CN104506515A - Firmware protection method and firmware protection device - Google Patents
Firmware protection method and firmware protection device Download PDFInfo
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- CN104506515A CN104506515A CN201410789754.XA CN201410789754A CN104506515A CN 104506515 A CN104506515 A CN 104506515A CN 201410789754 A CN201410789754 A CN 201410789754A CN 104506515 A CN104506515 A CN 104506515A
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 22
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 claims description 25
- 101100217298 Mus musculus Aspm gene Proteins 0.000 description 2
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 2
- 206010033799 Paralysis Diseases 0.000 description 1
- 238000007792 addition Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000001680 brushing effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000007547 defect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000005242 forging Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000006467 substitution reaction Methods 0.000 description 1
Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/72—Signcrypting, i.e. digital signing and encrypting simultaneously
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
The invention relates to the field of network equipment safety and discloses a firmware protection method and a firmware protection device. The firmware protection method comprises the following steps: carrying out Hash on firmware through a Hash algorithm to obtain a Hash value of the firmware; encrypting the Hash value of the firmware by using a private key of an asymmetric encryption algorithm to obtain a digital signature of the firmware; sending the firmware and the digital signature to software of a router; carrying out Hash on the firmware by the Hash algorithm to obtain the Hash value of the firmware; decrypting the digital signature by using a public key of the asymmetric encryption algorithm to obtain an decrypted Hash value; comparing the Hash value of the firmware and the decrypted Hash value, wherein if the Hash value of the firmware is equal to the decrypted Hash value, the updating of the router can be finished. According to the firmware protection method and the firmware protection device, the firmware can be subjected to digital signature so as to ensure the origination safety and the data integrity of the firmware, and meanwhile, data are protected from faking.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of network equipment safety, in particular to a firmware protection method.
Background
In recent years, computer networks are rapidly popularized, and the network era is formally coming, so that not only one family needs to install the networks, but also wireless networks are laid in public places including cinemas, buses, large markets and the like. Therefore, routers for network interconnection are very important. In order to prevent the router software of local upgrade or local flashing from being replaced by software constructed by others and finish some illegal operations, such as attacking a server, illegally collecting user information, redirecting a URL (uniform resource locator) of a user and the like, a router manufacturer encrypts firmware in a digital signature mode and prevents the firmware from being intercepted and forged in midway. At present, the main technical solutions for manufacturers to perform digital signatures are:
1. encrypting the firmware by adopting a special format;
2. a hash or other verification algorithm is adopted;
3. a symmetric encryption algorithm, e.g., AES algorithm, encryption,
the firmware is encrypted by using the methods, although the safety of the firmware is ensured to a certain extent, the methods are easy to crack, once the firmware is cracked, the source of the firmware cannot be authenticated, and whether the firmware changes or not cannot be verified and tampered by people, so that the local upgrade or local flashing of the firmware has great network safety problems and even causes network paralysis.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the defects of the prior art, the invention aims to provide a firmware protection method to solve the problem that a router cannot authenticate and verify whether the source of the firmware changes or not when other people tamper the firmware.
In order to solve the above problems, the present invention provides a firmware protection method, which includes the steps of:
s1, digitally signing the firmware;
and S2, verifying the digital signature.
Preferably, the step S1 includes the steps of:
s101, hashing the firmware through a hashing algorithm to obtain a hash value of the firmware;
s102, encrypting the hash value by using a private key of an asymmetric encryption algorithm to obtain the digital signature;
s103, storing the digital signature in the firmware.
Preferably, the step S2 includes the steps of:
s201, hashing the firmware through the hashing algorithm to obtain a hash value of the firmware;
s202, decrypting the digital signature by using a public key of an asymmetric encryption algorithm to obtain a decrypted hash value;
s203, comparing the hash value of the firmware with the decrypted hash value, and judging the authenticity of the firmware.
Preferably, the step S1 is completed at the server side, and the digital signature and the firmware are sent and saved to the router software; said step S2 is done in said router software.
