CN102413313A - Data integrity authentication information generation method and device as well as data integrity authentication method and device - Google Patents

Abstract

A device and method for generating data integrity verification information, the device comprising: a hash structure generating unit, through the generation of hash values of data segments included in a plurality of data sources within a specific time period and the specific time The hash structure corresponding to the segment, so that the hash values of all data segments represent the bottom child nodes of the hash structure so as to calculate its root hash value; the public verification information acquisition unit obtains the public verification information for the root hash value Verification information; the integrity verification information generation unit generates the integrity verification information of the data segments included in a specific time period for multiple data sources, and the integrity verification information of each data segment includes public verification information, hash Path information from the hash value of the data segment representing the leaf node of the lowest layer to the root node in the hash structure, and hash values of nodes related to the child node included in the path. Apparatus and methods for verifying the integrity of data are also provided.

Description

Data integrity verification information generation method and device, data integrity verification method and device

technical field

The present invention generally relates to the technical field of data processing, and more specifically, to a method and device for generating data integrity verification information, and a method and device for verifying data integrity. the

Background technique

Video surveillance is playing an increasingly important role in social security, crime prevention, case evidence collection, etc. Many enterprises, institutions, traffic roads, public places, and even individual residences have installed surveillance cameras. According to Article 42 of the "Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China", audio-visual materials can be used as the basis for a verdict after verification. However, because video data is easy to forge and tamper, whether video and audio recording (hereinafter referred to as video) can be used as effective evidence in court has been controversial in reality. In other words, a necessary condition for a video to be used as court evidence is to ensure that the video has not undergone any tampering (such as shielding, abridgement, modification of content, etc.) after recording, that is, to ensure integrity. the

There are many methods to ensure integrity in the field of coding theory and cryptography, and different methods can be adopted according to the strength of integrity requirements. A method that can prove safe and effective to prevent or detect video tampering is to use time stamps to protect the integrity of the recorded video in real time, that is, the surveillance camera applies to the Time Stamp Authority (TSA, Time Stamp Authority) for time stamps online in real time , so that the time-stamped video cannot be tampered (or tamper-detectable), and the time is real and valid, so that the integrity of the video can be verified by any person or proven by an authority. Thus, time-stamped surveillance video has legal validity in terms of integrity. At present, there are many TSAs at home and abroad that can provide online timestamp services (for example, you can visit http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc3161.html to obtain relevant information), which can protect the integrity and timeliness of any data, and Have legal effect (for example, through the time stamp service center, see http://www.tsa.cn/). The surveillance camera divides the video into several segments according to time, obtains a time stamp for each segment, and saves the video segment and the corresponding time stamp at the same time. Anyone can verify the integrity and timeliness of the corresponding segment based on the timestamp. the

However, the cost of online time stamping is relatively high, which involves network bandwidth costs and single service fees. Especially its cost problem is just particularly outstanding for the unit that multiple cameras are installed. For example, Figure 1 gives an example of securing data from multiple cameras via online timestamping. As shown in the figure, if several video cameras 102-110 are installed in the video surveillance system 100 of a unit, each camera needs to apply to the TSA for time stamp service online separately, which requires a wider network bandwidth, and from each camera The amount of video data is large, and many times of time stamping service are required, and TSA usually charges according to the number of times of time stamping service. Therefore, if each camera applies for a timestamp (verification information) separately, the network bandwidth cost and the timestamp service fee are proportional to the number of cameras. the

In order to save the bandwidth and time stamp service fees required by multiple cameras, the number of time stamp applications should be reduced, and the size of the verification information should not be too large. the

Fig. 2 shows an overall hashing method in the prior art. As shown in Figure 2, overall hashing refers to hashing video data segments from several cameras (cameras AE in Figure 2) in a certain period of time. The entire video data segment A2-E2 is hashed, that is, the overall hash value H _AE2 of these video data segments is obtained, and then a public timestamp Timestamp(H _AE2 ) is applied for the hash value to the TSA. This public time stamp can be used as the verification information of the corresponding video data of all cameras AE within the time period. The advantage of this method is that it greatly reduces the number of times to apply for time stamps and the space for storing verification information (that is, time stamps). However, this method prevents the video data from one camera from being stored and verified separately, and it is necessary to ensure that the video data of all cameras exist at the same time in order to verify its integrity. This brings troubles to video preservation, clipping and verification.

Contents of the invention

In view of the foregoing, it is necessary to provide a device and method capable of independently protecting and verifying the integrity of data from multiple data sources efficiently and conveniently. Furthermore, such devices and methods are preferably cost effective. the

According to an embodiment of the present invention, a device for generating data integrity verification information is provided, including:

A hash structure generating unit configured to generate a hash structure corresponding to the specific time period through the hash values of the data segments included in each of the multiple data sources within a specific time period, so that all data segments The hash values respectively represent the bottommost sub-nodes of the hash structure in order to calculate the root hash value of the root node of the hash structure;

A public verification information acquisition unit configured to obtain public verification information for the root hash value;

an integrity verification information generation unit configured to generate integrity verification information for the data segments included in each of the above-mentioned specific time periods for a plurality of data sources, wherein the integrity verification information for each data segment includes common verification information , the path information from the hash value of the data segment representing the lowest-level child node to the root node in the hash structure, and the hash values of the nodes related to the child node included in the path . the

According to an embodiment of the present invention, a system for providing integrity protection for data is also provided, including:

A plurality of data sources, the plurality of data sources are divided into the first to Z level hash areas, wherein, the Lth level hash area in the first to Z level hash areas includes M _L hash structures, L= 1, ..., Z, and wherein each hash structure includes a management data source, and each management data source has the device for generating data integrity verification information according to an embodiment of the present invention as described above , where Z is an integer greater than or equal to 2, M _L is an integer greater than or equal to 1;

For each hash structure in the K-th level hash area, the management data source of the hash structure is configured as the hash of the data segment included in itself and the data source it manages in a specific time period The hash value is used as the bottommost child node to generate the hash structure, or the management data source of the hash structure is configured to include the hash value of the data segment and the K-th The root node value of at least one hash structure corresponding to the level 1 hash area is used as the bottom child node to generate the hash structure, where K is an integer greater than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to Z;

The final root hash value is generated based on the root node values of each hash structure in the Z-level hash area, and the pre-specified highest-level management data source among the management data sources included in the Z-level hash area is selected configured to obtain public verification information for the final root hash; and

The highest-level management data source is configured to generate integrity verification information for the lowest-level subnode corresponding to the data source in each hash structure of the Z-level hash area. The integrity verification information includes the above-mentioned public verification information, Path information from the child node to the final root node in the Z-level hash area, and hash values of nodes related to the child node included in the path; and

For each hash structure in the Qth level hash area from the first level to the Z-1 level hash area, the management data source in the hash structure is configured as, Other underlying sub-nodes corresponding to the data source generate integrity verification information, the integrity verification information includes the integrity verification information of the root node of the hash structure, and from the sub-node in the Qth level hash area The path information to the root node and the hash value of the node related to the child node on the path, wherein the root node of the hash structure is used as the hash value of the corresponding hash structure in the Q+1 level hash area The integrity verification information of the lowest layer child node is generated through the management data source of the corresponding hash structure in the Q+1 level hash area, where Q is an integer greater than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to Z-1. the

According to an embodiment of the present invention, a method for generating data integrity verification information is also provided, including:

Hash structure generation step, which uses the hash values of the data segments included in each of the multiple data sources in a specific time period as the bottom child node to generate a hash structure corresponding to the specific time period, through which The child node of the lowest level of the hash structure is used to calculate the root hash value of the root node of the hash structure;

a public verification information acquisition step that obtains public verification information for the root hash value; and

Integrity verification information generating step, which generates the integrity verification of the data segment based on the following information for each of the data segments included in the above-mentioned multiple data sources within the specific time period Information: the above public verification information, path information from the hash value of the data segment representing the lowest level child node to the root node in the hash structure, and information related to the child node included in the path The hash value of the node. the

According to an embodiment of the present invention, a device for verifying data integrity is also provided, including:

A public verification information verification unit configured to verify the public verification information included in the integrity verification information of the data segments of the corresponding data sources of the plurality of data sources within a specific time period; and

An integrity verification unit configured to include in the root hash value and the integrity verification information calculated according to the integrity verification information of the data segment of the corresponding data source and the hash value of the data segment The root hash value is compared, and in the case that both the comparison result and the verification result of the public verification information verification unit are positive, it is determined that the data segment is complete;

Wherein, the integrity verification information of the data segment includes the above-mentioned public verification information, and in the hash structure corresponding to the above-mentioned specific time period, from the lowest-level child node represented by the hash value of the data segment to the root The path information of the node, and the hash value of the node related to the child node included in the path, wherein the hash structure corresponding to the specific time period is obtained by making the above-mentioned multiple data sources each in the specific time period The hash value of the included data segment is generated on behalf of the lowest-level child nodes, and the root hash value is the hash value of the root node of the hash structure. the

According to an embodiment of the present invention, a method for verifying the integrity of data is also provided, including:

The public verification information verification step is to verify the public verification information included in the integrity verification information of the data segments of the corresponding data sources within a specific time period of the multiple data sources;

In the comparison step, the root hash value calculated according to the integrity verification information of the data segment of the corresponding data source and the hash value of the data segment is compared with the root hash value contained in the integrity verification information compare; and

In an integrity determination step, if the comparison result of the comparison step shows that the calculated root hash value is consistent with the root hash value contained in the integrity verification information, and the verification result of the public verification information verification step is positive, then determine the data score segment is complete,

Wherein, the integrity verification information of the data segment includes the above-mentioned public verification information, and in the hash structure corresponding to the above-mentioned specific time period, from the lowest-level child node represented by the hash value of the data segment to the root node The path information of the path, and the hash value of the node related to the child node included in the path, wherein the hash structure corresponding to the specific time period is obtained by making the above-mentioned multiple data sources each include in the specific time period The hash value of the data segment is generated on behalf of the lowest-level child nodes, and the root hash value is calculated through the hash structure. the

The method and device for generating data integrity verification information according to various embodiments of the present invention enable independent and effective integrity protection for data from multiple data sources through a simple means based on a hash structure. Correspondingly, the method and device for verifying data integrity according to various embodiments of the present invention can quickly and accurately perform integrity verification on data from multiple data sources individually. Thus, the data integrity protection and verification apparatus and method according to the various embodiments of the present invention can efficiently and reliably realize independent protection and verification of the integrity of data from multiple data sources. In addition, due to the adoption of simple structural configuration and implementation means, effective cost reduction is realized. the

Other embodiments of the present invention also provide a video camera device, which includes the above-mentioned apparatus for generating data integrity verification information according to the embodiments of the present invention. the

Another embodiment of the present invention also provides a program product storing machine-readable instruction codes. When the instruction codes are read and executed by a machine, the above-mentioned generation of Integrity of data A method of verifying information and/or a method of verifying the integrity of data. the

Another embodiment of the present invention also provides a storage medium carrying the above-mentioned program product. the

Description of drawings

The above and other objects, features and advantages of the present invention will become clear by describing specific embodiments of the present invention in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. In each drawing, the same or similar reference numerals denote the same or similar functional components or steps. In the attached picture:

Fig. 1 is the simplified block diagram of the configuration that shows the video data of a plurality of video cameras respectively carrying out timestamp protection in the prior art;

FIG. 2 is a simplified block diagram illustrating a prior art configuration for holistic timestamp protection of video data from multiple video cameras;

Fig. 3 is a simplified block diagram showing the structure of a device for generating data integrity verification information according to an embodiment of the present invention;

Fig. 4 is a schematic diagram showing a specific example of the operation of the device for generating data integrity verification information in Fig. 3;

Fig. 5 is a schematic diagram illustrating another specific example of the operation of the device for generating data integrity verification information in Fig. 3;

FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram showing packaged data with integrity verification information generated by an apparatus for generating data integrity verification information according to an embodiment of the present invention;

Figure 7 is a schematic diagram showing an example of integrity protection for a data sub-segment of a certain data source through an internal sub-hash chain by utilizing the device for generating data integrity verification information in Figure 3;

Fig. 8 is a schematic diagram showing an example of integrity protection for a data sub-segment of a certain data source through an internal sub-hash tree by utilizing the device for generating data integrity verification information in Fig. 3;

9A-9B are schematic diagrams showing common possible hash tree structures;

10A-10D are simplified block diagrams illustrating the process of generating an efficient hash binary tree using an apparatus for generating integrity verification data according to an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 11 is a simplified structural block diagram showing an imaging device equipped with an apparatus for generating data integrity verification information according to an embodiment of the present invention;

Fig. 12A is a simplified structural block diagram showing a system for generating data integrity verification information according to an embodiment of the present invention, wherein multiple data sources are divided into multi-level hash areas, and the hashes contained in each level of hash areas The Greek structure is equipped with a management data source with a device for generating data integrity verification information as shown in Figure 3;

