CN101405753A - Card capable of performing true/false judgment by a fluorescent particle chip - Google Patents

Abstract

The present invention relates to a card capable of performing autentication by radio-active materail chip. A card authentication is performed. An authentication chip for performing authentication by a copy-disabled hologram chip is attached to a card and when or after the card is introduced into a handling device, the authentication chip information is read to perform authentication. Read may be performed in a planar shape but a linear shape can reduce the processing load. An arbitrary straight line or a curved line may be used as a read line shape by modifying the read position in association with the card movement when the card is placed to be read. When the card introduced to a terminal device is an unauthorized one, the card is ejected or an alarm is issued when the card is introduced inside.

Description

A card that can be authenticated by a hologram chip

technical field

The present invention relates to the structure of items such as cards, banknotes, and securities that are easily counterfeited and require authenticity authentication, and a method for authenticating the items.

Background technique

In today's so-called card society, there are a large number of cards, such as cash cards of banks, credit cards of trust companies and other cards related to the owner's property, prepaid cards as securities, driver's licenses, health insurance cards, passports, etc. Cards associated with identification are used.

Cards related to property and cards used as securities are mostly written with the required information on the magnetic stripe installed on the front or back, and are read by automatic equipment such as ATM (Automatic Teller's Machine: automatic teller machine) or manually The device reads magnetic information from the magnetic strip and performs various processing.

Figure 1 shows an example of the current cash card processing flow.

(1) When the card owner inserts the cash card into the card slot of a terminal device such as an ATM, the sensor of the card slot detects it and takes the card into the device.

(2) When the card is taken in, the terminal device reads the card information from the magnetic recording portion of the card. In the case of a cash card, card information such as a bank code, a branch code, an account type, and an account number is read. In addition, in the case of a credit card, a card identification number, an expiration date, an account type, and an account number are recorded in the magnetic recording unit as card information. In addition, there are cases where a password is recorded on a cash card or a credit card, and in this case, the password is also read out.

(3) The terminal device judges whether or not the inserted card is a card that can be handled by the terminal device.

(4) When the read card information is not confirmed to be information indicating that it can be processed, or when the card information cannot be read due to damage or contamination even if it is a legitimate card, the terminal device Discard the card as an unsuitable card that cannot be dealt with.

(5) When the card is a legitimate card and the information of the magnetic recording unit has been read correctly, communication with the host computer is started.

(6) The host requests to enter a password.

(7) The card user inputs the password in response to the request from the host computer.

(8) When the card user inputs a password in response to a request from the host, the host compares the input password with a password stored in the host corresponding to the read card information.

(9) In the case of inconsistency, record this in the magnetic recording part of the card and request to re-enter the password. When the re-entered password is correct, perform subsequent procedures. The password is input again, and when the wrong password is entered three times in total, the card is invalidated and invalidation measures such as taking it into the terminal device are executed.

(10) When they match, the host judges that the card user is the correct card owner, and requests input of the withdrawal amount.

(11) The user inputs the amount requested for withdrawal.

(12) If the amount requested for withdrawal is appropriate, the cash of the amount is sent out, the cash card is withdrawn from the terminal device, and the bookkeeping for the passbook or the issuance of a processing statement is performed, and the transaction is completed. And, when the password is recorded in the cash card, the password is used as the correct password for transactions, but the password is erased from the magnetic recording unit afterwards.

Figure 2(a) shows an example of cash cards used in the current cash card processing flow shown in Figure 1 . In this figure, 1 is a cash card main body made of plastic or the like, and a magnetic stripe 2 with recorded information and an arrow 3 indicating the insertion direction of the cash card are formed on the front side thereof. In addition, illustrations are omitted, but required items are listed as embossed characters.

The information written in the magnetic stripe can be easily read using a device called a skimmer, so there is a loss of making a counterfeit card and using the counterfeit card repeatedly.

As a countermeasure against this, IC cards incorporating semiconductor memory are used instead of magnetic cards, and banks and the like are planning to popularize them.

However, even with such an IC card, the information stored in the memory can be read, and it cannot be said to be absolutely safe even if it takes a lot of effort to forge it. In addition, IC cards are very expensive compared with magnetic cards, and rapid popularization cannot be expected.

In the case of a bank cash card, it is sufficient that it can be used in only one country. However, in the case of a credit card, it is necessary to be able to use it in a foreign country. All the magnetic cards used in the world, that is, credit cards, will be replaced with IC cards with uniform specifications. This is also impossible in fact.

