CN103713298B - An anti-spoofing method based on interactive ranging information and RNSS - Google Patents
An anti-spoofing method based on interactive ranging information and RNSS Download PDFInfo
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
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- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
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Abstract
本发明公开了一种基于交互式测距信息和RNSS的反欺骗方法，应用于包括用户接收机、交互式测距平台、测量控制中心和导航卫星的系统，用户接收机与测量控制中心之间通过交互式测距平台互通交互式测距信号，导航卫星向用户接收机发送RNSS信号；用户接收机将根据交互式测距信号获取的定位结果或距离信息与根据RNSS获得的定位结果或距离信息进行对比，判断是否受到欺骗式干扰；测量控制中心根据所接收的来自同一用户接收机及同一交互式平台节点的交互式测距应答信号的数量，判断用户接收机是否受到欺骗式干扰。本发明采用交互式测距平台实现反欺骗，能够避免对信号特征进行解析，从而降低了实现难度，能够实现反欺骗。
The invention discloses an anti-spoofing method based on interactive ranging information and RNSS, which is applied to a system including a user receiver, an interactive ranging platform, a measurement control center and a navigation satellite, between the user receiver and the measurement control center The interactive ranging signal is communicated through the interactive ranging platform, and the navigation satellite sends the RNSS signal to the user receiver; the user receiver combines the positioning result or distance information obtained according to the interactive ranging signal with the positioning result or distance information obtained according to the RNSS Make a comparison to determine whether it is subject to fraudulent interference; the measurement control center judges whether the user receiver is subject to fraudulent interference based on the number of interactive ranging response signals received from the same user receiver and the same interactive platform node. The invention adopts an interactive ranging platform to realize anti-spoofing, can avoid analyzing signal characteristics, thereby reducing the difficulty of implementation, and can realize anti-spoofing.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to a kind of satellite navigation anti-spoofing technology, propose a kind of anti-spoofing method based on interactive ranging information and RNSS, the positioning result of interactive mode found range observed quantity and receiver RNSS is compared, and then reaches the object of anti-spoofing.
Background technology
Along with Beidou satellite navigation system is in the generally application of China, especially in the widespread use in military and national defense field, requirements at the higher level are proposed to the security of satellite navigation.Satellite navigation signals is restricted because of its emissive power, signal when arriving ground will be quite faint, simultaneously disclosed in part signal system is, covert signal also has may by what track down, even without being tracked down, also the mode by forwarding is replicated, and therefore satellite navigation signals is very easy to be subject to Deceiving interference, and receiver user uses the navigation signal being subject to Deceiving interference to bring huge harm.As impact widely Iran inveigle U.S. RQ-170 " sentry " unmanned plane event be exactly together typical receiver user receive and utilize the event of the satellite navigation signals being subject to Deceiving interference.
The radionavigation-satellite service of serving user location has two kinds, a kind of be now the whole world four large navigational system all radionavigation-satellite service, i.e. RNSS, receiver user, according to the satellite navigation signals received, independently completes the functions such as location, navigation and time service.Another kind is radiodetermination-satellite service, i.e. RDSS.The range finding of satellite interactive mode refers to carries out information interaction by satellite between ground central station and user, and ground central station completes pseudo range measurement, and namely RDSS is a kind of application typically utilizing the interactive location of having found range of satellite.Beidou satellite navigation system not only has RNSS function, also has RDSS function simultaneously.
Satellite navigation system is faced with the electromagnetic interference environment of various complexity, be divided into and have a mind to interference and be not intended to interference, be not intended to interference and mainly refer to the interference unintentionally that other telstars, ground radar and radio etc. send, interference mainly refers to suppress interfere and Deceiving interference intentionally.Suppress interfere refers to that the interference strength entering receiver is greater than the intensity of useful signal, and receiver cannot normally be worked, and this interference effect is good, but power is large, and interference source is easily found and destroys.Deceiving interference realizes by the navigation signal or information providing falseness, can be divided into production cheating interference and deceiving jamming.Production cheating interference is the actual signal form of analog satellite, produces the production interference of false navigation message; Deceiving jamming is the positional information by making receiver user calculate mistake to the forwarding of navigation signal.Deceiving interference power is low, and interference source is not easily found, and interference effect is good simultaneously, by the positional information making receiver calculate mistake, is therefore widely used in engineer applied, becomes the important threat of one that satellite navigation receiver faces.