Figure 12B is a simplified structural block diagram illustrating a system for generating data integrity verification information as a variant of the system of Figure 12A;

Fig. 13 is a schematic flow diagram illustrating a method for generating data integrity verification information according to an embodiment of the present invention;

Fig. 14 is a simplified structural block diagram showing a device for verifying data integrity verification information according to an embodiment of the present invention;

Fig. 15 is a diagram showing a specific implementation of the method shown in Fig. 14;

Fig. 16 is a simplified flowchart showing a method for verifying data integrity verification information according to an embodiment of the present invention; and

Fig. 17 is a schematic block diagram showing a computer system that can be used to implement the method and apparatus according to the embodiments of the present invention. the

Detailed ways

Embodiments of the present invention will be described below with reference to the drawings. It should be noted that in order to avoid obscuring the present invention due to unnecessary details, only the device structure and/or processing steps closely related to the solution according to the present invention are shown in the accompanying drawings, while the components having little relation to the present invention are omitted. other details. In each drawing, the same or similar constituent elements or parts are denoted by the same or similar reference numerals. the

Fig. 3 is a simplified block diagram showing the structure of an apparatus 300 for generating data integrity verification information according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in the figure, the apparatus 300 includes a hash structure generation unit 310 , a public verification information acquisition unit 320 and an integrity verification information generation unit 330 . The hash structure generation unit 310 generates a hash structure corresponding to the specific time period through the hash values of the data segments included in each of the multiple data sources in a specific time period, so that the hash values of all the data segments are respectively Represents the child nodes of the lowest level of the hash structure in order to calculate the root hash value of the hash structure. The public verification information obtaining unit 320 obtains public verification information for the root hash value. The integrity verification information generation unit 330 generates integrity verification information for the data segments included in the specific time period for the plurality of data sources. The integrity verification information of each data segment includes the public verification information, path information in the hash structure from the hash value of the data segment representing the lowest-level child node to the root node, and hash values of nodes associated with the bottommost child node included in the path. the

It should be noted that the "lowest-level child node" mentioned here refers to a node without its own lower-level child nodes in the hash structure. It is easy to understand that when the hash structure is a hash tree, this "lowest-level child node" is a leaf node. the

FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram illustrating a specific example of the operation of the apparatus 300 in FIG. 3 . the

As shown, in this example, the timestamp proxy 410 operates as a specific implementation of the apparatus 300 shown in FIG. 3 . The timestamp agent 410 generates integrity verification information for video data from multiple data sources, ie camera devices AE. This instance generates integrity verification information by constructing a hash chain. The hash structure generation unit in the time stamp agent 410 constructs a hash chain in a chain-like manner through the hash values of the data segments from the camera equipment AE within a certain period of time, and then the public verification information in the time stamp agent 410 The acquiring unit stamps the value of the last node (ie root node) of the hash chain with a public time stamp through the time stamp authority TSA 420, thereby obtaining the public verification information Timestamp(H _AE2 ). For example, the figure schematically shows the respective data segments A1-A3 to E1-E3 of each camera device in three time periods. Assume that for the data segments A2-E2 generated by the imaging device AE during a certain period of time, the respective hash values of these data segments are H _A2 -H _E2 . The hash values H _A2 and H _B2 are concatenated and hashed to obtain the hash value H _AB2 , the hash values H _AB2 and H _C2 are concatenated and hashed to obtain the hash value H _AC2 , and the hash values H _AC2 and H _D2 Hashing is performed after connection to obtain hash value H _AD2 , and hash value H _AD2 and H _E2 are connected to obtain hash value H _AE2 . As shown in the figure, a hash chain is constructed based on the hash values of data segments of multiple data sources (i.e. camera equipment AE) in the specific time period, wherein the hash values H _A2 of these data segments can be -H _E2 is regarded as representing the child node of the lowest level (that is, a node without its own subordinate child nodes), the hash values H _AB2 , H _AC2 and H _AD2 are respectively the parent nodes of the upper level, and the final hash chain The endpoint value H _AE2 represents the root hash value of the hash chain. The basic concept of the hash value and the method of obtaining it are well-known technologies in the art, and details will not be repeated here. The integrity verification information in the timestamp agent 410 generates integrity verification information for the unit data segments A2-E2. For example, the integrity verification information of the data segment D2 of the imaging device D in the specific time period includes the public verification information Timestamp(H _AE2 ), the hash value _HD2 of the data segment D2 to the root hash value H _AE2 The path information of , and the hash value of some nodes along the path on the hash chain. In the hash chain, the path from the lowest child node _HD2 to the root node H _AE2 includes nodes _HD2 and H _AD2 , and the hash values H _AC2 and H _E2 of the nodes related to these nodes constitute a data segment Part of D2's integrity verification information.

FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram showing another specific example of the operation of the apparatus 300 for generating data integrity verification information in FIG. 3 . As shown in the figure, in this example, the timestamp agent 510 operates as another specific implementation form of the apparatus 300 shown in FIG. 3 . the

In this example, timestamp agent 510 generates integrity verification information for video data from multiple data sources, namely cameras A-E. This instance generates integrity verification information by constructing a hash tree. The timestamp agent 510 is mainly responsible for the calculation of the hash tree, the application of the timestamp, the generation of integrity verification information, and the like. The time stamp agent 510 can be implemented, for example, by a computer connected to the Internet, to which each camera A-E can be connected, for example, through a local area network, and which has access to the online time stamp authority TSA 520 credentials (such as user name and password) and a representative monitoring unit ( That is, the identity information of the unit to which multiple data sources belong. the

The hash structure generation unit in the time stamp agent 510 constructs a hash tree in a tree-like manner through the hash values of the data segments from the imaging device AE within a certain period of time, and then the public verification information in the time stamp agent 510 The acquiring unit stamps the hash value of the root node of the hash tree with a public timestamp through the timestamp authority TSA520, thereby obtaining the public authentication information Timestamp(H _AE2 ). For example, the figure schematically shows the respective data segments A1-A3 to E1-E3 of each camera device in three time periods. Assume that for the data segments A2-E2 generated by the imaging device AE during a certain period of time, the respective hash values of these data segments are H _A2 -H _E2 . The hash value H _A2 and H _B2 are merged to obtain the hash value H _AB2 , the hash value H _C2 and H _D2 are combined to obtain the hash value H _CD2 , and the hash value H _AB2 and H _CD2 are combined Perform hashing to obtain a hash value H _AD2 , and combine the hash values H _AD2 and H _E2 to obtain a hash value H _AE2 . As shown in the figure, a hash tree is constructed based on the hash values of data segments of multiple data sources (that is, camera equipment AE) in the specific time period, wherein the hash values H _A2 of these data segments can be -H _E2 is regarded as the child node of the lowest level of the hash tree, that is, the leaf node, the hash values H _AB2 , H _CD2 and H _AD2 are the parent nodes of each upper level, and the final endpoint value H _AE2 of the hash tree represents The root hash of this hash tree. The timestamp agent 510 receives the hash value of the video data segment in the specific time period from each camera, and for example can also record the serial number of each camera (which can be used to identify the camera in the subsequent verification process) ). As mentioned above, the timestamp agent 510 uses these hash values as the leaf nodes of the binary hash tree, and starts from the leaf nodes to calculate the upper-level nodes of the hash tree level by level. Greek value. It is worth noting that the number of camera devices may not be an exponential multiple of 2 (that is, the binary hash tree may not be a full binary tree), so some hash values from camera devices may not be at the bottom of the hash tree ( For example, as shown in FIG. 5, the hash value of the camera device E is not used until the root node is calculated). According to this two-in-one method, the hash value of the root node is finally calculated. All node values and node position information of the hash tree calculated by the timestamp agent 510 may be temporarily stored in the memory of the timestamp agent 510 , for example. The timestamp agent 510 encapsulates the value of the root node of the hash tree and the identity information according to the requirements of the timestamp standard (for example, refer to http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc3161.html to obtain relevant information), and then sends To Timestamp Authority TSA 520. The TSA 520 returns the corresponding timestamp (ie, the public authentication letter Timestamp(H _AE2 )). After receiving the time stamp information, the integrity verification information generation unit in the time stamp agent 510 respectively generates integrity verification information for the data segments of the multiple imaging devices AE in the specific time period. The integrity verification information of each camera device is different, depending on the position of the leaf node corresponding to the camera device in the hash tree. The verification information of a camera device includes two parts: one part is the public verification information (time stamp), and the other part is some node values and path information on the hash tree. The path information acquisition of the hash tree in the integrity verification information and the selection method of some nodes on the path are as follows: find the leaf node corresponding to the data segment of the camera device in the specific time period on the hash tree, and then obtain Take this as the starting point to reach the path of the root node (indicated by a thick dotted line with an arrow in the figure), and sequentially obtain the hash values of sibling nodes of nodes on the path. The path information includes the position of each selected node relative to the path, such as the level of the node in the hash tree, and the left-right relationship with respect to the path. For example, in FIG. 5 , the integrity verification information of the data segment D2 of the imaging device D in the above-mentioned specific time period is ([l, H _C2 ], [l, H _AB2 ], [r, H _E2 ], Timestamp (H _AE2 )), where the arrangement order of the nodes expresses the order from the leaf nodes to the root node, that is, the path information, and r and l indicate whether the sibling nodes are right nodes or left nodes relative to the path. For the left-right relationship with respect to the path contained in the path information, the arrangement method of the hash tree can be pre-agreed first. For example, if the root node is placed above, the left-right relationship of the hash values H _C2 , H _AB2 , and H _E2 of the relevant nodes is r, r, l (that is, right, right, left), and the The left-right relationship in the integrity verification information is the result obtained when the root node is placed below. This l,r information of the left-right relationship with the relevant nodes in the path is necessary for hash trees. However, if the hash structure is a hash chain, l, r information may not be stored, because such l, r information is implied in the arrangement rule of the hash value in the integrity verification information. In the following description, for the sake of brevity, l, r information is not shown when verifying the integrity of the information, but such information actually exists in the path information.

The above-mentioned level information can be represented separately, or can be pre-agreed according to a certain format, for example, it is agreed that the node value of the lowest level related node is the first one, and so on. In the example given in Fig. 5, the hierarchy of nodes is estimated according to the arrangement order of each node in the integrity verification information. the

According to the above detailed description in conjunction with FIGS. 4 and 5, it can be seen that the benefit of the method for generating integrity verification information for multiple data sources according to the embodiment of the present invention is that the data of each data source can be stored separately and have their own The separate integrity verification information enables the data integrity of each data source to be independently verified in the subsequent verification process (described in detail later), thereby improving the efficiency and accuracy of data integrity protection. In addition, for data from multiple data sources within a certain period of time, only one time stamp needs to be applied for, thus greatly reducing the number of time stamp applications, reducing data communication overhead, and thus reducing costs. the

As a specific implementation solution, the time stamp agent 410 or 510 can send the generated integrity verification information of the data segments of multiple camera devices in a specific time period to the corresponding camera devices for subsequent verification of the camera devices Used when verifying the integrity of the data segment. Alternatively, the timestamp agent 410 or 510 may also combine the generated integrity verification information together with the identification information of the data segment corresponding to the integrity information (for example, which camera device the integrity verification information belongs to, The integrity verification information of the data segment in a specific time period) is stored for use in the subsequent verification process. In addition, in the case of distributing the integrity verification information to the corresponding camera devices, after confirming that each camera device has received the corresponding integrity verification information, the timestamp agent 410 or 510 can save the temporarily cached hash tree Delete, and then perform the next generation of integrity verification information corresponding to the next specific time period. This way can save the storage space of the timestamp proxy. the

In a specific example, the apparatus 300 for generating data integrity verification information according to the embodiment of the present invention as shown in FIG. 3 may further include a data encapsulation unit. For example, the device 300 can be set in a data source, and after the integrity verification information generation unit in the device 300 generates the integrity verification information of the corresponding data segment, the data encapsulation unit can set the integrity verification information to after the corresponding data segment. In order to form the encapsulated data of the data source to which the data segment belongs. Figure 6 shows one possible form of such encapsulated data. As shown in the figure, the encapsulated data of a certain data source is given, wherein C1 and C2 represent data segments in different specific time periods, and the information VC1 following C1 is generated through the Integrity verification information generated by the device 300 for data integrity verification information. Similarly, integrity verification information VC2 follows the data segment C2. In this way, in the subsequent verification process, the corresponding integrity verification information can be easily read out at the same time when acquiring the data segments that need to be verified. In this way, the link between the data segments to be verified for integrity and the corresponding integrity verification information can be enhanced, which in turn facilitates the subsequent data integrity verification process (described in detail below) . the

For example, the above-mentioned encapsulated data combined with the data segment and its integrity verification information can be stored on the internal storage device of the corresponding data source, or sent to the monitoring center server through the network for monitoring or archiving. the