In addition, cash cards and credit cards are embossed and information such as the owner's name is set, and this information is also used in magnetic information, so the embossed information becomes a clue for counterfeiting the card.

In the case where these magnetic cards or IC cards are lost or stolen, the owner is likely to notice the fact, but, in the case of returning it to the hand after being stolen, especially in the case of returning without noticing, it is easy to happen. Losses caused by using counterfeit cards.

It is not to prevent fraudulent use by preventing the counterfeiting of the card, but to determine whether the card user is appropriate or not. Conventionally, a password consisting of four digits has been used. This password has repeatedly used analogous numbers, and many losses have occurred in the past. Recently, it has become extremely difficult to use passwords not only by analogy but also by monitoring passwords for theft and using passwords to prevent unauthorized use.

In order to prevent losses due to counterfeit cards, biometrics (biometrics) technology using pattern recognition technology is used in part. Representatives of biometric technology include iris recognition, fingerprint recognition, palmprint recognition, finger vein recognition, palm vein recognition, and nail vein recognition. Among these, recognition other than iris recognition includes contact and non-contact types. Either way, graphics need to be entered in advance, and since graphic entry requires labor and time, and certification also takes time, the use cost is very high.

In the case of the contact type, direct contact with the detection device is required, so there is a hygienic or physiological discomfort. In addition, when the authentication part is damaged or in the worst case, the authentication part is lost, and in other cases, biometric authentication cannot be performed. In addition, only partial authentication is performed during the authentication process, so this is not a surefire solution.

In addition, for the biometric authentication system that can only be used by the card owner himself, it is very difficult for the user to entrust an agent to process the card because the time of using the card or the card processing device is not with him. inconvenient.

As one of counterfeiting prevention means, on credit cards, banknotes, securities, etc., embossed holograms formed with concavities and convexities are attached to plastics. The embossed hologram is very difficult to reproduce, so it is practically impossible to counterfeit a card with an embossed hologram, however, in the current way of use, people read the information visually, so it is possible to use Similar embossed holograms forged and used cards etc.

Shown in Fig. 2(b) is an example of a cash card with a hologram for sensory authenticity verification. In this figure, 1 is a credit card body made of plastic or the like, and a magnetic stripe 2 on which information is recorded and an arrow 3 indicating a cash card insertion direction are formed on the front side thereof. In addition, although illustration is omitted, required items are listed in embossed letters.

The cash card 1 is inserted into a terminal device with the portion marked with the arrow 3 as the front end, and an authenticity verification chip 4 made of, for example, an embossed hologram is mounted near the front end.

In the case of a credit card, unlike a cash card, the magnetic stripe is placed on the back of the card, but the card is inserted into the terminal in the same direction, and as a result, the magnetic information of the credit card is read in the opposite direction to that of the cash card.

In the authenticity verification chip 4 , the operator who inserts the card into the terminal device visually, that is, visually, that is, visually confirms the illustrated figure "A" by the senses, instead of being read by the card terminal device.

Due to the difference in the ability of the individual who conducts the identification, and even the same person, due to the difference in the identification environment, psychological state, physical condition, etc., although authenticity identification through the senses plays a great role in one screening, but Low reliability.

For authenticity using the senses, there are deviations in the ability of the individual who conducts the authentication. Even the same person will have differences due to the authentication environment, psychological state, and physical condition. Larger effect, but less reliable.

In JP-A-6-124866, JP-A-6-318282, JP-A-7-220077, JP-9-319849, JP-11-180079, JP-10-143621, JP-A KOKAI Publication No. 2000-47557, JP-A No. 2000-48146, and JP-A No. 2002-74283 show structures for reading data linearly.

In any of the methods described in these known documents, the embossed hologram is read in a straight line along the longitudinal direction of a rectangular card on which the embossed hologram or diffraction grating (grating) is formed. Therefore, there are advantages in that the device is relatively simple and the handling is simple, but the forgery resistance itself is low.

In addition, JP-A-11-272836 discloses an identification technique using a diffraction grating, and JP-A-2002-279480 discloses an identification technique using an embossed hologram and an interference phenomenon of a pattern, Japanese Unexamined Patent Publication No. 2002-341733 discloses an identification technique using an embossed hologram and a latent image.