Anti-deception algorithm research now for Deceiving interference becomes focus, existing anti-deception algorithm mainly contains: before positioning calculation, by the identification of signal characteristic method of discrimination with reject and have the Deceiving interference signal of obvious undesired signal feature, the features such as signal characteristic differentiates when arriving by the power of Received signal strength, signal, direction of arrival degree and polarizations mode differentiate.In positioning calculation process, carry out filtering process to the Deceiving interference signal be not yet identified, filtering algorithm mainly comprises expanded Kalman filtration algorithm, filtering algorithm etc. based on matrixing.
But existing anti-spoofing algorithm all needs the identification carrying out signal characteristic, and it implements relative complex.
Summary of the invention
In view of this, the object of the invention is to resist satellite navigation Deceiving interference, propose a kind ofly to utilize interactive ranging information and signal and in conjunction with the method for RNSS technology to the anti-Deceiving interference that Deceiving interference signal identifies, can avoid resolving signal characteristic, thus reduce and realize difficulty, the performance of receiver user can be improved, realize quick anti-spoofing.The method and the not mutual exclusion of existing anti-deception algorithm, namely independently can use and also can combine with existing algorithm.
In order to solve the problems of the technologies described above, the present invention is achieved in that
Receiver user and Survey control center all utilize interactive distance measuring signal to carry out deception judgement: the positioning result of the positioning result obtained according to interactive distance measuring signal and RNSS contrasts by receiver user, or the positioning result of Distance geometry RNSS between the interactive platform that obtains according to interactive distance measuring signal of receiver user and receiver and the distance of interactive platform are compared, and judge whether to be subject to Deceiving interference; Survey control center, according to the quantity of the received interactive mode range finding answer signal from same receiver user and same interactive mode range finding platform nodes, judges whether receiver user is subject to Deceiving interference.
Wherein, the described positioning result obtained according to interactive distance measuring signal is calculated by receiver user, or is calculated by interactive mode range finding platform and sent to receiver user.
Preferably, the method specifically comprises the steps:
Step 1, receiver user are resolved by RNSS signal and obtain local position S
rNSS-1, the interactive distance measuring signal of receiver user response source measurement control center, concurrently send interactive range finding answer signal;
Step 2, receiver user carry out first time and cheat judgement:
Receiver user is according to described local position S
rNSS-1with the interactive mode range finding position of platform S obtained from interactive distance measuring signal
1-2, calculate the distance R of receiver user and interactive platform of finding range
1-Δ 12; Be delivered to the time-delay calculation receiver user of receiver user and the distance R of interactive platform of finding range according to interactive distance measuring signal from interactive mode range finding platform simultaneously
alternately-Δ 12; Will apart from R
1-Δ 12with distance R
alternately-Δ 12compare, if do not matched, then think and be subject to Deceiving interference;
Step 3, Survey control center are carried out deception and are judged:
Interactive range finding answer signal described in step 3a, Survey control receive centre, according to the interactive mode range finding answer signal quantity received, judge whether receiver user is subject to Deceiving interference, if be subject to Deceiving interference, inform receiver user by interactive range finding platform, enter step 3b;
The distance R of receiver user to interactive range finding platform, according to described interactive mode range finding answer signal, is resolved in step 3b, Survey control center
3-Δ 12; If described interactive mode range finding answer signal is enough to consumer positioning receiver, then by positioning result S
3-1send to receiver user; If described interactive mode range finding answer signal is not enough to consumer positioning receiver, then by the distance R of the receiver user of Survey control center calculation to interactive range finding platform
3-Δ 12send to receiver user;
Step 4, receiver user carry out second time and cheat judgement:
If step 4a receiver user receives the described positioning result S that Survey control center is sent
3-1, then by this positioning result S
3-1to resolve from RNSS signal with step 1 and obtain local position S
rNSS-1compare, if do not matched, then think and be subject to Deceiving interference;
If step 4b receiver user receives the described receiver user sent at the Survey control center distance R to interactive range finding platform
3-Δ 12, then by this distance R
3-Δ 12the user calculated by receiver user with step 2 is to the distance R of interactive platform of finding range
1-Δ 12compare, if do not matched, then think and be subject to Deceiving interference.
