CN101730907A - Point-of-sale transaction device with magnetic stripe emulator and biometric authentication - Google Patents
Point-of-sale transaction device with magnetic stripe emulator and biometric authentication Download PDFInfo
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- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
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Abstract
Description
相关申请related application
本申请是申请号为11/456,906、提交日为2006年7月12日的同时待审的美国申请案的部分继续申请;同时,要求以下美国临时申请案的权利:(1)申请号:60/866,909;申请日:2006年11月22日;名称:“带有生物识别保护的销售点交易设备”,(2)申请号:60,866,922;申请日:2006年11月22日;名称:“带有生物识别保护的认同卡”,(3)申请号:60/942,729;申请日:2007年7月8日;名称:.“带有增强功能的生物识别身份验证的磁条模拟器和智能卡”。This application is a continuation-in-part of co-pending U.S. Application No. 11/456,906, filed July 12, 2006; also, claiming rights to the following U.S. provisional applications: (1) Application No.: 60 /866,909; Filing date: November 22, 2006; Title: "Point-of-Sale Transaction Device with Biometric Protection", (2) Application No.: 60,866,922; Filing date: November 22, 2006; Biometric Protected Identity Card", (3) Application No.: 60/942,729; Filing Date: July 8, 2007; Title: . "Magnetic Stripe Simulator and Smart Card with Enhanced Biometric Authentication" .
背景技术Background technique
每年,由于信用卡欺诈,世界范围内的塑料信用卡发行商承受着数十亿美元的亏损。这些损失通常采用提高消费者和商户的交易费和利率来进行一定程度的弥补。然而,这些损失对于信用卡发行商来说仍是巨大的。Every year, issuers of plastic credit cards around the world suffer billions of dollars in losses due to credit card fraud. These losses are usually compensated to some extent by increasing transaction fees and interest rates for consumers and merchants. However, these losses are still huge for credit card issuers.
可以通过多个不同的手段来获得信用卡的信息并用于欺诈。最近有案例显示,员工或黑客获得了在未授权的情况下进入了商户或卡信息处理数据库的机会,这些数据库中包括了数百万的信用卡和借记卡的账户。信用卡本身经常会被丢失或盗取,使盗窃者可以在账户取消前从账户中支付未经授权的费用。盗窃者会冒充个人,运用从信用卡磁条上获取私人信息或者账户信息的高科技方法,例如公知的“浏览(ski·mming)”或者“克隆(cloning)”方法,采用身份盗窃,非法获得账户信息。Credit card information can be obtained and used fraudulently through a number of different means. In recent cases, employees or hackers have gained unauthorized access to merchant or card information processing databases that contain millions of credit and debit card accounts. The credit cards themselves are often lost or stolen, allowing the thief to make unauthorized payments from the account before it is cancelled. Thieves will impersonate individuals and use high-tech methods to obtain private information or account information from the magnetic stripe of credit cards, such as the well-known "skimming" or "cloning" methods, and use identity theft to illegally obtain accounts information.
因为帐户信息是静态的,一旦被危及,就可以用来在各种商业场所实施诈骗交易,或者通过在线交易或其它“无卡”交易的形式,如通信确认订购或电话确认订购的方式来实施诈骗。因此,让完成信用卡交易的信息随着每次交易而动态改变,就是防止窃取后被再次使用的好方法。在英国,一种“芯片和PIN码”的方法就是沿这个方向的很好尝试。这个项目使用了一种智能信用卡,要求使用者在进行交易时输入一个PIN密码来代替签名。这个PIN密码会与智能卡中的芯片相匹配。但需要注意的是,这种设置虽然是向正确的方向迈出了一步,但并不能解决“无卡”交易时的诈骗。Because account information is static, once compromised, it can be used to carry out fraudulent transactions in various commercial establishments, either through online transactions or other "card-not-present" transactions, such as order confirmation by mail or order confirmation by phone scam. Therefore, making the information that completes the credit card transaction dynamically changes with each transaction is a good way to prevent it from being stolen and reused. In the UK, a 'chip and PIN' approach is a good attempt in this direction. The project uses a smart credit card that requires users to enter a PIN instead of a signature when making a transaction. This PIN code will match the chip in the smart card. It’s important to note, though, that this setup, while a step in the right direction, doesn’t solve fraud when it comes to “card-not-present” transactions.
无线射频识别技术(RFID,Radio frequency identification,俗称电子标签)是一种公知技术。一个标准的RFID设备包括一个天线和一个芯片,能够通过读取设备上的射频波辐射而激活。读取设备上的天线会把信号传入离读卡器非常近的电子标签的芯片里。RFID标签就类似于条形码的作用。Radio Frequency Identification (RFID, Radio frequency identification, commonly known as electronic tags) is a known technology. A standard RFID device consists of an antenna and a chip that is activated by radiation of radio frequency waves from the reading device. The antenna on the reading device will transmit the signal to the chip of the electronic tag very close to the reader. RFID tags are similar to barcodes.
电子标签在许多方面有着应用,包括存货控制和跟踪、作为POS机上进行电子支付的传统磁条卡的替代品、作为高速公路上自动记录通行费的装置、在护照和个人身份证上的应用。电子标签甚至还被用作活体的嵌入设备,例如嵌入宠物和孩子。Electronic tags have many applications, including inventory control and tracking, as a replacement for traditional magnetic stripe cards at POS machines for electronic payments, as a device for automatically recording tolls on highways, and in passports and personal identification cards. Electronic tags are even used as embedded devices in living bodies, such as embedded in pets and children.
“智能卡”是一种嵌入了一个微处理机和记忆芯片或只嵌入一个无程序逻辑芯片的卡片。微处理机可以增加、删除以及对卡片上的信息做其它处理,而记忆芯片卡则只能进行事先确定好的操作。尽管智能卡使用无线射率来传送和接受数据,但它们与那些传统的电子标签或磁条卡并不同,在智能卡上记载了完成这笔交易所需要的所有功能和数据。因而,它们并不需要在交易的同时进入远程数据库。智能卡有很多标准,特别是ISO/IEC 7816和14443。前面所提到的英国的“芯片和PIN码”项目使用的就是这种卡。A "smart card" is a card that has embedded a microprocessor and memory chip or just a non-programmable logic chip. The microprocessor can add, delete and do other processing to the information on the card, but the memory chip card can only carry out predetermined operation. Although smart cards use wireless radios to transmit and receive data, they are different from those traditional electronic tags or magnetic stripe cards, and all the functions and data needed to complete the transaction are recorded on the smart card. Therefore, they do not need to enter the remote database at the same time as the transaction. There are many standards for smart cards, notably ISO/IEC 7816 and 14443. This is the card used by the UK's "Chip and PIN" program mentioned earlier.
智能卡正在快速取代那些使用传统方法把数据存于磁条中的“刷的”信用卡。在销售点(POS)上,智能卡能被与该项业务请求相匹配的附着于外部装备上的非接触读卡器激活,例如,一个附着于收银机上的电子标签读卡器。读卡器上的射频天线可以将信号传入卡片上的射频天线,由此而激活智能卡。该业务请求通过读卡器单元连接智能卡,然后传送持卡人账户数据回到该业务请求销售点,所使用的指令是按照ISO7816标准。Smart cards are rapidly replacing "swipe" credit cards that use the traditional method of storing data on a magnetic strip. At the point of sale (POS), the smart card can be activated by a contactless reader attached to external equipment matching the transaction request, for example, an electronic tag reader attached to a cash register. The RF antenna on the card reader activates the smart card by sending a signal to the RF antenna on the card. The service request connects the smart card through the card reader unit, and then transmits the cardholder account data back to the service request point of sale, and the instructions used are in accordance with the ISO7816 standard.
