CN104598357A - Anti-interference protecting method for data - Google Patents
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- CN104598357A CN104598357A CN201510076727.2A CN201510076727A CN104598357A CN 104598357 A CN104598357 A CN 104598357A CN 201510076727 A CN201510076727 A CN 201510076727A CN 104598357 A CN104598357 A CN 104598357A
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 35
- 238000005192 partition Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 24
- 238000007689 inspection Methods 0.000 claims description 20
- 238000004321 preservation Methods 0.000 claims description 6
- 230000000153 supplemental effect Effects 0.000 claims description 5
- 238000005538 encapsulation Methods 0.000 description 3
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 3
- 230000002159 abnormal effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 1
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Abstract
The invention discloses an anti-interference protecting method for preventing data of a memory unit from being mistakenly erased. The method comprises the following steps: S1, protecting the partitions: that is, dividing the memory unit of stored data into a plurality of partitions independently controlling the erasing rights; S2, setting a state machine of an erasing program and examining whether the state value of the partition is a predetermined state value or not before the partition executes each command of the erasing program, if so, executing the command and updating the state value; or program error. According to the anti-interference protecting method for data disclosed by the invention, after electronic equipment subjected to an interference program is out of control, program runaway is detected, and program parameters and procedure codes are prevented from being damaged.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to data guard method, the anti-interference guard method that the data relating more specifically to a kind of storage unit for preventing electronic equipment are erased and written by mistake.
Background technology
Electronic equipment has been widely used in the every field of productive life, not only increases production efficiency, also allows the life of people more convenient.But electronic equipment is interfered under severe electromagnetic environment, internal processes operation there will be out of control.If the storage unit of electronic equipment internal is in Full-open state, program may to the erasing of the data execution error in storage unit, write operation.After directly causing electronic equipment to re-power, because data are modified, program cannot normally be run.Strong jamming may cause program to go to the position of erasable data, mistake perform the erasable operation of data, cause data by bug patch.
As shown in Figure 1, memory cell data is destroyed to have following several situation to occur:
Program directly flies to the start address of the 2nd line code, when p, addr, buf and len are stored in internal memory, may revise or wipe the data in any memory unit address space; Most possibly can wipe p page when p, addr and len are constant, and revise the data of len the byte that addr address starts.
Eliminate storage unit write-protect after program fleet, when directly the inside of the 3rd row, the 4th row or the erasable function of data is flown in race more afterwards, the data in storage unit may be destroyed.
Generally speaking, the number of times that code above occurs is more, and the probability that data are erased and written by mistake is larger.The maximum problem of this program is that storage unit unlocks and erasablely can directly sequentially to perform.
The probability may by mistake wiped after program out of control is
wherein Pa is the size (unit is byte) in the instruction addressing space of MCU, and Ic is the instruction strip number that possible cause erasing by mistake.Pc is the parameter situation that possible occur, the length as parameter each in program is 8bit, then the span of all parameters is between 0 ~ 255, has 256 values, then Pc is 256.Pv is can by erasable sector number.Ep is the probability of erasing by mistake.Suppose in certain electronic equipment, there is an erasing instruction, and Pa is 65536, Pv be 94, Pc is 256, then after program out of control may is by the probability wiped by mistake
The probability by mistake writing data after program out of control is
wherein the definition of Pa, Pc, Pv is with identical above, and Ic may cause the instruction strip number by mistake write, and Ep is the probability by mistake write.If there is one to write instruction in program, and Pa is 65536, Pv when be 48640, Pc being 65536, then write probability after program out of control is by mistake
Below be only the probability of storage unit maloperation under limiting case, actual probabilities should judge with the actuating logic in conjunction with program, as have invoked 4 (comprise packed after call number) above-mentioned codes in practical situations both, there is 1 package interface, and have call erasable interface 2 times in the inside of encapsulation, the interface after encapsulation has been called 10 times.Final race flies rear storage unit
By the probability write by mistake be
The probability that memory cell data is destroyed is
Namely program directly may be run and be flown to unblock place and perform erasable, also may run and call place after flying to encapsulation, storage unit finally also may be caused by mistake to be wiped.
Summary of the invention
For the problems referred to above, the object of this invention is to provide the anti-interference guard method of a kind of data, after making electronic equipment be disturbed program out of control, program fleet detected, and defence program parameter and program code itself are not destroyed.
The anti-interference guard method of data of the present invention comprises:
Step one, partition protecting, be divided into the subregion that several control separately its erasable authority by the storage unit of storage data;
Step 2, arrange the state machine of erasable program, before each order performing erasable program for described subregion, check whether its state value is preset state value, is then, fill order also upgrades state value; Otherwise program is run and is occurred mistake, and program enters endless loop until device reset.
Preferably, described subregion is provided with three kinds of states, i.e. guard mode, non-guard mode and lock-out state.