In JP-A-6-124866, JP-A-6-318282, JP-A-7-220077, JP-9-319849, JP-11-180079, JP-10-143621, JP-A KOKAI Publication No. 2000-47557, JP-A No. 2000-48146, and JP-A No. 2002-74283 show structures for reading data linearly.

In any of the methods described in these known documents, the embossed hologram is read in a straight line along the longitudinal direction of a rectangular card on which the embossed hologram or diffraction grating (grid) is formed. Therefore, there are advantages in that the device is relatively simple and the handling is easy, but the forgery resistance itself is low.

In addition, JP-A-11-272836 discloses an identification technique using a diffraction grating, JP-A 2002-279480 discloses an identification technique using embossed holograms and optical interference, KOKAI Publication No. 2002-341733 discloses an identification technique using an embossed hologram and a latent image.

In authenticity identification using auxiliary equipment, micro-scribing lines, special scribing lines, micro-characters, special-shaped grids, etc., magnifying devices such as magnifying glasses, or special filters that cause optical interference are used for authenticity identification.

Specifically, materials that exhibit special optical properties such as luminescent substrates, luminescent laminated films, luminescent inks, thermochromic inks, and photochromic inks are mixed into substrates, luminescent laminated films, inks, etc. However, these final certifications rely on people's sense organs, so the reliability is low.

In the authenticity verification by mechanical processing, the characteristics of the material are mechanically detected to perform authenticity verification, and there are detection objects such as magnetic and optical characteristics.

Specifically, there are: mixing luminescent materials and magnetic materials into substrates, luminescent laminated films, inks, etc., and using detection equipment to detect; using OCR characters, magnetic barcodes, magnetically or optically attach coded Specific information is detected using magnetic and optical detection equipment.

As a technology for authenticity verification using mechanical processing, in "Financial Business and Artifact Metrix" Bank of Japan Financial Research Institute (http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/japanese/jdps/2004/04-J-12 .pdf) and "The 6th Information セキユテイ・シンポジェョム "Financial Division Nikeru Artifact Metrix" の様" (http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/japanese/kinyu/2004/kk23-2-6 .pdf) shows an artifact-metric system that randomly arranges non-reproducible artifacts in a medium instead of inherent information of living organisms.

In the identification of artificial object features, the light reflection pattern of granular objects, the light transmission pattern of optical fiber, the parallax image pattern of polymer optical fiber, the image pattern of optical fiber, the magnetic pattern of magnetic optical fiber, the magnetic pattern of random recording, the magnetic Random magnetic patterns, random charge patterns of storage units, resonance patterns of conductive optical fibers, resonance patterns of vibration seals, etc. are formed by chance.

There are "card description information" added when the card is issued to the user, and "card body information" added during the manufacturing process of the card. (Refer to "Combined IC Card Coupon Face Counterfeit Prevention Technology Handbook" Ministry of Finance Printing Bureau (http://www.npb.go.jp/ja/info/ichb.pdf))

The card description information is information printed and attached to the card body at the time of card issuance, and corresponds to information related to issuance such as holder information and expiration date.

Tampering, which is a typical form of fraudulent use, is an act of rewriting all or part of the card description information, erasing legitimate information and adding fraudulent information.

The card body information is the information on the card itself after removing the card description information from the issued card, and is laminated with the physical shape of the card, the printing layer of the background pattern base attached in the main pre-printing process, and the protective layer Layer, etc. are attached to the information of the card base.

Counterfeiting is an illegal act performed on the main body of the card by copying or imitating the information attached to the main body of the card, that is, patterns or patterns, and making a card that is similar in appearance. Specifically, it is read by a scanner or the like. The pattern or pattern attached to the face of the real card is processed and corrected by using a printer or the like.

Counterfeit counterfeiting technology against the card itself is limited to printing technology. Although there are many combinations of printing methods, inks, and printing patterns, there is no technology that plays a decisive role so far.

Authenticity authentication methods for authenticating counterfeit are generally classified into authentication with sense organs, authentication with assistive devices, and authentication with mechanical processing.

Authenticity verification using the senses is to verify the authenticity with human senses such as vision and touch. In the authenticity verification using vision, there are main colors, watermarks, patterns or colors attached by changing the viewing angle, etc. Varying holograms, etc., in the authenticity verification using the sense of touch, there are detection of concave and convex shapes attached, detection of the texture of the main body of the card, and the like. Specifically, it is difficult to copy and copy logo marks, special fonts, anti-copy scanning lines, special inks, holograms, optically variable materials, latent image patterns, etc., and there are visually easy Authenticity authentication, embossing processing, additional embossing, perforation, etc. to perform authenticity authentication on the fingertips and visually.