虽然智能卡允许交易以比传统磁条卡更快的速度进行,但相比较那些它们所替代的传统磁条卡,在保护帐户数据的安全方面,能力提高也不大。一项最近的测试表明,智能卡存在着一些不足,让那些数据窃取者有机可乘。首先,卡主下了订单之后,就不再输入PIN密码或签信用卡交易单。因此,如果智能卡丢失或被盗,就能被用于未经授权的购买交易。同时,在技术上,非接触的智能卡也存在新的安全威胁。一个丢掉或被盗的智能卡上仍含有所有需要的信息,包括帐户号,CCV和其它完成交易所需的信息,这些信息很容易被读取和复制。盗窃者可以用差分功耗分析(DPA)和简单功耗分析(SPA)来破译通信中所进行编码和解码的密钥。而且,智能卡还会遭受到其它类型的攻击,比如公知的“中继(relay)”攻击,即对于不靠近基于POS读卡器的智能卡,可以通过其它配对的智能卡和读卡器来“中继(relaying)”获得其所载有的信息。While smart cards allow transactions to be processed faster than traditional magnetic stripe cards, they offer only modest improvements in the ability to secure account data compared to those they replace. A recent test revealed that smart cards have weaknesses that could be exploited by data thieves. First of all, after the card owner places an order, he no longer needs to enter a PIN code or sign a credit card transaction form. Therefore, if the smart card is lost or stolen, it can be used for unauthorized purchase transactions. At the same time, technically, there are new security threats in contactless smart cards. A lost or stolen smart card still contains all the required information, including account number, CCV and other information needed to complete the transaction, which can be easily read and copied. Thieves can use differential power analysis (DPA) and simple power analysis (SPA) to decipher the encryption and decoding keys used in communications. Moreover, smart cards are also subject to other types of attacks, such as the well-known "relay (relay)" attack, that is, for a smart card that is not close to a POS-based card reader, it can be "relayed" by other paired smart cards and readers. (relaying)” to obtain the information it contains.
这些缺陷的存在对于发行机构和卡的所有者是一个巨大的金融风险。尽管信用卡公司和保险公司通常会支付欺诈保证金来减缓相关欺诈活动的损失,但对于受害者的长期影响和他们的信用评级就非常的严重。另外,明显的,任何能被探知的有关智能卡安全技术的风险将成为市场推广的障碍。因此,提供智能卡中一个安全的数据存储方式以避免被秘密和非法获得,将是非常有益的。The existence of these defects is a huge financial risk for the issuer and the owner of the card. While credit card companies and insurance companies often pay fraud deposits to mitigate losses related to fraudulent activity, the long-term impact on victims and their credit ratings can be severe. In addition, it is obvious that any risks that can be detected related to smart card security technology will become an obstacle to market promotion. Therefore, it would be very beneficial to provide a secure data storage method in the smart card to avoid being obtained secretly and illegally.
发明内容Contents of the invention
本发明是一种价格划算的设备,可以储存多个智能卡的信息和多个传统磁条卡的数据,并通过磁条模拟器或者通过“虚拟的”的非接触智能卡来使用。同时,通过生物识别技术,例如指纹验证、或者声音识别,来阻止未经授权地使用设备和公然盗窃设备上的信息。如果具有这种功能,通过中继攻击盗窃数据的行为和有关丢失和盗窃智能卡的犯罪,将会基本消除。The present invention is a cost-effective device that can store information from multiple smart cards and data from multiple conventional magnetic stripe cards and use it either through a magnetic stripe emulator or through a "virtual" contactless smart card. At the same time, use biometrics, such as fingerprint verification, or voice recognition, to prevent unauthorized use of devices and blatant theft of information on devices. With this capability, data theft through relay attacks and crimes related to lost and stolen smart cards would be virtually eliminated.
在最佳的实施例中,本发明由两个部分组成,一个在个人计算机上运行的应用程序,一个手持便携式数据存储和交易设备,可选的,提供一个相关的基础单元。In the preferred embodiment, the invention consists of two parts, an application program running on a personal computer, a handheld portable data storage and transaction device, and optionally, an associated base unit.
本发明还公开了一手持设备,在最佳的实例中,具有信用卡的尺寸,即具有ISO7813的标准的0.76mm的厚度。它包括一个显示器和一个小键盘,以及几个用于对账户和应用程序进行合适选择的导航键。可选的,设备的一部分包括一个可编程的磁条。设备中设置了可以执行简单请求的主处理器,以及一个智能卡芯片组和相应的天线。The present invention also discloses a hand-held device, in a preferred embodiment, having the size of a credit card, ie having a thickness of 0.76 mm according to the ISO7813 standard. It includes a display and a keypad, as well as several navigation keys for making appropriate selections of accounts and applications. Optionally, part of the device includes a programmable magnetic strip. The device houses a main processor that can execute simple requests, as well as a smart card chipset and corresponding antenna.
这个设备也可以加入符合ISO14443标准兼容性的近距离通讯(NFC)模块。NFC是一个点对点的连接,相比较于简单查询和答复智能卡的智能卡,允许更大容量的数据传输。因而,NFC模块能够与智能卡相竞争。NFC模块也可以用于下载各种数据,例如电子收据、优惠券、广告、电子票据等等。另外,该设备能够连接可短距离通讯的POS终端,并可用于传送账户信息、优惠券信息和其它类型的信息到POS终端。也可以从POS终端接受信息,例如电子票据信息。另外,该设备也能够连接其它的可短距离通讯(NFC)设备,例如可以使用优惠券的自助服务机,在使用前可以购买和以电子方式存储的赛事门票的票务代理。The device can also incorporate a Near Field Communication (NFC) module that complies with the ISO14443 standard. NFC is a point-to-point connection that allows for much larger data transfers than smart cards that simply query and reply to smart cards. Thus, NFC modules can compete with smart cards. The NFC module can also be used to download various data, such as electronic receipts, coupons, advertisements, electronic bills, etc. In addition, the device can be connected to a POS terminal that can communicate over a short distance, and can be used to transmit account information, coupon information, and other types of information to the POS terminal. It is also possible to receive information from POS terminals, such as electronic receipt information. In addition, the device can also be connected to other short-range communication (NFC) devices, such as self-service kiosks that can use coupons, and ticket agents that can purchase and electronically store event tickets before use.
最重要的是,该设备加入一生物识别传感器,用于进行指纹或其它生物识别的认证,用来确定使用者是设备的主人。这提供一种方式,确保仅是被授权的卡主正在执行交易。在更好的实例中,用指纹验证的方式来生物识别和认证已授权的用户,然而,其它认证用户的方式,包括生物识别和非生物识别的方式都可以被使用。每一个交易都需要认证,授权用户的身份必须在设备的可编程磁条卡、智能卡电路或者短距离通讯电路被激活,并且它的信号传送到一个电子标签读卡器或者可短距离通讯POS终端之前被验证。并非所有的设备功能都需要认证。例如,下载优惠券并不需要认证。Most importantly, the device incorporates a biometric sensor for fingerprint or other biometric authentication to determine that the user is the owner of the device. This provides a way to ensure that only authorized card owners are performing transactions. In a preferred embodiment, fingerprint authentication is used to biometrically identify and authenticate authorized users, however, other means of authenticating users, both biometric and non-biometric, may be used. Every transaction needs to be authenticated, and the identity of the authorized user must be activated on the device's programmable magnetic stripe card, smart card circuit or short-range communication circuit, and its signal is transmitted to an electronic tag reader or short-range communication POS terminal was verified before. Not all device functions require authentication. For example, downloading coupons does not require authentication.