In another specific example, the apparatus 300 for generating data integrity verification information according to the embodiment of the present invention as shown in FIG. The integrity verification information generated by the respective data segments included in the data source within a specific period of time is stored centrally, and a corresponding relationship between the integrity verification information and the corresponding data segments is established. In the subsequent integrity verification process, the integrity verification information corresponding to the data segment to be integrity verified can be obtained through this corresponding relationship for integrity verification. By storing integrity verification information centrally, it is better protected from corruption. In addition, since the corresponding relationship between the data segment and the integrity verification information is established, the accuracy of the subsequent verification process is guaranteed. the

In the example given above, each imaging device hashes the data segments within a certain period of time, and then sends the hash value to the device for generating data integrity verification information according to an embodiment of the present invention (such as Timestamp agent) for the generation of integrity verification information. In this case the length of the specific time period (ie the data segment) is for example on the order of minutes, for example 1 minute. However, in some applications, it may be necessary to locate data segments in the data source more precisely, that is, shorter time segments or data segment lengths are required. In order to meet this requirement, Figure 7-8 shows the corresponding solution. the

FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram showing an example of performing integrity protection on data sub-segments of a certain data source through internal sub-hash chains by using the apparatus 300 for generating data integrity verification information as shown in FIG. 3 . In this example, the camera device is still used as an example of the data source for illustration. As shown in FIG. 7 , the device 300 enables one of the multiple imaging devices AD to subdivide the data segments in a certain time period into four data sub-segments A1-A4. The respective hash values of the data sub-segments are H1-H4. By using these hash values as the lowest-level child nodes, a sub-hash chain is constructed inside the camera device A (opposite to the external hash tree formed by the hash values of the data segments of the camera device AD within a specific time period) language), and calculate the sub-root hash value H ₁₄ of the sub-hash chain (relative to the root hash value of the external hash tree). Use the root hash value H ₁₄ of the internal hash chain as the hash value of camera A, through the external hash tree (that is, the hash value H _A of the data segment of the camera device AD in this specific time period - The processing of _HD as an external hash tree constructed by a leaf node applies for a timestamp (for example, in the manner shown in FIG. 5 ) to a timestamp agent (implemented by means 300), and the timestamp agent returns a public verification After receiving the information, the distribution of the verification information is re-distributed in the imaging device A. That is, each data sub-segment inside camera A is formed by its own integrity verification information obtained by camera A in the external hash tree processing, the path information of the internal hash chain, and the hash values of relevant nodes on the path Integrity verification information of A1-A4. In a preferred implementation, if the verification of the data sub-segment is relatively independent, in order to save storage space, each data sub-segment only needs to store the hash value of the data sub-segment, for example, the A1 data sub-segment Only need to store the verification information of H(A1), and then store the verification information V ₁₄ of A1-A4 behind the four data sub-segments, that is, the verification information for the camera device A returned from the timestamp agent. During subsequent verification, the internal hash chain is regenerated according to the hash values of other segments, and the hash value of the root node of the internal hash chain is verified using the verification information in V ₁₄ . When some data sub-segments in a large segment are missing, but the hash value of the missing data sub-segment exists, the integrity of each remaining data sub-segment can still be verified independently, thereby improving the accuracy of verification and granularity.

It is easy to understand that although what is shown in FIG. 7 is a configuration for integrity protection by constructing an internal sub-hash chain for a camera device A, those skilled in the art understand that depending on actual needs and actual processing capabilities of the system, it can be This configuration is performed for all image pickup devices A-D or arbitrarily selected several image pickup devices among them. the

FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram showing an example of performing integrity protection on data sub-segments of a certain data source through an internal sub-hash tree by using the apparatus 300 for generating data integrity verification information as shown in FIG. 3 . As shown in FIG. 8, in one imaging device A among the plurality of imaging devices AD, the apparatus 300 makes the data segment in a specific time period be subdivided into four data sub-segments A1-A4, these The respective hash values of the data sub-segments are H ₁ -H ₄ . By using these hash values as leaf nodes, a sub-hash tree is constructed inside the imaging device A, and the sub-root hash value H ₁₄ of the sub-hash tree is calculated. Use the root hash value H ₁₄ of the internal hash tree as the hash value of camera A, through the external hash tree (that is, the hash value H _A of the data segment of the camera device AD in this specific time period − The processing of _HD as an external hash tree constructed by a leaf node applies for a timestamp (for example, in the manner shown in FIG. 5 ) to a timestamp agent (implemented by means 300), and the timestamp agent returns a public verification After receiving the information, the distribution of the verification information is re-distributed in the imaging device A. That is, each data sub-segment inside camera A is formed by its own integrity verification information obtained by camera A in the external hash tree processing, path information of the internal hash tree, and hash values of relevant nodes on the path Integrity verification information of A1-A4. Similar to the example shown in Figure 7, in a preferred implementation, if the verification of the data sub-segment is relatively independent, then in order to save storage space, for example, only the data sub-segment needs to be stored after each data sub-segment The hash value of the segment, for example, the verification information of the A1 data sub-segment only needs to be stored in H1, and then the verification information V ₁₄ of A1~A4 is stored behind the four data sub-segments, that is, the verification information returned from the timestamp agent . In the subsequent verification process, the internal hash tree is regenerated according to the hash values of other segments, and the root node of the internal hash tree is verified using the verification information in _V14 . When some data sub-segments in a large data segment are missing, but the hash value of the missing data sub-segment still exists, the integrity of each remaining data sub-segment can still be independently verified, thereby improving The precision and granularity of subsequent integrity verification.

Similarly, it is easy to understand that although the configuration shown in FIG. 8 is to implement integrity protection by constructing an internal sub-hash tree for an imaging device A, those skilled in the art understand that it depends on the actual needs and the actual processing of the system. Capability, this configuration can be performed on all imaging devices A-D or arbitrarily selected several imaging devices among them. the

In the above two solutions shown in FIG. 7 and FIG. 8, the device 300 for generating data integrity verification information according to the embodiment of the present invention uses chain or tree hash structure technology inside the corresponding data source To generate integrity verification information for smaller data segments in the data source, which can further improve the accuracy and granularity of verification. In addition, storage space can be saved, since the authentication information for the entire large data segment only needs to be stored once. the

It should be noted that the above two solutions can be selected according to different application scenarios in order to obtain better technical benefits. Specifically, if the verification of small data sub-segments inside a large data segment is relatively independent, that is, the verification of one data sub-segment depends on the existence of hash values of other data sub-segments, but other data sub-segments The original content of the data sub-segment may be missing. In this case, each data sub-segment only needs to store its own hash value, so that the chain hash structure is easier to implement, and the calculation of the hash tree requires a larger storage space, so the hash chain is used more advantageous. If it is required that the verification of each data sub-segment in a large data segment is still absolutely independent, that is, each data sub-segment stores verification information separately without relying on the existence of the original content and hash value of other data sub-segments, That is to say, even if other data sub-segments and their hash values are missing, the remaining data sub-segments can still be verified independently, because the verification information of each data sub-segment saves the verification path and its associated nodes on the path. information. In the case where the verification of such data sub-segments is absolutely independent, the chain hash method needs to store a larger volume of verification information for each data sub-segment, and the length of the verification information after the data sub-segment is the same as that of the sub-segment. The number of segments is proportional, and the tree hash method makes the length of the verification information after the sub-segment logarithmically related to the number of sub-segments, so the tree hash has more advantages. Of course, it is easy to understand that if the processing capability of the system permits, the internal hash chain and hash tree configurations shown in Figures 7 and 8 can be arbitrarily applied to various types of data sub-segments whose verification is relatively independent or absolutely independent. Scenes. the

In addition, in the above-mentioned solutions of FIG. 7 and FIG. 8 , the internal hash structure and the external hash structure can be combined arbitrarily. That is to say, both the internal hash structure and the external hash structure can be hash trees or hash chains; or the internal hash structure is a hash tree and the external hash structure is a hash chain; or the internal hash structure is a hash Greek chain, the external hash structure is a hash tree. the

Although Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 show the solution that only one of the multiple data sources adopts the internal hash structure, those skilled in the art can easily understand that according to actual needs, the hash structure of multiple data sources can be Some or even all of the above solutions can be adopted. the

Under normal circumstances, the number of multiple data sources (such as camera equipment in the monitoring system) that needs to be protected and verified for its data integrity may be relatively fixed, so the integrity verification of the generated data according to the embodiment of the present invention The shape of the hash tree constructed by a new device (for example, implemented as a timestamp agent) is fixed, so a suitable and efficient hash tree can be constructed in advance. However, there are some situations in reality that will cause the number of camera devices to change dynamically, for example: the increase of new camera devices, the removal of camera devices, the failure of image devices due to faults, and the different protection levels of each camera device (such as The length of the specific time period corresponding to the data segment is different), etc., which makes the number of hash values received by the timestamp proxy change dynamically in different time periods. Therefore, a solution for dynamically constructing an efficient hash tree suitable for use by a timestamp proxy is required. the

When the number of camera devices can form a full binary hash tree, that is, when the number of camera devices is an exponential multiple of 2, there is minimum volume of verification information. When the number of cameras is not an exponential multiple of 2, there are various methods of constructing a hash tree. For example, FIGS. 9A and 9B show a hash tree constructed in the case of having 7 imaging devices. As shown in FIG. 9B , the hash tree has fewer layers, and the hash tree with fewer layers has the smallest verification information volume on average. Therefore, constructing an efficient hash tree is to construct a hash tree with the least number of layers. the

In a specific example of the device for generating data integrity verification information according to an embodiment of the present invention, it may include a hash tree height calculation subunit and a hash tree construction subunit for constructing an efficient hash tree. Assuming that the number of imaging devices is N (N is a natural number greater than 1), and the number of data segments generated by these imaging devices in a certain period of time is N, the hash tree height calculation subunit calculates the height of the hash tree h=ceil(log ₂ N), ceil represents the smallest integer not less than log ₂ N. The hash tree construction subunit completes the construction of an efficient hash tree in the following manner: if log ₂ N is an integer, directly construct a full binary tree with a height of h. If log ₂ N is not an integer, for example, the hash values of the N data segments can be used as leaf nodes to virtually construct a full binary tree with a height of h, and then N nodes can be divided according to the leaf nodes of the virtual full binary tree. The order from left to right determines the position of N nodes in the virtual full binary tree in turn, then removes redundant nodes, and finally compresses it into a target efficient hash binary tree. Figures 10A-10D show the process of constructing an efficient binary tree when the number of leaf nodes is N=13. The hash tree height calculation subunit calculates the height h=ceil(log ₂ 13)=4 of the hash tree. Since log ₂ 13 is not an integer, the hash tree construction subunit constructs a virtual full binary tree with a height of 4 as shown in FIG. 9A . Then, for the 13 nodes, the positions of the 13 nodes in the virtual full binary tree are sequentially determined according to the order of the leaf nodes of the virtual full binary tree from left to right, and redundant nodes are removed, as shown in Figures 10B-10C. Finally, an efficient hash binary tree as shown in FIG. 10D is obtained.

