CN103092680B - Computer network defense scheme emulated execution system - Google Patents
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Abstract
计算机网络防御方案仿真执行系统包括:(1)设计并实现了一种上下文无关文法的形式化的计算机网络防御方案描述语言CNDSDL(Computer?NetworkDefense?Scheme?Description?Language),给出该描述语言的EBNF范式,并设计了基于CNDSDL语言解释器。(2)提出了基于CNDSDL语言的方案部署方法。包括防御方案中任务的死锁检测及调度算法,保障了防御方案的正确性。(3)在GTNetS仿真平台上,实现了防御方案的仿真,包括IDS、防火墙、备份、恢复、以及IDS、漏洞库和防火墙之间的联动任务的仿真。
The computer network defense scheme simulation execution system includes: (1) Design and implement a formalized computer network defense scheme description language CNDSDL (Computer? NetworkDefense? Scheme? Description? Language) of context-free grammar. EBNF paradigm, and designed a language interpreter based on CNDSDL. (2) A scheme deployment method based on CNDSDL language is proposed. Including the deadlock detection and scheduling algorithm of tasks in the defense scheme, which ensures the correctness of the defense scheme. (3) On the GTNetS simulation platform, the simulation of the defense scheme is realized, including the simulation of IDS, firewall, backup, recovery, and linkage tasks between IDS, vulnerability database and firewall.
Description
技术领域technical field
本发明设计并实现了一种计算机网络防御方案仿真执行系统,属于计算机网络安全技术领域,涉及到计算机网络防御方案的描述问题,方案的部署问题,以及方案的仿真实现。The invention designs and implements a computer network defense scheme simulation execution system, belongs to the technical field of computer network security, and relates to the description of the computer network defense scheme, the deployment of the scheme, and the simulation realization of the scheme.
背景技术Background technique
由于互联网本身的多样性、开放性和计算机系统及网络设备存在的许多软硬件漏洞,以及网络规模的增长和结构的日益复杂等原因,导致系统内各个部分的关系复杂、多样,网络攻击手段也呈现多样性发展,人们面临着网络安全问题带来的诸多风险,从而对计算机网络防御提出来更大的挑战。为了适应这种保障大规模的计算机网络及应用系统安全的需求,必须研究如何在网络上自动实现防御方案的部署来应对复杂的攻击。Due to the diversity and openness of the Internet itself, many software and hardware vulnerabilities in computer systems and network equipment, as well as the growth of the network scale and the increasingly complex structure, the relationship between various parts of the system is complex and diverse, and the means of network attacks are also complicated. With the development of diversity, people are faced with many risks brought by network security issues, which poses greater challenges to computer network defense. In order to meet the needs of ensuring the security of large-scale computer networks and application systems, it is necessary to study how to automatically implement the deployment of defense solutions on the network to deal with complex attacks.
安全并非一个孤立的问题,依靠任何单一的安全产品都无法保障计算机网络和信息的安全,网络安全设备的种类千变万化,配置方法各异,传统的手工配置网络安全防御方案日益力不从心。在网络防御方案中,安全设备进行联动防御已成为一种常用手段。通过将各种安全设备互联,进行安全信息的互通与整合,每个系统利用自己的优势弥补其他系统的不足,可以更加有效的实现网络防御方案。Security is not an isolated issue. Relying on any single security product cannot guarantee the security of computer networks and information. The types of network security devices are ever-changing and the configuration methods are different. The traditional manual configuration of network security defense solutions is increasingly inadequate. In the network defense scheme, the joint defense of security devices has become a common method. Through the interconnection of various security devices, the intercommunication and integration of security information, each system uses its own advantages to make up for the shortcomings of other systems, and can more effectively implement network defense solutions.
由于搭建物理网络易受到网络规模的限制,且具有无法精确再现数据,数据易丢失,错误处理等原因,因此,建模与仿真的方法在研究网络攻击与防御中得到了广泛的应用。建模与仿真研究网络安全问题的一种重要方式和手段。Because building a physical network is easily limited by the size of the network, and there are reasons such as the inability to accurately reproduce data, easy data loss, and error handling, the modeling and simulation methods have been widely used in the study of network attack and defense. Modeling and simulation is an important way and means to study network security issues.
通过对以上研究现状的分析,可以发现存在如下问题。Through the analysis of the above research status, we can find the following problems.
(1)目前对方案的形式化描述的研究多集中在军事领域,缺乏对面向计算机网络防御的方案形式化描述方法的研究。即缺乏一种统一的松耦合的语言级接口描述,从而可以表达安全设备的防御任务,以及设备之间的联动防御任务;(1) At present, the research on the formal description of the scheme is mostly concentrated in the military field, and there is a lack of research on the formal description method of the scheme for computer network defense. That is, there is a lack of a unified loosely coupled language-level interface description, so that the defense tasks of security devices and the linkage defense tasks between devices can be expressed;
(2)缺乏防御方案自动执行的部署方法。能够自动化的验证防御方案中所存在的死锁等问题,并能将其自动部署到仿真平台上实现方案的仿真;(2) There is a lack of deployment methods for automatic execution of defense schemes. It can automatically verify the problems such as deadlock in the defense scheme, and can automatically deploy it to the simulation platform to realize the simulation of the scheme;
(3)网络防御的仿真研究多用于安全评估和训练演习,对实现防御方案的自动部署的仿真执行机制有待进一步研究,特别是实现各种防御设备联动防御任务的联动防御方案的仿真。(3) The simulation research of network defense is mostly used for security assessment and training exercises. The simulation execution mechanism to realize the automatic deployment of defense schemes needs to be further studied, especially the simulation of linkage defense schemes that realize the linkage defense tasks of various defense equipment.
发明内容Contents of the invention
本发明的技术解决问题:克服现有技术的不足,提供一种计算机网络防御方案仿真执行系统,能够更有效地描述防御方案,将防御方案部署到仿真平台上以实现方案的仿真,从而大大提高了计算机网络防御的效率。The technical problem of the present invention is to overcome the deficiencies of the prior art, and provide a computer network defense scheme simulation execution system, which can more effectively describe the defense scheme, and deploy the defense scheme on the simulation platform to realize the simulation of the scheme, thereby greatly improving increase the efficiency of computer network defense.