Preferably, described guard mode refers to: the memory cell region be under this state can not directly carry out wiping, write operation, and to carry out wiping, write operation first must cancel write-protect;
Described non-guard mode refers to: the memory cell region be under this state can be wiped arbitrarily, write operation:
Described lock-out state refers to: the memory cell region be under this state can not carry out any wiping, write operation again before device reset.
Preferably, first the anti-interference guard method of described data also comprises carries out partition protecting initialization to the data in storage element, specifically comprises:
A, routine data and supplemental characteristic are stored to different subregion;
B, described routine data place subregion is set to lock-out state;
C, supplemental characteristic place subregion is set to guard mode.
Preferably, the state machine arranging erasable program comprises and carries out initialization to state machine, specifically comprises:
A, the original state value p of state machine is set to 0;
Whether B, inspection original state value p are 0, are then, normal program operation, and upgrading state value is 1, performs next order; Otherwise program run-time error, program enters endless loop until device reset.
Preferably, the anti-interference guard method of described data, comprises and first carries out initialization protection to the storage element of storage data, specifically comprise:
Step one, state machine original state value p is set to 0;
Step 2, routine data place subregion is set to lock-out state, then, before device reset, this sector data can not carry out any wiping, write operation;
Step 3, storage parameter data place subregion is set to guard mode, before de-preservation, cannot wipes corresponding data, write operation;
Whether step 4, inspection original state value p are 0; Then, normal program operation, upgrading state value is 1, performs next order; Otherwise program run-time error, after this program enters endless loop until device reset.
Preferably, the anti-interference guard method of described data also comprises after initialization, protects, specifically comprise when carrying out erasable program to the data of storage element:
The state value p of step one, inspection current state machine
Whether step 2, inspection state value p are preset state value; Then carry out step 3, otherwise jump to step 9;
Step 3, cancel described specified partition parameter protection;
Step 4, renewal state value are p+1;
Step 5, closedown software locks;
Whether step 6, inspection state value p+1 are preset state value; Then carry out step 7, otherwise jump to step 9;
Step 7, amendment designated parameter;
Step 8, open software locks;
Step 9, open software locks;
Step 10, the protection of unlatching specified partition.
The anti-interference guard method of data of the present invention adopts the mode of " state machine+partition protecting " two class protection to protect for program,
Wherein, partition protecting storage unit is divided into several regions that can control separately its erasable authority, and there are three kinds of states in each region, i.e. guard mode, non-guard mode and lock-out state.
Guard mode: the memory cell region be under this state can not directly carry out wiping, write operation, to carry out wiping, write operation first must cancel write-protect;
Non-guard mode: the memory cell region be under this state can be wiped arbitrarily, write operation;
Lock-out state: the memory cell region be under this state can not carry out any wiping, write operation again before device reset.
The execution flow process of described state machine essential record program, namely a state machine state of often advancing must carry out strict status checking, as long as Discovery Status machine is abnormal with regard to endless loop.Finally in cancellation write-protect and the validity checking that state machine must be carried out when carrying out erasable, only just allow to perform when state machine is legal to cancel write-protect and erasable operation.
Wherein in an embodiment, after program brings into operation, first carry out initialization protection according to state machine+partition protecting method to storage unit, step is as follows:
State machine parameter p is set to 0.
Sector, routine data place is set to lock-out state, then, before device reset, this sector data can not carry out any wiping, write operation.
The sector of stored parameter data is set to guard mode, before de-preservation, cannot wipes corresponding data, write operation.
Check whether state machine p is 0.If met, prover normally runs, and state machine is set to 1, performs next order.Otherwise read-me run-time error, after this program enters endless loop until device reset.
Wherein in an embodiment, when modifying to the parameter in storage unit, step is as follows:
1, inspection arranges state machine p
2, whether in the reasonable scope state machine p is checked.If correct, perform step 3-5, otherwise jump to step 9.
3, designated sector parameter protection is cancelled;
4, inspection arranges state machine p;
5, software locks is closed;
6, whether in the reasonable scope state machine p is checked.If correct, perform step 7-8, otherwise jump to step 9.
7, designated parameter is revised;
8, software locks is opened;
9, software locks is opened;
10, designated sector protection is opened.
Wherein, check and arrange in the step of state machine p, first check whether state machine is function input value P.If correct, read-me normally runs, and performs next order after p being set to P+1.Otherwise read-me is out of control, after this program enters endless loop, until Program reset.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 shows the erasable program code not adding protection described in prior art of the present invention;
Fig. 2 shows the schematic diagram of the partition protecting of the anti-interference guard method of data described in one of them embodiment of the present invention;
Fig. 3 shows the initialize flow schematic diagram of the anti-interference guard method of data described in one of them embodiment of the present invention;
Fig. 4 shows the schematic flow sheet of the erasable operation protection of the anti-interference guard method of data described in one of them embodiment of the present invention;
Fig. 5 shows the erasable operation code of part of the anti-interference guard method of data described in one of them embodiment of the present invention.