In each example given above, the public verification information acquisition unit in the device 300 for generating data integrity verification information as shown in FIG. Protection of the integrity of data segments of a data source within a specified period of time. According to an alternative implementation manner, the data integrity protection means may also be encryption or signature. the

In the case of implementing data integrity protection by means of encryption, the root hash value and verification information of the hash structure are encrypted with a predetermined encryption key. For example, a check code (for example, a check code with a length of 10 bits) can be added to the root hash value as check information, the data obtained in this way can be encrypted with the encryption key, and the encrypted root hash can be encrypted. The value and check code are used as public verification information, and tamperers cannot obtain the encryption key, so that the encrypted root hash value and check code can only be verified by the person or organization that owns the encryption key, and then verify the corresponding Data Integrity. Anyone who does not know the encryption key cannot make any modifications to the encrypted data, even if the modification can be discovered by the verifier. When verifying the public verification information, the encrypted root hash value and check code are decrypted by the predetermined encryption key, and the check code is calculated according to the decrypted root hash value. If the verification passes, that is, the calculated check code is consistent with the decrypted check code, it can be determined that the verification of the public verification information passes, that is, the verification result is positive. At the same time, the root hash value contained in the public verification information can also be restored for use in subsequent verification processes (details will be described later). According to another example, a hash calculation can also be performed on the root hash value to obtain another hash value (hereinafter referred to as "verification hash value") as verification information, and the root hash value can be encrypted using a predetermined encryption key. Value and verification hash value are encrypted, the encrypted data is used as public verification information, and tamperers cannot obtain the encryption key, so that the encrypted root hash value and verification hash value can only be owned The person or organization verifies the encryption key, which in turn verifies the integrity of the corresponding data. Anyone who does not know the encryption key cannot make any modifications to the encrypted data, even if the modification can be discovered by the verifier. When verifying the public verification information, the encrypted root hash value and the verification hash value are decrypted by the predetermined encryption key, and a hash calculation is performed on the decrypted root hash value. If the verification passes, that is, the hash value obtained by the hash calculation is consistent with the verification hash value obtained by decryption, it can be determined that the verification of the public verification information passes, that is, the verification result is positive. Similarly, the verification process can also recover the root hash value contained in the public verification information for use in subsequent verification processes. As mentioned above, since the verification information (such as the verification code and the verification hash value in the above example) is added during the encryption process of the root hash value, in the process of verifying the public verification information, it is possible to use The verification information determines whether the decrypted root hash value is the original hash value, that is, the root hash value contained in the public verification information can be restored for use in a subsequent verification process. the

In the case of implementing data integrity protection by means of digital signatures, after signing the root hash value of the hash structure with a predetermined secret private key, the integrity verification information of the generated data segments can be verified by anyone who holds the above-mentioned The person or organization verifies the public key certificate corresponding to the predetermined secret private key, and can also confirm the identity information of the person who signed the data. The tamperer cannot make any modification to the data without knowing the secret private key, and even the modification can be discovered by the verifier. As a result, protection of the integrity of the data can be achieved. When verifying the public verification information, use the public key certificate corresponding to the secret private key to verify the signed root hash value. If the verification is passed, it can be determined that the verification of the public verification information is passed, that is, the verification result is Front. Similar to the above case where the public verification information is generated by encrypting the root hash value, the root hash value contained in the public verification information can also be recovered while confirming that the verification is passed, for use in a subsequent verification process. the

In addition, the public verification information can also be obtained through any combination of the above-mentioned encryption, signature, and time stamp methods, so that the integrity-protected data can have various protection attributes to meet different needs of users. the

In the example given above, multiple data sources are video camera devices, and the data to be generated for integrity verification information is video data from multiple video camera devices. However, those skilled in the art understand that the device for generating data integrity verification information according to the embodiment of the present invention can also perform any type of data from multiple data sources of any type, such as audio, text, pictures, any real-time data, and Integrity verification information is generated by a combination of these types of data, and then the integrity protection of these data is realized. The specific generation process is similar to that of the above-mentioned video data, and will not be repeated here. the

The device 300 for generating data integrity verification information shown in Figure 3 can be implemented as an independent functional device, such as described in Figures 4-5, 7-8, but it can also be combined protected data sources. For example, in an alternative embodiment, the device 300 (such as a timestamp agent) can be integrated with a data source (such as a camera), so that the data source itself has integrity verification information for the generated data function. the

FIG. 11 shows a simplified block diagram of an example of an imaging device 1100 having such a function. As shown in FIG. 11 , the camera device 1100 includes a video acquisition unit 1102 , the apparatus 300 shown in FIG. 3 , and a communication interface 1104 . The video collection unit 1102 provides the collected video data to the hash structure generation unit 310 included in the device 300, and the hash structure generation unit 310 uses the hash value of each data segment corresponding to a specific time segment as the lowest layer child nodes to form a hash structure (such as a hash tree or hash chain). The public verification information acquisition unit 320 included in the device 300 obtains public verification information for the root hash value of the hash structure obtained from the hash structure generation unit 310, for example, through the above-mentioned technical means such as time stamp, encryption and digital signature. accomplish. Taking the timestamp method as an example, the public verification information acquisition unit 320 obtains timestamp information from the TSA (not shown in the figure) via the communication interface 1104, and the timestamp information can be transmitted to the integrity verification information in the device 300 via the communication interface 1104 The generation unit 330 uses the public verification information and the hash structure information obtained from the hash structure generation unit 310 to generate integrity verification information for corresponding data segments. In addition, the generated integrity verification information may be transmitted to a corresponding data source through the communication interface 1104, for example. the

It should be noted that as long as the finally obtained imaging equipment can realize the function of generating integrity verification information for data, the configuration of each component unit in the imaging equipment shown in Figure 11 is not limited to the specific way shown in Figure 11 . For example, the hash structure generation unit 310 in the device 300 can also be combined with the video acquisition unit, or the public verification information acquisition unit 320 and the integrity verification information generation unit 330 in the device 300 can be combined with the communication interface 1104 ,etc. the

It is easy to understand that such an imaging device integrated with the integrity verification information for generating data can save a separate device 300 (such as a time stamp agent) to generate the integrity verification information of the corresponding data segment, thereby helping to reduce data integrity. Integrity protection of the structural complexity of the system, in addition to reducing costs. the

In the example described above, the generation of integrity verification information is realized by the apparatus 300 for generating data integrity verification information implemented according to the present invention (for example, implemented as a time stamp agent). However, according to another embodiment of the present invention, for example, one or more data sources in multiple data sources may also complete the function of a time stamp agent without setting a separate time stamp agent. the

Still taking the camera device as an example of the data source for description. In fact, the calculation amount and the required storage space of the time stamp agent are relatively small, and it can be completely implemented in one or more camera devices, thereby reducing the difficulty of device maintenance. Therefore, when deploying multiple cameras serving as multiple data sources, for example, a master camera may be selected or randomly determined by the user, and other camera devices may be connected to the master camera through a local area network. The main camera device connected to the external network is responsible for the generation of the hash tree, the application of time stamps, and the generation of integrity verification information. Such a main imaging device can be realized, for example, by the imaging device shown in FIG. 11 described above. the

In the case of a large number of imaging devices, for example, the imaging devices may be organized into a structure as shown in FIGS. 12A-12B . Fig. 12A is a simplified structural block diagram showing a system for generating data integrity verification information according to an embodiment of the present invention, wherein multiple data sources are divided into multi-level hash areas, and Fig. 12B is a diagram showing A simplified structural block diagram of a system for generating data integrity verification information of a variant of the system. the

In the configuration shown in Figures 12A-12B, all camera devices are divided into multiple hash areas, namely, the first-level hash area and the second-level hash area in Figure 12A, and the first-level hash area in Figure 12B to the third-level hash area. As shown in Figure 12A, the first-level hash area includes four hash structures, which are hash trees here, which can be represented by a-e respectively. Each hash tree includes 5 data sources, that is, camera equipment, and each hash tree includes a management camera device, which is responsible for the generation of the hash tree it manages and the distribution of integrity verification information wait. As shown in FIG. 12A , for example, in the first-level hash area, imaging device A is the management imaging device of imaging device groups A1-A5, imaging device B is the management imaging device of imaging device groups B1-B4, and imaging device C As the management imaging device of the imaging device groups C1 to C5, the imaging device D serves as the management imaging device of the imaging device groups D1 to D5. In the second-level hash area, the camera device E is used as the management camera device. As shown in FIG. 12B, the first-level hash area includes three hash structures, namely hash trees a-c. Each hash tree includes 4 data sources, that is, camera equipment, and each hash tree includes a management camera device, which is responsible for the generation of the hash tree it manages and the distribution of integrity verification information wait. As shown in FIG. 12B , imaging devices A, B, and C are respectively used as management imaging devices of the imaging device groups (A1-A3, A), (B1-B3, B), and (C1-C3, C). Similarly, two hash trees d and e are included in the second-level hash area, and camera devices D and E are respectively used as management camera devices. It is easy to understand, the number of levels of hash areas that multiple data sources can be divided into, the number of hash structures (for example, hash trees or hash chains) included in each level of hash area, and the number of each hash area The number of imaging devices included in the structure can be adjusted accordingly according to actual needs and is not limited to the specific configuration examples shown in FIGS. 12A-12B . the

The above-mentioned management camera equipment can also be realized by the above-mentioned camera equipment shown in FIG. 11 , for example. The following briefly describes how each management camera device generates the hash tree it manages. First take Figure 12A as an example, for example, the management camera device A uses the hash values of the data segments included in itself and the camera devices A1-A4 it manages in a specific period of time as the bottom-level child nodes to generate hash values. tree a, and manage the camera device E by the hash value of its own data segment included in a specific time period and the root node value of the corresponding hash tree a-d in the previous level, that is, the first level hash area The hash tree e is generated as the bottommost child node respectively. Referring again to FIG. 12B , for example, a management camera device D in the second-level hash area can use the hash values of the data segments included in itself and the camera devices D1-D3 it manages in a specific time period as The lowest child node to generate the hash tree d. Another management camera device E in the second-level hash area can combine the hash value of the data segment it includes in a specific time period with the previous level, that is, the corresponding hash tree in the first-level hash area The root node values of a-c are respectively used as the bottom child nodes to generate the hash tree e. The process of generating the hash tree managed by other management camera devices in FIGS. 12A-12B is similar to the above, and will not be repeated one by one. the

Next, the process of managing the verification information generated by the camera equipment in the hash areas at all levels is outlined. the

In the configurations of FIGS. 12A and 12B , the management camera devices E and F are respectively located in the hash tree in the highest-level hash area, which can be referred to as "the highest-level management camera device" (that is, the aforementioned main camera device ). This highest-level management camera is used to generate the final root hash value according to the root node value of each hash structure in the highest-level hash area, and the highest-level management camera obtains the final root hash The information protected by the hash value (for example, by means of time stamp, encryption or digital signature, etc.) is used as public verification information. It should be noted that although in Figures 12A and 12B, only one hash structure is included in the highest-level hash area, this is not limiting. According to actual needs, multiple hash structures can also be included in the highest-level hash area . In this case, it may be specified in advance which of these hash structures manages the imaging device as the highest-level management imaging device. the

In the highest-level hash area, the highest-level management data source generates integrity verification information for the lowest-level sub-node corresponding to the data source in each hash structure of the highest-level hash area. The information includes the above-mentioned public verification information, path information from the child node to the final root node in the highest-level hash area, and hash values of nodes related to the child node included in the path . the

For a hash structure in a hash area other than the highest-level hash area, the management camera equipment in the hash structure generates for other bottom-level child nodes corresponding to the camera equipment in the hash structure Integrity verification information. The integrity verification information includes the integrity verification information of the root node of the hash structure, the path information from the child node to the root node in the hash area of this level, and the information related to the child node on the path The hash value of the node. As mentioned above, since the root node of the hash structure is the child node of the lowest layer of the corresponding hash structure in the upper-level hash area, its integrity verification information can be passed through the corresponding hash in the upper-level hash area. It is generated by the management camera equipment of the Greek structure. the

Referring to Figures 12A and 12B, for example, in Figure 12A, the leaf nodes represented by the hash values of the data segments of the camera equipment A1-A4 in the specific time period are combined twice to obtain node A', and then the management camera The hash value of the data segment included in device A in the specific time period is combined with the hash value of node A' to obtain the hash value of node A". It can be seen from the figure that through the management of camera device A managed The hash values of the data segments included in the camera equipment group in a specific time period are used as leaf nodes to construct the hash tree a. Similarly, the root node B of each hash tree b-d is obtained by managing the camera equipment B-D ", C", D" hash value. The hash value of node A"-D" is combined twice to obtain the hash value of node E'. A hash tree e is formed by hash values of data segments included in a specific period of time by the highest-level imaging device E and hash values of the respective root nodes B", C", D", and E". The highest-level camera device E is responsible for the generation of the hash tree e, and calculates the hash value of the root node E" of the hash tree e, and finally the highest-level camera device E is responsible for the application of the time stamp. The camera devices A-E Each, for example, can have the structure and configuration shown in Figure 11. For example, the integrity verification information composed of public verification information based on time stamp, hash tree path information and the hash value of the corresponding node on the path is generated Integrity verification information for each imaging device. For example, the generated integrity verification information can be distributed to each imaging device by the highest-level imaging device E. For example, each imaging device can be generated by the operation described above in conjunction with Fig. 5 The integrity verification information of , the details will not be repeated here. 