Beneficial effect:
The present invention utilizes interactive ranging information and signal and in conjunction with RNSS technology, can avoid resolving signal characteristic, thus reduces and realize difficulty, can improve the performance of receiver user.
Accompanying drawing explanation
Fig. 1 adopts GEO satellite as the interactive range measurement principle figure of interactive mode range finding platform in prior art.
Fig. 2 is the general frame of anti-spoofing method of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is Deceiving interference scene 1 in the embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 4 is Deceiving interference scene 2 in the embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 5 is Deceiving interference scene 3 in the embodiment of the present invention.
Embodiment
To develop simultaneously embodiment below in conjunction with accompanying drawing, describe the present invention.
First, interactive mode range finding ultimate principle is described.
Interactive range finding refers to carries out information interaction by interactive range finding platform 2 between the Survey control center 3 on ground and receiver user 1, Survey control center completes pseudo range measurement, interactive range finding platform can have multiple, can be balloon, ground repeater station, IGSO satellite, MEO satellite, GEO satellite etc. in practice.Beidou satellite navigation system is based on RDSS service business just interactive a kind of implementation of finding range of GEO satellite, and here, for Big Dipper RDSS service business explanation interactive range finding ultimate principle, operating diagram as shown in Figure 1.
The course of work is: first send departures interrogating signal by Survey control center to GEO satellite simultaneously, to be transmitted to the user in service area through satellite with the forms of broadcasting; User responds the interrogating signal of GEO satellite, and sends check-in signal to Survey control center simultaneously, is transmitted to Survey control center through GEO satellite.The check-in signal that Survey control receive centre demodulation user send, calculates time delay according to the moment of exit signal and the moment of check-in signal, and finally obtains the pseudorange of satellite to receiver user in conjunction with satellite ephemeris, complete measurement.This process is exactly the ultimate principle of interactive range finding.RDSS service is that the information utilizing the interactive mode more than more than 2 GEO satellites to find range positions receiver user, and positioning result is sent to receiver user through GEO satellite.
The core of the anti-spoofing method based on interactive ranging information and RNSS of the present invention utilizes above-described interactive distance measurement function, its overall system block diagram, as Fig. 2, is applied to the system comprising receiver user 1, interactive range finding platform 2, Survey control center 3 and Navsat 4.Survey control center forwards interactive distance measuring signal by interactive range finding platform to receiver user, receiver user receives the RNSS signal of Navsat and the interactive distance measuring signal of interactive range finding platform forwarding simultaneously, in deception environment, receiver user also can receive curve simultaneously.Receiver user by the positioning result at local comparison RNSS signal and the positioning result according to interactive ranging information and signal acquisition, thus judges whether to there is Deceiving interference.In addition, because some Deceiving interference chance forwards interactive range finding answer signal, therefore Survey control center can also, according to the quantity of the received interactive mode from same receiver user range finding answer signal, judge whether to be subject to Deceiving interference.
Identify to realize deception more comprehensively, the deception identification at receiver user and Survey control center combines by the present invention, and receiver user all can carry out deception identification two stages, thus improves the success ratio of anti-spoofing.Specific implementation step is as follows:
Step 1: receiver user is resolved by RNSS signal, obtains local position S
rNSS-1; The interactive distance measuring signal of receiver user response source measurement control center, concurrently send interactive range finding answer signal;
Wherein, Survey control center sends interactive distance measuring signal, this signal is forwarded by interactive mode range finding platform, the positional information of interactive range finding platform self is comprised in interactive signal, this positional information can be any type, direct or indirect positional information, as long as receiver user can identify the position of interactive range finding platform according to this positional information.In existing interactive mode range finding plateform system, the overwhelming majority has all achieved the interpolation of position of platform information.
