CN101923875A - Method for controlling Java security of Blu-ray disc, audio-visual playing device and control circuit - Google Patents

Abstract

The invention relates to a method for controlling Java security of a Blu-ray disc, an audio-visual playing device and a control circuit. A method for controlling Java security of a Blu-ray disc, comprising: verifying a Java archive manifest file by utilizing at least one signature file; At least one signature file is verified corresponding to at least one signature block file of the at least one signature file. The above-mentioned method for controlling the Java security of the Blu-ray disc, the audio-visual playing device and the control circuit can effectively control the Java security of the Blu-ray disc.

Description

Method for controlling Java security of Blu-ray disc, audio-visual playing device and control circuit

technical field

The present invention is related to Blu-ray Disc (Blu-ray Disc, BD), and in particular to a method for controlling the security of Blu-ray Disc Java (BD-Java, BD-J), related audio-visual playback device and its control circuit .

Background technique

Blu-ray Disc Java (ie "Blu-ray Disc Java programming language") can be regarded as a platform supporting advanced content for Blu-ray Discs. In order to facilitate a comprehensive understanding, the background of Java on Blu-ray discs is first explained as follows.

Blu-ray disc Java is designed based on a concept of Globally Executable Multimedia Home Platform (Globally Executable Multimedia Home Platform, Globally Executable MHP, GEM). The global executable multimedia home platform described above has almost become the basis of most global digital TV application standards, such as: multimedia home platform (Multimedia Home Platform, MHP), open cable application platform (OpenCableTM Application Platform, OCAPTM), and the Advanced Common Application Platform (ACAP) for US broadcasting. In general, the standards based on the global executable multimedia home platform are all based on the Java programming language technology of Sun Microsystems, so a high degree of content interoperability (Interoperability) can be achieved between these standards. For example: it is feasible that Blu-ray Disc content features are used for video on demand; and for example, it is also feasible that certain types of interactive television content are repackaged for use on Blu-ray Disc.

Because of the interoperability of the above-mentioned content, the security mechanism is very important. The security mechanism of Blu-ray Disc Java is designed based on the security mechanism model of the Java programming language platform. According to the security mechanism of Java on the Blu-ray Disc, in the Java archive (JavaArchive, JAR) file, the signed application can perform more work than the unsigned application; for example: read/write to the local storage device Access actions such as writing, network access, selection of certain titles on a Blu-ray Disc read-only memory (BD Read-Only Memory, BD-ROM) disc, and other Blu-ray Discs being executed Application control.

Due to the existing format limited by the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) in order to meet the widely used standards, the prior art controls the Java security performance of the Blu-ray Disc too loosely, so that the processing performance is reduced in some cases. Therefore, a novel and efficient approach is needed for the control of Java security on Blu-ray discs.

Contents of the invention

In order to solve the above-mentioned problem that the performance control of Java security of Blu-ray discs is too loose, so that the processing performance drops under certain conditions, the present invention provides a method for controlling Java security of Blu-ray discs, an audio-visual playback device and a control circuit, which can Effectively control Java security on Blu-ray discs.

A method for controlling Java security of a Blu-ray disc, comprising: verifying a Java archive manifest file by utilizing at least one signature file; At least one signature file is verified on at least one signature block file of the at least one signature file.

An audio-visual playing device includes a storage module or a portable storage medium loading module, and a controller. The portable storage medium loading module is used for loading portable storage medium. The controller is used to control the Java security of the Blu-ray Disc for the storage module or the portable storage medium, wherein the controller verifies a Java file manifest file by using at least one signature file, and verifies the operation of the Java file manifest file by using at least one signature file After completion, the controller verifies the at least one signature file by utilizing at least one signature block file corresponding to the at least one signature file.

A control circuit is used in an audio-visual playing device. The control circuit includes a controller and program code. The program code is built in the controller or read from outside the controller, and is used for the controller to execute to control the Java security of the Blu-ray disc; wherein the controller executing the program code verifies the Java archive manifest file by using at least one signature file, And after the operation of verifying the Java archive manifest file by using the at least one signature file is completed, the controller verifies the at least one signature file by using at least one signature block file corresponding to the at least one signature file.