As shown in Figure 12B, the management cameras at all levels A, B, C, D, E, and F are respectively responsible for the hash trees a, b, c, d, e, and f in the first-level to third-level hash areas. generate. The management camera devices A, B and C send the root nodes a3, b3 and c3 of the hash trees a, b and c to the management camera device E. The management camera devices D and E send the hash tree d, the root nodes d3 and e3 of e to the highest management camera device F, which is responsible for the generation of the hash tree f, and applies for a time stamp for the root node f2. Correspondingly, the highest-level management camera device F obtains the root node stamped with the time stamp as public verification information, and combines the public verification information with the verification information corresponding to each leaf node e3, d3 and F of the hash tree f (path information and Hash value of some related nodes) is sent to the management camera devices E and D and F itself. The management camera devices E and D are respectively responsible for the generation and distribution of verification information related to each camera device in the hash tree e and d. the

According to the system of the embodiment shown in FIGS. 12A-12B of the present invention, the imaging devices responsible for calculating the hash tree (that is, the management imaging devices at all levels) only need to be responsible for a small part of the hash tree generation, effectively reducing the load. Uniform distribution improves system efficiency and avoids system bottlenecks. the

It is easy to understand that various changes can be made to the configuration of the system shown in FIGS. 12A-12B above. For example, the hash trees included in the hash areas at all levels may also adopt other hash structures, such as hash chains, or partly hash trees and partly hash chains, and so on. Moreover, according to actual needs, hash regions of any number of stages can be configured, not limited to the specific number of stages shown in FIGS. 12A-12B . the

The embodiment of the present invention also provides a method for generating data integrity verification information. Figure 13 shows a simplified flowchart of this method. As shown in FIG. 13 , the method 1300 starts at step S1310 , includes a hash structure generating step S1320 , public verification information obtaining step S1330 and integrity verification information generating step S1340 , and ends at step S1350 . In the hash structure generation step S1320, the hash values of the data segments included in each of the multiple data sources within a specific time period are used as the lowest-level child nodes to generate a hash structure corresponding to the specific time period, And calculate the root hash value of the hash structure through the child nodes of the lowest layer of the hash structure. In the public verification information obtaining step S1330, the public verification information for the root hash value is obtained. In the integrity verification information generation step S1340, for each data segment in the data segments included in each of the multiple data sources within the specific time period, the integrity verification information of the data segment is generated based on the following information : Public verification information, path information from the hash value of the data segment representing the lowest-level child node to the root node in the hash structure, and the nodes related to the child node included in the path hash value. the

In a specific example according to the above method 1300, a hash substructure corresponding to a specific time period may be generated for at least one data source among the plurality of data sources to be protected for data integrity, so that the at least one data source The smaller data segments in provide integrity verification information. Therefore, the accuracy and granularity of subsequent integrity verification are improved. For example, such an instance may be realized by the configurations shown in FIGS. 7 and 8 described above. For specific details, reference may be made to the above description of FIGS. 7-8 , which will not be repeated here. Similar to the situation in Figure 7-8, the generated hash substructure can be a hash tree or a hash chain, or a sub-hash tree is generated for some data sources, and a sub-hash chain is generated for some data sources. the

In another specific example according to the above-mentioned method 1300, the integrity verification information generated for the system having the configuration shown in FIGS. 12A-12B above may be verified. For specific processing details, for example, reference may be made to the above-mentioned description of FIGS. 12A-12B , which will not be described in detail one by one. the

In yet another specific example according to the above-mentioned method 1300, an efficient hash tree, that is, a hash with the least number of layers, can be constructed under the condition that the leaf nodes in the hash structure (such as hash tree and hash chain) change dynamically. Greek tree. For specific details, refer to the above descriptions for FIGS. 9A-9B , 10A-10D , which will not be repeated here. the

In yet another specific example according to the above method 1300, a data encapsulation step may also be included. After the integrity verification information of the corresponding data segment is generated, the data encapsulation step may set the integrity verification information in the corresponding After the data segment, in order to form the encapsulated data of the data source to which the data segment belongs. For specific details, reference may be made to the above description in conjunction with FIG. 6 , which will not be repeated here. the

In another specific example according to the above-mentioned method 1300, it may also include a corresponding relationship creation step, which can convert the integrity verification information generation step into the complete data generated by the data segments included in each of the multiple data sources within a specific time period. The integrity verification information is stored centrally, and the correspondence between the integrity verification information and the corresponding data segments is created. In the subsequent integrity verification process, the integrity verification information corresponding to the data segment to be integrity verified can be obtained through this corresponding relationship for integrity verification. By storing integrity verification information centrally, it is better protected from corruption. In addition, since the corresponding relationship between the data segment and the integrity verification information is established, the accuracy of the subsequent verification process is guaranteed. the

It is easy to understand that, similar to the above-mentioned apparatus 300 for generating data integrity verification information according to the embodiment of the present invention in conjunction with FIG. The root hash value of the Greek structure obtains the time stamp to realize the protection of the integrity of the data segment of each data source in a specific period of time. However, according to an alternative embodiment, the data integrity protection means may also be encryption or signature, or public verification information may be obtained through any combination of the above encryption, signature, and time stamp, so that the protected Data can have a variety of protection attributes in order to meet the different needs of users. the

The method 1300 according to this embodiment of the present invention and the processing of each step therein can be realized, for example, by an apparatus or system for generating integrity verification information having the configurations shown in FIGS. 3-12 and the like above. For specific details, reference may be made to the descriptions of the above figures, which will not be repeated here. the

The purpose of generating the integrity verification information of the data is to verify the integrity of the data according to the integrity verification information in subsequent verification processing. Therefore, according to an embodiment of the present invention, a device for verifying data integrity is also provided. FIG. 14 shows a schematic diagram of the structure of such a device 1400 . The apparatus 1400 includes a public verification information verification unit 1410 and an integrity verification unit 1420 . The common verification information verification unit 1410 verifies the common verification information included in the integrity verification information of the data segments of the corresponding data sources within a specific time period of the plurality of data sources. The integrity verification unit 1420 combines the root hash value calculated according to the integrity verification information of the data segment of the corresponding data source and the hash value of the data segment with the root hash value contained in the integrity verification information A comparison is made, and in a case where both the comparison result and the verification result of the above public verification information verification unit are positive, it is determined that the data segment is complete. Wherein, the integrity verification information of the data segment includes public verification information, the path from the lowest-level child node represented by the hash value of the data segment to the root node in the hash structure corresponding to a specific time period information, and the hash values of the nodes involved in the path that are related to the child nodes of the lowest level. The hash structure corresponding to the specific time period is generated by making the hash values of the data segments included in each of the plurality of data sources within the specific time period represent the child nodes of the lowest layer, and the root hash value is the hash value The hash value of the root node of the Greek structure. the

FIG. 15 shows a specific operation flow of an example of the verification operation implemented by the integrity verification apparatus 1400 shown in FIG. 14 . By using the method according to the above-mentioned embodiments of the present invention for each data source, such as a camera device, the integrity verification information generated by the data segment in a specific time period can be used, for example, by any personal verification or trusted third party The integrity verification apparatus 1400 according to the embodiment of the present invention verifies the integrity of these data segments and the accurate time period of recording. As shown in FIG. 15 , it is assumed that the integrity of the data segment C2 of the imaging device C shown in FIG. 5 for a certain period of time needs to be verified. The verification is performed according to the integrity verification information (H _D2 , H _AB2 , H _E2 , Timestamp(H _AE2 )) of the data segment. As pointed out above in the description of FIG. 5, for the sake of brevity, l, r, etc. An information element that represents the left-right relationship of each relevant node in the path information, but this information element actually exists in the path information. In addition, the hierarchical information in the path information can be expressed by, for example, a pre-agreed rule, an arrangement order of the hash values of each node in the integrity verification information, and the like. In the verification process shown in FIG. 15 , the public verification information (namely, the public time stamp) is firstly verified, and the credible and accurate time stamped by the TSA during video recording can be obtained from the time stamp. The verification of the time stamp needs to use the root certificate provided by TSA (the root certificate includes, for example, the root hash value of the hash structure and the time stamp information assigned to the root hash value, etc.), at 1510, according to relevant standards (for example, refer to http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc3161.html for relevant information), extract time information and root hash value based on the public verification information Timestamp (H _AE2 ), and verify the integrity of these data. If the integrity verification fails in this process, the verification failure result is directly obtained. If the integrity verification is passed in this process, the root hash value of the data segment to be verified is calculated by using the integrity verification information (H _AB2 , _HD2 , H _E2 , Timestamp(H _AE2 )) of the data segment. Specifically, the brother node values and path information included in the integrity verification information are extracted, and the root node value H _AE2 of the hash tree is recovered in a two-in-one step-by-step calculation manner. Then, at 1520 , compare the root hash value H _AE2 extracted from the integrity verification information with the root node value H _AE2 calculated at 1520 . If the two values are the same, it indicates that the integrity verification of the data segment is passed, otherwise the verification fails.

In the above processing, for example, the hash value H _AE2 of the root node is calculated according to the integrity verification information (H _AB2 , _HD2 , H _E2 , Timestamp(H _AE2 )), which can also be combined with the verification of the public timestamp in 1510 The processing is performed synchronously, rather than on the premise that the verification result at 1510 is positive.

In other alternative implementations, the integrity verification unit 1420 does not need to calculate the root hash based on the integrity verification information of the data segment whose integrity is to be verified when the verification result of the public verification information verification unit 1410 is positive. hash value and compare it with the root hash value contained in the integrity verification information, but the calculation and calculation of the root hash value may be performed in parallel with or even prior to the verification process performed by the public verification information verification unit 1410. Compare. Finally, when both the comparison result and the verification result of the public verification information verification unit 1410 are positive, it is determined that the data is complete; destroy. the

In the case of generating integrity verification information for several sub-segments of data subdivided by at least one data source within a specific period of time in the configuration shown in FIGS. 7-8 above, the device according to an embodiment of the present invention A specific example of 1400 can verify the integrity of such sub-segments of data. the

Take the configuration shown in Figure 8 as an example. Assume that the data segments in the camera device A within a certain period of time are divided into four data sub-segments A1-A4, and the hash values of these data sub-segments form a sub-hash tree. The sub-root hash value H ₁₄ of the sub-root node of the sub-hash tree is used as the hash value of the data segment of the imaging device A in the specific time period. A hash tree is formed by the hash values of the data segments of the imaging device AD in the specific time period, and the root hash value of the hash tree is H _ABCD . Obtain public verification information for this root hash through a timestamp proxy. Thus, the integrity verification information of each data sub-segment in the imaging device A can be obtained, and this integrity verification information for the data sub-segment can be referred to as secondary integrity verification information, so as to be consistent with the integrity verification information for the imaging device A The integrity verification information of the time segment in the specific time segment of the BD is distinguished. For each data sub-segment, this secondary integrity verification information includes the integrity verification information of the data segment to which the data sub-segment belongs (for example, it can be obtained in the manner described above in conjunction with FIG. 5 ), hash In the substructure, the path information from the leaf node represented by the hash value of the data subsection to the subroot node of the hash substructure, and the nodes related to the leaf node in the path (that is, sibling node) hash value. For example, assuming that the hash values of the data segments of the camera device AD in the specific time period are respectively H _A -H _D , and the public verification information obtained by the timestamp agent for the root hash value H _ABCD is Timestamp(H _ABCD ), Then the integrity verification information of the imaging device A is (H _B , H _CD , Timestamp(H _ABCD )). For example, the secondary integrity verification information of the data sub-segment A1 is (H ₂ , H ₃₄ , H _B , H _CD , Timestamp(H _ABCD )). The integrity verification unit 1420 in the apparatus 1400 for verifying data integrity according to the embodiment of the present invention verifies the secondary integrity verification information of the data sub-segment in the following manner. The sub-root hash value is calculated according to the secondary integrity verification information of the data sub-segment A1 and the hash value H1 of the data sub-segment. The calculation method is similar to that described with reference to FIG. 15 , that is, the child root hash value H ₁₄ is obtained according to the path information included in the secondary integrity verification information and the hash values of related sibling nodes on the path. Then, use the sub-root hash value as the hash value of the data segment to which the data sub-segment belongs, and verify the integrity information (H _B , H _CD , Timestamp(H _ABCD )) to calculate the root hash value of the external hash tree, and compare the calculated root hash value with the root hash value contained in the integrity verification information. If the above comparison result shows that the two are consistent, and at the same time, the verification result of the public verification information verification unit 1410 is positive, then it is determined that the data sub-segment A1 is complete. If any one of the above comparison result and the verification result of the public verification information verification unit 1410 is negative, it is determined that the integrity of the data sub-segment A1 is destroyed.