更好的,一个设备的实例中将有标准的智能卡接触器。可选的基础单元将包括相匹配的连接器,将允许数据在设备和在一个标准个人电脑上运行的应用程序之间传输。也允许通过接触器给设备的充电电池充电。另外,基础单元可以选择包括一个NFC或智能卡读卡器,这样基础单元可以作为用于在线购买的POS终端。Even better, an instance of the device will have standard smart card contacts. An optional base unit will include matching connectors that will allow data to be transferred between the device and applications running on a standard PC. It also allows charging of the rechargeable battery of the device via the contactor. Additionally, the base unit can optionally include an NFC or smart card reader so that the base unit can act as a POS terminal for online purchases.
该手持设备可以与个人电脑上运行的应用程序进行通讯。较好的,可以通过基础单元连接到个人电脑上。或者,可选的,直接通过一个无线连接方式,例如蓝牙。该个人电脑的应用程序允许从多个信用卡或者其它类型卡的上面下载账户信息进入设备,当它们相连时能和手持设备同步,这样个人电脑的数据能被镜像在手持设备的数据中。个人电脑应用程序也可以提供其它的功能,以下将会做详细地讨论。该设备还应包括足够的记忆装置,能从多个传统的磁条卡和智能卡中,去存储账户信息。The handheld device can communicate with applications running on a PC. Preferably, it can be connected to a personal computer through the base unit. Or, optionally, directly via a wireless connection such as Bluetooth. The PC application allows account information to be downloaded from multiple credit cards or other types of cards into the device, which when connected can be synchronized with the handheld so that the PC's data can be mirrored in the handheld's data. The PC application may also provide other functions, as will be discussed in detail below. The device should also include sufficient memory means to store account information from multiple conventional magnetic stripe cards and smart cards.
该手持设备也能通过一个可编程磁条来模拟磁条卡。该可编程磁条在运行中能被再次程序化,并且,为了安全起见,在超过预设的时间或使用的次数,该可编程磁条能被擦除。如果POS终端上有个RF读卡器,从卡上磁条来的账户信息也可以通过RF信号来传递。以这种方式,传统磁条卡的主人将能用更可取的非接触RF技术在发生地执行交易。The handheld can also emulate a magnetic stripe card with a programmable magnetic stripe. The programmable magnetic strip can be reprogrammed on the fly and, for safety, can be erased after a preset time or number of uses has passed. If there is an RF card reader on the POS terminal, the account information from the magnetic stripe on the card can also be transmitted through the RF signal. In this way, owners of traditional magnetic stripe cards will be able to use the more desirable contactless RF technology to execute transactions where they occur.
手持设备必须在账户信息下载之前被初始化。初始化进行始于用户注册步骤,其中,提示使用者把一个或多个的手指端部放到生物识别传感器。指纹被扫描,并被转化成数字样本,储存在记忆装置中。在磁条程序化或者RF信号传输之前,指纹样本可以用于认证或者激活程序。可选的,可以把多个用户注册成卡上的多个账户。Handhelds must be initialized prior to downloading account information. Initialization proceeds with a user registration step in which the user is prompted to place one or more fingertips on the biometric sensor. Fingerprints are scanned and converted into digital samples that are stored in a memory device. Fingerprint samples can be used for authentication or activation procedures prior to magnetic strip programming or RF signal transmission. Optionally, multiple users can be registered as multiple accounts on the card.
在设备上存储的账户的使用依赖于用生物识别来确认其身份,然后选择其专用的账户,此时这个账户就变成“激活”账户。为了验证身份,用户放一个指头在生物识别传感器上,指纹被扫描,与设备中存储的指纹样本之一进行匹配。可选的,解锁设备也可能需要不同手指的多个指纹特征。有了这种功能,任何未经授权的使用该卡都是被禁止的。从而,传统卡或者智能卡交易的安全性都达到了一个新的水平。Use of the account stored on the device relies on confirming its identity with biometrics and then selecting its dedicated account, at which point the account becomes an "activated" account. To verify identity, the user places a finger on the biometric sensor, and the fingerprint is scanned and matched against one of the fingerprint samples stored on the device. Optionally, unlocking the device may also require multiple fingerprint features of different fingers. With this feature, any unauthorized use of the card is prohibited. Thus, the security of traditional card or smart card transactions has reached a new level.
指纹识别的一个缺点是,一小部分人口由于缺乏可用的指纹图谱用于认证,在一些案例中,用户可以选择输入一个个人身份号码(PIN)作为认证的替代方案。在初始化期间,将提示用户选择指纹或者PIN号码来进行认证。一旦当PIN被输入设备,将储存在记忆装置中已选定应用程序的数据库中去。One disadvantage of fingerprinting is that a small portion of the population lacks available fingerprints for authentication, and in some cases users may choose to enter a personal identification number (PIN) as an alternative to authentication. During initialization, the user will be prompted to select a fingerprint or PIN number for authentication. Once the PIN is entered into the device, it is stored in memory in a database of selected applications.
为了安全和阻止在设备上的某些类型攻击,在单次使用之后设备上的RF天线将被禁用。如果没有可用的天线,询问的RF信号将不能被接收。同时,设备也不能回传一个应答信号。在随后交易的认证步骤已完成时,为了去完成交易,要有足够的时间让天线再次启用,启用之后再次被自动禁用。可选的,该设备也能用于账户数据的单次传输。对于通过磁条方式进行的交易,为了阻止再使用,在超过预设的时间时,设备上可编程的磁条会被擦除。设备还包括一个电路,对所有恢复数据的请求进行记录和盖时间戳,这些请求包括已认证时的请求,和未认证使用设备时的请求。For security and to prevent certain types of attacks on the device, the RF antenna on the device will be disabled after a single use. If no antenna is available, the interrogating RF signal will not be received. At the same time, the device cannot return a reply signal. When the authentication step of the subsequent transaction has been completed, there is sufficient time for the antenna to be enabled again in order to complete the transaction, after which it is automatically disabled again. Optionally, the device can also be used for a single transfer of account data. For transactions via magnetic stripe, the programmable magnetic stripe on the device is erased after a preset period of time in order to prevent reuse. The device also includes a circuit that records and time-stamps all requests to restore data, both when authenticated and when the device is used without authentication.
手机上经常使用的照相头也可以安装在设备上。照相头可以通过给优惠券条形码照相,来捕获优惠券信息。在一些案例中,一些设备也装备条形码读取软件,可用于从捕获的照片中读取条形码和显示纯文本信息给客户。The camera head that is often used on mobile phones can also be installed on the device. The camera head can capture coupon information by taking a photo of the coupon barcode. In some cases, some devices are also equipped with barcode reading software that can be used to read barcodes from captured photos and display plain text information to customers.
本发明还可以采用其它类型认证设备进行生物识别的方法,包括但不限于,声音识别、皮肤电阻和皮肤电容,和其它类型的公知的和未来的生物验证方法。The present invention can also use other types of authentication devices for biometric identification methods, including but not limited to, voice recognition, skin resistance and skin capacitance, and other types of known and future biometric verification methods.
附图说明Description of drawings
图1A-1D是设备实施例一的前视图、后视图、侧面图和仰视图。1A-1D are the front view, rear view, side view and bottom view of the first embodiment of the device.
图2是本发明实施例一的可选的基础单元。Fig. 2 is an optional basic unit in Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
图3是设备形状因素中包括有信用卡和智能卡的最佳的实施例的前视图。Figure 3 is a front view of a preferred embodiment incorporating a credit card and a smart card in a device form factor.
图4是设备最佳实施例的后视图,显示包括有磁条模拟器。Figure 4 is a rear view of the preferred embodiment of the device, shown including a magnetic stripe emulator.
图5是设备的最佳实施例的内部结构图,显示各组成部分的示意外形。Fig. 5 is an internal block diagram of the preferred embodiment of the device, showing the schematic outlines of the constituent parts.
图6是设备的最佳实施例的系统图,显示不同部分的连接关系。Fig. 6 is a system diagram of the preferred embodiment of the device, showing the connections of different parts.