Embodiment
Below in conjunction with accompanying drawing, the present invention is described in further detail, can implement according to this with reference to instructions word to make those skilled in the art.
The anti-interference guard method of data of the present invention adopts the mode of " state machine+partition protecting " two class protection to protect program,
Wherein, partition protecting storage unit is divided into several regions that can control separately its erasable authority, and there are three kinds of states in each region, i.e. guard mode, non-guard mode and lock-out state.
Guard mode: the memory cell region be under this state can not directly carry out wiping, write operation, to carry out wiping, write operation first must cancel write-protect;
Non-guard mode: the memory cell region be under this state can be wiped arbitrarily, write operation;
Lock-out state: the memory cell region be under this state can not carry out any wiping, write operation again before device reset.
The execution flow process of described state machine essential record program, namely a state machine state of often advancing must carry out strict status checking, as long as Discovery Status machine is abnormal with regard to endless loop.Finally in cancellation write-protect and the validity checking that state machine must be carried out when carrying out erasable, only just allow to perform when state machine is legal to cancel write-protect and erasable operation.
Wherein in an embodiment, after program brings into operation, first carry out initialization protection according to state machine+partition protecting method to storage unit, step is as follows:
State machine parameter p is set to 0.
Sector, routine data place is set to lock-out state, then, before device reset, this sector data can not carry out any wiping, write operation.
The sector of stored parameter data is set to guard mode, before de-preservation, cannot wipes corresponding data, write operation.
Check whether state machine p is 0.If met, prover normally runs, and state machine is set to 1, performs next order.Otherwise, read-me run-time error.
Wherein in an embodiment, when modifying to the parameter in storage unit, step is as follows:
1, inspection arranges state machine p
2, whether in the reasonable scope state machine p is checked.If correct, perform step 3-5, otherwise jump to step 9.
3, designated sector parameter protection is cancelled;
4, inspection arranges state machine p;
5, software locks is closed;
6, whether in the reasonable scope state machine p is checked.If correct, perform step 7-8, otherwise jump to step 9.
7, designated parameter is revised;
8, software locks is opened;
9, software locks is opened;
10, designated sector protection is opened.
Wherein, check and arrange in the step of state machine p, first check whether state machine is function input value P.If correct, read-me normally runs, and performs next order after p being set to P+1.Otherwise read-me is out of control.After this program enters endless loop, until Program reset.
As shown in Figure 2, partition protecting storage unit is divided into several regions that can control separately its erasable authority, and there are three kinds of states in each region, i.e. guard mode, non-guard mode and lock-out state.
Guard mode: the memory cell region be under this state can not directly carry out wiping, write operation, to carry out wiping, write operation first must cancel write-protect;
Non-guard mode: the memory cell region be under this state can be wiped arbitrarily, write operation;
Lock-out state: the memory cell region be under this state can not carry out any wiping, write operation again before device reset.
As shown in Figure 3, the anti-interference guard method of data of the present invention, after program brings into operation, first carry out initialization protection to storage unit, step is as follows:
S101, inspection arrange state machine p, are set to 0 by state machine parameter p.
S102, lock program district, be set to lock-out state by sector, routine data place, then, before device reset, this sector data can not carry out any wiping, write operation.
S103, Protection parameters district, the sector by stored parameter data is set to guard mode, before de-preservation, cannot wipe corresponding data, write operation.
S104, inspection arrange state machine p, namely check whether state machine p is 0.If met, prover normally runs, and state machine is set to 1, performs next order.Otherwise, read-me run-time error.After this program enters endless loop, until Program reset.
As described in Figure 4, the anti-interference guard method of data of the present invention, after initialization, when carrying out erasable operation to storage element, it adopts following steps protection:
S201, inspection arrange state machine p
In the reasonable scope whether S202, inspection state machine p.If correct, perform step S203-S205, otherwise jump to step S209.
S203, cancellation designated sector parameter protection;
S204, inspection arrange state machine p;
S205, closedown software locks;
In the reasonable scope whether S206, inspection state machine p.If correct, perform step S207-S208, otherwise jump to step S209.
S207, amendment designated parameter;
S208, open software locks;
S209, open software locks;
S210, the protection of unlatching designated sector.
Fig. 5 shows in the anti-interference guard method of data of the present invention, the code that one section of using state machine+partition protecting mode is protected the data in storage unit.First, to state machine initialization, state machine is set to 0.Then partition protecting initialization is arranged to the data in memory device.Program code is stored in sector 2-11, and supplemental characteristic is stored in sector 12-22.The third line code, by program area data interlock, before guaranteeing to re-power, cannot be modified to program.The sector settings of stored parameter data is guard mode by fourth line code, and the data in sector just can perform erasable operation after only having de-preservation to enter not protect state.After partition protecting initialization completes, executing state machine check renewal rewards theory.Clipped code between the 6th row to the 7th line code.7th walks to the protection that the 10th line code relieves designated sector, the 11st walk to the 14th line code erasable be protection state sector in designated parameter.15th to walk to the 16th line code by sector settings be guard mode.
