CN103297963B - Based on the method and system without the M2M secret protection of certificate and key management - Google Patents

Abstract

Disclosure is based on the method and system without the M2M secret protection of certificate and key management; the method: its identity information is sent to business platform by different terminal units, utilizes its system private key, initial value and identity information generate the private key of terminal unit and dynamic factor and store return；Terminal unit chooses random value, generates the public private key pair of this terminal unit；When between different terminal units, request communicates, the terminal unit of requesting party generates anonymous information and sending to Requested Party according to random value, identity information and dynamic factor it described；Requested Party receives this anonymity message, and the PKI of requesting party is verified by coupling system PKI, and as being proved to be successful, then Requested Party utilizes its private key negotiate the session key of both sides with anonymous message and carry out both sides' Dialog processing；Such as authentication failed, then refuse communication request。This invention address that the power consumption issues safeguarding certificate, all kinds of privacy informations are easily revealed, and the key safety problem of whole mechanism。

Description

Method and system for certificateless M2M privacy protection and key management

technical field

The present invention relates to the field of information security, in particular to a certificate-less M2M (Machine to Machine, machine-to-machine communication) privacy protection and key management method and system.

Background technique

At present, with the acceleration of the construction of the Internet of Things, various Internet of Things services (such as smart medical care, smart transportation, home furnishing, military, etc.) have gradually entered people's lives.

Because the Internet of Things has the characteristics of compatibility in network technology types and unlimited expansion in business scope, security issues have become an important factor restricting its development.

On the one hand, when national data and personal information are connected to the Internet of Things, more personal privacy information may be illegally obtained at any time and anywhere;

On the other hand, since the country's important basic industries and social key service areas such as electricity and medical care rely on the Internet of Things and sensing services, dynamic information in the country's basic fields may be stolen.

In other words, the transmission of perceived information in the Internet of Things is often attacked by various opponents (eavesdropping, tampering, interception, etc.), so that the information cannot be transmitted accurately, and even the entire network cannot operate normally. Therefore, the confidentiality of information transmission must be guaranteed. integrity. This will inevitably involve key management issues, such as key generation, update, revocation, etc., so key management is a problem that needs to be solved first.

However, due to the multi-source heterogeneity of the Internet of Things and the limited capabilities of sensing nodes, it is difficult to manage secure and effective keys—that is, how to design key generation, update, and revocation methods throughout the entire network, and how to communicate with things. Adapt to the network's own characteristics and system structure.

As shown in Figure 1, first of all, the existing key management schemes are mainly certificate-based and identity-based. For the certificate-based key management scheme, the certificates used for verification are provided by the authorized party. Both energy consumption and maintenance are large, which is unbearable for the sensing nodes; for identity-based key management, although there are no certificate-related issues, the user's private key is completely distributed by a trusted party, and there is a Key escrow issues, the security of the entire mechanism is greatly threatened.

Secondly, in the existing key management mechanism, the identity information of the terminal device is transmitted in plain text, and the identity privacy protection of the terminal device is not considered. However, most IoT terminal devices are deployed in an unmanned monitoring environment, and are vulnerable to interception and control by illegal users. Once the identity information of the device is leaked, potential private information may be exposed, such as: the location of the user, the collected data time and so on. In this way, illegal users can pretend to be legitimate terminals to communicate, obtain their session keys, and decrypt messages. Therefore, it is necessary to protect the identity privacy of terminal devices.

Thirdly, the existing key management mechanism relies on the platform to generate and update keys, and cannot realize the end-to-end communication characteristics of MTC (machine type communication, machine type communication) terminal equipment in the Internet of Things, and the key update method relies on session encryption. key, cannot satisfy forward/backward security.

Therefore, how to solve the energy consumption of the MTC terminal equipment of the Internet of Things, which cannot provide maintenance certificates due to the limited capabilities, and because the terminal equipment is unattended, all kinds of private information are easy to leak, and the existing identity-based key management mechanism exists. Key escrow, keys that cannot be updated by themselves, and the key security issues of the entire mechanism have become technical issues that need to be solved urgently.

Contents of the invention

The main purpose of the present invention is to provide a method and system based on certificate-free M2M privacy protection and key management, so as to solve the problem of energy consumption for maintaining certificates due to the limited capabilities of MTC terminal devices in the Internet of Things. All kinds of private information are easy to leak, the key escrow exists in the existing identity-based key management mechanism, the key cannot be updated by itself, and the key security of the whole mechanism is problematic.