图7是设备的最佳实施例的硬件结构的标准配置示意图。Fig. 7 is a schematic diagram of a standard configuration of the hardware structure of the preferred embodiment of the device.
图8是设备的高层次的软件结构的标准配置图。Fig. 8 is a standard configuration diagram of the high-level software structure of the device.
图9是在设备上注册用户的流程图。Figure 9 is a flow diagram for registering a user on a device.
图10是用户进行生物识别认证的流程图。FIG. 10 is a flow chart of user biometric authentication.
图11是从帐户发行商处下载电子帐户记录的设备配置过程流程图。Figure 11 is a flowchart of the device configuration process for downloading electronic account records from an account issuer.
图12A是选择和激活一个账户的实施例一的流程图。Figure 12A is a flowchart of Embodiment 1 of selecting and activating an account.
图12B是选择账户和激活一个账户的另外一个实施例的流程图。Figure 12B is a flowchart of another embodiment of selecting an account and activating an account.
图13是可选择的显示在手持设备上的软件应用程序菜单的功能结构图。Figure 13 is a functional block diagram of a menu of software applications that can be selected for display on the handheld device.
图14是个人电脑上的支撑应用程序的功能结构图。Fig. 14 is a functional structure diagram of a supporting application program on a personal computer.
图15是用磁力刷或者非接触智能卡模型作为传输媒介的读卡器的应用程序和设备的第一实施例。Fig. 15 is a first embodiment of the application program and device of the card reader using a magnetic swipe or a contactless smart card model as the transmission medium.
图16是用NFC作为传输媒介的读卡器的应用程序和设备的第二实施例。Fig. 16 is a second embodiment of the application program and device of the card reader using NFC as the transmission medium.
图17是用本发明设备并基于每次交易产生的动态安全码来进行交易的流程图。Figure 17 is a flow chart of transactions performed with the device of the present invention based on the dynamic security code generated for each transaction.
图18是账户下载进入设备的数据记录(结构化数据文件)的通用结构框图。Fig. 18 is a general structural block diagram of a data record (structured data file) downloaded into a device by an account.
具体实施方式Detailed ways
本发明的设备提供两个实施例。在第一个实施例中,请参见图1A到1D,该设备包括有不同厚度的两部分,设备的第一部分具有标准的信用卡的厚度,第二部分较厚,有更多的空间存放物理元件。在第二部分(厚的部分)的最佳实施例中(请参考图3和图4),整个设备具有标准信用卡的厚度,在信用卡能够使用的任何地方都能够使用,包括ATM机和加气站等需要插卡的地方。The device of the invention provides two embodiments. In a first embodiment, see Figures 1A to 1D, the device consists of two parts of different thicknesses, the first part of the device has the thickness of a standard credit card, and the second part is thicker to allow more room for physical components . In the preferred embodiment of the second part (thick part) (see Figures 3 and 4), the entire device has the thickness of a standard credit card and can be used anywhere a credit card can be used, including ATM machines and gas refills Station and other places where cards need to be inserted.
图1A-1C是设备100第一实施例的外观的前视图、后视图和侧面视图,包括两部分,薄的部分100a和厚的部分100b,厚的部分100b最好是10mm或者更薄,由任何通用的在电子设备外壳制作中使用的材料制成,但是这个材料不能妨碍RF信号的传送和接收。设备100的前面包括显示屏101,其可以是LCD显示屏。同时,还有一菜单选择键102和数字键103。菜单选择键102通过一连串的在显示屏101上的显示的菜单来帮助导航。菜单选择键102由方向键组成,它用来控制光标上、下、左或右,中心的ENTER键用来选择菜单内容,方向键和ENTER键可以组成任何形状。1A-1C is a front view, rear view and side view of the appearance of the first embodiment of the
设备100中较薄的部分100a后部包括一可编程的磁条107,这部分最好按照ISO7813的标准做成0.76mm左右的厚度。设备100的薄的部分100a的厚度因此能通过标准的磁条卡刷写器。设备薄的部分100a和厚的部分100b之间是一个斜面区域104,是设备100薄的部分与厚的部分的过渡。设备100的薄的部分100a和磁条107都是可选的,设备的未来版本中可以没有可编程的磁条107,因为磁条式信用卡和刷卡器会逐步被非接触式交易设备淘汰。在一些案例中,设备100的薄的部分100a可以取消。The thinner part 100a of the
设备100的前面还包括生物识别输入传感器105,在最佳的实施例中,由指纹扫描仪组成。在本发明的其它实施例中,也可以采用其它的生物认证设备,例如声音识别装置、皮肤PH值分析装置,或者现在的以及未来发明的其它能识别用户的设备。另外,生物认证的方式也可以被字母数字混合密码或者用户通过数字键盘103输入设备100的PIN码的方式所替代。The front of
设备的后面包括可编程的磁条107,其位于设备100的薄部分100a。背面还包括一个可选择的照相头106,优选的,其主要用于给能被条形码识别软件读取的条形码拍照。然而,任何一个图片都可以被拍照,然后储存在设备中,用于显示或传送。另外,设备100的背面还显示有NFC芯片108和蓝牙芯片109,然而,这些芯片实际上是在设备的内部。设备100的背面还有系统重设按钮110。The rear of the device includes a programmable magnetic strip 107 located on the thin portion 100a of the
设备100的侧面图1C中可以看到设备的软键109,用于用户将软件应用程序连接到设备中。In side view 1C of
图1d显示设备100的底端,显示有磁条107的薄部分100a、厚部分100b和它们之间的斜面区域104。设备100的底端还存在一个连接器201,通过一个电缆直接连接或者通过一个基础单元200的连接(参见图3),用于与PC应用程序1002之间传输数据(参见图15)。Figure 1d shows the bottom end of the
可选的基础单元200,包括与设备100底端的连接器201相配的连接器202,用于提供前述的功能。基础单元200也包括一个NFC芯片205,或其它无线通讯方式,这样将允许基础单元200作为用于在线购买的非接触销售点(POS)终端。基础单元200也存在有能与设备100和PC应用程序1400连接的PC界面204。设备100与PC应用程序1400的连接方式,也可以是所属技术领域任何一种公知的无线传输协议,例如蓝牙;或者被串行线、USB接口等有线连接。The
连接器201也可以给设备100上的充电电池405充电。通过和基础单元200连接或者直接通过电缆和PC连接。在基础单元200上的AC适配器(交流电源适配器)203在可以为充电电池提供电源。可替代的充电方式还包括,设备的RF天线通过电磁感应产生了电压后,通过感应给电池充电。Connector 201 may also charge
图3到图5是本发明的最佳实施例的物理配置。在这个实施例中,设备150具有标准信用卡的尺寸和厚度。请参见图3,设备150正面的显示屏区152,可以显示一个激活账户信息,可以用按键153和154进行选择。虽然标准的最佳实施例中有这两个按键,显然设备的用户界面上可以有任何数目按键。3 to 5 are physical configurations of the preferred embodiment of the present invention. In this embodiment,
