的消息编码方式等,但在交互过程和交互的信息要素上,不同协议间存在共性,可以此为基础,抽象出包含基本流程、消息和参数的“伪协议”。呼叫建立时,在呼叫控制逻辑上采用“伪协议”进行交互,但在物理承载时根据当前安全策略随机选取各种真实协议进行封装,从而实现针对不同呼叫甚至同一呼叫的不同控制过程,可随机选择异构信令协议进行呼叫控制。通过异构协议动态切换机制,一方面可在信令信息层面呈现出多样化和随机性,增大攻击者利用信令数据分析掌握网络关键参数和用户私密信息的难度,另一方面也可有效避免攻击者利用某种信令协议可能存在的漏洞发起信令攻击而带来的网络安全风险。呼叫标识是信令控制过程中用于区分不同呼叫并在一定的时间和空间范围内唯一确定一个呼叫的一组相关标签信息,通常包含三个基本要素:源信令设备标识、目的信令设备标识和呼叫编号。呼叫标识隐含着网络设备及其相互连接关系,在现有的网络规划和实际运行中,呼叫标识一般是一对一的静态配置。通过分析信令消息所携带的呼叫标识,很容易提取出网络拓扑结构和业务关系。用户信息是通信过程中主叫用户、被叫用户双方的属性参数,包括用户电话号码或网络地址等。用户信息封装在信令消息中,作为通信重要参数通过信令进行传递,用来对呼叫进行鉴权认证和地址翻译,指引呼叫控制设备进行路由选择和建立呼叫连接。通过分析大量的用户信息,可以了解掌握网络中的用户构成、数量和相互间的通联关系等敏感信息。在标准的信令流程设计中,用户信息一般通过一个信令消息集中携带(例如呼叫建立消息),其好处是可以简化通信控制过程、提高呼叫接续效率,但不足是攻击者只需截获每个呼叫业务的一条信令消息而无需截获完整信令流程,就可能达到窃取用户敏感信息或据此实施其它攻击的目的。信令通道是指用于传递信令数据的网络路径。出现信令传送服务均衡原则和管理便利的目的,信令传送通道一般与信令来源、目的地及媒体端口标识静态绑定,除非信令通道发生拥塞或故障,否则同类呼叫的信令路径相对固定。这种特性在给网络运营者带来“有序、便利”的同时,也留下了较大的安全隐患,攻击者只需在一定时间内对截获的信令数据进行跟踪分析,即可发现规律并加以利用,下面通过实施例进行详细介绍。Heterogeneous protocol dynamic switching, call identification virtualization, user information fragmentation and portability, and signaling channel dynamic switching technology, and multi-level dynamic equivalent of signaling data in terms of the type of protocol carried, call identification, carried parameters, and transmission channels. Transformation to establish the technical principle of telecommunication network signaling control and transmission dynamics and disorder in third-party view. Commonly used telecommunication network call control protocols include SS7 TUP and ISUP protocols, BICC protocol, SIP protocol, etc. They have different message sets, different message structures, different parameter types and different message encoding methods, etc., but in In terms of the interaction process and the information elements of the interaction, there are commonalities among different protocols. Based on this, a "pseudo-protocol" including basic processes, messages, and parameters can be abstracted. When a call is set up, a "pseudo-protocol" is used for interaction in the call control logic, but various real protocols are randomly selected for encapsulation according to the current security policy during the physical bearer, so as to realize different control processes for different calls or even the same call. Select a heterogeneous signaling protocol for call control. Through the dynamic switching mechanism of heterogeneous protocols, on the one hand, it can present diversification and randomness at the level of signaling information, increasing the difficulty for attackers to use signaling data analysis to grasp key network parameters and user private information; on the other hand, it can also effectively Avoid network security risks caused by attackers using possible loopholes in a certain signaling protocol to initiate signaling attacks. Call ID is a group of related label information used to distinguish different calls and uniquely determine a call within a certain time and space range in the signaling control process. It usually contains three basic elements: source signaling device identification, destination signaling device ID and call number. Call IDs imply network devices and their interconnection relationships. In existing network planning and actual operation, call IDs are generally one-to-one static configurations. By analyzing the call identification carried in the signaling message, it is easy to extract the network topology and service relationship. User information is the attribute parameters of both the calling user and the called user during the communication process, including the user's phone number or network address. The user information is encapsulated in the signaling message, which is