本发明的技术解决方案:计算机网络防御方案仿真执行系统,其特征在于包括:方案解释模块、方案部署模块、方案仿真模块及其执行结果显示模块,其中:Technical solution of the present invention: computer network defense scheme simulation execution system, characterized in that it includes: scheme interpretation module, scheme deployment module, scheme simulation module and its execution result display module, wherein:
方案解释模块:防御方案是由防御任务和任务之间的时序逻辑关系构成。防御任务是由任务主体、操作集、执行时间和执行结果构成。包括防护任务、检测任务、分析任务、响应任务和恢复任务。操作是由动作、动作对象和输入参数构成。首先设计并实现一种语法形式简单,结构清晰,具有易操作性和可扩展性的计算机网络防御方案描述语言CNDSDL,给出该语言的EBNF范式。然后面向计算机网络防御方案描述语言CNDSDL,设计并实现基于Flex和Bison的防御方案解释器,对CNDSDL语句进行解析识别,从而将各种语句的参数传递到接口函数中。解释器分别进行词法分析、语法分析和语义分析,最终分别识别出全局变量定义语句、任务描述语句,任务关系描述语句。其具体过程为对输入的计算机网络防御方案描述文件进行解析,解析出防御方案中的防护、检测、分析、响应和恢复防御任务,以及任务之间的顺序与、顺序或、并行与、并行或和异或关系。Scheme interpretation module: the defense scheme is composed of defense tasks and the temporal logical relationship between tasks. The defense task is composed of task subject, operation set, execution time and execution result. Including protection tasks, detection tasks, analysis tasks, response tasks and recovery tasks. An operation is composed of an action, an action object, and input parameters. Firstly, a computer network defense scheme description language CNDSDL with simple syntax, clear structure, easy operability and scalability is designed and implemented, and the EBNF paradigm of the language is given. Then, for the computer network defense scheme description language CNDSDL, a defense scheme interpreter based on Flex and Bison is designed and implemented, which parses and recognizes CNDSDL sentences, and passes the parameters of various sentences to the interface function. The interpreter performs lexical analysis, syntax analysis and semantic analysis respectively, and finally recognizes the global variable definition statement, task description statement, and task relationship description statement respectively. The specific process is to analyze the input computer network defense scheme description file, analyze the protection, detection, analysis, response and recovery defense tasks in the defense scheme, and the sequence and, sequence or, parallel and, parallel or and XOR relationship.
方案部署模块:对解释出来的防御方案中的各种防御任务进行死锁检测和任务调度。根据任务之间的关系构建任务图,采用基于图的任务死锁检测算法,通过对图进行闭包运算,若发现任意一条有向边存在逆向边,则两个任务互相存在时序依赖关系,表示方案会产生死锁,则拒绝方案的执行;否则将其部署到对应的仿真节点执行。Scheme deployment module: perform deadlock detection and task scheduling for various defense tasks in the explained defense scheme. The task graph is constructed according to the relationship between tasks, and a graph-based task deadlock detection algorithm is used. By performing a closure operation on the graph, if any directed edge is found to have a reverse edge, then the two tasks have a temporal dependency on each other, indicating that If the scheme will cause deadlock, the execution of the scheme is rejected; otherwise, it is deployed to the corresponding simulation node for execution.
方案仿真模块:将防御方案中的防御任务部署在仿真平台上实现仿真,并显示拓扑中节点的信息。采用基于离散事件驱动的分布式仿真器GTNetS,对IDS检测任务,防火墙的访问控制任务,漏洞扫描任务,备份任务,恢复任务,系统打补丁和重启任务,IDS,漏扫和防火墙之间的联动任务进行仿真。Scheme simulation module: deploy the defense tasks in the defense scheme on the simulation platform to realize the simulation, and display the information of the nodes in the topology. Using GTNetS, a distributed simulator based on discrete events, for IDS detection tasks, firewall access control tasks, vulnerability scanning tasks, backup tasks, recovery tasks, system patching and restart tasks, linkage between IDS, missed scans and firewalls The task is simulated.
执行结果显示模块:防火墙任务仿真将会显示在防火墙上部署的访问控制列表,IDS仿真任务将显示部署的检测规则;这些仿真任务最终将以命令控制台的形式显示各个仿真节点的信息。Execution result display module: the firewall task simulation will display the access control list deployed on the firewall, and the IDS simulation task will display the deployed detection rules; these simulation tasks will finally display the information of each simulation node in the form of a command console.