注意显示屏区152并不被图上的尺寸和形状所限制,它可以是任何一种尺寸和形状。更好的,显示屏152是一个LCD显示屏,但可以是所属领域公知的任何一种类型显示屏,尤其包括在装置150被关闭后能够保留图像的电泳显示器。在金融交易以外的用途中,可以设想设备150能显示颜色和视频。在最佳实施例中,显示屏152主要用于显示当前激活的账户,来提示给客户。其中所显示的账户信息可以包括图形。较好的,是账户发行商的一个LOGO或商标和任何其它完成交易所必需的信息,例如CCV码或者动态产生的PIN码。Note that the
显示屏上显示的账户信息,可以是“激活”账户。请参见图4,在用户用生物传感器151认证好自己之后,激活账户交易所需的信息将被程序化进入可编程磁条卡161或者被RF模块传输。较好的,生物传感器151是一个指纹扫描设备,有能力扫描一个或多个标准的用户的手指,以便和存储的指纹样本配合。然而,任何一种现在或者未来的生物识别传感器都可以被采用。另外,PIN码也可以被采用。The account information displayed on the display screen may be an "activated" account. Referring to Figure 4, after the user has authenticated himself with the
设备150正面的区域156是一个可打印区域,允许在这张卡上打印LOGO或者其它信息。较好的,这个卡不被装饰上压纹,为了增加安全性,卡片上不应有帐户的相关信息,这些只应在显示屏152上展示。
接触器155是智能卡中的标准设备,是按照智能卡ISO标准设计的。这些接触器通过基础单元700(参见图6),可以在设备和运行在PC上的应用程序之间进行数据传输;也允许卡上的充电电池通过智能卡接触器充电。The
图4显示设备150背面的配置。区域160是一个可选的区域,允许打印能显示在卡上的信息。区域162是一个可选择的签名区,是按照典型信用卡的标准签名区制造。可编程的磁条161位于传统信用卡磁条标准位置,也就是卡的顶端。FIG. 4 shows the configuration of the back of the
图5显示卡内部的组件的结构框图。电池171是一个充电电池。较好的,由薄膜锂聚合物组成,当设备150置于基础单元700中(参见图3),可通过智能卡接触器155进行充电,如图3所示。我们还在考虑,通过电磁场或射频波接触在RF天线173中产生的感应电流的,可以对电池进行感应充电。Figure 5 shows a block diagram of the components inside the card. The
组件172是设备的系统主板,包括一个中央处理器和相关的记忆装置,还有我们后面将会详细介绍的其它组件。组件173是一个能够让设备在POS终端处理非接触式交易的RF天线。当标准智能读卡器通过天线173对设备发出询问信号时,设备允许传输账户信息。标准智能卡读卡器体还可以通过天线的感应给一个智能卡提供电力和传输信息。然而,可以自供电的设备,就不需要那些功能。虽然我们设想能让该设备在紧急情况下通过射频天线的电磁感应进行充电以完成至少一项交易。然而,较好的,天线仅仅用于设备与非接触的智能卡读卡器进行通信。
组件176是一个智能卡电路,可以支撑智能卡接触器、非接触智能卡界面和通讯等模块,还包括记忆装置,记忆装置中存储有为结束一个交易必须被传送到POS设备中的激活账户信息。
组件174是磁条模拟的控制器,是一个定制芯片,用于控制在POS终端完成一个交易所需的轨道1和轨道2的数据的储存和传输。组件175是可编程磁条的轨道1和轨道2的发射器。我们可以设想,.POS设备可以在任何一个磁条轨道上写数据。磁条模拟控制器174能够在设备150的闪存403中的有关当前激活账户信息的区域读取一些信息然后储存。
图6是本发明最佳实施例的系统图,基础单元700提供一个设备150和标准的个人电脑704之间的连接点。基础单元700和PC704之间的连接可以是任何一种所属领域公知的常用方式,例如串口电缆线、USB线、或者蓝牙等无线连接方式。任何一种现在或者未来公知的通讯协议都可以被使用。基础单元700包括一个可拆装电池701,可以给设备150上的内部电池171充电。可拆装电池701可以是任何一种消费级电池,例如9v电池或者复数个“AA”、“AAA”电池。可选的,AC适配器702也可以用于相同的用途。设备150插入基础单元700中,此时PC704和设备150之间传输数据,同时,设备上的内部电池171也在被充电。数据传输和电池充电都是通过智能卡接触器155进行。当设备150被放置在基础单元700中,基础单元700上的接触器705和设备150前面的智能卡接触器155进行触电相连。这允许基础单元150与PC704上运行的应用程序1400之间传输数据。个人电脑704我们将在后面进一步详细讨论。另外,另外,充电电池171可通过智能卡接触器155进行充电。FIG. 6 is a system diagram of the preferred embodiment of the present invention. The
我们还设想充电电池171可以用便携式充电器来充电,充电器可以像夹子或软信封的形状,以使其可以与设备150配套。这个充电器(图未示)可以用单电池供电,可以是薄片电池。这样充电器就可以嵌在钱包中,提供一个方便的地方用来储存设备150,以方便对设备150上的电池171充电。It is also contemplated that the
在另一个实例中,设备150为了充电可以与移动电话相连,移动电话上有一个插槽可以容纳设备150。当设备150插入插槽,智能卡接触器155与给电池171充电的移动电话上的接触点进行电接触。我们也可以设想设备150和移动电话之间存在数据传输模块,通过移动电话网进行数据传输。例如,数据交易可以被加密,通过移动电话网络发送信用卡处理中心和其它处理程序。In another example, the
我们也设想设备150能在某一时刻被并入手机。在一些案例中,交易能通过RF或者NFC模块和同样功能的POS终端完成。因为厚度的原因,在一些案例的使用中没有可编程的磁条161。或者有一个可伸缩的磁条161,没有被用的时候,磁条被容纳在电话的插擦中;当使用的时候,磁条是伸出插槽外。We also envision
还是上述的另一个实施例中,一个可选的太阳能模块能被用于给电池171充电,其中光伏电池(图未示)将从背景光中转换足够的电量,保持电池171满电或者减缓电池放电。另外,设备150上液晶显示器152的背景光也可以转化电流减缓电池171的放电。In yet another embodiment of the above, an optional solar module can be used to charge the
在图3-5所表达的最佳实施例中,较好的,基于信用卡的已知技术,设备150在结构上是灵活的。因此,设备150可以制作成防水的设备。In the preferred embodiment represented by Figures 3-5, the
图7是设备150上系统主板401结构示意框图。系统主板401包括大部分控制和使用设备的组件。CPU408是设备150的主要的处理器,同时提供对设备150的全面的控制,并且运行主要的操作系统软件和应用程序。记忆装置402是操作设备以及控制软件和应用程序等等所需要的内存。闪存403被用于安全的长期存储应用程序数据和电子账户记录的设备。FIG. 7 is a schematic block diagram showing the structure of the system board 401 on the
智能卡控制器404包括软件和硬件,这些软件和硬件控制着中央处理器408和中央处理器相互作用的智能卡线路176。智能卡读写接触器405控制着数据的输入和输出、电力的输送,这个电力输送是通过位于设备150前面的标准智能卡接触器155来进行的。The
电源管理组件406控制着充电电池171的状态;也控制着当设备与基础单元700相连时,有关充电电池171的电力的输送和调节。The
磁条控制器407是磁条控制电路174的界面,同时提供将被编码写入可编程磁条161的账户数据。同时,磁条控制407还决定了何时将可编程磁条161删除或让其禁用。
显示屏控制器409负责控制位于卡前端的显示屏152上显示的图像和信息。The
生物识别传感器控制器410采集设备150前面的生物识别传感器151的输入信息,然后传送到生物识别注册和认证软件。这个软件是主系统软件的一部分。可替代的,这个功能也可以由生物识别传感器控制器组件410来提供。The
可编程软键控制器411控制了滚动键153和154的输入,以及卡片上的其它输入。Programmable soft
除了最佳实施例中所展示的组件外,在主系统板401上还可以包括其它的电路,或者以设备中的独立的组件形式存在。这些组件包括主板上的照相头、蓝牙界面、近距离通讯模块。需要注意的是,图7中所展示的配置仅仅是一个样本,本领域内的普通技术人员可以提供多种可用的替代方案,这仍然被认为属于本发明的保护范围之内。In addition to the components shown in the preferred embodiment, other circuitry may be included on the main system board 401 or as a separate component within the device. These components include the camera head on the motherboard, the Bluetooth interface, and the short-range communication module. It should be noted that the configuration shown in FIG. 7 is only a sample, and those skilled in the art may provide many available alternative solutions, which are still considered to be within the protection scope of the present invention.