According to one aspect of the present invention, a method for M2M privacy protection and key management based on certificates is provided, which is characterized in that it includes:

Different terminal devices send their identity information to the service platform, and the service platform uses its system private key, initial value and received identity information to generate and store the private key and dynamic factor of the terminal device, and store the private key and The dynamic factor is returned to the terminal equipment;

The terminal device selects a random value, and generates a public-private key pair of the terminal device in combination with the received private key and dynamic factors;

When different terminal devices request communication, the requester's terminal device generates an anonymous message of the requester's terminal device according to its random value, identity information and dynamic factors, and sends it to the requested party;

The terminal device of the requested party receives the anonymous message, and verifies the public key of the terminal device of the requesting party in combination with the system public key of the service platform. If the verification is successful, the terminal device of the requested party uses its The private key and the anonymous message are negotiated to obtain a session key between the two parties, and the session process between the two parties is performed; if the verification fails, the communication request of the requesting party is rejected.

Preferably, the dynamic factor will change successively according to the number of sessions of the terminal device to which it belongs, and at the same time, the terminal device will also change the private key of the terminal device due to the changed value of the dynamic factor.

Preferably, it also includes:

When the service platform receives report information that a certain terminal device is a malicious device or an illegal device sent by multiple terminal devices, the service platform will send request identity information to the terminal device, and the terminal device will provide its identity The information is sent to the service platform, and the service platform obtains its dynamic factor according to the identity information, and judges whether the dynamic factor is consistent with the stored dynamic factor of the terminal device, and if the same, the terminal device is a legal device; If not, the service platform revokes the information sent or received by the terminal device.

Preferably, the dynamic factor will change successively according to the number of sessions of the terminal device to which it belongs, further: the dynamic factor will be based on the dynamic factor used in the last session of the terminal device to which it belongs and the current session of the terminal device The number of sessions generates a new dynamic factor.

According to another aspect of the present invention, a certificate-free M2M privacy protection and key management system is also provided, which is characterized in that it includes: a registration module, a key establishment module and a key verification module, wherein,

The registration module is used to receive the identity information sent by different terminal devices, use the system private key, initial value and received identity information to generate and store the private key and dynamic factor of the terminal device, and store the private key and The dynamic factor is returned to the terminal device and the key establishment module;

The key establishment module is used to receive the private key and the dynamic factor of the different terminal equipment sent by the registration module, combine the random value on the terminal equipment to generate the public-private key pair of the terminal equipment, and return it to the a terminal device and the key verification module;

The key verification module is used to receive an anonymous message generated by the terminal device of the requesting party according to its random value, identity information and dynamic factors when different terminal devices request communication, and combine the key The system public key in the establishment module verifies the public key of the requesting party's terminal device. If the verification is successful, it instructs the requesting party's terminal device to use its private key to negotiate with the anonymous message to obtain a session key for both parties and conduct a session between the two parties. Processing; if the verification fails, rejecting the communication request of the requesting party.

Preferably, the dynamic factor will change successively according to the number of sessions of the terminal device to which it belongs, and at the same time, the terminal device will also change the private key of the terminal device due to the changed value of the dynamic factor.

Preferably, it further includes: a revocation processing module, configured to send the request identity information to the terminal device when receiving a plurality of report information sent by the terminal device that a certain terminal device is a malicious device or an illegal device, and Receive its feedback identity information, obtain its dynamic factor according to the identity information, and judge whether the dynamic factor is consistent with the dynamic factor of the terminal device stored in the registration module, if the same, the terminal device is a legal device ; If they are not the same, cancel the information sent or received by the terminal device.

Preferably, the dynamic factor will change successively according to the number of sessions of the terminal device to which it belongs, further: the dynamic factor will be based on the dynamic factor used in the last session of the terminal device to which it belongs and the current session of the terminal device The number of sessions generates a new dynamic factor.

Compared with existing solutions, the technical effects obtained by the present invention are:

1) The present invention can solve the energy consumption of unable to provide maintenance certificates due to the limited capabilities of the MTC terminal equipment of the Internet of Things. Since the terminal equipment is unattended, various types of private information are easy to leak. In the existing identity-based key management mechanism There is key escrow, the key cannot be updated by itself, and the key security problem of the whole mechanism.