所述方案解释模块的具体实现过程:(1)设计并实现一种计算机网络防御方案描述语言,给出该语言的EBNF范式,用该语言表达防御方案中的防护、检测、分析、响应和恢复任务,以及任务之间的顺序与、顺序或、并行与、并行或和异或关系。(2)设计了CNDSDL解释器。对输入计算机网络防御方案描述文件进行解析,解析出防御方案中的防御任务和任务之间的关系,以及每条任务中的主体,操作集合,执行时间,执行结果,及任务约束,操作所包含的动作、动作对象、动作输入参数三元组。首先对CNDSDL语句进行解析识别,包括词法分析和语法分析,分别由Flex和Bison工具完成,从而将各种语句的参数传递到接口函数中。然后进行语义分析,根据CNDSDL中的EBNF范式描述,分别识别全局变量定义语句、任务描述语句,任务关系描述语句。并对不同的语句调用相应的API接口,将参数传递至仿真系统中的相关模块,由仿真系统完成最终的方案执行。解释器通过以上流程实现了对CNDSDL源文件的解析;The specific implementation process of the program interpretation module: (1) Design and implement a computer network defense program description language, give the EBNF paradigm of the language, and use this language to express the protection, detection, analysis, response and recovery in the defense program Tasks, and sequential and, sequential or, parallel and, parallel or, and exclusive or relationships between tasks. (2) The CNDSDL interpreter is designed. Analyze the description file of the input computer network defense scheme, and analyze the defense tasks in the defense scheme and the relationship between tasks, as well as the subject in each task, operation set, execution time, execution result, and task constraints, and the operation includes Action, action object, action input parameter triplet. Firstly, analyze and identify the CNDSDL statement, including lexical analysis and syntax analysis, which are completed by Flex and Bison tools respectively, so that the parameters of various statements are passed to the interface function. Then carry out semantic analysis, according to the EBNF paradigm description in CNDSDL, respectively identify the global variable definition statement, task description statement, and task relationship description statement. And call the corresponding API interface for different statements, pass the parameters to the relevant modules in the simulation system, and the final program execution is completed by the simulation system. The interpreter implements the parsing of the CNDSDL source file through the above process;
所述方案部署模块的具体实现过程:对解释后得到的各种类型的防御任务进行任务的死锁检测,采用基于图的任务死锁检测算法。(1)首先根据任务间的顺序或关系和顺序与关系构建任务图。(2)通过对图进行闭包运算,若发现任意一条有向边存在逆向边,则两个任务互相存在时序依赖关系,表示方案会产生死锁(3)否则,从任务图中调度入度为0的节点,若该节点具有顺序或关系的所有前向任务逻辑执行结果失败,则该任务必须执行,若该节点具有顺序与关系的所有前向任务逻辑执行结果执行成功,则该任务方能执行;The specific implementation process of the solution deployment module: perform task deadlock detection on various types of defense tasks obtained after explanation, and use a graph-based task deadlock detection algorithm. (1) First construct a task graph according to the sequence or relationship between tasks and the sequence and relationship. (2) Through the closure operation on the graph, if any directed edge has a reverse edge, then the two tasks have a timing dependency relationship with each other, indicating that the scheme will cause deadlock (3) Otherwise, schedule the in-degree from the task graph For a node with a value of 0, if the logic execution results of all forward tasks with sequence or relationship of the node fail, the task must be executed; if the logic execution results of all forward tasks with sequence and relationship of the node are successfully executed, the task will able to execute;
所述方案仿真模块的具体实现过程:将经过死锁检测的任务调入到仿真平台中来实现仿真,采用基于离散事件驱动的分布式仿真器(discreteevent-drivensimulator)GTNetS,方便对大中型网络进行模拟;数据库中将存储漏洞信息以及仿真过程中产生的IDS检测规则和防火墙的访问控制规则。其具体的任务仿真包含如下三部分:(1)采用GTNetS实现一种基于网络的入侵检测(NIDS)的仿真,并重点关注其中的特征检测。NIDS放置在比较重要的网段内,不停地监视网段中的各种数据包,对每个数据包或可疑的数据进行特征分析。如果数据包与规则相符合,则入侵检测系统会发出报警,或进行响应,如向漏洞发出漏洞确认信息,或向防火墙放出阻断数据包的任务;(2)采用GTNetS实现防火墙的访问控制仿真。安全仿真中的防火墙主要应用于数据包过滤,而数据包过滤分为静态包过滤和根据状态对数据包的过滤。静态包过滤防火墙,当接口收到数据包时,首先确定ACL是否被应用到了该接口。如果没有,正常的路由该数据包。如果有,处理ACL。对于输出ACL,过程是相似的。状态防火墙主要通过记录连接的状态信息来过滤,对于IP、TCP、UDP、ICMP协议,一种可行的方案是在连接时要获取连接相关信息进行Hash,防火墙根据Hash匹配判断流量是否是返回流量,从而达到过滤的效果。(3)采用GTNetS实现其它的防御任务的仿真。实现了防护任务中的备份任务和检测任务中的漏洞确认任务的仿真,备份是目标到其副本的映射,通过对系统中的数据和文件进行备份,在面对攻击和威胁时,可以及时采用恢复任务进行数据的恢复,从而保障了网络的安全性。漏洞确认任务主要是较低IDS的误检率。对IDS检测到的攻击特征,进行漏洞扫描,并在漏洞知识库中进行查找,从而确认网络中是否存在该种漏洞的攻击。通过方案描述语言的描述,最终实现了一种考虑IDS,防火墙和漏洞扫描系统之间的联动仿真。The specific implementation process of the simulation module of the scheme: transfer the tasks through the deadlock detection into the simulation platform to realize the simulation, and adopt the distributed simulator (discrete event-drivensimulator) GTNetS based on discrete events to facilitate large and medium-sized networks. Simulation; vulnerability information, IDS detection rules and firewall access control rules generated during the simulation process will be stored in the database. Its specific task simulation includes the following three parts: (1) Using GTNetS to implement a network-based intrusion detection (NIDS) simulation, and focusing on the feature detection. NIDS is placed in a relatively important network segment, constantly monitors various data packets in the network segment, and analyzes the characteristics of each data packet or suspicious data. If the data packet conforms to the rules, the intrusion detection system will send an alarm or respond, such as sending a vulnerability confirmation message to the vulnerability, or sending the task of blocking the data packet to the firewall; (2) using GTNetS to realize the access control simulation of the firewall . The firewall in security simulation is mainly used for data packet filtering, and data packet filtering is divided into static packet filtering and filtering of data packets according to state. Static packet filtering firewalls, when an interface receives a data packet, first determine whether the ACL is applied to the interface. If not, the packet is routed normally. Process ACLs, if any. For outgoing ACLs, the process is similar. Stateful firewalls mainly filter by recording connection status information. For IP, TCP, UDP, and ICMP protocols, a feasible solution is to obtain connection-related information for Hash when connecting, and the firewall judges whether the traffic is return traffic based on Hash matching. So as to achieve the filtering effect. (3) Using GTNetS to realize the simulation of other defense tasks. The simulation of the backup task in the protection task and the vulnerability confirmation task in the detection task is realized. The backup is the mapping from the target to its copy. By backing up the data and files in the system, it can be used in time when facing attacks and threats. Restoration tasks restore data, thereby ensuring network security. The vulnerability confirmation task is mainly to lower the false detection rate of IDS. For the attack characteristics detected by the IDS, perform vulnerability scanning and search in the vulnerability knowledge base to confirm whether there is such a vulnerability attack in the network. Through the description of the scheme description language, a linkage simulation considering IDS, firewall and vulnerability scanning system is finally realized.