图16展示了设备的软件结构。包括全部软件组件。设备应用程序501是运行在CPU 408上控制设备150的最重要的软件应用程序。它提供了一个基本的输入输出流程,和设备150上主要的功能和控制。设备应用程序501在设备操作系统503上运行,设备操作系统可以是现在或者未来的任何一种运行在便携式设备上的系统,例如,LINUX或者JAVA卡开放平台系统(JCOP),然而,可以采用任何一种合适的操作系统。设备操作系统503将执行所有的基础任务,去控制设备内部组件,同时提供一个设备应用程序501能够运行的软件平台。Figure 16 shows the software structure of the device. Includes all software components. The device application 501 is the most important software application running on the
生物识别注册和认证组件502是初次采集生物识别的样本和存储着为了以后认证使用所必需的样本的软件组件。另外,生物识别注册和认证组件502负责读取用生物识别传感器151的扫描件,然后同存储的样本相比较,去验证用户的身份。如果认证处理不成功,设备就不激活。The biometric registration and authentication component 502 is a software component that collects biometric samples for the first time and stores the necessary samples for later authentication. Additionally, the biometric enrollment and authentication component 502 is responsible for reading the scan from the
软件组件504是智能卡操作系统,用于管理智能卡命令和答复系统。智能卡操作系统504可以是设备操作系统503的一部分。Software component 504 is the smart card operating system for managing the smart card command and reply system. Smart card operating system 504 may be part of device operating system 503 .
作为硬件的组件,图8的结构仅仅是一种通常的案例。也可以是任何一种可替代的设计,这也在本发明的范围之内。As a hardware component, the structure of Fig. 8 is just a common case. Any alternative design is also possible, which is also within the scope of the present invention.
图9是一个显示用户在设备150上注册过程的流程图。在步骤900,开始“设备初始化”流程。在步骤902,包括存储有账户信息或其它用户数据(例如,预先存储的生物样本)的记忆装置的一部分内容将被删除,是为了阻止物理上拥有却未授权的人去增加已经在设备150存在有账号的授权用户。步骤904,是为了决定认证需要多少次扫描。较好的,这通过询问客户来决定。在最佳实施例中,用户可能需要多次扫描来认证其身份。例如,用户给出完成认证过程的具体命令:扫描不同手指的多个指纹。一旦当合适的扫描次数被确定,就进入计数器复位的步骤906。生物识别采集的流程,其包括采集、编码和存储生物样板,这些在步骤908执行。较好的,这些功能将作为包括生物识别扫描仪在的非定制组件的一部分。在步骤910,计数器增加。在步骤912,判定是否所需要的生物识别样本都被采集齐全。如果还需要另外的生物样本,也就是没有采集齐全,步骤912则返回步骤908,此时另一个样本将被采集、编码和储存。另外,在步骤912判定所需要的生物样本数量是否采集齐全,如果齐全,下一步直接到步骤914,此时判定是否将注册另外一个用户。如果是,将返回步骤904,去开始另外一个用户的注册流程。如果没有另外的需要注册,注册流程就在步骤916完成。FIG. 9 is a flowchart showing the process of user registration on
在另外的设备的实施例中,可以提供不同类型的生物识别扫描装置,例如语音识别,或者用替代生物识别扫描装置的PIN码。这些实施例是需要在设备中设置另外的控制器,用来输入PIN码。这些实施例仍然在本发明的范围之内。In further device embodiments, a different type of biometric scanner may be provided, such as voice recognition, or a PIN code instead of a biometric scanner. In these embodiments, another controller needs to be set in the device to input the PIN code. These embodiments are still within the scope of the present invention.
图10在POS终端上使用时激活设备的流程图。设备的激活流程是这样的:客户被认证,然后打开各种相关联用户的账户。流程始于步骤1000,从生物识别传感器151或者滚动键153、154被触摸开始。在另外一个设备的实施例中,任何用户输入组件都可以开始认证流程。如果滚动键153或者154之一被触摸,因此就开始滚动动账户信息,显示在显示屏152上的当前账户是将被激活的账户。如果生物识别传感器151被触摸,目前显示的,或者上一个显示的账户将被激活。在步骤1002,将显示信息,提示用户完成认证流程。在这个例子中,当用户在扫描仪上放上合适的手指(或按顺序排列的几个手指),指纹扫描仪开始启用。步骤1003是采集生物识别信息,然后进行编码与存储的有效生物识别扫描样本进行匹配。在步骤1004,采集的生物识别信息与图9中的用户注册流程中所收集和存储的生物识别样本进行比较和分析。Figure 10 Flowchart for activating the device when used on a POS terminal. The activation process for the device works like this: the customer is authenticated, and then various associated user accounts are opened. The flow begins at
如果确认匹配,则流程转至1006步骤,计数器更新,显示出已经完成多少正确的匹配。在步骤1008,判定其它的生物识别信息是否要被采集,如果要采集,流程就转回步骤1003。如果正确数量的生物识别信息已经被收集,并确认匹配,流程转至步骤1010,此时信息被清除,然后转至步骤1012,此时“TRUE”指令已经回转到主系统板401上的生物识别传感器控制器上。If a match is confirmed, flow goes to step 1006 and a counter is updated to show how many correct matches have been made. In
步骤1003中,当任何一个生物识别扫描在匹配中失败,流程转至步骤1014,此时,显示屏152上显示“错误”信息。在步骤1016,判定是否失败的尝试次数到达预先定义的限制次数,如果到达,流程就转至步骤1018,此时,一个FALSE值回到到生物识别传感器控制器410,显示设备未被激活。如果没有到达重复的次数,流程从步骤1016转至步骤1003,进行下一个生物识别信息的采集。In
图11显示的是从账户发行商下载到设备的完成交易所需的电子表格形式的账户数据800的配置过程。这些信息在图18中有具体显示。包括账户属性802、账户发行商的LOGO或者其它标志804、轨道1和轨道2各自的数据806和808(需要对可编程磁条161进行程序化编码)、智能卡文件系统810(可以是可执行代码),还有其它完成交易所需的或者不需要的其它任何数据812,例如广告内容和/或优惠券。智能卡文件系统810可以包括支持防盗措施的可执行代码,例如轮换账号计算、动态生成的密码或者验证码。Figure 11 illustrates the process of configuring
账户的发行商是标准的银行或者其它的信用卡发行商,将提供一个结构化数据文件800,包括刚刚讨论的那些信息,以及相关的特定账户。较好的,可以通过安全通道1103从发行商网站1104下载可用的结构化数据文件800,或通过其它的本领域内公知的技术手段来传送电子数据文件。The issuer of the account, which is a standard bank or other credit card issuer, will provide a structured
图11显示把结构化数据文件提供给用户的流程。在步骤1100,用户把设备150插入基础单元700,基础单元最好通过任何一种公知的通讯方式(例如前面所述的)连接标准的个人电脑。可以设想的是,设备150的今后的实例中,可以通过无线手段直接与PC机连通,因此消除对基础单元700的需求。Fig. 11 shows the flow of providing structured data files to users. At
在步骤1102,用户登录账户发行商网站1104需要通过一个认证流程,所以账户发行商需要建立一个安全通道1103。较好的,安全通道是HTTPS连接,其使用基于SSL加密的HTTP协议或者TSL传输协议去保证与网络服务器的安全通讯。然而,任何一个加密的安全通道都可以采用。基于用户的需求,账户发行商产生结构化数据文件800(步骤1106),这为用户所特有。从PC704上通过安全通道1103可下载结构化数据文件800,它将被储存(步骤1108)。最好,它还要以某种形式永久存储在PC704上。在步骤1110,用户用PC应用程序1400去促进结构化数据文件传送至设备150。较好的,结构化数据文件800被加密,以至仅仅设备150或者PC应用程序1400才能读取。In