The above-mentioned method for controlling the Java security of a Blu-ray disc, the audio-visual playing device and the control circuit verify the Java file list file by using at least one signature file, and after the operation of verifying the Java file list file by using at least one signature file, pass The at least one signature file is verified by using at least one signature block file corresponding to the at least one signature file, thereby effectively controlling the Java security of the Blu-ray disc.

Description of drawings

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an audio-video player according to a first embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 2 is a flowchart of a method for controlling Java security of a Blu-ray disc according to an embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a verification chain involved in the method shown in FIG. 2 .

FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of an audio-video player according to a second embodiment of the present invention.

Detailed ways

Please refer to FIG. 1. FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an audio-visual playback device 100 according to a first embodiment of the present invention, wherein the audio-visual playback device 100 of this embodiment can be used as a Blu-ray Disc (Blu-ray Disc, BD) player. The audio-video playback device 100 includes: a storage module 110 , a portable storage medium loading module 120 , a controller 130 , and a memory 140 . The portable storage medium loading module 120 is used for loading the portable storage medium. The memory 140 is, for example, a nonvolatile memory.

In this embodiment, the storage module 110 can be implemented as a hard disk drive (Hard Disk Drive, HDD), and the portable storage medium loading module 120 can be implemented as a Blu-ray disc loading module for loading Blu-ray discs. However, this is for the purpose of illustration only and not limitation of the present invention. According to a variation of this embodiment, the portable storage medium loading module 120 can be implemented as a card reader module for loading at least one memory card (such as a Security Digital Card). Such changes are not limitations of the invention.

According to this embodiment, the controller 130 is a Micro Control Unit (MCU), which executes a program code 140C read from the memory 140 . However, this is for the purpose of illustration only and not limitation of the present invention. According to a variation of this embodiment, the controller 130 is a hardware controller, wherein the program code 140C is built in the hardware controller. That is to say, whether a program code such as the above-mentioned program code 140C is stored in the memory may vary according to different variant implementations of the present embodiment; such changes are not limitations of the present invention. For example: in another variant implementation of this embodiment, the audio-visual playback device 100 can be a portable audio-visual playback device, and the processing circuit (such as the portable storage medium loading module 120) can be implemented as a micro processing unit (Micro Processing Unit, MPU), where program codes such as software codes can be pre-stored in the portable video player or downloaded from a server (Server) or the Internet (Internet).

The controller 130 of this embodiment can control the operation of the storage module 110 and the portable storage medium loading module 120 to store/read data, and can perform decoding to achieve the basic operation of the video and audio reproduction device. However, this is for the purpose of illustration only and not limitation of the present invention. According to a variation of this embodiment, the display module and the digital tuner can be integrated into the audio-visual playback device 100, thus forming a multifunctional digital TV; such variation is not a limitation of the present invention.

Please note that whether a video processing module is required to perform operations such as decoding and image processing may vary according to different variations of this embodiment; such variations are not limitations of the present invention. In addition, whether it is necessary to set an On Screen Display (OSD) processing circuit to process the decoded video content that is expected to be displayed can also be changed according to different implementation modes of this embodiment; such changes are not a limitation of the present invention limit.

The controller 130 in this embodiment can not only decode and control the operation of storing/reading data of the above-mentioned storage module 110 and the portable storage medium loading module 120, but also can control the Java security of the Blu-ray disc for the storage module 110 or the portable storage medium. In this embodiment, the controller 130 (for example: the micro control unit executing the program code 140C) can verify the Java Archive Manifest File (JARManifest File) by using at least one signature file (Signature File). In addition, after the operation of verifying the Java archive manifest file by using at least one signature file is completed, the controller 130 (for example, the above-mentioned micro control unit executing the program code 140C) by using at least one signature block file corresponding to the at least one signature file ( Signature Block File) to verify at least one signature file.

According to this embodiment, the user operation interface of the video player 100 includes a remote control 180 , wherein the remote control 180 communicates with the controller 130 through the remote control interface unit 170 (such as a receiver). In addition, the user operation interface of the audio-visual playback device 100 further includes some on-screen menus that can be displayed through the display interface, so that the user can perform various adjustment/setting operations. In this embodiment, the user can select through the buttons on the remote control 180 to trigger operations such as storing/reading data of the storage module 110 and the portable storage medium loading module 120, and the controller 130 can selectively The above Java security control for the Blu-ray Disc is performed on the content stored in the storage module 110 or the portable storage medium. In addition, the user operation interface of the audio-visual player 100 can also provide the user with the option to operate only according to the traditional Java security mechanism of the Blu-ray disc, or activate the above-mentioned control on the Java security of the Blu-ray disc to enhance the performance of the Java security mechanism of the Blu-ray disc.