所述执行结果显示模块的具体实现过程:将防御仿真任务的仿真执行结果以命令控制台的形式显示出来,根据方案仿真模块得到的仿真现象,点击仿真中的拓扑节点,即可将该节点的仿真执行结果显示出来。例如点击防火墙,将会显示部署防火墙的访问控制任务后的访问控制列表,点击IDS,将会显示部署IDS检测任务后的检测规则。The specific implementation process of the execution result display module: the simulation execution result of the defense simulation task is displayed in the form of a command console, and according to the simulation phenomenon obtained by the simulation module of the scheme, click on the topology node in the simulation, and the node's The simulation execution results are displayed. For example, click Firewall to display the access control list after deploying the firewall access control task, and click IDS to display the detection rules after deploying the IDS detection task.
本发明与现有的技术方法相比的有益效果在于:The beneficial effect of the present invention compared with prior art method is:
(1)本发明提出了一种计算机网络防御方案描述语言。针对计算机网络防御任务,采用一种计算机网络防御方案描述语言CNDSL,该语言能够统一描述计算机网络防御中保护、检测、分析、响应和恢复任务,及其这些任务之间的顺序与、顺序或、并行与、并行或和异或5种时序逻辑关系。这样可以描述各种安全设备的防御任务,及其各种安全设备相互联动的协同防御任务。这样大大提高了计算机网络防御的效率。(1) The present invention proposes a computer network defense scheme description language. For computer network defense tasks, a computer network defense solution description language CNDSL is adopted, which can uniformly describe the protection, detection, analysis, response and recovery tasks in computer network defense, and the sequence and, sequence or, Parallel AND, parallel OR and XOR 5 sequential logic relationships. In this way, the defense tasks of various security devices and the coordinated defense tasks of the mutual linkage of various security devices can be described. This greatly improves the efficiency of computer network defense.
(2)本发明给出了防御方案的解释与部署方法。设计并实现了一种CNDSDL语言的解释器,结合其EBNF范式,解析计算机网络防御方案。并设计了一种防御方案的死锁检测算法和任务调度算法,这样可以验证防御方案,防止所描述的防御方案中存在冲突的任务。确保了防御方案的正确性。最终将正确的方案部署在仿真平台上。(2) The present invention provides the explanation and deployment method of the defense scheme. A CNDSDL language interpreter is designed and implemented, combined with its EBNF paradigm, to analyze computer network defense schemes. And a deadlock detection algorithm and task scheduling algorithm of the defense scheme are designed, which can verify the defense scheme and prevent conflicting tasks in the described defense scheme. The correctness of the defense scheme is ensured. Finally, the correct solution is deployed on the simulation platform.
(3)本发明给出了防御方案的仿真。实现基于分布式的GTNetS仿真平台的IDS任务的仿真,防火墙访问控制任务的仿真,备份恢复任务的仿真,漏洞扫描的仿真,及其IDS、漏洞库和防火墙各种防御任务的联动仿真。(3) The present invention provides the simulation of the defense scheme. Realize the simulation of IDS tasks based on the distributed GTNetS simulation platform, the simulation of firewall access control tasks, the simulation of backup recovery tasks, the simulation of vulnerability scanning, and the linkage simulation of various defense tasks of IDS, vulnerability database and firewall.
附图说明Description of drawings
图1为本发明的CND防御方案仿真执行系统功能结构图;Fig. 1 is the functional structural diagram of the simulation execution system of the CND defense scheme of the present invention;
图2为本发明的CND方案的语法树图;Fig. 2 is the syntax tree diagram of the CND scheme of the present invention;
图3为本发明的CND任务死锁检测及调度算法流程图;Fig. 3 is a CND task deadlock detection and scheduling algorithm flow chart of the present invention;
图4为本发明的Snort入侵检测系统对数据包处理流程图;Fig. 4 is that Snort intrusion detection system of the present invention processes flow chart to packet;
图5为本发明的输入访问控制列表(ACL)逻辑流程图;Fig. 5 is the logical flowchart of input access control list (ACL) of the present invention;
图6为本发明的输出访问控制列表(ACL)逻辑流程图。FIG. 6 is a logical flow chart of the output access control list (ACL) of the present invention.
具体实施方式detailed description
如图1所示,本发明计算机网络防御方案仿真执行系统,输入为防御方案,输出为防御方案执行报告,包括方案解释模块、方案部署模块、方案仿真模块及其执行结果显示模块。As shown in Figure 1, the computer network defense scheme simulation execution system of the present invention, the input is a defense scheme, and the output is a defense scheme execution report, including a scheme interpretation module, a scheme deployment module, a scheme simulation module and an execution result display module.
整个实现过程如下:The whole implementation process is as follows:
(1)方案解释模块(1) Program explanation module
设计计算机网络防御方案描述语言CNDSDL及其解释器,对采用CDNSDL描述的防御方案进行词法分析、语法分析和语义分析,解释生成各种符合防御方案语法格式的防御任务。Design the computer network defense scheme description language CNDSDL and its interpreter, conduct lexical analysis, syntax analysis and semantic analysis on the defense scheme described by CDNSDL, explain and generate various defense tasks that conform to the grammatical format of the defense scheme.
定义1方案:方案是由任务集合及任务之间的关系集合构成的二元组。记为:Definition 1 Scheme: A scheme is a binary group composed of a set of tasks and a set of relationships between tasks. Recorded as:
其中ζ指任务集合,R指任务与任务之间的关系集合。Among them, ζ refers to the set of tasks, and R refers to the set of relations between tasks.
定义2任务:任务是由主体,操作集合,执行时间,执行结果,及任务约束构成的五元组,形式化表示为:Definition 2 Task: A task is a five-tuple consisting of subject, operation set, execution time, execution result, and task constraints, formalized as:
其中,Subject指网络中可以执行任务的所有主体;Operation是该任务所包含的操作;TIME指任务执行的时间;Effect指任务执行的结果,包括成功和失败两种;Condition指任务执行时,执行主体本身需满足的约束条件。Among them, Subject refers to all subjects in the network that can execute the task; Operation refers to the operation contained in the task; TIME refers to the execution time of the task; Effect refers to the result of task execution, including success and failure; Constraints that the subject itself needs to satisfy.