Suppose 1: program is flown to eighth row and performed cancellation write-protect, will make mistakes, and because state 3 and state 4 are arranged in reception program, cannot wipe by mistake when arranging state machine;
Suppose 2: program is flown to the 10th row and performed the operation of closing software locks, and because Flash write-protect is not opened, and the step of state machine is invalid, cannot wipe by mistake;
Suppose 3: program flies to the 12nd row or the 13rd row, because Flash software lock and write-protect are not all opened, finally cannot perform erasable operation.
The mechanism of this " state machine+partition protecting " security of flow process; no matter PC runs to fly to what address, all impossible directly Flash erase/write, except discontinuous very repeatedly race flies; this probability is each product running error probability when flying, and error probability is less than 2
32/ 1.
Suppose under strong interference environment, chip to run and to fly 1000 times every 1 second, needs continuous working 49 talent under capable and experienced environment may occur the situation that 1 Flash is erased and written by mistake.
Although embodiment of the present invention are open as above, but it is not restricted to listed in instructions and embodiment utilization, it can be applied to various applicable the field of the invention completely, for those skilled in the art, can easily realize other amendment, therefore do not deviating under the universal that claim and equivalency range limit, the present invention is not limited to specific details and illustrates here and the legend described.
Claims (7)
1. the anti-interference guard method of data, comprising:
Step one, partition protecting, be divided into the subregion that several control separately its erasable authority by the storage unit of storage data;
Step 2, arrange the state machine of erasable program, before each order performing erasable program for described subregion, check whether its state value is preset state value, is then, fill order also upgrades state value; Otherwise program is run and is occurred mistake, and program enters endless loop until device reset.
2. the anti-interference guard method of data as claimed in claim 1, it is characterized in that, described subregion is provided with three kinds of states, i.e. guard mode, non-guard mode and lock-out state.
3. the anti-interference guard method of data as claimed in claim 2, it is characterized in that, described guard mode refers to: the memory cell region be under this state can not directly carry out wiping, write operation, and to carry out wiping, write operation first must cancel write-protect;
Described non-guard mode refers to: the memory cell region be under this state can be wiped arbitrarily, write operation;
Described lock-out state refers to: the memory cell region be under this state can not carry out any wiping, write operation again before device reset.
4. the anti-interference guard method of data as claimed in claim 3, is characterized in that, also comprise and first carry out partition protecting initialization to the data in storage element, specifically comprise:
A, routine data and supplemental characteristic are stored to different subregion;
B, described routine data place subregion is set to lock-out state;
C, supplemental characteristic place subregion is set to guard mode.
5. the anti-interference guard method of data as claimed in claim 1, is characterized in that, the state machine arranging erasable program comprises and carries out initialization to state machine, specifically comprises:
A, the original state value p of state machine is set to 0;
Whether B, inspection original state value p are 0, are then, normal program operation, and upgrading state value is 1, performs next order; Otherwise, program run-time error.
6. the anti-interference guard method of data as described in any one of claim 4 or 5, is characterized in that, first carries out initialization protection to the storage element of storage data, specifically comprises:
Step one, state machine original state value p is set to 0;
Step 2, routine data place subregion is set to lock-out state, then, before device reset, this sector data can not carry out any wiping, write operation;
Step 3, storage parameter data place subregion is set to guard mode, before de-preservation, cannot wipes corresponding data, write operation;
Whether step 4, inspection original state value p are 0; Then, normal program operation, upgrading state value is 1, performs next order; Otherwise, program run-time error.
7. the anti-interference guard method of data as claimed in claim 6, is characterized in that, also comprise after initialization, protect, specifically comprise when carrying out erasable program to the data of storage element:
The state value p of step one, inspection current state machine
Whether step 2, inspection state value p are preset state value; Then carry out step 3, otherwise jump to step 9;
Step 3, cancel described specified partition parameter protection;
Step 4, renewal state value are p+1;
Step 5, closedown software locks;
Whether step 6, inspection state value p+1 are preset state value; Then carry out step 7, otherwise jump to step 9;
Step 7, amendment designated parameter;
Step 8, open software locks;
Step 9, open software locks;
Step 10, the protection of unlatching specified partition.
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| CN111414316A (en) * | 2020-03-13 | 2020-07-14 | 海芯科技(厦门)有限公司 | Electronic scale system structure for improving safety of calibration data |
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| CN104598357B (en) | 2018-05-08 |
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