Step 2: receiver user carries out first time and cheats judgement:
Receiver user resolves the local position S of acquisition according to RNSS
rNSS-1with the interactive mode range finding position of platform S obtained from interactive distance measuring signal
1-2calculate the distance R obtaining receiver user and interactive platform of finding range
1-Δ 12;
Receiver user is also delivered to the time-delay calculation receiver user of receiver user and the distance R of interactive platform of finding range according to interactive distance measuring signal from interactive mode range finding platform
alternately-Δ 12;
By R
1-Δ 12with R
alternately-Δ 12compare, if do not matched, then think and be subject to Deceiving interference.
Wherein, match in the present embodiment in the preset range of the difference referring to two numerical value, represent that these two values are quite similar.It is hereinafter all that to match are all these implications.
Step 3: Survey control center is carried out deception and judged:
Step 3a: the interactive mode range finding answer signal of Survey control receive centre user, when be derived from same receiver user and the answer signal quantity that forwards of the same node point of being found range in platform by interactive mode is more than one time, judge to be subject to Deceiving interference; When judgement is subject to Deceiving interference, then inform receiver user by interactive range finding platform; Enter step 3b;
Further, Survey control center receives more than 1 answer signal, and cheating interference source is positioned at is multiplied by the light velocity with the time difference of the moment of second answer signal and first answer signal and is on the ball that radius and receiver actual position are the center of circle.
Step 3b: Survey control center, according to connecing interactive range finding answer signal, calculates the distance R of user to interactive range finding platform
3-Δ 12.Its solution process is: moment of the interactive distance measuring signal of the known transmission in Survey control center and receive moment of interactive range finding answer signal, thus calculates signal and travel to and fro between time delay Δ 1 between Survey control center and receiver user; The position of known interactive mode range finding platform again, thus obtain Survey control center and interactive time delay Δ 2 of finding range between platform, utilize Δ 1 and Δ 2 just can calculate R
3-Δ 12.
If step 3c interactive mode range finding answer signal is enough to consumer positioning receiver, then by positioning result, be designated as S
3-1, send to receiver user;
If step 3d interactive mode range finding answer signal is not enough to consumer positioning receiver, then by the distance R of the receiver user of Survey control center calculation to interactive range finding platform
3-Δ 12send to receiver user.
Wherein, whether answer signal is enough to consumer positioning receiver is have the high equipment of survey to decide according to the source of answer signal with local, as a rule, if answer signal is from the interactive mode range finding platform nodes of more than 3 or 3, then can locate a locus, if receiver user this locality has survey high equipment, then only need 2 or 2 with the answer signal of interactive range finding platform nodes.
Step 4: receiver user carries out second time and cheats judgement:
Step 4a: if receiver user receives the positioning result S sent at Survey control center
3-1, then by this positioning result S
3-1with the positioning result S of step 1 from RNSS signal acquisition
rNSS-1compare, if do not matched, then think and be subject to Deceiving interference.
Further, if RNSS signal repeating jamming, then the positioning result of RNSS is position of interference source, if the interference of RNSS production, can not determine position and the interference source radius of interference source.
Step 4b: if receiver user receives the receiver user sent at the Survey control center distance R to interactive range finding platform
3-Δ 12, then by this distance R
3-Δ 12the user calculated by receiver user with step 2 is to the distance R of interactive platform of finding range
1-Δ 12compare, if do not matched, then think and be subject to Deceiving interference.
Further, if RNSS signal repeating jamming, then R
3-Δ 12deduct R
1-Δ 12be the distance of cheating interference source and receiver, namely cheating interference source is positioned at R
3-Δ 12deduct R
1-Δ 12for radius and receiver actual position are on the ball in the center of circle.If RNSS production is disturbed, can not determine the position of interference source.
Be more than the testing process of anti-spoofing interference, from above process, whether there is the place of Deceiving interference according to judgement, can be divided into receiver user and at Survey control center two kinds of situations; Number according to the interactive mode range finding platform nodes participating in detection deception can be divided into two kinds of situations, is that interactive range finding quantity can carry out independent location and interactive range finding lazy weight can not be located separately respectively.Below by with Big Dipper RDSS and RNSS business for background and different typical scenes illustrate anti-spoofing method.