Fig. 3 shows a conventional example of a card equipped with an artificial feature recognition chip made of metal particles disclosed in JP-A-10-44650, in which (a) is an overall view, and (b) is a cross-section Figure, (c) is an enlarged view of the card.

For this card 1, on the opaque card base body 7 that is formed with the opening 8 that authenticity authentication chip is used, laminated with the sheet-shaped artifact feature recognition chip (artifact) of the translucent resin that has mixed metal grain 5 -metrics chip) 4, on which the card surface plate 6 is laminated, and the card surface plate 6 is formed with an opening at the same position as the opening formed on the card base 7 and is formed with a magnetic stripe 2 and an arrow 3.

The metal particles 5 are mixed into the light-transmitting resin in a three-dimensional manner without any regularity. Therefore, the configuration patterns of the metal particles 5 observed through the openings are inherent to each artificial object feature recognition chip 4 . Utilizing this, the light transmitted through the artificial object identification chip 4 is photographed through the opening to observe the arrangement pattern of the metal grains 5, and each artificial object identification chip 4, that is, the card, can be identified.

FIG. 4 shows another conventional example of a card equipped with an artificial object feature recognition chip made of fibers disclosed in JP-A-2003-29636. In this figure, (a) is an overall view, (b) is a cross-sectional view, and (c) is an enlarged view of an artificial object feature recognition chip.

For this card, an artifact feature identification chip 8 is embedded in the opening of the opaque card base body 1, and a magnetic strip 2 and an arrow 3 are formed on the surface of the card base body 1. The mesh member 9 and short fibers 10 are three-dimensionally mixed in a transparent resin. In the artifact recognition chip 8 , an interference pattern is generated due to the pattern of the mesh member 9 and the short fibers 10 .

This interference pattern is inherent in each artificial object feature recognition chip 8, that is, the card. This is utilized to photograph the identification pattern of the artificial object feature recognition chip 8 of the authenticity verification chip according to transmitted light or reflected light, and the card is authenticated.

For the mechanical reading of graphics such as biological feature recognition or artificial object feature recognition, it is generally read by a camera device and performed according to graphic recognition technology. Therefore, there is a possibility of counterfeiting by duplication technology.

In JP-A-6-124866, JP-A-6-318282, JP-A-7-220077, JP-9-319849, JP-11-180079, JP-10-143621, JP-A KOKAI Publication No. 2000-47557, JP-A No. 2000-48146, and JP-A No. 2002-74283 show structures for reading data linearly.

In any of the methods described in these known documents, the embossed hologram is read in a straight line along the longitudinal direction of a rectangular-shaped card on which the embossed hologram or diffraction grating (grating) is formed. Therefore, there are advantages in that the device is relatively simple and the handling is simple, but the forgery resistance itself is low.

In addition, JP-A-11-272836 discloses an identification technique using a diffraction grating, JP-A 2002-279480 discloses an identification technique using embossed holograms and stripes, and JP-A Publication No. 2002-341733 discloses a recognition technique using an embossed hologram and a latent image.

In this way, a card that cannot be forged cannot be realized without establishing a technology for determining the authenticity of the card itself.

Thus, a technology that cannot forge a card has not been realized.

Patent Document 1: JP-A-10-44650

Patent Document 2: JP-A-2003-29636

Patent Document 3: Japanese Unexamined Patent Publication No. 6-124866

Patent Document 4: JP-A-6-318282

Patent Document 5: JP-A-7-220077

Patent Document 6: JP-A-9-319849

Patent Document 7: Japanese Unexamined Patent Application Publication No. 11-180079

Patent Document 8: JP-A-11-272836

Patent Document 9: JP-A-10-143621

Patent Document 10: JP-A-2000-47557

Patent Document 11: JP-A-2000-48146

Patent Document 12: JP-A-2000-66567

Patent Document 13: JP-A-2000-298880

Patent Document 14: JP-A-2002-74283

Patent Document 15: JP-A-2002-279480

Patent Document 16: JP-A-2002-341733

Patent Document 17: JP-A-2005-205897

Non-Patent Document 1: "Financial Business and Artifact Metrix" Bank of Japan Financial Research Institute (http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/japanese/jdps/2004/04-J-12.pdf)