Preferably, in step S203, if the hash value of the firmware is equal to the decrypted hash value, the digital signature verification passes, and the firmware is upgraded; and if the hash value of the firmware is not equal to the decrypted hash value, the digital signature verification fails, and the firmware is discarded.
In order to achieve the above object, according to another aspect of the present invention, there is provided a firmware protection device including:
the digital signature device is used for digitally signing the firmware;
verification means for verifying a digital signature of the firmware;
preferably, the digital signature apparatus includes:
the first hash module is used for hashing the firmware to obtain a hash value of the firmware;
the encryption module is used for encrypting the hash value by using a private key of an asymmetric encryption algorithm to obtain the digital signature;
a storage module for storing the digital signature in the firmware.
Preferably, the authentication device includes:
the second hash module is used for hashing the firmware to obtain a hash value of the firmware;
the decryption module is used for decrypting the digital signature by using a public key of an asymmetric encryption algorithm to obtain a decrypted hash value;
and the judging module is used for comparing the hash value of the firmware with the decrypted hash value and judging the authenticity of the firmware.
Preferably, the digital signature device runs on a server side, and sends and stores the digital signature and the firmware into the router software; the verification device runs at the router software end.
Preferably, the judging module judges the authenticity of the firmware, and if the hash value of the firmware is equal to the decrypted hash value, the digital signature passes verification and the firmware is upgraded; and if not, the digital signature verification fails, and the firmware is discarded.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart illustrating a firmware protection method according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a flow chart illustrating digital signing of firmware in a preferred embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a flow chart illustrating the verification of a digital signature in a preferred embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 4 is a flow chart illustrating a firmware upgrade of a router according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 5 is a block diagram of a firmware protection device in a preferred embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The following examples are only for illustrating the technical solutions of the present invention more clearly, and the protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereby. The description which follows is a preferred embodiment of the invention, however, the description is for the purpose of illustrating the general principles of the invention and is not intended to limit the scope of the invention. The scope of the present invention is defined by the appended claims.
Referring to fig. 1, an embodiment of the present invention provides a firmware protection method, including:
s1, digitally signing the firmware;
and S2, verifying the digital signature.
In the invention, the digital signature is carried out on the firmware through the Hash algorithm and the asymmetric encryption algorithm, so that the router software can verify the digital signature after receiving the digital signature, thereby determining whether the firmware source changes, protecting the firmware data, preventing other people from forging the firmware and brushing the router software, and ensuring the network security.
In this embodiment, the hash algorithm adopts a secure hash algorithm SHA, which is an algorithm for abstracting input information, and this algorithm can ensure that the abstractions generated by different input information are different；The asymmetric encryption algorithm adopts a public key encryption algorithm RSA, which can ensure that the information encrypted by the RSA cannot be decrypted as long as the secret key is long enough, and in the embodiment, the length of the RSA secret key is 2048 bits.
Further, referring to fig. 2, step S1 includes the steps of:
s101, hashing the firmware through SHA1 to obtain a hash value of the firmware;
s102, encrypting the hash value of the firmware by using an RSA private key to obtain a digital signature;
s103, storing the digital signature in firmware;
step S1 is completed at the server side; and sending the digital signature and the firmware obtained in the step S103 to router software and storing the digital signature and the firmware.
Further, referring to fig. 3, the step S2 includes the steps of:
s201, hashing the firmware through SHA1 to obtain a hash value of the firmware;
s202, decrypting the digital signature by using a public key of RSA to obtain a decrypted hash value;
s203, comparing the hash value of the firmware with the decrypted hash value, and judging the authenticity of the firmware;
step S2 is completed in the router; the method for judging the authenticity of the firmware in the step S203 comprises the following steps: comparing the hash values obtained in the step S201 and the step S202, if the hash values are equal, the digital signature passes verification, and upgrading the router; if the verification result is not equal to the verification result, the digital signature verification fails, the firmware source is wrong or the data is incomplete, the firmware and the digital signature stored in the router software are discarded, and a message is sent to the server side to request the firmware to be sent again.