Situation 1: interactive range finding quantity is enough, and Survey control center can be located separately
Below point, 3 scenes perform an analysis:
Scene 1: deception jammer forwards or produces RNSS signal;
Scene 2: deception jammer forwards to user simultaneously or produces RNSS signal, forwards RDSS exit signal to user;
Scene 3: deception jammer forwards to user or produces RNSS signal, forwards RDSS exit signal and the inbound answer signal of RDSS.
Scene 1: deception jammer forwards or produce satellite RNSS signal
Deception jammer forwards or produces RNSS signal, does not forward and produces RDSS signal, and in this case, receiver user to position by RNSS signal after being cheated and resolves, but the result now calculated will be wrong.Twice anti-spoofing judgement is carried out in receiver user side under this scene, respectively:
A) anti-spoofing judgement is carried out in receiver user side self
The local position that receiver user resolves acquisition according to RNSS and the interactive mode range finding position of platform obtained from interactive ranging information calculate the distance obtaining receiver user and interactive platform of finding range, the pseudorange that this distance and interactive distance measuring signal obtain is compared, judge whether to be subject to Deceiving interference, be interfered and then send alarm to Survey control center.I.e. step 1, step 2.
B) receiver user and Survey control center complex carry out anti-spoofing judgement
Survey control center is by interactive pseudo range measurement, obtain the actual position of receiver user, the actual position of receiver is transmitted to user by satellite by interactive type communication by Survey control center, user is locally through the positioning result comparing two kinds of modes, whether self judgment receiver is subject to the impact of Deceiving interference, is interfered and then sends alarm to Survey control center.I.e. step 1, step 3b, step 3c and step 4a.
Scene 2: deception jammer forwards to user simultaneously or produces RNSS signal, forwards RDSS exit signal to user
In such cases, forward to user while of deception jammer or produce RNSS signal, after receiver user is cheated, positioning by RNSS signal and resolve, calculate the result of mistake.Receive RDSS signal and be divided into two kinds of situations, user has only responded interactive distance measuring signal that jammer forwards and user and has responded interactive distance measuring signal that is real and jammer forwarding.
1) user has responded interactive mode that real and jammer forwards and to have found range RDSS exit signal
Receiver can respond twice Survey control center broadcasts in succession to the interrogating signal of user, and is transmitted to Survey control center by synchronous satellite, two kinds of loops respectively:---satellite---user's---satellite---Survey control center, Survey control center;---satellite---deception jammer---user's---satellite---Survey control center, Survey control center.Survey control center will receive 2 times to user answer under normal circumstances, and the interval of two times of reception is exactly satellite broadcast downwards be forwarded formula jammer forward increase time delay, now Survey control center can detect to there is Deceiving interference around user, and sends corresponding warning message to user.Survey control center can draw the actual position of receiver user equally by the respective algorithms of prior art simultaneously, while user gives a warning information, send real co-ordinate position information to user.I.e. step 1, step 3a, step 3b and step 3c.
2) user has only responded the interactive mode range finding RDSS exit signal that jammer forwards
Survey control center can calculate the position of user, and sends to user.But the position that the position solved is not interference source neither the actual position of user, compared in the position calculated and the position calculated by RNSS signal by Survey control center, receiver makes their own the judgement being forwarded formula Disturbance and deceit, send false alarm, simultaneously and send alarm to Survey control center.I.e. step 1, step 3b, step 3c and step 4a.
Scene 3: deception jammer forwards to user or produces RNSS signal, forwards RDSS exit signal and the inbound answer signal of RDSS.
Deception jammer forwards to user or produces RNSS signal, forward RDSS exit signal and the inbound answer signal of RDSS, then the signal circuit of interactive range finding will have 4 kinds,---satellite---user's---satellite---Survey control center respectively: Survey control center;---satellite---deception jammer---user's---satellite---Survey control center, Survey control center;---satellite---user---deception jammer---satellite---Survey control center, Survey control center;---satellite---deception jammer---user---deception jammer---satellite---Survey control center, Survey control center.Loop number from whole interactive ranging process is carried out the explanation of anti-spoofing scheme respectively below.