定义3主体:主体指参与计算机网络安全防御的所有软件和硬件资源,是保护、检测、响应和恢复主体的集合。Definition 3 subject: subject refers to all software and hardware resources participating in computer network security defense, and is a collection of subjects for protection, detection, response and recovery.
Subject::=Subjectprotect∪Subjectdetect∪Subjectrespond∪Subjectrecover Subject::=Subject protect ∪Subject detect ∪Subject respond ∪Subject recover
定义4操作:是由动作、动作对象、动作输入参数构成的三元组。记为:Definition 4 Operation: It is a triplet consisting of action, action object, and action input parameters. Recorded as:
其中,Action是动作的集合,Object是动作对象的集合,InPara是输入参数的集合,输入参数是键值对构成,InPara::={(key,value)|key∈strig,value∈strig}Among them, Action is a collection of actions, Object is a collection of action objects, InPara is a collection of input parameters, and the input parameters are key-value pairs, InPara::={(key,value)|key∈strig, value∈strig}
定义5任务间关系:任务间的关系指任务间的时序与逻辑关系,包括顺序与关系,顺序或关系,并行与关系,并行或关系,异或关系。记为:Definition 5 Inter-task relationship: The inter-task relationship refers to the timing and logical relationship between tasks, including sequence and relationship, sequence or relationship, parallel and relationship, parallel or relationship, and XOR relationship. Recorded as:
Rtask::={rseq_and,rseq_or,rconcu_and,rconcu_or,rxor}R task ::={r seq_and ,r seq_or ,r concu_and ,r concu_or ,r xor }
下面对每种关系分别进行介绍:Each relationship is described below:
rseq_and:如果seq_and(task1,task2),则表示先执行task1,若task1执行成功,则接着执行task2,且task1,task2都执行成功,表示方案执行成功。r seq_and : If seq_and(task 1 , task 2 ), it means that task 1 is executed first, and if task 1 is executed successfully, then task 2 is executed next, and both task 1 and task 2 are executed successfully, indicating that the plan is executed successfully.
rseq_or:若果seq_or(task1,task2),则表示先执行task1,若task1执行成功,则task2可不必执行,如果task1执行失败,则task2必须执行,且方案的成功与否取决于task2是否能成功执行。r seq_or : If the result is seq_or(task 1 , task 2 ), it means that task 1 is executed first. If task 1 is successfully executed, task 2 does not need to be executed. If task 1 fails, task 2 must be executed, and the plan is successful. Whether or not depends on whether task 2 can be successfully executed.
rconcu_and:如果concu_and(task1,task2),表示task1和task2须同时执行,且task1,task2都执行成功,方案方能成功。r concu_and : If concu_and(task 1 , task 2 ), it means that task 1 and task 2 must be executed at the same time, and task 1 and task 2 are both executed successfully, so that the scheme can succeed.
rconcu_or:如果concu_or(task1,task2),表示task1和task2须同时执行,且只要一个任务执行成功,则方案执行成功。r concu_or : If concu_or(task 1 , task 2 ), it means that task 1 and task 2 must be executed at the same time, and as long as one task is executed successfully, the plan is executed successfully.
rxor:如果xor(task1,task2),表示task1和task2有且只有一个会执行,且这个任务的成功与否直接决定方案的成功与失败。r xor : If xor(task 1 , task 2 ), it means that only one of task 1 and task 2 will be executed, and the success of this task directly determines the success or failure of the plan.
防御方案的EBNF定义如下:The EBNF definition of the defense scheme is as follows:
防御任务是由任务执行主体,任务包含的操作,任务执行时间,及任务执行的约束条件构成。The defense task is composed of the task execution subject, the operations contained in the task, the task execution time, and the constraints of task execution.
<tasks>::=<task>|<tasks>;<task><tasks>::=<task>|<tasks>;<task>
<task>::=task<num>‘{‘subject:<subject>actions:‘(‘<actions>‘)’<task>::=task<num>'{'subject:<subject>actions:'('<actions>')'
[time:<time>][constrains:‘{‘<constrains>’}’][time:<time>][constrains:'{'<constrains>'}']
主体分为四种,分别是保护主体,检测主体,响应主体,恢复主体。There are four types of subjects, namely protection subjects, detection subjects, response subjects, and recovery subjects.
<subjcet>::=<protection_subject>|<detection_subject>|<response_subject>|<recovery_subject><subjcet>::=<protection_subject>|<detection_subject>|<response_subject>|<recovery_subject>
常用的保护主体为备份服务器、防火墙和网关,网关,加密机,主机和服务器等。Commonly used protection subjects are backup servers, firewalls and gateways, gateways, encryption machines, hosts and servers, etc.
<protection_subject>=back_up_server<num>|firewall<num>|gateway<num>|cryptor<num>|host<num>|server<num><protection_subject>=back_up_server<num>|firewall<num>|gateway<num>|cryptor<num>|host<num>|server<num>
检测主体包括入侵检测系统,防病毒系统,漏洞库,审计系统。Detection subjects include intrusion detection systems, antivirus systems, vulnerability databases, and audit systems.
<detection_subject>::=IDS<num>|anti_virus_system<num>|vul_base<num>|audit_system<num><detection_subject>::=IDS<num>|anti_virus_system<num>|vul_base<num>|audit_system<num>
响应主体包括主机和服务器。The response body includes host and server.
<response_subject>::=server<num>|host<num><response_subject>::=server<num>|host<num>
恢复主体包括备份服务器,主机,服务器等。Recovery subjects include backup servers, hosts, servers, etc.
<recovery_subject>::=back_up_server<num>|host<num>|server<num><recovery_subject>::=back_up_server<num>|host<num>|server<num>
每一类主体均可通过增加关键字进行扩展。Each type of subject can be extended by adding keywords.