In the invention, the step S1 and the step S2 realize the requirements of digitally signing and verifying the firmware, and the safety of the firmware source and the integrity of data can be verified due to the irreversibility of SHA and the indecomposability of RSA algorithm, thereby completely avoiding the possibility that the firmware is artificially tampered or replaced and ensuring the safety of a user network.
Further, referring to fig. 4, a method for upgrading a router is disclosed, after power is on, a router reset key is pressed, a digitally signed firmware is downloaded from a server, a digital signature of the firmware is verified, if the digital signature passes the verification, the router is booted, and the router is normally restarted to complete upgrading; if the digital signature is not verified, the downloaded firmware is discarded, and a reset key is pressed to download the firmware again. Therefore, the digital signature obtained by SHA hash and RSA encryption cannot be cracked, and when the router is refreshed and upgraded locally, the authenticity and integrity of the firmware source and data can be verified easily by verifying the digital signature, so that the real and complete firmware is obtained, and the upgrade is completed.
Fig. 5 is a block diagram of a firmware protection apparatus in the present embodiment, and as shown in fig. 5, the apparatus includes: a digital signature device 110 and a verification device 120; wherein,
the digital signature device 110 includes a first hash module 111, an encryption module 112, and a storage module 113;
the verification device 120 includes a second hash module 121, a decryption module 122, and a judgment module 123;
the digital signature device 110 operates on the server side and is used for digitally signing the firmware; the verification means 120 operates at the router side for verifying the digital signature of the firmware.
The first hash module 111 hashes the firmware with SHA to obtain a hash value of the firmware, and transmits the hash value to the encryption module 112; the encryption module 112 encrypts the hash value by using the private key of RSA to obtain a digital signature, and the digital signature is transmitted to and stored in the storage module 113.
The second hash module 121 hashes the SHA firmware to obtain a hash value of the firmware, and transmits the hash value to the judgment module 123; the decryption module 122 decrypts the digital signature by using the public key of RSA, obtains a decrypted hash value, and transmits the hash value to the judgment module 123.
The determining module 123 compares the hash value of the firmware with the decrypted hash value, so as to determine the authenticity of the router-side firmware. If the hash value of the firmware is equal to the decrypted hash value, the digital signature passes verification, and the firmware is upgraded; and if not, the digital signature verification fails, and the firmware is discarded.
In this embodiment, the digital signature device performs digital signature on the firmware through the cooperation of the first hash module, the encryption module and the storage module and stores the digital signature; the firmware and the digital signature thereof are sent to the router end, the second hash module and the decryption module respectively process the firmware and the digital signature to obtain corresponding hash values, and the hash values are compared in the judgment module to determine the security of the firmware source and the integrity of data, so that malicious upgrading or malicious flash can be prevented, and the internet surfing safety of a user is improved.
Compared with the prior art, the invention provides a firmware protection method, which is characterized in that a digital signature is obtained by encrypting firmware by using a Hash algorithm and an asymmetric encryption algorithm at a server end, so that the firmware data can not be cracked by others and the firmware information is tampered even if the firmware data is intercepted midway; the digital signature is verified at the router end, so that the authenticity of the firmware information can be verified at the router end even if the firmware information is intercepted and tampered midway, the possibility of using unsafe firmware to upgrade or refresh the router is completely eradicated, the safety of a firmware source and the integrity of data are ensured, the router which is locally upgraded or locally refreshed is prevented from being easily cracked, and the user can surf the internet more safely.
Although the present invention has been described in connection with preferred embodiments, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that the methods and systems of the present invention are not limited to the embodiments described in the detailed description, and various modifications, additions, and substitutions are possible, without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as defined in the accompanying claims.
Claims (10)
1. A firmware protection method is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s1, digitally signing the firmware;
and S2, verifying the digital signature.
2. The firmware protection method of claim 1, wherein the step S1 includes the steps of:
s101, hashing the firmware through a hashing algorithm to obtain a hash value of the firmware;
s102, encrypting the hash value by using a private key of an asymmetric encryption algorithm to obtain the digital signature;
s103, storing the digital signature in the firmware.