The Java security control of the Blu-ray disc in this embodiment can improve the efficiency of the Java security mechanism of the Blu-ray disc, and while providing a novel and efficient security mechanism, it will not cause incompatibility of processed files or data. Further description will be made below with reference to FIG. 2 .

FIG. 2 is a flowchart of a method 910 for controlling Java security of a Blu-ray disc according to an embodiment of the present invention. The method 910 can be applied to the audio-video playback device 100 shown in FIG. 1 , especially the controller 130 shown in FIG. 1 (such as the above-mentioned micro control unit executing the program code 140C). In addition, the method 910 can be implemented by using the audio-visual playing device 100 , especially by using the controller 130 shown in FIG. 1 (such as the above-mentioned micro control unit executing the program code 140C). Thus, the method 910 can be described as follows according to the first embodiment:

Step 912: The controller 130 (for example: the MCU executing the program code 140C) verifies the Java archive manifest file by using at least one signature file. A more common situation in practice is that at least one signature file contains multiple signature files, for example: multiple signature files SF(0), SF(1), SF(2), .. ., SF(99). In this way, the controller 130 (for example: the above-mentioned micro control unit executing the program code 140C) uses the signature files SF(0), SF(1), SF(2), . . . , SF(99) in this step to Validate the Java archive manifest file.

Step 914: The controller 130 verifies at least one signature file by using at least one signature block file (Signature Block File) corresponding to the at least one signature file after the operation of the Java archive manifest file is verified by using the at least one signature file. As mentioned above, the more common situation encountered in practice is that at least one signature file contains multiple signature files, such as the multiple signature files SF(0), SF(1), SF(2) shown in Figure 3 ), ..., SF (99); so, by utilizing the signature files SF (0), SF (1), SF (2), ..., SF (99) to verify that the operation of the Java file manifest file is completed Afterwards, the controller 130 (for example: the above-mentioned micro-control unit executing the program code 140C) in this step by using the signature files corresponding to SF(0), SF(1), SF(2), . . . , SF( 99), a plurality of signature block files shown in Figure 3 such as SBF (0), SBF (1), SBF (2), ..., SBF (99), to verify the signature file SF ( 0), SF(1), SF(2), ..., SF(99).

FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a verification chain involved in the method shown in FIG. 2 . As shown in Figure 3, each verification chain passed between the bottommost authentication class file (Authenticated Class File) and the topmost root certificate (Root Certificate) is represented by a dotted line in this embodiment, where the arrow points upward Indicates that the object below is checked by the object above. Since the number of Java file list files used in the verification process in the Java security mechanism of the Blu-ray Disc is single, the verification process from the bottom authentication category file to the top root certificate in Figure 3 Chains all go through a single Java archive manifest file. Therefore, once a single Java file list file or signature file SF(0), SF(1), SF(2), ..., SF(99) has any error or inapplicable situation, the verification in step 912 With the advantage that the verification operation is generally performed before the verification operation in step 914, the controller 130 of this embodiment can quickly find out and take contingency steps.

According to this embodiment, once the controller 130 judges that there is any error or inapplicable case, then terminate/avoid the operation of verifying the Java archive manifest file by using the specific signature file and the operation of verifying the specific signature file by using the specific signature block file corresponding to the specific signature file.

In addition, once the controller 130 judges that there is any error or inapplicability in the Java archive manifest file, it terminates/avoids the execution by using multiple signature files SF(0), SF(1), SF(2), . . . SF(99) to verify the operation of the Java archive manifest file and by utilizing a plurality of signature block files corresponding to a plurality of signature files SF(0), SF(1), SF(2), . . . , SF(99) SBF(0), SBF(1), SBF(2), ..., SBF(99) to verify multiple signature files SF(0), SF(1), SF(2), ..., SF( 99) operation.

In this embodiment, the controller 130 can improve the efficiency of the Java security mechanism of the Blu-ray disc through the above-mentioned control of the Java security of the Blu-ray disc, and while providing a novel and efficient security mechanism, it will not cause the file being processed or data incompatibility.