操作与主体相对应,分别为保护操作,检测操作,响应操作,恢复操作。The operations correspond to the main body, which are protection operations, detection operations, response operations, and recovery operations.
<actions>::=<action>|<actions>,<action><actions>::=<action>|<actions>,<action>
<action>::=<protect_action>|<detect_action>|<respond_action>|<recover_action><action>::=<protect_action>|<detect_action>|<respond_action>|<recover_action>
操作包括动作,动作对象,输入参数构成。Operations consist of actions, action objects, and input parameters.
<protect_action>::=<protect_act><protect_obj>[inPara:’{‘<protection_inParas>’}’]<protect_action>::=<protect_act><protect_obj>[inPara:’{‘<protection_inParas>’}’]
保护动作包括备份,允许,拒绝,加密,认证等,可通过增加关键字进行扩展。Protection actions include backup, permission, denial, encryption, authentication, etc., which can be extended by adding keywords.
<protect_act>::=back_up|permit|deny|crypt|authenticate<protect_act>::=back_up|permit|deny|crypt|authenticate
保护对象包括文件,数据包,ip地址等。Protected objects include files, data packets, ip addresses, etc.
<protect_obj>::=<file>|<packet>|ip<protect_obj>::=<file>|<packet>|ip
数据包包括ip包,TCP包,UDP包,ICMP包。Data packets include ip packets, TCP packets, UDP packets, and ICMP packets.
<packet>::=<ip_packet>|<tcp_packet>|<udp_packet>|<icmp_packet><packet>::=<ip_packet>|<tcp_packet>|<udp_packet>|<icmp_packet>
ip包包括原IP地址,目的IP地址。The ip packet includes the original IP address and the destination IP address.
<ip_packet>::=IP<src_ip><dst_ip><ip_packet>::=IP<src_ip><dst_ip>
TCP包,UDP包,ICMP包包括IP地址与端口号。TCP packets, UDP packets, and ICMP packets include IP addresses and port numbers.
<tcp_packet>::=TCP<src_ip><ports><dst_ip><ports><tcp_packet>::=TCP<src_ip><ports><dst_ip><ports>
<udp_packet>::=UDP<src_ip><ports><dst_ip><ports><udp_packet>::=UDP<src_ip><ports><dst_ip><ports>
<icmp_packet>::=ICMP<src_ip><ports><dst_ip><ports><icmp_packet>::=ICMP<src_ip><ports><dst_ip><ports>
IP地址包括ip和掩码。IP address includes ip and mask.
<src_ip>::=(ip/mask)|any<src_ip>::=(ip/mask)|any
<dst_ip>::=(ip/mask)|any<dst_ip>::=(ip/mask)|any
端口可以是一个特定端口,端口区间,或带有比较符的端口等。A port can be a specific port, a range of ports, or a port with a comparator, etc.
<ports>=<port>|<port>:<port>|<port_operator><port>|any<ports>=<port>|<port>:<port>|<port_operator><port>|any
保护动作的参数主要有备份优先级,备份类型,是否加密,安全传输,接口编号等。The parameters of the protection action mainly include backup priority, backup type, encryption or not, secure transmission, interface number, etc.
<protection_inPara>::=priority:<num>|type:(full|addition|offset)|crypt:(Y|N)|secure_trans:(Y|N)|interface:<num><protection_inPara>::=priority:<num>|type:(full|addition|offset)|crypt:(Y|N)|secure_trans:(Y|N)|interface:<num>
检测操作包括检测数据包,检查病毒,扫描漏洞,审计日志等操作。Detection operations include detecting data packets, checking viruses, scanning vulnerabilities, auditing logs and other operations.
<detection_action>::=<detect_act><detect_obj>[in_Para:’{‘<detection_inParas>’}’<detection_action>::=<detect_act><detect_obj>[in_Para:’{‘<detection_inParas>’}’
<detect_act>::=detect|check_virus|scan|audit<detect_act>::=detect|check_virus|scan|audit
<detect_obj>::=<IDS_rule>|<virus>|<vul>|<log><detect_obj>::=<IDS_rule>|<virus>|<vul>|<log>
<virus>::=<string><virus>::=<string>
<vul>::=cve-<cve_year>-<cve_number><vul>::=cve-<cve_year>-<cve_number>
<log>::=<file><log>::=<file>
<detection_inPara>::=(host:<num>)|(ip:<ip>)|(service:<service_name>)<detection_inPara>::=(host:<num>)|(ip:<ip>)|(service:<service_name>)
<service_name>::=Web|Telnet|Rlogin|Ftp|SMTP<service_name>::=Web|Telnet|Rlogin|Ftp|SMTP
ids规则包括规则头和规则体两部分。The ids rule includes two parts: the rule header and the rule body.
<ids_rule>::=<idsRule_head><idsRule_body><ids_rule>::=<idsRule_head><idsRule_body>
<idsRule_head>::=<idsRule_action><packet><idsRule_head>::=<idsRule_action><packet>
<idsRule_action>::=alert|pass|log<idsRule_action>::=alert|pass|log
规则体包括检测选项。The rule body includes detection options.
<idsRule_body>::=’(‘<options>’)’<idsRule_body>::=’(‘<options>’)’
<options>::=<option>|<options>;<option><options>::=<option>|<options>;<option>
content一般是二进制位串或字符串,用于特征模式匹配,refenrence是攻击利用的漏洞信息,fw参数则是当该规则触发时,需要联动的防火墙编号或IP地址,vbase表示规则触发时,需要联动的漏洞库编号或IP地址。content is generally a binary bit string or character string, used for feature pattern matching, refenrence is the vulnerability information exploited by the attack, the fw parameter is the firewall number or IP address that needs to be linked when the rule is triggered, and vbase indicates that when the rule is triggered, it needs to Linked vulnerability database number or IP address.