3. The firmware protection method of claim 1, wherein the step S2 includes the steps of:
s201, hashing the firmware through the hashing algorithm to obtain a hash value of the firmware;
s202, decrypting the digital signature by using a public key of an asymmetric encryption algorithm to obtain a decrypted hash value;
s203, comparing the hash value of the firmware with the decrypted hash value, and judging the authenticity of the firmware.
4. The firmware protection method according to claim 1, wherein the step S1 is completed at a server side, and the digital signature and the firmware are sent and saved to the router software; said step S2 is done in said router software.
5. The firmware protection method according to claim 3, wherein in the step S203, if the hash value of the firmware and the decrypted hash value are equal, the digital signature verification passes, and the firmware is upgraded; and if the hash value of the firmware is not equal to the decrypted hash value, the digital signature verification fails, and the firmware is discarded.
6. A firmware protection device, comprising:
the digital signature device is used for digitally signing the firmware;
and the verification device is used for verifying the digital signature of the firmware.
7. The firmware protection device of claim 6, wherein the digital signature device comprises:
the first hash module is used for hashing the firmware to obtain a hash value of the firmware;
the encryption module is used for encrypting the hash value by using a private key of an asymmetric encryption algorithm to obtain the digital signature;
a storage module for storing the digital signature in the firmware.
8. The firmware protection device of claim 6, wherein the verification device comprises:
the second hash module is used for hashing the firmware to obtain a hash value of the firmware;
the decryption module is used for decrypting the digital signature by using a public key of an asymmetric encryption algorithm to obtain a decrypted hash value;
and the judging module is used for comparing the hash value of the firmware with the decrypted hash value and judging the authenticity of the firmware.
9. The firmware protection device of claim 6, wherein the digital signature device runs on a server side, and sends and saves the digital signature and the firmware into the router software; the verification device runs at the router software end.
10. The firmware protection device of claim 8, wherein the determining module determines authenticity of the firmware, and if the hash value of the firmware is equal to the decrypted hash value, the digital signature verification is passed, and the firmware is upgraded; and if not, the digital signature verification fails, and the firmware is discarded.
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| CN106412121A (en) * | 2016-11-21 | 2017-02-15 | 四川长虹电器股份有限公司 | System security upgrade method applied to intelligent refrigerators |
| CN106506163A (en) * | 2016-10-21 | 2017-03-15 | 北京小米移动软件有限公司 | ROM packet processing methods and device |
| CN106534083A (en) * | 2016-10-31 | 2017-03-22 | 北京小米移动软件有限公司 | Root tool verification method and apparatus |
| CN106685653A (en) * | 2016-12-29 | 2017-05-17 | 同济大学 | A vehicle remote firmware update method and device based on information security technology |
| CN107359999A (en) * | 2017-07-04 | 2017-11-17 | 深圳市智联物联科技有限公司 | A kind of uboot firmwares guard method |
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| CN107888577A (en) * | 2017-10-31 | 2018-04-06 | 美的智慧家居科技有限公司 | Upgrade method, door lock, server, system and the storage medium of door lock firmware |
| CN108111425A (en) * | 2018-02-24 | 2018-06-01 | 上海康斐信息技术有限公司 | A kind of method and system of the anti-brush machine of router |
| CN108306970A (en) * | 2018-02-02 | 2018-07-20 | 浙江德景电子科技有限公司 | A kind of download of firmware safety and calibration equipment and method based on safety chip |
| CN108491215A (en) * | 2018-02-11 | 2018-09-04 | 苏州光之翼智能科技有限公司 | A kind of unmanned plane firmware protection system |
| CN108491289A (en) * | 2018-03-22 | 2018-09-04 | 北京顶象技术有限公司 | Firmware guard method and device |
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| CN108920962A (en) * | 2018-06-26 | 2018-11-30 | 百富计算机技术（深圳）有限公司 | Firmware downloads sign test method, firmware dissemination method, mobile terminal and server |
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