transmitted through the signaling as an important communication parameter, and is used for authentication and address translation of the call, and guides the call control device to perform route selection and establish a call connection. By analyzing a large amount of user information, it is possible to understand sensitive information such as user composition, quantity, and mutual communication relationship in the network. In the standard signaling process design, user information is usually carried centrally through a signaling message (such as a call setup message). The advantage is that it can simplify the communication control process and improve the efficiency of call connection. A single signaling message of the call service may achieve the purpose of stealing sensitive user information or carrying out other attacks based on it without intercepting the complete signaling process. A signaling channel refers to a network path used to transfer signaling data. For the purpose of signaling transmission service balance principle and convenient management, the signaling transmission channel is generally statically bound with the signaling source, destination and media port identifier, unless the signaling channel is congested or faulty, the signaling path of the same call is relatively fixed. While this feature brings "order and convenience" to network operators, it also leaves a relatively large security risk. Attackers only need to track and analyze the intercepted signaling data within a certain period of time to find out Rules and make use of them, the following are described in detail through the embodiments.
实施例一,参见图1所示,一种电信网信令安全主动防护方法,包含如下步骤:Embodiment 1, as shown in FIG. 1, a method for active protection of telecommunication network signaling security includes the following steps:
步骤1.异构协议动态切换,信令数据在交互过程中,根据电信网异构呼叫控制协议的共性要素生成包含基本流程、消息和参数的伪协议,呼叫控制时,在呼叫控制逻辑上采用伪协议进行交互,在物理承载上随机动态选择电信网异构呼叫控制协议进行呼叫控制,其中,共性要素主要指形式和称呼不同但含义和作用相同的命令和参数等的要素;Step 1. Dynamic switching of heterogeneous protocols. During the interaction process of signaling data, a pseudo-protocol including basic procedures, messages and parameters is generated according to the common elements of the heterogeneous call control protocols of the telecommunication network. During call control, the call control logic adopts Pseudo-protocol interaction, random and dynamic selection of telecommunications network heterogeneous call control protocols on the physical bearer for call control, in which common elements mainly refer to elements such as commands and parameters with different forms and names but the same meaning and function;
步骤2.呼叫标识虚拟化,建立与呼叫标识组相对应的虚拟呼叫标识,呼叫标识组包含多个具有不同源信令设备、目的信令设备及呼叫编号的呼叫标识,呼叫启动时,源信令设备与目的信令设备采用虚拟呼叫标识完成握手,其后则由源信令设备与目的信令设备根据虚拟呼叫标识所对应的呼叫标识组随机可变地选择呼叫标识组中某个呼叫标识进行后续的信令消息交互和呼叫识别,呼叫从开始到结束都使用同一个三元组以标识同一次呼叫,本方法则分配多个不同三元组来标识同一次呼叫,将呼叫标识从现有的一对一的关系变为多对一的关系,从而实现呼叫标识的虚拟化;Step 2. call identity virtualization, set up a virtual call identity corresponding to the call identity group, the call identity group contains a plurality of call identities with different source signaling equipment, destination signaling equipment and call numbers, when calling, the source signal The command device and the destination signaling device use the virtual call ID to complete the handshake, and then the source signaling device and the destination signaling device randomly and variablely select a call ID in the call ID group according to the call ID group corresponding to the virtual call ID For subsequent signaling message interaction and call identification, the same triplet is used to identify the same call from the beginning to the end of the call. This method allocates multiple different triplets to identify the same call, and the call identifier is changed from the current Some one-to-one relationships are changed to many-to-one relationships, so as to realize the virtualization of call identification;