图12a显示在用户在被认证之后设备150的最佳实施例的上一级的流程控制。在步骤1200,图10所示的设备激活流程被执行。如果成功(例如,图10中所示流程中返回的“TRUE”结果),流程转至步骤1202,此时,当前激活账户被显示。当前的激活账户可以是账户列表中的第一账户,也可以是最后一个被激活账户。注意,如果图10所示的激活流程已经返回了一个“FLASE”结果,设备将维持锁定和等候执行另外一个设备激活的请求。设备激活请求的失败次数可以被限制,但是需要在认证尝试过程之前把设备150连接到PC应用程序1400。Figure 12a shows the upper level of flow control of the preferred embodiment of the
在步骤1204,目前的激活账户能被使用。这意味着账户信息被程序化(编码)进入可编程磁条卡161和/或装载进入记忆装置(如果是无线的交易方式,记忆装置包含有通过RF天线173传送的信息)。另外,任何一个完成交易所需要的辅助信息都可以显示在显示屏151上。例如动态生成密码、安全码或者CCV码。At
在步骤1206,判定当前激活账户是否已超时。如果是,设备将再次被激活(步骤1208),同时图10中所显示的认证流程将被迫重复去再激活账户。如果没有超时,在步骤1210,将判定是否按键153或者154之一被按下,这表明用户希望去滚动帐户列表中的上一个或者下一个账户,然后使这个账户被激活。滚动页面发生在步骤1212,在流程转向步骤1202之后,就要去显示新的账户信息。如果在步骤1210没有按键被按下,则目前的激活账户信息将被使用,同时,设备150等候直至超时(步骤1208)。可替代的,此时判定是否该账户信息被传送,或者通过无线的传送,或者是可编程的磁条卡161通过物理刷卡的读取。如果是,设备在到达最后超时时间之前会被关闭。In
图12b显示的是另外一个实施例的流程。在步骤1210中,如果检测到一个按键的按压,需要判定(步骤1211)是否按压的按键是软键。如果是,转到步骤1213,将显示最高一级的板载应用程序菜单1300(参见图13)。按键153和154也能被用于导航这个菜单。板载应用程序菜单1300提供进入不同的设备的辅助功能菜单。注意,图12b显示的流程图是:设备150的改进的功能可以被加入软键,然后去使用这个这个改进的功能。可选的,设备150可以采用另一种方法检测软键是否被按压,例如检测是否同时按压按键153和154。Figure 12b shows the flow of another embodiment. In
图13显示板载应用程序菜单1300的最高一级。最高一级菜单允许用户选择几个功能。在方框1302,用户能激活NFC电路去下载内容进入设备150,或者从设备150进入PC704或其它的近距离通讯设备。例如,NFC内容下载1302能被用于从PC704移动相关新账户数据到设备150。另外,有关账户用途的数据能从设备150下载至PC应用程序1400,例如账户使用的次数、不同账户的金额等等。设备的NFC功能可以被用于和适当装备的POS终端或者其它用途的自助服务机通讯,例如从广告自助服务机下载优惠券、上传优惠券到POS终端、从POS终端下载电子收据、下载产品(例如电子票)和内容等等。FIG. 13 shows the top level of the on-
在方框1304,照相头106用于捕获图片,包括优惠券或其它广告材料(例如海报)的条形码。用户通过给条形码拍照来获得条形码。条形码的解释在方框1305,具体是通过一个作用类似光学字符识别软件的计算机程序去解释条形码的内容,并变成纯文本格式。优惠券的细节然后能够显示显示屏151上。在方框1306内,优惠券数据能够储存在主板记忆装置402内,当设备和个人电脑连接时,能够上传至应用程序1400.At block 1304, the camera head 106 is used to capture a picture, including a barcode of a coupon or other advertising material (eg, a poster). The user obtains the barcode by taking a photo of the barcode. The barcode is interpreted at
用户可以选择再检查一下已储存的优惠券、产品和下载内容(方框1310),然后判定它们是否被用或者删除。类似的,在方框1312,用户能够检查通过NFC电路下载至设备150的记忆装置402内储存的收据。这些收据可以最终可以被下载到PC应用程序1400,然后永久存储和/或在个人电脑上再检查和打印。方框1014是为设备150未来功能扩展预备的。未来功能的扩展可通过软件的升级,软件的升级将通过PC应用程序来申请。The user may choose to double check stored coupons, products and downloads (block 1310) to determine if they are used or deleted. Similarly, at block 1312, the user can review receipts stored in the
图14是PC应用程序的功能结构图。PC应用程序1400最好在设备150通过基础单元连接的PC704上运行。较好的,PC应用程序1400运行所在的电脑将和网络连接用于从账户发行商处下载账户信息和下载其它内容。因此,只要图14中展示的所有的或者子集的功能被提供,PC应用程序1400应该能为这种类型功能的应用程序进行一种常规的设计。Fig. 14 is a functional structure diagram of the PC application program.
PC应用程序1400允许维护账户记录(方框1404)。这包括定义一个新账户记录(方框1405),修正现存的账户记录(方框1406)和删除现存的账户记录(方框1407)。定义一个新的账户记录包括从账户发行商处下载的结构化数据文件800中的账户信息,正如前面图11所讨论的内容。从账户发行商下载到PC应用程序1400处的账户信息包括当账户被激活时在显示屏152上显示的广告材料或者图表。The
在方框1408,PC应用程序1400中的账户数据和其它内容可以和设备150中的内容进行同步。PC应用程序1400和PC704上的永久存储设备,可以作为设备150的存储信息的备份,也可以保留设备150上的所要恢复的历史记录,还可以在设备150和PC1400之间同步所有的账户记录数据。Account data and other content in
一个附加水准的账户数据保护方式是在同步流程中通过私人化账户数据到一个专用的设备150上来实现。在这个流程中,所有的新账户记录被移动到设备150上最好经过一个独特的加密流程再到设备150上。加密流程被设备150上的软件指引,新的被加密的账户数据被移回PC704储存,因此,会覆盖未加密版本的账户数据。这将确保产生的帐户数据仅仅在设备150上运行,而在其它设备上没有。为了完成这些功能,每个设备150都被编码有一个单独的序号,或者加密数据所用的加密按键仅在设备150上能使用。An additional level of account data protection is achieved by personalizing the account data to a
PC应用软件1400还能够为在线购买进行支付代理。这时基础单元700作为POS机,能通过近距离通讯(NFC)或无线智能卡传输帐户数据来从设备150完成交易。可替代的,账户信息的传输也可以通过设备150上的智能卡接触器来进行。进一步的,如果没有基础单元700,可以从设备150上用无线连接模块通过个人电脑直接进行支付。
为了进行互联网上的支付,要激活设备150并选择合适的账户。当设备150被插入基础单元700,设备150上的账户信息通过智能卡接触器155读取,主页上的相关领域被填入在线购买所要付款的内容。In order to make payments over the Internet, the
类似的,设备150也可以作为一个认证设备,用于频繁登录网上站点的、并且进入时需要用户名/密码组合的用户。当用户登录网站,设备150将会检测到网站并自动提供合适的用户名/密码组合,使用户有权进入网站。还可以设想本发明的其它用途,包括可以作为一个学生的ID卡,可以作为电子驾驶执照、护照以及对建筑物限制区域访问进行控制的卡。一般说来,任何需要数字或账户和具体的人有关联的场合,都能通过使用设备150所提供的更加安全的、并能减少偷窃和欺诈的认证手段,而有所帮助。Similarly,
PC应用程序1400也可以通过选择菜单1412,来进行收据记录的管理。在同步处理流程1409中,能够从设备下载收据记录,收据记录被PC704上的永久存储装置通过PC应用程序1402保留到本地存储器上。在方框1413,收据记录能以任何一个公知的图像文件格式输出,例如,JPEG、TIFF、PDF格式或文本文件格式。另外,多个收据的记录可以通过一种适合阅读的数据表格格式输出,例如通过EXCEL输出。在方框1414,当记录不再需要时,可以从本地存储器清除,The
菜单1416能够执行PC应用程序1400的优惠券管理功能。在方框1418,用户不想继续保留的优惠券能够清除,或者到期的优惠券则会自动清除。另外,通过PC应用程序1400可以从互联网上下载优惠券,然后,在同步流程1409的时候发送这些优惠券到设备150。The
菜单1420能够执行PC应用程序1400的多种配置选项。例如,基础单元700与个人电脑连接传输的方法、应用程序1400的用户界面的格式,和其它可能影响设备150的操作的菜单的格式。
在操作中,如图15所示,设备150采用磁条或RF传输的方法,通过POS终端进行交易。在用户成功激活设备后,帐户的记录数据被编码进入设备上的磁条模拟器。然后,磁条模拟器能被POS终端上常见的磁条读卡器刷读。这提供了用一种现存工作设备来完成交易的方式所需的信息。现存的非接触POS终端界面也支持设备通过用RF模块传输所需的交易数据的方式。In operation, as shown in Figure 15, the
图16显示设备150和可NFC的POS设备之间的交易。在这里,展开一个交互式的会话,其中,设备150的NFC电路和含有NFC功能的POS终端建立一个双向通讯,去交换有关交易的关键信息,例如所选择的账户信息、任何一个可用的优惠券或特殊报价信息。另外的,信息能够从POS终端下载到设备150,这些信息包括电子收据数据、有关忠诚点数的信息、未来购买的要点、广告内容、产品(比如电子车票)及直接给用户的信息。在图15中并未显示这些功能,因为没有能通过磁条或智能卡界面使数据从POS终端传回到设备150的通道。在设备150的实施例中有NFC电路,这些NFC电路能用来模拟智能卡RF交易。Figure 16 shows a transaction between