2) The present invention can also meet end-to-end communication scenarios between devices in the Internet of Things, and is suitable for MTC terminal devices with limited computing and storage capabilities in the Internet of Things. It does not require an authority to distribute certificates, which improves the efficiency of the entire mechanism. MTC The session key is obtained through authentication and negotiation between the terminal devices. It does not need to distribute the key and solves the existing key escrow problem, and improves the security of the session key. At the same time, the session key can also be dynamically updated. And the update does not require the participation of the business platform.

3) The method and system of the present invention also have the functions of revoking the malicious terminal equipment, ensuring the forward/backward security of the key through the selection of dynamic factors, and effectively protecting the privacy of the terminal equipment by anonymously transmitting the identities of both communication parties information, and the present invention is easy to implement and operate, and conforms to the communication mode of MTC terminal equipment in the Internet of Things.

Description of drawings

The accompanying drawings described here are used to provide a further understanding of the present invention and constitute a part of the application. The schematic embodiments of the present invention and their descriptions are used to explain the present invention and do not constitute improper limitations to the present invention. In the attached picture:

Fig. 1 is an overview structural block diagram of the key management mechanism in the prior art;

FIG. 2 is a flow chart of a certificate-less M2M privacy protection and key management method according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention;

FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a system structure based on certificateless M2M privacy protection and key management described in Embodiment 2 of the present invention;

Fig. 4 is a structural relationship diagram of a specific embodiment after adopting the method in Fig. 2 .

detailed description

Certain terms are used, for example, in the description and claims to refer to particular components. Those skilled in the art should understand that hardware manufacturers may use different terms to refer to the same component. The specification and claims do not use the difference in name as a way to distinguish components, but use the difference in function of components as a criterion for distinguishing. As mentioned throughout the specification and claims, "comprising" is an open term, so it should be interpreted as "including but not limited to". "Approximately" means that within an acceptable error range, those skilled in the art can solve the technical problem within a certain error range and basically achieve the technical effect. In addition, the term "coupled" herein includes any direct and indirect electrical coupling means. Therefore, if it is described that a first device is coupled to a second device, it means that the first device may be directly electrically coupled to the second device, or indirectly electrically coupled through other devices or coupling means. connected to the second device. The following descriptions in the specification are preferred implementation modes for implementing the present invention, but the descriptions are for the purpose of illustrating the general principles of the present invention, and are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention. The scope of protection of the present invention should be defined by the appended claims.

In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the present invention clearer, the present invention will be further described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.

As shown in Figures 2 and 4, it is a method for M2M privacy protection and key management based on no certificate according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention, the method includes:

Step 201, different terminal devices send their identity information to the service platform, and the service platform uses its system private key, initial value and received identity information to generate and store the private key and dynamic factor of the terminal device, and store the The private key and dynamic factor are returned to the terminal device;

Step 202, the terminal device selects a random value, and generates a public-private key pair of the terminal device in combination with the received private key and dynamic factors;

Step 203, when different terminal devices request communication, the requester's terminal device generates an anonymous message of the requester's terminal device according to its random value, identity information and dynamic factors, and sends it to the requested party ;

Step 204, the terminal device of the requested party receives the anonymous message, and verifies the public key of the terminal device of the requesting party in combination with the system public key of the service platform. If the verification is successful, the terminal device of the requested party The device uses its private key to negotiate with the anonymous message to obtain the session key of the two parties and process the session between the two parties; if the verification fails, the communication request of the requesting party is rejected.

Wherein, each operation in step 203 above, the dynamic factor will change successively according to the number of sessions of the terminal device to which it belongs, and at the same time, the terminal device will also change the private key of the terminal device due to the changed value of the dynamic factor.

Further, the dynamic factor will change successively according to the number of sessions of the terminal device to which it belongs, further: the dynamic factor will be based on the dynamic factor used in the last session of the terminal device to which it belongs and the number of sessions currently conducted by the terminal device Generate new dynamic factors. In Embodiment 1 of the present invention, the dynamic factor will change according to the following manner: DK _i =DK _i-1 H(i, ID _A ) (i is the i-th session, ID is the identity of the MTC device, DK (dynamickey) is a dynamic factor), so the private key of the terminal device also changes accordingly, and the corresponding subsequent session key is updated synchronously.