1) whole interactive ranging process only has a kind of loop
The first loop is not by repeating jamming, does not need to carry out anti-spoofing; Any one loop of its excess-three kind is as interactive ranging process, then Survey control center can not judge whether receiver is subject to repeating jamming, but the position that Survey control center calculates also is wrong, receiver, by the positioning result of the positioning result and Survey control center that compare RNSS, can show that receiver receives repeating jamming.Because the position calculated by RNSS is the position of interference source all the time, and the position that Survey control center calculates be not interference source neither the position of receiver, both positions are different.Step is step 1, step 3b, step 3c and step 4a.
2) whole interactive ranging process is more than a kind of loop
Survey control center will be subject to repeatedly the answer signal of receiver, and Survey control center will detect that receiver receives Deceiving interference.Survey control center can draw the actual position of receiver user equally by respective algorithms simultaneously, while user gives a warning information, send real co-ordinate position information to user.I.e. step 1, step 3a, step 3b and step 3c.
Situation 2: interactive range finding lazy weight can not be located separately
This situation also divides above-mentioned 3 scenes to perform an analysis:
Scene 1: deception jammer forwards or produce satellite RNSS signal
This scene and the situation 1 anti-spoofing scheme under scene 1 is identical, does not repeat here:
Scene 2: deception jammer forwards to user simultaneously or produces RNSS signal, forwards RDSS exit signal to user
In such cases, forward to user while of deception jammer or produce RNSS, after receiver user is cheated, positioning by RNSS signal and resolve, calculate the result of mistake.Receive RDSS signal and be divided into two kinds of situations, user has only responded interactive distance measuring signal that jammer forwards and user and has responded interactive distance measuring signal that is real and jammer forwarding.
1) user has responded interactive mode that real and jammer forwards and to have found range RDSS exit signal
Receiver can respond twice Survey control center broadcasts in succession to the interrogating signal of user, and is transmitted to Survey control center by synchronous satellite, two kinds of loops respectively:---satellite---user's---satellite---Survey control center, Survey control center;---satellite---deception jammer---user's---satellite---Survey control center, Survey control center.Survey control center will receive 2 times to user answer under normal circumstances, and the interval in two moment is exactly satellite broadcast downwards be forwarded formula jammer forward increase time delay, now Survey control center can detect to there is Deceiving interference around user, and sends corresponding warning message to user.But the actual position of receiver user can not be obtained.I.e. step 1 and step 3a.
2) user has only responded the interactive mode range finding RDSS exit signal that jammer forwards
Survey control center can not calculate the position of user, but can calculate the distance of user user's time of reception to interactive range finding platform, and this distance is sent to user by Survey control center; Receiver user utilizes the positioning result of RNSS can calculate the distance of receiver user and interactive platform of finding range simultaneously; Compare by these two distances, judge whether receiver user is subject to Deceiving interference, simultaneously and send alarm to Survey control center.I.e. step 1, step 2, step 3b, step 3d and step 4b.
Scene 3: deception jammer forwards to user or produces RNSS signal, forwards RDSS exit signal and the inbound answer signal of RDSS.
Identical with situation 1, the signal circuit of interactive range finding will have 4 kinds,
1) whole interactive ranging process only has a kind of loop
---satellite---deception jammer---user's---satellite---Survey control center, Survey control center;---satellite---user---deception jammer---satellite---Survey control center, Survey control center;---satellite---deception jammer---user---deception jammer---satellite---Survey control center, Survey control center.The first loop is not by repeating jamming, does not need to carry out anti-spoofing; Any one loop of its excess-three kind is as interactive ranging process, then Survey control center can not judge whether receiver is subject to repeating jamming, but the position that Survey control center calculates also is wrong, receiver, by the positioning result of the positioning result and Survey control center that compare RNSS, can show that receiver receives repeating jamming.Because the position calculated by RNSS is the position of interference source all the time, and the position that Survey control center calculates be not interference source neither the position of receiver, both positions are different.Step is step 1, step 3b, step 3c and step 4a.
2) whole interactive ranging process is more than a kind of loop
Survey control center will be subject to repeatedly the answer signal of receiver, and Survey control center will detect that receiver receives Deceiving interference.I.e. step 1, step 3a.
In sum, these are only preferred embodiment of the present invention, be not intended to limit protection scope of the present invention.Within the spirit and principles in the present invention all, any amendment done, equivalent replacement, improvement etc., all should be included within protection scope of the present invention.
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