For the situation in which a sub-hash chain is formed in a camera device shown in FIG. 7 , the processing of the integrity verification of the data sub-segment is similar to the above-mentioned situation in FIG. 8 , and will not be repeated here. the

As mentioned above in conjunction with the system configuration of Figures 12A-12B, in the case of many data sources (such as camera equipment), the camera equipment can be divided into several hash areas, and the hash structure contained in each hash area is determined by A management camera is responsible for generating the hash structure, and finally the highest management camera is responsible for generating integrity verification information. When performing integrity verification on the data segments included in each data source (such as camera equipment) within a specific time period, the public verification information verification unit is used to verify that the integrity verification information corresponding to the data segment contains public authentication information for . The integrity verification unit compares the root hash value calculated according to the integrity verification information of the data segment and the hash value of the data segment with the final root hash value contained in the integrity verification information , in case that the result of this comparison and the verification result of the public verification information verification unit are both positive, the corresponding data segment is complete. Among them, according to the path information related to the child node of the lowest layer represented by the hash value of the data segment included in the integrity verification information of the data segment, and the hash value of the related sibling nodes included in the path value to calculate the root hash value to be compared with the final root hash value contained in the data segment's integrity verification information. the

If the data to be verified by integrity is packaged data as shown in Figure 6, the public verification information verification unit 1410 and the integrity verification information verification unit 1420 in the device 1400 directly obtain the data to be verified from the corresponding packaged data segment and the integrity verification information of the data segment, so as to perform integrity verification according to the process shown in FIG. 15 , for example. For the case of encapsulating the data sub-segments in FIGS. 7-8 in the manner shown in FIG. 6 , similarly, the apparatus 1400 directly obtains the integrity verification information of the corresponding sub-segments for integrity verification. the

If the integrity verification information of the data segment is not directly set behind the corresponding data segment but is stored separately, a corresponding relationship between the data segment and the integrity verification information is constructed. Then the public verification information verification unit 1410 and the integrity verification information verification unit 1420 in the apparatus 1400 obtain the integrity verification information of the corresponding data segment from the corresponding relationship, so as to perform integrity verification according to the process shown in FIG. 15 . For the case of encapsulating the data sub-segments in FIGS. 7-8 in the manner shown in FIG. 6 , the apparatus 1400 similarly obtains the integrity verification information of the corresponding sub-segments through the corresponding relationship for integrity verification. the

As mentioned above, in addition to achieving the protection of the integrity of the data segments of each data source in a specific time period by obtaining a timestamp for the root hash value of the hash structure, according to an alternative embodiment, the data The means of integrity protection can also be encryption or signature. In the case where the integrity protection of data is realized by means of encryption, when verifying the integrity of the data, the device 1400 according to the embodiment of the present invention decrypts the encrypted public verification information by using a predetermined encryption key and The verification information contained in the public verification information (such as the aforementioned verification code and verification hash value, etc.) is used to achieve verification. If the verification is passed, the root hash value contained in the public verification information can also be recovered for future use. It will be used in the subsequent verification process. In this way, it is avoided that any modification to the encrypted data can be made by any party who does not know the encryption key, or even the modification can be discovered by the authenticating party. In the case of implementing data integrity protection by means of digital signatures, after signing the root hash value of the hash structure with a predetermined secret private key, the device 1400 according to the embodiment of the present invention uses the predetermined secret private key to The corresponding public key certificate is used to verify the signed root hash value. If the verification is passed, it can be determined that the verification of the public verification information has passed. At the same time, the root hash value contained in the public verification information can also be restored for subsequent use. used during verification. In this way, any modification of the data by a tamperer without knowledge of the secret private key can be avoided, or even the modification can be discovered by the verifier. the

Correspondingly, an embodiment of the present invention also provides a method for verifying data integrity. FIG. 16 shows a simplified flowchart of such a method 1600 . As shown in the figure, the method 1600 starts at step S1610, includes public verification information verification step S1620, comparison step S1630 and integrity determination step S1640, and ends at step S1650. In the public verification information verification step S1620, the public verification information included in the integrity verification information of the data segments of the corresponding data sources within a specific time period of the multiple data sources is verified. In the comparison step S1630, the root hash value calculated according to the integrity verification information of the data segment of the corresponding data source and the hash value of the data segment and the root hash value contained in the integrity verification information Compare. In the integrity determination step S1640, if the comparison result of the comparison step S1630 shows that the calculated root hash value is consistent with the root hash value contained in the integrity verification information, and the verification result of the public verification information verification step S1620 is positive, Then it is determined that the data segment is complete. Wherein, the integrity verification information of the data segment includes public verification information, the path from the lowest-level child node represented by the hash value of the data segment to the root node in the hash structure corresponding to a specific time period information, and hash values of nodes related to the child node included in the path. The hash structure corresponding to the specific time period is generated by making the hash values of the data segments each included in the plurality of data sources in the specific time period represent the child nodes of the lowest layer, and the root hash value is passed through the hash structure to calculate. the

In the configuration shown in Figures 7-8 above, in the case of the integrity verification information of several data sub-segments subdivided by at least one data source within a certain period of time, the method 1600 according to the embodiment of the present invention A specific instance of , which verifies the integrity of such sub-segments of data. For example, this kind of integrity verification can be realized by the device 1400 shown in the above-mentioned FIG. 14. For the processing details of the specific verification method, please refer to the above-mentioned description of the operation of the device 1400 with reference to FIGS. . the

The method 1600 according to this embodiment of the present invention is also capable of verifying integrity verification information obtained with the system configuration shown in FIGS. 12A-12B . For a specific verification process, for example, reference may be made to the above description of the operation of the device 1400 with reference to FIGS. 12A-12B , which will not be repeated here. the

If the data to be verified for integrity is encapsulated data as shown in FIG. 6, the method 1600 according to this embodiment directly obtains the data segment to be verified and the integrity verification of the data segment from the corresponding encapsulated data information for integrity verification according to the process shown in Figure 15. For the case where the data sub-segments in FIGS. 7-8 are encapsulated in the manner shown in FIG. 6 , the method 1600 similarly directly obtains the secondary integrity verification information of the corresponding sub-segments for integrity verification. the

If the integrity verification information of the data segment is not directly set behind the corresponding data segment but is stored separately, a corresponding relationship between the data segment and the integrity verification information is constructed. Then, according to the method 1600 for integrity verification of this embodiment, the integrity verification information of the corresponding data segment is obtained from the corresponding relationship, so as to perform integrity verification according to the process shown in FIG. 15 . For the case where the data sub-segments in Figures 7-8 are encapsulated in the manner shown in Figure 6, the method 1600 similarly obtains the secondary integrity verification information of the corresponding sub-segments through the corresponding relationship for integrity verification . the

As mentioned above, in the case of implementing data integrity protection by means of encryption, the method 1600 according to the embodiment of the present invention uses a predetermined encryption key and public verification information to encrypt the root hash value of the hash structure The verification information contained in (such as the aforementioned verification code and verification hash value, etc.) is used to verify the public verification information. In addition, in the case of implementing data integrity protection through digital signature means, the method 1600 according to the embodiment of the present invention is implemented by using a public key certificate corresponding to a predetermined secret private key used when digitally signing data Verification of public verification information. For specific implementation details, for example, reference may be made to the above description of the apparatus 1400 for verifying data integrity, which will not be repeated here. the

The device and method for generating data integrity verification information and the device and method for verifying data integrity according to various embodiments of the present invention are video surveillance systems with multiple camera equipment (an example of a data source) The system provides an efficient integrity protection scheme, so that for different video data segments of all camera devices, only one time stamp needs to be applied, regardless of the number of camera devices. Thus, individual integrity protection of data segments within a specific time period of each camera device can be efficiently implemented. In addition, network bandwidth and time stamp costs are greatly saved. The length of the verification information stored in each camera device is in a logarithmic relationship with the number of the camera devices, which effectively prevents the expansion of the verification information. In the case of using encryption means or digital signature means to protect the integrity of the root node value, efficient and accurate data integrity protection can also be provided. In addition, the system configuration can be simplified and the cost can be reduced. the

Assuming that the number of camera equipment is N, and the number of data segments generated in a certain period of time is also N, then the height of the constructed efficient binary tree is h=ceil(log ₂ N), and ceil means that it is not less than log ₂ N The smallest integer of . The length of the path from each leaf node to the root node is h, so the number of sibling nodes on the path stored in the verification information is the length h of the path, and h has an approximate logarithmic relationship with the number of camera devices. For example, when a monitoring system has 1000 camera devices, the height of the constructed hash tree is 10, so the verification information of each segment needs to store 10 hash values.

A specific application example is used below to illustrate related beneficial effects. Suppose there are 100 camera devices in a system, and the video bit rate of the monitoring camera devices is set to 2Mbps, and a time stamp is applied for every 30 seconds. First, the height of the binary tree is 7, and the verification information that needs to be stored for the 30-second video data of each camera device is 7 hash values and a public timestamp. Assuming that SHA256 is used, the length of the hash value is 256bits, and the size of the timestamp It is assumed to be 3000 bits, so the length of verification information of each 30-second segment is 7*256+3000=4792 bits=600 bytes. And the video data length of 30 seconds is 2M*30bits=7.5Mbytes, so verification information accounts for 600/7.5M=0.01% of the whole video data. Therefore, the code rate expansion caused by the addition of verification information can be ignored. The timestamp proxy needs to construct a binary tree with 7 layers, and needs to hash up to 256 hash values, that is, the amount of calculation required is to perform hash operations on 256*256/8=8Kbytes of data. Today's ordinary computers or microcontrollers or embedded devices such as camera equipment are fully capable of this calculation. The time stamp proxy requires storage space for 256 hash values and time stamps, approximately (256*256+3000)/8=9Kbytes, such storage space is not suitable for ordinary computers, microcontrollers or embedded devices Too much to ask. the

The device and method for generating integrity verification information according to the embodiment of the present invention, and the device and method for verifying the integrity of data provide the same security level of integrity protection as the method of applying for time stamps for each imaging device , the security level of which is based on the anti-second preimage ability of the hash function. It can be seen that the above solution according to the present invention significantly improves the efficiency and accuracy of integrity protection. the

It should be noted here that, due to space limitations, the embodiments and specific application examples listed above are illustrative rather than exhaustive, and are not intended to limit the present invention. For example, the various specific examples and specific implementations shown in the above embodiments can be combined arbitrarily according to needs, and are not limited to the combination modes given in the above specific examples and implementations. In addition, in the above descriptions of the various embodiments and specific examples, expressions "1", "2", "one", "two", "first", "second" etc. related to numerals are merely The purpose is to distinguish the parts or elements decorated by these numbers, not to indicate the order or importance among these parts or elements. the

In addition, each component unit, subunit and component in the device for generating integrity verification information and the device or system for verifying data integrity shown in Figures 3-5, 7-8, 11, 12, and 14 above It can be configured by means of software, firmware, hardware or a combination thereof. Specific means or manners that can be used for configuration are well known to those skilled in the art, and will not be repeated here. In the case of realization by software or firmware, the program constituting the software can be installed from a storage medium or a network to a computer having a dedicated hardware configuration (for example, a general-purpose computer 1700 shown in FIG. 17 ). , capable of performing various functions, etc. the

As shown in FIG. 17 , a central processing unit (CPU) 1701 executes various processes according to programs stored in a read only memory (ROM) 1702 or loaded from a storage section 1708 to a random access memory (RAM) 1703. In the RAM 1703, data required when the CPU 1701 executes various processing and the like is also stored as necessary. The CPU 1701, ROM 1702, and RAM 1703 are connected to each other via a bus 1704. The input/output interface 1705 is also connected to the bus 1704 . the

The following components are connected to the input/output interface 1705: an input section 1706 (including a keyboard, a mouse, etc.), an output section 1707 (including a display such as a cathode ray tube (CRT), a liquid crystal display (LCD), etc., and a speaker, etc.), Storage section 1708 (including hard disk, etc.), communication section 1709 (including network interface card such as LAN card, modem, etc.). The communication section 1709 performs communication processing via a network such as the Internet. A driver 1710 may also be connected to the input/output interface 1705 as needed. A removable medium 1711 such as a magnetic disk, an optical disk, a magneto-optical disk, a semiconductor memory, or the like can be mounted on the drive 1710 as needed, so that a computer program read therefrom can be installed into the storage section 1708 as needed. the

In the case of realizing the above-described series of processing by software, the programs constituting the software are installed from a network such as the Internet or a storage medium such as the removable medium 1711 . the

Those skilled in the art should understand that such a storage medium is not limited to the removable medium 17011 shown in FIG. 17 in which the program is stored and distributed separately from the device to provide the program to the user. Examples of the removable media 1711 include magnetic disks (including floppy disks (registered trademark)), optical disks (including compact disk read only memory (CD-ROM) and digital versatile disks (DVD)), magneto-optical disks (including )) and semiconductor memory. Alternatively, the storage medium may be a ROM 1702, a hard disk contained in the storage section 1708, or the like, in which programs are stored and distributed to users together with devices containing them. the

The invention also proposes a program product storing machine-readable instruction codes. When the instruction code is read and executed by a machine, the above-mentioned method for generating data integrity verification information according to the embodiment of the present invention, or the method for verifying data integrity may be executed. the

Correspondingly, a storage medium for carrying the program product storing the above-mentioned machine-readable instruction codes is also included in the disclosure of the present invention. The storage medium includes, but is not limited to, a floppy disk, an optical disk, a magneto-optical disk, a memory card, a memory stick, and the like. the

In the above description of specific embodiments of the present invention, features described and/or illustrated for one embodiment can be used in one or more other embodiments in the same or similar manner, and features in other embodiments Combination or replacement of features in other embodiments. the

It should be emphasized that the term "comprising/comprising" when used herein refers to the presence of a feature, element, step or component, but does not exclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, elements, steps or components. the

In addition, the methods and processes according to the various embodiments of the present invention are not limited to being executed in the chronological order described in the specification, and may also be executed in other chronological order, in parallel, or independently. Therefore, the execution order of various methods and processes described in this specification does not limit the technical scope of the present invention. the

Although the present invention has been disclosed above by describing specific embodiments of the present invention, it should be understood that all the above-mentioned embodiments and examples are illustrative rather than restrictive. Those skilled in the art can devise various modifications, improvements or equivalents to the present invention within the spirit and scope of the appended claims. These modifications, improvements or equivalents should also be considered to be included in the protection scope of the present invention. the

Claims (33)

1. device that is used to generate the integrity verification information of data comprises:

Hash structure generation unit; The cryptographic hash of the data sementation that it is configured to comprise separately in certain period of time through a plurality of data sources generates and the corresponding Hash structure of said special time period, makes the child node of the bottom that the cryptographic hash of all data sementations represents said Hash structure respectively so that calculate the root cryptographic hash of the root node of said Hash structure;

Public authorization information acquiring unit, it is configured to obtain the public authorization information to said cryptographic hash;

The integrity verification information generating unit; It is configured to the integrity verification information that said a plurality of data source is created on the data sementation that comprises separately in the said certain period of time, wherein the integrity verification information of each data sementation comprise in said public authorization information, the said Hash structure, the cryptographic hash from the cryptographic hash of this data sementation of the child node of representing lowermost layer to the routing information and the node that said path, comprise, relevant with this child node of said root node.