可以想到,该设备应该符合ISO 7810、7811、7812和7813有关磁条卡的标准。也可以想到,可选的实施例中可以没有磁条卡部分,与其它设备的通信也仅仅使用智能卡技术或NFC技术。It is conceivable that the device should comply with the ISO 7810, 7811, 7812 and 7813 standards for magnetic stripe cards. It is also conceivable that there may be no magnetic stripe card part in an optional embodiment, and the communication with other devices only uses smart card technology or NFC technology.
图17提供了一种解决办法,是在信用卡流程中的交易中,要求包含一个动态生成一次性密码,这样欺诈就可以被排除。这种功能在传统信用卡中是没有的,因为传统信用卡没有能算出动态密码的计算单元。Figure 17 provides a solution by requiring transactions in the credit card process to include a dynamically generated one-time password so that fraud can be ruled out. This function does not exist in traditional credit cards, because traditional credit cards do not have a calculation unit that can calculate dynamic passwords.
可以设想,不同的帐户发行商能对生成动态密码有不同的解决办法和运算法则。因此,一个生成动态密码的加密算法能作为电子帐户记录800的一部分下载(如图18所示),并作为智能卡文件系统810的一部分。It is conceivable that different account issuers may have different solutions and algorithms for generating dynamic passwords. Thus, an encryption algorithm that generates a dynamic password can be downloaded as part of the electronic account record 800 (shown in FIG. 18 ) and as part of the smart
通过设备150生成的动态密码可与余下帐户信息一起进行电子化传输至POS设备,最后转到金融机构寻求付费的授权,或在显示屏152上展示,以致于设备的使用者可以看到密码,并口头告知商户或用POS设备上的键输入。可选择的,一个不需要计算的静态的字母和数字组成的密码,比如CCV码,也可以被显示并以相同的方式被用户使用。The dynamic password generated by the
在操作中,当用户激活帐户或询问POS设备时,密码就生成了。密码在显示屏152上展示,或者密码通过可编程磁条161或通过天线173的无线RF交易,作为帐户号的电子传输的一部分共同被提交。In operation, a password is generated when a user activates an account or asks a POS device. The password is displayed on the
过程如图17所示。方框1701,在POS终端上处理一个交易的正常过程中,用户向商户提供了帐号和动态密码。在方框1702中,商户已有资料、以及包括这次传输中的动态密码,一起上传到作为正常支付授权传输流程的一部分的支付处理点1703,然后信息被发送至获取银行(方框1704)。可选的,商户可以直接与获取银行1704通信,这样,在设置中就没有了支付处理点服务的提供。获取银行然后传送账户号码和动态密码到支付卡协会1705。支付卡协会1705传送信息到支付处理服务(方框1706),来验证针对该特定账户的一次性密码是真实的,然会对付费授权。在方框1707,金融卡的发行商也会验证动态密码,然后给付费授权。然后授权会返回获取银行1704。支付处理点或者网关服务1703然后传送授权到商户,交易完成。注意,图17中的一个或多个单位可以是相同的单位。The process is shown in Figure 17. Block 1701, during the normal process of processing a transaction on the POS terminal, the user provides the account number and dynamic password to the merchant. In block 1702, the merchant's existing information, together with the dynamic password included in this transfer, is uploaded to the payment processing point 1703 as part of the normal payment authorization transfer process, and then the information is sent to the acquiring bank (block 1704) . Alternatively, the merchant can communicate directly with the acquiring bank 1704, so that there is no provision of payment processing point services in the setup. The acquisition bank then transmits the account number and dynamic password to the payment card association 1705 . The payment card association 1705 sends a message to the payment processing service (block 1706) to verify that the one-time password for that particular account is authentic, and then authorizes the payment. In block 1707, the issuer of the financial card will also verify the dynamic password, and then authorize the payment. Authorization is then returned 1704 to the acquiring bank. The payment processing point or gateway service 1703 then transmits authorization to the merchant and the transaction is complete. Note that one or more of the units in Figure 17 may be the same unit.
若用户使用的是基于设备150的独特认证的动态生成密码,这样就可以消除以下类型的欺诈:一种是当信用卡号被偷,通过在另一张卡上压纹出号码,亲自用假卡去购买商品;一种是卡号被偷,通过互联网进行仅需提供卡号并通过简单引导就能进行的交易,来购买商品。这种方法也可以取消把安全码或者CCV码打印在卡的签字的一面上的这种方式。就这点而论,盗窃动态生成的安全码,实际上是不可能的。If the user is using a dynamically generated password based on the unique authentication of the
注意,本发明所提供的实施例仅仅是样本,并不意味着是对本发明的限制。例如,设备150的实际的物理配置可以根据其上所运行应用程序的需要而改变。例如,某些应用程序需要更大或者更小的显示屏,或者某些实施例可以包括扬声器或者麦克风。同样的,按键153和154的布局和所要附加的按键的数量和位置,可以采用方便用户的任何一种配置方案。生物识别传感器151也可以设置在任何一个方便的位置,可以在设备150的壳体上或者壳体内。同样的,图7所显示的系统结构仅仅是一个可能的实施例。系统结构可以按照本发明所描述的磁条的模拟、智能卡和\或NFC等所需的功能,配置成任何一种方式。Note that the examples provided in the present invention are only samples, and are not meant to limit the present invention. For example, the actual physical configuration of
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WO2008147457A1 (en) | 2008-12-04 |
CA2667306A1 (en) | 2008-12-04 |
EP2095343A1 (en) | 2009-09-02 |
AU2007354267A8 (en) | 2010-03-04 |
AU2007354267A1 (en) | 2008-12-04 |
JP2010510609A (en) | 2010-04-02 |
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