步骤3.用户信息打散携带,信令控制中强制将主叫用户信息和被叫用户信息分离并结合步骤2中的虚拟呼叫标识,解除同一呼叫信令流中不同信令消息间的耦合性,首先通过虚拟呼叫标识来解除同一次呼叫涉及的信令流中不同信令消息间基于呼叫标识的关联,其次通过将一般在同一个消息中携带的主叫与被叫用户信息分开并在不同的消息中携带,从而进一步主叫和被叫用户信息之间的关联;Step 3. The user information is scattered and carried. In the signaling control, the calling user information and the called user information are forcibly separated and combined with the virtual call identifier in step 2 to release the coupling between different signaling messages in the same call signaling flow. Firstly, the virtual call ID is used to disassociate the association between different signaling messages in the signaling flow involved in the same call based on the call ID, and secondly, by separating the calling and called user information usually carried in the same message Carried in the message, so as to further associate the calling and called user information;
步骤4.信令多通道传送,基于异构呼叫控制协议,信令节点间建立不同类型的信令传送通道,针对同一类型的信令传送通道,对其两端的信令设备配置多个信令地址,由信令设备双方建立信令通道动态切换机制,结合步骤1中的异构协议动态切换,在信令数据传送中依据预制策略随机改变同向呼叫或同源同宿呼叫的信令流所使用的信令通道类型及物理路径,其中,预知策略包括根据不同时间段或不同的呼叫次数动态改变所采用信令协议及其路由。Step 4. Signaling multi-channel transmission. Based on the heterogeneous call control protocol, different types of signaling transmission channels are established between signaling nodes, and multiple signaling devices are configured for the same type of signaling transmission channel. address, the signaling channel dynamic switching mechanism is established by both sides of the signaling device, combined with the dynamic switching of heterogeneous protocols in step 1, the signaling flow of the same-direction call or the same-source-same-destination call is randomly changed in the signaling data transmission according to the prefabricated strategy The type of signaling channel and physical path used, wherein the predictive strategy includes dynamically changing the adopted signaling protocol and its routing according to different time periods or different call times.
实施例二,与实施例一基本相同,不同之处在于:所述步骤3中还包含针对敏感用户,将主叫用户信息或被叫用户信息拆分多段,通过不同的信令消息携带传送。Embodiment 2 is basically the same as Embodiment 1, except that step 3 also includes splitting the calling user information or called user information into multiple segments for sensitive users, and carrying and transmitting them through different signaling messages.
实施例三,与实施例一基本相同,不同之处在于:步骤1中所述电信网异构呼叫控制协议包含七号信令TUP和ISUP协议、BICC协议、SIP协议。Embodiment 3 is basically the same as Embodiment 1, except that: the heterogeneous call control protocol of the telecommunications network in step 1 includes SS7 TUP and ISUP protocols, BICC protocol, and SIP protocol.
实施例四,与实施例一基本相同,不同之处在于:步骤2中呼叫标识虚拟化依据七号信令多点码和IP端口多地址建立与呼叫标识组相对应的虚拟呼叫标识,虚拟呼叫标识与呼叫标识组具有相同的编码及分配方式。Embodiment 4 is basically the same as Embodiment 1, and the difference is that in step 2, the call identifier virtualization is based on SS7 multi-point code and IP port multi-address to establish a virtual call identifier corresponding to the call identifier group, and the virtual call The ID has the same encoding and distribution method as the call ID group.
本发明并不局限于上述具体实施方式,本领域技术人员还可据此做出多种变化,但任何与本发明等同或者类似的变化都应涵盖在本发明权利要求的范围内。The present invention is not limited to the specific embodiments described above, and those skilled in the art can also make various changes accordingly, but any changes that are equivalent or similar to the present invention should be covered within the scope of the claims of the present invention.
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