<option>::=(message:<string>)|(content:<bin-str>|<string<option>::=(message:<string>)|(content:<bin-str>|<string
>)|(refenrence:<vul>)|(fw:<num>|<ip>)|(vbase:<num>|<ip>)|resp:(rst_all|rst_rcv|rst_send|icmp_all|icmp_host|icmp_net|icmp_port)>)|(refenrence:<vul>)|(fw:<num>|<ip>)|(vbase:<num>|<ip>)|resp:(rst_all|rst_rcv|rst_send|icmp_all|icmp_host|icmp_net| icmp_port)
基于以上EBNF设计了CNDSDL解释器。对CNDSDL语句进行解析识别,从而将各种语句的参数传递到接口函数中。CNDSDL解释器中词法分析和语法分析模块代码即分别由Flex和Bison工具生成,在语义分析中,根据CNDSDL中的EBNF范式描述,分别识别全局变量定义语句、任务描述语句,任务关系描述语句,并生成一颗防御方案语法树,如图2所示。Based on the above EBNF, a CNDSDL interpreter is designed. Analyze and identify the CNDSDL statement, so that the parameters of various statements are passed to the interface function. The lexical analysis and syntax analysis module codes in the CNDSDL interpreter are respectively generated by Flex and Bison tools. In the semantic analysis, according to the EBNF paradigm description in CNDSDL, respectively identify the global variable definition statement, task description statement, task relationship description statement, and Generate a defense scheme syntax tree, as shown in Figure 2.
(2)方案部署模块(2) Solution deployment module
当一个方案可以执行,当且仅当该方案的任务没有构成死锁,即两个任务之间不存在相互的时序依赖关系,所以判断任务死锁及选择正确的任务运行是方案执行的关键,根据上文中的任务相关概念及任务间关系,可以分析得到任务死锁检测及调度算法。When a plan can be executed, if and only if the tasks of the plan do not constitute a deadlock, that is, there is no mutual timing dependency between the two tasks, so judging the task deadlock and selecting the correct task to run are the keys to the execution of the plan. According to the above task-related concepts and the relationship between tasks, the task deadlock detection and scheduling algorithm can be analyzed.
该算法中,首先根据任务间的seq_or关系seq_and关系构建任务图,通过对图进行闭包运算,若发现任意一条有向边存在逆向边,则两个任务互相存在时序依赖关系,表示方案会产生死锁;否则,从任务图中调度入度为0的节点,若该节点具有seq_or关系的所有前向任务逻辑执行结果失败,则该任务必须执行,若该节点具有seq_and关系的所有前向任务逻辑执行结果执行成功,则该任务方能执行。该算法的流程图为图3所示。In this algorithm, the task graph is first constructed according to the seq_or relationship seq_and relationship between tasks. By performing a closure operation on the graph, if any directed edge is found to have a reverse edge, then the two tasks have a temporal dependency on each other, indicating that the scheme will generate Deadlock; otherwise, schedule a node with an in-degree of 0 from the task graph. If the logic execution result of all forward tasks with seq_or relationship of this node fails, the task must be executed. If the node has all forward tasks with seq_and relationship The task can only be executed if the logic execution result is executed successfully. The flow chart of this algorithm is shown in Fig.3.
(3)方案仿真模块(3) Scheme simulation module
采用基于离散事件驱动的、支持分布式仿真的仿真器GTNetS对IDS检测任务、防火墙的访问控制任务、备份恢复任务、IDS、漏扫和防火墙的联动任务进行仿真。The simulator GTNetS, which is based on discrete event-driven and supports distributed simulation, is used to simulate IDS detection tasks, firewall access control tasks, backup and recovery tasks, and linkage tasks of IDS, missed scans and firewalls.
IDS检测任务IDS detection task
对基于特征检测的网络的入侵检测(NIDS)进行仿真。NIDS的典型代表是Snort。Snort是一个轻量级的入侵检测系统,具有截取网络数据报文,进行网络数据实时分析,报警以及记录日志的能力。Snort的报文截取基于libpcap库。Snort由数据包嗅探器、预处理器、检测引擎、报警输出等基本模块组成。Snort对数据包的处理流程具体如下图4所示。Simulation of Network Intrusion Detection (NIDS) based on signature detection. A typical representative of NIDS is Snort. Snort is a lightweight intrusion detection system, capable of intercepting network data packets, performing real-time analysis of network data, alarming and recording logs. Snort's packet interception is based on the libpcap library. Snort is composed of basic modules such as packet sniffer, preprocessor, detection engine, and alarm output. The processing flow of Snort on data packets is shown in Figure 4 below.
规则解析首先读取规则文件,紧接着依次读取每一条规则,然后对其进行解析,并用相应的规则语法表示,在内存中对规则进行组织,建立规则语法树。Rule parsing first reads the rule file, then reads each rule in turn, then parses it, and expresses it with the corresponding rule syntax, organizes the rules in memory, and builds a rule syntax tree.
Snort中的所有规则按照规则头排列成主链,然后根据规则选项把规则插入到这个链中,构成一棵规则树,RTN(RuleTreeNode)节点组成规则树的第一层,这样每一个选项节点OTN(OptTreeNode节点)就对应一条规则。All the rules in Snort are arranged into the main chain according to the rule header, and then the rules are inserted into this chain according to the rule options to form a rule tree. RTN (RuleTreeNode) nodes form the first layer of the rule tree, so that each option node OTN (OptTreeNode node) corresponds to a rule.
检测引擎使用模式匹配方法对网络数据包进行检测,主要是根据规则树与数据包的信息进行匹配,以判断是否有入侵行为。The detection engine uses the pattern matching method to detect network data packets, mainly to match the information of the data packets according to the rule tree to determine whether there is any intrusion.
采用GTNetS仿真出检测的流程及检测的结果。IDS的仿真包括数据包的嗅探和解码,入侵检测规则的设置和检测引擎的设置。Use GTNetS to simulate the detection process and detection results. The simulation of IDS includes sniffing and decoding of data packets, setting of intrusion detection rules and detection engine.
采用GTNetS中的PeekPDU函数得到仿真平台中解码的数据包。Use the PeekPDU function in GTNetS to get the decoded data packets in the simulation platform.