2. device as claimed in claim 1, wherein

Said Hash structure generation unit comprises that the Hash minor structure generates subelement, and it is configured to through following mode is that each data source at least one data sources of said a plurality of data sources generates and the corresponding Hash minor structure of said special time period:

The data sementation of this data source in said special time period is divided into the sub-segmentation of a plurality of data; Cryptographic hash through the sub-segmentation of each data generates said Hash minor structure, makes the child node of the bottom that the cryptographic hash of the sub-segmentation of said each data represents said Hash minor structure so that calculate the sub-root cryptographic hash of the sub-root node of said sub-Hash structure;

Said integrity verification information generating unit is configured to generate secondary integrity verification information respectively to the sub-segmentation of a plurality of data of this data source; Wherein, At the integrity verification of the sub-segmentation of said data is definitely independently under the situation, the secondary integrity verification information of the sub-segmentation of each data comprise in the integrity verification information of the data sementation under the sub-segmentation of these data, the said Hash minor structure, from the cryptographic hash of the child node of the lowermost layer of the cryptographic hash representative of the sub-segmentation of the said data node relevant to the routing information of the sub-root node of said Hash minor structure and the said path with this child node; Perhaps; Under the integrity verification of the sub-segmentation of said data is relatively independent situation; The secondary integrity verification information of the sub-segmentation of each data comprises the integrity verification information of the data sementation under the sub-segmentation of these data, and the cryptographic hash of the sub-segmentation of these data.

3. device as claimed in claim 2, wherein, the Hash structure that said Hash structure generation unit is generated is Hash tree or hash chain, and the Hash minor structure that said Hash minor structure generates the subelement generation is Hash tree or hash chain.

4. device as claimed in claim 3, wherein, the Hash structure that said Hash structure generation unit is generated is a Hash tree, and said Hash structure generation unit comprises:

Hash tree high computational subelement, it is configured to N data segmentation in said special time period, producing for said a plurality of data sources, calculates h=ceil (log ₂N), ceil representes to get and is not less than log ₂The smallest positive integral of N, h represents the height of Hash tree, and N is the natural number greater than 1; And

Hash tree constructor unit, it is configured at log ₂N is under the situation of integer, with said N data segmentation cryptographic hash separately as N leaf node come structure height be h full y-bend Hash tree as with the corresponding Hash tree of said special time period, and, at log ₂N is not under the situation of integer; Coming structure height with said N data segmentation cryptographic hash separately as N leaf node is the virtual full y-bend Hash tree of h; Then for this virtual N leaf node of expiring the cryptographic hash representative of N data segmentation in y-bend Hash tree; Confirm the position of N leaf node in this virtual full y-bend Hash tree successively according to the leaf node order from left to right of this virtual full y-bend Hash tree; Remove unnecessary node in this virtual full y-bend Hash tree according to definite result, obtain thus and the corresponding Hash tree of said special time period.

5. like any described device among the claim 1-4, also comprise the data encapsulation unit, it is configured to:

With said integrity verification information generating unit is that the integrity verification information setting that generates of the data sementation that in said certain period of time, comprises separately of said a plurality of data source is after the data sementation of correspondence, so that form the encapsulation of data with integrity verification information of said a plurality of data sources; And/or

With said integrity verification information generating unit is that the secondary integrity verification information setting that generates of the sub-segmentation of the data that in said certain period of time, comprise separately of said a plurality of data source is after the sub-segmentation of the data of correspondence, so that form the encapsulation of data of the secondary integrity verification information of having of said a plurality of data sources.

6. like any described device among the claim 1-4, also comprise corresponding relation establishment unit, it is configured to:

With said integrity verification information generating unit is the integrity verification information centralized stores that the data sementation that in said certain period of time, comprises separately of said a plurality of data source generates, and creates said integrity verification information and first corresponding relation between the data sementation accordingly; And/or

With said integrity verification information generating unit is the secondary integrity verification information centralized stores that the sub-segmentation of the data that in said certain period of time, comprise separately of said a plurality of data source generates, and creates second corresponding relation between said secondary integrity verification information and the sub-segmentation of data accordingly.

7. like each described device among the claim 1-4, wherein, said public authorization information acquiring unit obtains the public authorization information to said cryptographic hash through at least a operation in carrying out as follows:

Be the timestamp of said cryptographic hash request through authentication, with the root cryptographic hash of having added a cover said timestamp as said public authorization information;

Through predetermined encryption key said cryptographic hash and check information are encrypted, root cryptographic hash and the check information that will pass through encryption are as said public authorization information; And

Secret private key through predetermined is signed to said cryptographic hash, and the root cryptographic hash that will pass through signature is as said public authorization information.

8. like each described device among the claim 1-4, wherein, each data source in said a plurality of data sources is a video camera apparatus, and said data are the data from said a plurality of video camera apparatus.

9. video camera apparatus, it has the device like the integrity verification information of each described generation data among the claim 1-8.

10. one kind for data provide the system of integrity protection, comprising:

A plurality of data sources, said a plurality of data sources are divided in first to the Z level Hash zone, and wherein, L level Hash zone comprises M in said first to the Z level Hash zone _LIndividual Hash structure, L=1 ...; Z, and wherein each Hash structure all comprises a management data source, each said management data source all has the device like the integrity verification information of each described generation data among the claim 1-8; Wherein Z is the integer more than or equal to 2, M _LIt is integer more than or equal to 1;

For each the Hash structure in the K level Hash zone; The cryptographic hash of the data sementation that the management data source of this Hash structure is configured to himself and the data source of being managed thereof are comprised in special time period generates this Hash structure as the child node of the bottom respectively; Perhaps; The root node value of at least one corresponding Hash structure generates this Hash structure as the child node of the bottom respectively in the cryptographic hash of the data sementation that the management data source of this Hash structure is configured to himself is comprised in special time period and the K-1 level Hash zone, and wherein K is more than or equal to 1 and smaller or equal to the integer of Z;

Root node value based on each Hash structure in the said Z level Hash zone generates final root cryptographic hash; And preassigned highest management data source is configured to obtain the public authorization information to said final root cryptographic hash in the management data source that comprises in the said Z level Hash zone; And

Said highest management data source is configured to the child node generation integrity verification information of the bottom in each Hash structure in said Z level Hash zone, corresponding with data source, and this integrity verification information comprises said public authorization information, cryptographic hash in said Z level Hash zone, the routing information from said child node to said final root node and the node relevant with said child node that said path, comprise; And

For each the Hash structure the Q level Hash zone among from the first order to Z-1 level Hash zone; The child node that management data source in this Hash structure is configured to other bottoms in this Hash structure, corresponding with data source generates integrity verification information; This integrity verification information comprises the integrity verification information, the routing information from said child node to said root node in said Q level Hash zone of the root node of this Hash structure and the cryptographic hash of the node relevant with this child node on this path; Wherein, The root node of this Hash structure is as the child node of the lowermost layer of corresponding Hash structure in the Q+1 level Hash zone; Its integrity verification information is that the management data source through corresponding Hash structure described in the Q+1 level Hash zone generates, and wherein Q is more than or equal to 1 and smaller or equal to the integer of Z-1.

11. system as claimed in claim 10, wherein, each the Hash structure that comprises in said first to the Z level Hash zone is Hash tree or hash chain.

12. a method that generates the integrity verification information of data comprises:

The Hash structure generates step; The cryptographic hash of the data sementation that it comprises a plurality of data sources in certain period of time separately generates and the corresponding Hash structure of said special time period as the child node of the bottom, and the child node of the lowermost layer through said Hash structure is calculated the root cryptographic hash of the root node of said Hash structure;

Public authorization information obtaining step, it obtains the public authorization information to said cryptographic hash; With

Integrity verification information generates step; Each data sementation in its data sementation that in said certain period of time, comprises separately to said a plurality of data sources generates the integrity verification information of this data sementation based on following information: in said public authorization information, the said Hash structure, the cryptographic hash from the cryptographic hash of this data sementation of the child node of representing lowermost layer to the routing information and the node that said path, comprise, relevant with this child node of said root node.

13. method as claimed in claim 12; Wherein, Said Hash structure generates step and comprises that the Hash minor structure generates substep, and it is that each data source at least one data sources of said a plurality of data sources generates and the corresponding Hash minor structure of said special time period through following mode:

The data sementation of this data source in said special time period is divided into the sub-segmentation of a plurality of data; The cryptographic hash of the sub-segmentation of each data is generated said Hash minor structure as the child node of the bottom of said Hash minor structure, and the child node of the lowermost layer through said Hash minor structure is calculated the sub-root cryptographic hash of the sub-root node of said sub-Hash structure;

Said integrity verification information generates a plurality of data sub-segmentation of step to this data source; Wherein, At the integrity verification of the sub-segmentation of said data is definitely independently under the situation, comes to generate respectively the secondary integrity verification information of the sub-segmentation of each data based on following information: in the integrity verification information of the data sementation under the sub-segmentation of these data, the said Hash minor structure, the cryptographic hash of the node relevant the routing information from the child node of the lowermost layer of the cryptographic hash representative of the sub-segmentation of these data to the sub-root node of said Hash minor structure and the said path with this child node; Perhaps; Under the integrity verification of the sub-segmentation of said data is relatively independent situation; Come to generate respectively the secondary integrity verification information of the sub-segmentation of each data based on following information: the integrity verification information of the data sementation under the sub-segmentation of these data, and the cryptographic hash of the sub-segmentation of these data.

14. method as claimed in claim 13, wherein, it is Hash tree or hash chain that said Hash structure generates the Hash structure that step generated, and the Hash minor structure that said Hash minor structure generates the substep generation is Hash tree or hash chain.

15. method as claimed in claim 14, wherein, it is Hash tree that said Hash structure generates the Hash structure that step generated, and said Hash structure generation step comprises:

Hash tree high computational substep, h=ceil (log is calculated in N the data segmentation that it produces in said special time period for said a plurality of data sources ₂N), ceil representes to get and is not less than log ₂The smallest positive integral of N, h represents the height of Hash tree, and N is big 1 natural number; And

Hash tree constructor step is at log ₂N is under the situation of integer, with said N data segmentation cryptographic hash separately as N leaf node come structure height be h full y-bend Hash tree as with the corresponding Hash tree of said special time period, and, at log ₂N is not under the situation of integer; Coming structure height with said N data segmentation cryptographic hash separately as N leaf node is the virtual full y-bend Hash tree of h; Then for this virtual N leaf node of expiring the cryptographic hash representative of N data segmentation in y-bend Hash tree; Confirm the position of N leaf node in this virtual full y-bend Hash tree successively according to the leaf node order from left to right of this virtual full y-bend Hash tree; Remove unnecessary node in this virtual full y-bend Hash tree according to definite result, obtain thus and the corresponding Hash tree of said special time period.

16. like any described method among the claim 12-15, also comprise the data encapsulation step, be used for:

It is that the integrity verification information setting that generates of data sementation that said a plurality of data source comprises in said certain period of time separately is after the data sementation of correspondence, so that form the encapsulation of data with integrity verification information of said a plurality of data sources that said integrity verification information is generated step; And/or

It is that the secondary integrity verification information setting that generates of the sub-segmentation of data that said a plurality of data source comprises in said certain period of time separately is after the sub-segmentation of the data of correspondence, so that form the encapsulation of data of the secondary integrity verification information of having of said a plurality of data sources that said integrity verification information is generated step.

17. like any described method among the claim 12-15, also comprise the corresponding relation foundation step, be used for:

It is the integrity verification information centralized stores that data sementation that said a plurality of data source comprises in said certain period of time separately generates that said integrity verification information is generated step, and creates said integrity verification information and first corresponding relation between the data sementation accordingly; And/or

It is the secondary integrity verification information centralized stores that the sub-segmentation of data that said a plurality of data source comprises in said certain period of time separately generates that said integrity verification information is generated step, and creates second corresponding relation between said secondary integrity verification information and the sub-segmentation of data accordingly.