In addition, the method described in the first embodiment above also includes: a revocation method, and the specific implementation content of the revocation method is as follows:

When the service platform receives report information that a certain terminal device is a malicious device or an illegal device sent by multiple terminal devices, the service platform will send request identity information to the terminal device, and the terminal device will provide its identity The information is sent to the service platform, and the service platform obtains its dynamic factor according to the identity information, and judges whether the dynamic factor is consistent with the stored dynamic factor of the terminal device, and if the same, the terminal device is a legal device; If not, the service platform revokes the information sent or received by the terminal device.

As shown in FIG. 3 , it is a certificate-less M2M privacy protection and key management system according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention, including: a registration module 301, a key establishment module 302 and a key verification module 303, wherein ,

The registration module 301 is respectively coupled with different terminal devices and the key establishment module 302, and is used to receive the identity information sent by different terminal devices, and use the system private key, initial value and received identity information to generate the terminal Store the private key and the dynamic factor of the device, and return the private key and the dynamic factor to the terminal device and the key establishment module 302;

The key establishment module 302 is respectively coupled to the different terminal devices, the registration module 301 and the key verification module 303, and is used to receive the private keys and Dynamic factors combined with the random value on the terminal device to generate the public-private key pair of the terminal device, and return to the terminal device and the key verification module 303;

The key verification module 303 is respectively coupled to the different terminal devices and the key establishment module 302, and is used to receive the request from the terminal device of the requesting party according to the The anonymous message generated by random value, identity information and dynamic factor, combined with the system public key in the key establishment module 302 to verify the public key of the requesting party's terminal device, if the verification is successful, it indicates that the requested party's terminal device Using its private key to negotiate with the anonymous message to obtain the session key of the two parties and process the session between the two parties; if the verification fails, rejecting the communication request of the requesting party.

Further, for the anonymous message generated by the terminal device of the requesting party received by the key verification module 303 according to its random value, identity information and dynamic factor, the dynamic factor mentioned here will be based on the The number of sessions is changed successively, and at the same time, the terminal device will also change the private key of the terminal device due to the changed value of the dynamic factor; further: the dynamic factor will be based on the dynamic factor used in the last session of the terminal device to which it belongs Generate a new dynamic factor with the number of sessions currently performed by the terminal device. In the second embodiment of the present invention, the dynamic factor will change according to the following manner: DK _i =DK _i-1 H(i, ID _A ) (i is the i session, ID is the identity of the MTC device, DK (dynamickey) is a dynamic factor), so the private key of the terminal device also changes accordingly, and the corresponding subsequent session key is updated synchronously.

In addition, the system described in the second embodiment above also includes:

The revocation processing module 304, the specific execution content of the revocation processing module 304 is as follows:

Coupled with the different terminal devices and the registration module 301, it is used to send request identity information to the terminal when receiving report information that a certain terminal device is a malicious device or an illegal device sent by multiple terminal devices device, and receive the identity information fed back by it, obtain its dynamic factor according to the identity information, and judge whether the dynamic factor is consistent with the dynamic factor of the terminal device stored in the registration module 301, if the same, then the terminal The device is a legal device; if they are not the same, the information sent or received by the terminal device will be revoked.

As shown in FIG. 4 , the terminal devices mentioned in the first and second embodiments above are all MTC terminal devices, which will not be repeated here.

Compared with existing solutions, the technical effects obtained by the present invention are:

1) The present invention can solve the energy consumption of unable to provide maintenance certificates due to the limited capabilities of the MTC terminal equipment of the Internet of Things. Since the terminal equipment is unattended, various types of private information are easy to leak. In the existing identity-based key management mechanism There is key escrow, the key cannot be updated by itself, and the key security problem of the whole mechanism.

2) The present invention can also meet end-to-end communication scenarios between devices in the Internet of Things, and is suitable for MTC terminal devices with limited computing and storage capabilities in the Internet of Things. It does not require an authority to distribute certificates, which improves the efficiency of the entire mechanism. MTC The session key is obtained through authentication and negotiation between the terminal devices. It does not need to distribute the key and solves the existing key escrow problem, and improves the security of the session key. At the same time, the session key can also be dynamically updated. And the update does not require the participation of the business platform.

3) The method and system of the present invention also have the functions of revoking the malicious terminal equipment, ensuring the forward/backward security of the key through the selection of dynamic factors, and effectively protecting the privacy of the terminal equipment by anonymously transmitting the identities of both communication parties information, and the present invention is easy to implement and operate, and conforms to the communication mode of MTC terminal equipment in the Internet of Things.