According to the variant implementation of this embodiment, once the operation of the Java file manifest file has been verified several times by using multiple signature files, the controller 130 may first assume that the Java file manifest file is wrong, It is possible to selectively omit the verification of all the verification chains, wherein the program code 140C executed by the controller 130 can be modified and set in advance, so that the controller 130 can directly omit all the verification chains in this situation. Check chain verification.

Of course, although the above-mentioned setting is highly efficient in operation, it still has risks; in case the controller 130 first assumes that "this Java file list file is wrong" is an erroneous assumption (that is to say, this Java file list file The file is actually fine, but the multiple signature files in the operation that failed the verification are actually wrong or inapplicable), then the above-mentioned wrong assumption will cause the controller 130 to make a misjudgment. According to another variation of this embodiment, in order to avoid misjudgment caused by the above-mentioned erroneous assumptions, the program code 140C executed by the controller 130 can be modified and set in advance, so that the controller 130 can spot-check in this situation A plurality of suspicious signature files in the operation of verification failure; then, the controller 130 verifies the plurality of suspicious signature files by using a plurality of signature block files corresponding to the plurality of suspicious signature files respectively, so as to avoid The above erroneous assumptions cause the controller 130 to misjudge.

According to another variation of this embodiment, in order to avoid misjudgment caused by the above-mentioned erroneous assumptions, the program code 140C executed by the controller 130 can be modified in advance so that the controller 130 can check Each signature file in the operation that fails to verify, wherein each signature file in the operation that fails to verify is all listed as a suspicious signature file; then, the controller 130 uses a plurality of signature files corresponding to the plurality of suspicious signature files. Signature block files are used to verify the multiple suspicious signature files, so as to avoid misjudgment by the controller 130 due to the above-mentioned wrong assumptions.

According to another variant implementation of this embodiment, once the operation of the Java file manifest file has been verified several times by using multiple signature files, the controller 130 can first assume that the Java file manifest file is correct. Thereafter, once there is any verification failure in the operation of verifying the Java archive manifest file by utilizing multiple signature files, since the number of Java archive manifest files in the Blu-ray Disc Java security mechanism is single, the controller 130 can immediately judge multiple signatures which signature files among the files are not applicable, and avoid verifying the non-applicable signature file(s) by using the signature block file corresponding to the non-applicable signature file(s). Therefore, the present invention can save time wasted due to any error or inapplicability of the plurality of signature files.

It should be noted that even if the controller 130 first assumes that "this Java file manifest file is correct" is a wrong assumption (that is to say, this Java file manifest file may be wrong or inapplicable), then it is different from the traditional Compared with other methods, in this situation, this embodiment still has a great opportunity to contribute to the performance improvement of the Java security control of the entire Blu-ray disc. Since the single Java file list file is located at the lower layer of each verification chain, it should be verified by the upper layer. Therefore, in the worst case, the performance of this embodiment is not as good as that of the traditional method. Improvement, but not performance degradation.

Please refer to FIG. 4 . FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of an audio-visual playing device 200 according to a second embodiment of the present invention, wherein the second embodiment is a modified embodiment of the first embodiment. Differences between the second embodiment and the first embodiment are explained below.

As shown in FIG. 4 , the audio-video playback device 200 includes a control circuit 205, and the control circuit 205 includes a controller 230 and a program code 240C, wherein the controller 230 in this embodiment is a hardware controller (such as the above-mentioned hardware controller), used for Instead of the above-mentioned controller 130 , the program code 240C is built in the controller 230 . According to this embodiment, the control circuit 205 is a control chip. In addition, the program code 240C is a modified version of the above-mentioned program code 140C, so that the controller 230 performs corresponding control in response to the above-mentioned structural changes. The similarities between this implementation manner and the foregoing implementation manners/variant implementation manners will not be repeated here.

According to a variation of the second embodiment, the program code executed by the controller 230 in the control circuit 205 is read from outside the controller 230 . For example, the program code executed by the controller 230 is read from the built-in memory in the control circuit 205 . For another example, the program code executed by the controller 230 is read from an external memory other than the control circuit 205 . The similarities between this implementation manner and the foregoing implementation manners/variant implementation manners will not be repeated here.