借鉴Snort的实现方式,将检测规则分为两个逻辑部分:规则头和规则选项。规则头包括规则的动作、协议、源和目标IP地址与网络源码,以及源和目标端口信息;规则选项部分包括报警信息内容和要检查的包的具体部分。Drawing reference from the implementation of Snort, the detection rules are divided into two logical parts: rule header and rule options. The rule header includes rule action, protocol, source and destination IP address and network source code, and source and destination port information; the rule option part includes the alarm information content and the specific part of the packet to be checked.
检测引擎部分的设置,对Snort实现的规则树进行如下修改,第一层为ListHead,该节点包含了一类攻击对应的检测规则集。按协议进一步组织不同的链表。第二层为RTN;第三层为标志选项结点;第四层为OTNIdx(OTNIndex)和OTN,它们之间是一一对应的关系,设置OTNIdx的目的是为了根据检索的结果动态调整OTN的次序。规则匹配时按照规则树进行递归遍历。For the setting of the detection engine part, the rule tree implemented by Snort is modified as follows. The first layer is ListHead, which contains the detection rule set corresponding to one type of attack. The different linked lists are further organized by protocol. The second layer is RTN; the third layer is the flag option node; the fourth layer is OTNIdx (OTNIndex) and OTN, and there is a one-to-one correspondence between them. The purpose of setting OTNIdx is to dynamically adjust the OTN according to the retrieval results. order. When a rule is matched, recursive traversal is performed according to the rule tree.
防火墙的访问控制任务Access Control Tasks for Firewalls
使用GTNetS仿真防火墙的数据包过滤过程。包括静态包过滤和基于状态的数据包过滤。Use GTNetS to simulate the packet filtering process of a firewall. Including static packet filtering and state-based packet filtering.
针对静态包过滤。防火墙对于输入的数据包有如图5逻辑流程:For static packet filtering. The firewall has a logic flow as shown in Figure 5 for the input data packets:
当接口收到数据包时,首先确定ACL是否被应用到了该接口。如果没有,正常的路由该数据包。如果有,处理ACL。从第一条语句开始,将条件和数据包内容作比较。如果没有匹配,将处理列表中的下一条语句。如果有匹配,则执行操作:允许或拒绝。如果默认操作是拒绝,则如果查遍了整个ACL也没有匹配,则丢弃数据包;如果默认操作是允许,则如果查遍整个ACL也没有匹配,则转发数据包。When an interface receives a packet, it first determines whether the ACL is applied to the interface. If not, route the packet normally. Process ACLs, if any. Starting with the first statement, the condition is compared to the contents of the packet. If there is no match, the next statement in the list will be processed. Action if there is a match: allow or deny. If the default action is Deny, then if the entire ACL is searched and there is no match, the packet will be discarded; if the default action is Allow, if the entire ACL is searched and there is no match, then the packet will be forwarded.
对于输出ACL,过程是相似的,如图6所示。当接收到数据包时,首先将数据包路由到输出接口,然后检查在接口上是否有ACL输出,如果没有,将数据包排在队列中,发送出接口。否则,数据包通过与ACL条目进行比较被处理,如前面所述。For outgoing ACLs, the process is similar, as shown in Figure 6. When a data packet is received, it first routes the data packet to the output interface, and then checks whether there is an ACL output on the interface, if not, queues the data packet and sends it out the interface. Otherwise, the packet is processed by comparison with the ACL entries, as described previously.
由于访问控制列表不能跟踪连接状态;因此,如果要在内网将流量发送到外网,再允许流量安全返回,静态防火墙很难做到,除非设置静态规则,而这样的静态规则同时会允许不是返回流量的数据包通过,所以会引起安全漏洞。即一个标准的或扩展的ACL总是使用静态的条目来过滤已经配置了的信息,而此时需要状态防火墙来实现。状态防火墙主要通过记录连接的状态信息来过滤,对于IP、TCP、UDP、ICMP协议,一种可行的方案是在连接时要获取连接相关信息进行Hash,防火墙根据Hash匹配判断流量是否是返回流量,从而达到过滤的效果。Because the access control list cannot track the connection state; therefore, if you want to send traffic from the internal network to the external network, and then allow the traffic to return safely, it is difficult for a static firewall to do so, unless you set static rules, and such static rules will also allow non- Packets of return traffic are passed through, so it would cause a security hole. That is, a standard or extended ACL always uses static entries to filter the configured information, and a stateful firewall is required to implement it. Stateful firewalls mainly filter by recording connection status information. For IP, TCP, UDP, and ICMP protocols, a feasible solution is to obtain connection-related information for Hash when connecting, and the firewall judges whether the traffic is return traffic based on Hash matching. So as to achieve the filtering effect.
其它防御任务other defense tasks
实现了防护任务中的备份任务和检测任务中的漏洞确认任务的仿真,备份是目标到其副本的映射,通过对系统中的数据和文件进行备份,在面对攻击和威胁时,可以及时采用恢复任务进行数据的恢复,从而保障了网络的安全性。漏洞确认任务主要是较低IDS的误检率。对IDS检测到的攻击特征,进行漏洞扫描,并在漏洞知识库中进行查找,从而确认网络中是否存在该种漏洞的攻击。通过方案描述语言的描述,最终实现了一种考虑IDS,防火墙和漏洞扫描系统之间的联动仿真。The simulation of the backup task in the protection task and the vulnerability confirmation task in the detection task is realized. The backup is the mapping from the target to its copy. By backing up the data and files in the system, it can be used in time when facing attacks and threats. Restoration tasks restore data, thereby ensuring network security. The vulnerability confirmation task is mainly to lower the false detection rate of IDS. For the attack characteristics detected by the IDS, perform vulnerability scanning and search in the vulnerability knowledge base to confirm whether there is such a vulnerability attack in the network. Through the description of the scheme description language, a linkage simulation considering IDS, firewall and vulnerability scanning system is finally realized.
(4)执行结果显示模块(4) Execution result display module
将步骤(3)中得出的防御节点的防御信息,包括IDS的检测规则信息,防火墙的访问控制列表信息,备份恢复节点信息等以报告的形式显示给网络安全管理人员。The defense information of the defense node obtained in step (3), including the detection rule information of the IDS, the access control list information of the firewall, the backup recovery node information, etc., is displayed to the network security management personnel in the form of a report.
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