The above description is only an embodiment of the present invention, and is not intended to limit the present invention. For those skilled in the art, the present invention may have various modifications and changes. Any modifications, equivalent replacements, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and principles of the present invention shall be included within the scope of the claims of the present invention.

Claims (8)

1. A method for certificate-free M2M privacy protection and key management, comprising: Different terminal devices send their identity information to the service platform, and the service platform uses its system private key, initial value and received identity information to generate and store the private key and dynamic factor of the terminal device, and store the private key and The dynamic factor is returned to the terminal equipment; The terminal device selects a random value, and generates a public-private key pair of the terminal device in combination with the received private key and dynamic factors; When different terminal devices request communication, the requester's terminal device generates an anonymous message of the requester's terminal device according to its random value, identity information and dynamic factors, and sends it to the requested party; The terminal device of the requested party receives the anonymous message, and verifies the public key of the terminal device of the requesting party in combination with the system public key of the service platform. If the verification is successful, the terminal device of the requested party uses its The private key and the anonymous message are negotiated to obtain a session key between the two parties, and the session process between the two parties is performed; if the verification fails, the communication request of the requesting party is rejected. 2. The method for M2M privacy protection and key management based on certificateless M2M as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that the dynamic factor will change successively according to the number of sessions of the terminal device to which it belongs, and at the same time, the terminal device will also The private key of the terminal device will be changed by the changed value of its dynamic factor. 3. The method for certificate-free M2M privacy protection and key management as claimed in claim 1, further comprising: When the service platform receives report information that a certain terminal device is a malicious device or an illegal device sent by multiple terminal devices, the service platform will send request identity information to the terminal device, and the terminal device will provide its identity The information is sent to the service platform, and the service platform obtains its dynamic factor according to the identity information, and judges whether the dynamic factor is consistent with the stored dynamic factor of the terminal device, and if the same, the terminal device is a legal device; If not, the service platform revokes the information sent or received by the terminal device. 4. The method for M2M privacy protection and key management based on certificateless M2M as claimed in claim 2, characterized in that the dynamic factor will change successively according to the number of sessions of the terminal device to which it belongs, further comprising: the dynamic factor The factor will generate a new dynamic factor according to the dynamic factor used in the last session of the terminal device to which it belongs and the number of sessions currently performed by the terminal device. 5. A system based on certificate-free M2M privacy protection and key management, comprising: a registration module, a key establishment module and a key verification module, wherein, The registration module is used to receive the identity information sent by different terminal devices, use the system private key, initial value and received identity information to generate and store the private key and dynamic factor of the terminal device, and store the private key and The dynamic factor is returned to the terminal device and the key establishment module; The key establishment module is used to receive the private key and the dynamic factor of the different terminal equipment sent by the registration module, combine the random value on the terminal equipment to generate the public-private key pair of the terminal equipment, and return it to the a terminal device and the key verification module; The key verification module is used to receive an anonymous message generated by the terminal device of the requesting party according to its random value, identity information and dynamic factors when different terminal devices request communication, and combine the key The system public key in the establishment module verifies the public key of the requesting party's terminal device. If the verification is successful, it instructs the requesting party's terminal device to use its private key to negotiate with the anonymous message to obtain a session key for both parties and conduct a session between the two parties. Processing; if the verification fails, rejecting the communication request of the requesting party. 6. The system of M2M privacy protection and key management based on certificateless M2M as claimed in claim 5, characterized in that, the dynamic factor will change successively according to the number of sessions of the terminal device to which it belongs, and at the same time, the terminal device will also The private key of the terminal device will be changed by the changed value of its dynamic factor. 7. The system of M2M privacy protection and key management based on certificateless M2M as claimed in claim 5, further comprising: a revocation processing module, configured to receive a certain terminal When the device is a malicious device or illegal device report information, send the request identity information to the terminal device, and receive the identity information fed back, obtain its dynamic factor according to the identity information, and judge whether the dynamic factor is consistent with the registration module The dynamic factors of the terminal device stored in the device are consistent. If they are the same, the terminal device is a legal device; 8. The system of M2M privacy protection and key management based on certificateless M2M as claimed in claim 6, characterized in that, the dynamic factor will change successively according to the number of sessions of the terminal device to which it belongs, further comprising: the dynamic factor The factor will generate a new dynamic factor according to the dynamic factor used in the last session of the terminal device to which it belongs and the number of sessions currently performed by the terminal device.