According to another variation of the second embodiment, part of the program code executed by the controller 230 in the control circuit 205 is built in the controller 230, and another part of the program code executed by the controller 230 is read from outside the controller 230. For example, the other part is read from a built-in memory in the control circuit 205 . For another example, another part is read from an external memory other than the control circuit 205 . The similarities between this implementation manner and the foregoing implementation manners/variant implementation manners will not be repeated here.

The above descriptions are only preferred embodiments of the present invention, and all equivalent changes and modifications made according to the claims of the present invention shall fall within the scope of the present invention.

Claims (10)

1. A method for controlling the Java security of a Blu-ray disc, comprising: verifying the Java archive manifest file by utilizing at least one signature file; and After verifying the Java archive manifest file by using the at least one signature file, verifying the at least one signature file by using at least one signature block file corresponding to the at least one signature file. 2. The method for controlling the Java security of a Blu-ray disc as claimed in claim 1, wherein the at least one signature file includes a plurality of signature files; and verifying the Java file list by utilizing the at least one signature file The step of verifying the at least one signature file by utilizing at least one signature block file corresponding to the at least one signature file after the operation of the file is completed further includes: After verifying the operation of the Java archive manifest file by using the plurality of signature files, verifying the plurality of signature files by using a plurality of signature block files corresponding to the plurality of signature files respectively. 3. the method for controlling the Java security of Blu-ray discs as claimed in claim 2, characterized in that, the method for controlling the Java security of Blu-ray discs additionally includes: Once it is judged that there is any error or inapplicability in the specific signature file in the plurality of signature files, then terminate and/or avoid the operation of verifying the Java archive manifest file by using the specific signature file and by using the specific signature file corresponding to the specific signature file. A specific signature block file of a signature file to verify the operation of that specific signature file. 4. the method for controlling the Java security of Blu-ray disc as claimed in claim 1, is characterized in that, the method for controlling Java security of Blu-ray disc additionally includes: Once it is judged that the Java file manifest file has any error or inapplicable situation, then terminate and/or avoid performing the operation of verifying the Java file manifest file by using the at least one signature file and by using the corresponding to the at least one signature file At least one signature block file is used to verify the operation of the at least one signature file. 5. An audio-visual playback device, comprising: a storage module or a portable storage medium loading module, the portable storage medium loading module is used to load a portable storage medium; and A controller for controlling the Java security of the Blu-ray Disc for the storage module or the portable storage medium, wherein the controller verifies a Java file manifest file by using at least one signature file, and verifies by using the at least one signature file After the operation of the Java file manifest file is completed, the controller verifies the at least one signature file by using at least one signature block file corresponding to the at least one signature file. 6. The audio-visual playback device as claimed in claim 5, wherein the at least one signature file includes a plurality of signature files; and the controller is verifying the operation of the Java file list file by utilizing the plurality of signature files After completion, the plurality of signature files are verified by utilizing the plurality of signature block files corresponding to the plurality of signature files, respectively. 7. The audio-visual playback device as claimed in claim 6, wherein once the controller judges that there is any error or inapplicability in the specific signature file in the plurality of signature files, it terminates and/or avoids the use of The specific signature file is used to verify the operation of the Java archive manifest file and to verify the operation of the specific signature file by using a specific signature block file corresponding to the specific signature file. 8. The audio-visual playback device as claimed in claim 5, wherein, once the controller judges that the Java file list file has any error or inapplicability, it terminates and/or avoids using the at least one signature file. to verify the operation of the Java archive manifest file and verify the operation of the at least one signature file by using at least one signature block file corresponding to the at least one signature file. 9. A control circuit for an audio-visual playback device, the control circuit comprising: controller; and program code, built into the controller or read from outside the controller, for execution by the controller to control Blu-ray Disc Java security; Wherein the controller executing the program code verifies the Java archive manifest file by using at least one signature file, and after the operation of verifying the Java archive manifest file by utilizing the at least one signature file is completed, the controller verifies the Java archive manifest file by utilizing the corresponding At least one signature block file of the at least one signature file is used to verify the at least one signature file. 10. The control circuit as claimed in claim 9, wherein the at least one signature file includes a plurality of signature files; and the controller verifies that the operation of the Java file list file is completed by utilizing the plurality of signature files Thereafter, the plurality of signature files are verified by using the plurality of signature block files corresponding to the plurality of signature files, respectively.

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