18. like each described method among the claim 12-15, wherein, said public authorization information obtaining step obtains the public authorization information to said cryptographic hash through at least a operation in carrying out as follows:

Be the timestamp of said cryptographic hash request through authentication, with the root cryptographic hash of adding a cover said timestamp as said public authorization information;

Through predetermined encryption key said cryptographic hash and check information are encrypted, root cryptographic hash and the check information that will pass through encryption are as said public authorization information; And

Secret private key through predetermined comes said cryptographic hash signed, and the root cryptographic hash that will pass through signature is as said public authorization information.

19. like each described method among the claim 12-15, wherein, each data source in said a plurality of data sources is a video camera apparatus, said data are the data from said a plurality of video camera apparatus.

20. the device that the integrality of data is verified comprises:

Public authorization information authentication unit, its public authorization information that is configured to comprise in the integrity verification information that data sementation had of corresponding data source in special time period to a plurality of data sources is verified; And

The integrity verification unit; The root cryptographic hash that comprises in root cryptographic hash that it is configured to the cryptographic hash according to the integrity verification information that data sementation had of corresponding data source and said data sementation is calculated and the said integrity verification information compares; And the checking of said comparative result and said public authorization information authentication unit as a result the both be under the positive situation, confirm that said data sementation is complete;

Wherein, The integrity verification information of said data sementation comprise said public authorization information, with the corresponding Hash structure of said special time period in, cryptographic hash from the child node of the lowermost layer of the cryptographic hash of this data sementation representative to the routing information and the node that said path, comprise, relevant with this child node of said root node; On behalf of the child node of lowermost layer, wherein said and the corresponding Hash structure of special time period generate through the cryptographic hash of the data sementation that makes said a plurality of data source and in said special time period, comprise separately, and said cryptographic hash is the cryptographic hash of the root node of said Hash structure.

21. device as claimed in claim 20; Wherein, Said integrity verification unit is configured to through following mode, and the integrity verification information that comprises in the data sementation according to corresponding data source and the cryptographic hash of said data sementation are calculated the root cryptographic hash:

According to the cryptographic hash of the said relevant node that comprises in the said integrity verification information and the path of said routing information indication, through the cryptographic hash of said interdependent node is combined to obtain in twos the root cryptographic hash of said calculating along said path.

22. device as claimed in claim 20, wherein

For each data source of at least one data source in said a plurality of data sources, under following situation:

The data sementation of this data source in said special time period is divided into the sub-segmentation of a plurality of data; Represent the child node of lowermost layer to generate the Hash minor structure corresponding through the cryptographic hash that makes the sub-segmentation of each data with said special time period; Wherein the sub-segmentation of each data has been assigned with secondary integrity verification information, said secondary integrity verification information comprise in the integrity verification information of the data sementation under the sub-segmentation of said data, the said Hash minor structure, from the child node of the lowermost layer of the cryptographic hash representative of the sub-segmentation of said data to the routing information of the sub-root node of said Hash minor structure and said path the cryptographic hash of the node relevant with said child node;

The public authorization information that comprises in the secondary integrity verification information of the corresponding sub-segmentation of data in the sub-segmentation of said a plurality of data that said public authorization information authentication unit is configured to said data source is comprised in said special time period is verified;

Said integrity verification unit is configured to through following mode the integrality of the sub-segmentation of corresponding data verified:

The root cryptographic hash that comprises in root cryptographic hash that the secondary integrity verification information that will be had according to the sub-segmentation of corresponding data and the cryptographic hash of the sub-segmentation of these corresponding data calculate and the said integrity verification information compares; The checking of said comparative result and said public authorization information authentication unit as a result the both be that the sub-segmentation of corresponding data is complete under the positive situation.

23. like each described device among the claim 20-22, wherein, said Hash structure is Hash tree or hash chain, and said Hash minor structure is Hash tree or hash chain.

24. like any described device among the claim 20-22, wherein, said public authorization information authentication unit and said integrity verification unit are configured to:

From the encapsulation of data of the special time period of corresponding data source, obtain integrity verification information so that carry out integrity verification; Wherein, said encapsulation of data is through the integrity verification information setting relevant with the data sementation that corresponding data source comprises in said certain period of time separately formed after corresponding data sementation; And/or

From the encapsulation of data of the special time period of corresponding data source, obtain secondary integrity verification information so that carry out integrity verification; Wherein, form after the sub-segmentation of corresponding data with the relevant secondary integrity verification information setting of the sub-segmentation of data that corresponding data source comprises in said certain period of time separately.

25. like any described device among the claim 20-22, wherein, said public authorization information authentication unit and said integrity verification unit are configured to:

Obtain integrity verification information and said integrity verification information and first corresponding relation between the corresponding data sementation of the centralized stores of said data sementation, so as when corresponding data sementation to be carried out integrity verification through said first corresponding relation acquisition integrity verification information relevant with this data sementation; And/or

Obtain secondary integrity verification information and said secondary integrity verification information and second corresponding relation between the corresponding sub-segmentation of data of the centralized stores of the sub-segmentation of said data, so as when integrity verification to be carried out in sub-segmentation to corresponding data through the said second corresponding relation acquisition secondary integrity verification information relevant with the sub-segmentation of these data.

26. like any described device among the claim 20-22, wherein, said public authorization information authentication unit is configured to carry out in the following operation any one and comes said public authorization information is verified:

Under the situation of root cryptographic hash as public authorization information of the timestamp of having added a cover the process authentication; Said public authorization information authentication unit is verified integrity verification information or the timestamp information in the secondary integrity verification information that the data sementation or the sub-segmentation of data of integrality to be verified had when carrying out integrity verification with respect to disclosed certificate of timestamp service centre; If checking is passed through; The checking result who then confirms public authorization information is positive, and recovers the root cryptographic hash that comprises in the said public authorization information;

Under the root cryptographic hash and the situation of check information of having carried out through predetermined encryption key encrypting as public authorization information; Said public authorization information authentication unit is when carrying out integrity verification; Through utilizing said encryption key and said check information to come integrity verification information that data sementation or the sub-segmentation of data to integrality to be verified had or the public authorization information in the secondary integrity verification information to verify; If checking is passed through; The checking result who then confirms public authorization information is positive, and recovers the root cryptographic hash that comprises in the said public authorization information; And

Under the situation of root cryptographic hash as public authorization information of having carried out through predetermined secret private key signing; Said public authorization information authentication unit comes integrity verification information that data sementation or the sub-segmentation of data to integrality to be verified had or the public authorization information in the secondary integrity verification information to verify through the public key certificate corresponding with said secret private key when carrying out integrity verification; If checking is passed through; The checking result who then confirms public authorization information is positive, and recovers the root cryptographic hash that comprises in the said public authorization information.

27. the method that the integrality of data is verified comprises:

Public authorization information verification step, the public authorization information that comprises in the integrity verification information that data sementation had of corresponding data source in special time period to a plurality of data sources is verified;

Comparison step, the root cryptographic hash that comprises in root cryptographic hash that will calculate according to the cryptographic hash of the integrity verification information that data sementation had of corresponding data source and said data sementation and the said integrity verification information compares; And

Integrality is confirmed step; If the root cryptographic hash that comprises in the root cryptographic hash that the comparative result of said comparison step shows said calculating and the said integrity verification information is consistent; And the checking result of said public authorization information verification step is positive, confirms that then said data sementation is complete

Wherein, The integrity verification information of said data sementation comprise said public authorization information, with the corresponding Hash structure of said special time period in, cryptographic hash from the child node of the lowermost layer of the cryptographic hash of this data sementation representative to the routing information and the node that said path, comprise, relevant with said child node of said root node; On behalf of the child node of lowermost layer, wherein said and the corresponding Hash structure of special time period generate through the cryptographic hash of the data sementation that makes said a plurality of data source and in said special time period, comprise separately, and said cryptographic hash calculated through said Hash structure.

28. method as claimed in claim 27, wherein, said comparison step comprises that through following mode the integrity verification information that comprises in the data sementation according to corresponding data source and the cryptographic hash of said data sementation are calculated the root cryptographic hash:

According to the cryptographic hash of the said interdependent node that comprises in the said integrity verification information and the path of said routing information indication, through the cryptographic hash of said interdependent node is combined to obtain in twos the root cryptographic hash of said calculating along said path.

29. method as claimed in claim 27, wherein

For each data source of at least one data source in said a plurality of data sources, under following situation:

The data sementation of this data source in said special time period is divided into the sub-segmentation of a plurality of data; Represent the child node of lowermost layer to generate the Hash minor structure corresponding through the cryptographic hash that makes the sub-segmentation of each data with said special time period; Wherein the sub-segmentation of each data has been assigned with secondary integrity verification information, said secondary integrity verification information comprise in the integrity verification information of the data sementation under the sub-segmentation of said data, the said Hash minor structure, from the child node of the lowermost layer of the cryptographic hash representative of the sub-segmentation of said data to the routing information of the sub-root node of said Hash minor structure and said path the cryptographic hash of the node relevant with said child node;

Said public authorization information verification step comprises in the sub-segmentation of said a plurality of data that said data source is comprised that the public authorization information that comprises in the secondary integrity verification information of the corresponding sub-segmentation of data verifies in said special time period;

Said comparison step comprises: the root cryptographic hash that comprises in root cryptographic hash that will calculate according to the cryptographic hash of secondary integrity verification information that is had in the sub-segmentation of corresponding data and the sub-segmentation of these corresponding data and the said integrity verification information compares; And

Said integrality confirms that checking result that result that step is included in said comparison step shows the consistent and said public authorization information verification step of the root cryptographic hash that comprises in the root cryptographic hash that calculates and the said integrity verification information under the positive situation, confirms that the sub-segmentation of corresponding data is complete.

30. like each described method among the claim 27-29, wherein, said Hash structure is Hash tree or hash chain, and said Hash minor structure is Hash tree or hash chain.

31. like any described method among the claim 27-29, wherein, said public authorization information verification step and said comparison step comprise:

From the encapsulation of data of the special time period of corresponding data source, obtain integrity verification information to carry out integrity verification; Wherein, The relevant integrity verification information setting of the data sementation that in said certain period of time, comprises separately with corresponding data source is after corresponding data sementation, so that form the encapsulation of data with integrity verification information of corresponding data source; And/or

From the encapsulation of data of the special time period of corresponding data source, obtain secondary integrity verification information to carry out integrity verification; Wherein, The relevant secondary integrity verification information setting of the sub-segmentation of data that in said certain period of time, comprises separately with corresponding data source is after the sub-segmentation of corresponding data, so that form the encapsulation of data of the secondary integrity verification information of having of corresponding data source.

32. like any described method among the claim 27-29, wherein, said public authorization information verification step and said comparison step comprise:

Obtain integrity verification information and said integrity verification information and first corresponding relation between the corresponding data sementation of the centralized stores of said data sementation, so as when corresponding data sementation to be carried out integrity verification through said first corresponding relation acquisition integrity verification information relevant with this data sementation; And/or

Obtain secondary integrity verification information and said secondary integrity verification information and second corresponding relation between the corresponding sub-segmentation of data of the centralized stores of the sub-segmentation of said data, so as when integrity verification to be carried out in sub-segmentation to corresponding data through the said second corresponding relation acquisition secondary integrity verification information relevant with the sub-segmentation of these data.

33. like any described method among the claim 27-29, wherein, said public authorization information verification step comprises that carrying out in the following operation any one comes said public authorization information is verified:

Under the situation of root cryptographic hash as public authorization information of the timestamp of having added a cover the process authentication; Said public authorization information verification step is verified integrity verification information or the timestamp information in the secondary integrity verification information that the data sementation or the sub-segmentation of data of integrality to be verified had when carrying out integrity verification with respect to disclosed certificate of timestamp service centre; If checking is passed through; The checking result who then confirms public authorization information is positive, and recovers the root cryptographic hash that comprises in the said public authorization information;

Under the root cryptographic hash and the situation of check information of having carried out through predetermined encryption key encrypting as public authorization information; Said public authorization information verification step is when carrying out integrity verification; Through utilizing said encryption key and said check information to come integrity verification information that data sementation or the sub-segmentation of data to integrality to be verified had or the public authorization information in the secondary integrity verification information to verify; If checking is passed through; The checking result who then confirms public authorization information is positive, and recovers the root cryptographic hash that comprises in the said public authorization information; And

Under the situation of root cryptographic hash as public authorization information of having carried out through predetermined secret private key signing; Said public authorization information verification step comes integrity verification information that data sementation or the sub-segmentation of data to integrality to be verified had or the public authorization information in the secondary integrity verification information to verify through the public key certificate corresponding with said secret private key when carrying out integrity verification; If checking is passed through; The checking result who then confirms public authorization information is positive, and recovers the root cryptographic hash that comprises in the said public authorization information.

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