Non-Patent Document 2: "The sixth round of information セキユテイ・シンポジウム "Financial branch field ni ける artificial object Metrix" の様" (http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/japanese/kinyu/2004/kk23-2- 6.pdf)

Non-Patent Document 3: "Combined IC Card Coupon Face Counterfeit Prevention Technology Handbook" Ministry of Finance Printing Bureau (http://www.npb.go.jp/ja/info/ichb.pdf)

Non-Patent Document 4: Nikon Electronics, No. 883

Contents of the invention

This application provides an invention of a card structure, a card processing method, and a card processing device capable of improving security without adding fundamental changes to conventional cash cards or credit cards.

Therefore, the authenticity authentication chip formed of the embossed hologram or the diffraction grating cannot be detachably fixed on the card.

A card authenticity verification device is added to the device that handles the card. In the detection of the information of the authenticity verification chip, in addition to fixing the card, the movement of the authenticity verification chip caused by the card taking operation is used. to scan.

An embossed hologram or a diffraction grating utilizing interference of light has a three-dimensional structure, and therefore, reproduction is impossible except for directly manufacturing a replica from the original. Therefore, even if the magnetically recorded data or the data in the IC chip is copied as in the past, it is impossible to use a counterfeit card.

In addition, by refusing to use illegally, it is possible to prevent damages before they occur, or tolerate the use of illegal cards to some extent, and finally control the illegal cards, thereby making it easy to identify illegal users. Preventing fraudulent card use or identifying fraudulent card users is easy, thereby suppressing fraudulent use.

Description of drawings

Fig. 1 is a flow chart of the current cash card processing.

Fig. 2 is an explanatory diagram of a current cash card and credit card.

Fig. 3 is an example of a conventional card using an artifact feature recognition formed of metal particles.

Figure 4 is an example of an existing card measured using an artifact formed from a fiber sheet.

Figure 5 is an illustration of a card of the present invention using an embossed hologram.

Fig. 6 is an example of writing authentication information using an embossed hologram.

Fig. 7 is an illustration of the installation position of the authenticity verification chip.

Fig. 8 is an example of authenticity authentication information of the present invention created by a computer.

FIG. 9 is an example of random numbers used in the authenticity identification chip of the present invention.

Fig. 10 is an example of an array of random numbers used in the authenticity identification chip of the present invention.

FIG. 11 is an example in which random numbers used in the authenticity identification chip of the present invention are binary numbers.

Fig. 12 is an example of arranging random numbers used in the authentication chip of the present invention as binary numbers.

Fig. 13 is an example of the increase of random numbers used in the authenticity identification chip of the present invention.

Fig. 14 is an example of making the added random number used in the authenticity identification chip of the present invention a binary number.

Fig. 15 is an example of making the increased random number used in the authenticity identification chip of the present invention a quaternary number.

Fig. 16 is an example of arranging random numbers used in the authenticity identification chip of the present invention as quaternary numbers.

FIG. 17 is an illustration of a method for obtaining multiple authenticity verification chips from a random number sequence.

Fig. 18 is an illustration of an authenticity verification chip reading device using an imaging device.

FIG. 19 is an illustration of an authentication chip reading device using reading elements arranged in a matrix.

FIG. 20 is an illustration of an authenticity verification chip reading device using monochromatic reading devices arranged in an array.

Fig. 21 is a structure of a single-color detection device arranged in an array.

FIG. 22 is an illustration of an authentication chip reading device using multi-color reading units arranged in an array.

Fig. 23 is the structure of a multi-color detection device arranged in an array.

Fig. 24 is an illustration of an authenticity verification chip reading device configured by combining a parabolic mirror and a polygon mirror.

FIG. 25 is an illustration of the authenticity verification chip reading device of the present invention using a single reading element.

Fig. 26 is an illustration of the authenticity verification chip reading device of the present invention using two reading elements.

Fig. 27 is an illustration of the read path.

Fig. 28 is an illustration of other read paths.

FIG. 29 is an example of a reading path of a binary random number authenticity verification chip.

FIG. 30 is an example of feature point extraction of a binary random number authenticity verification chip.

FIG. 31 is an example of extracting feature points of a quaternary random number authenticity verification chip.

Fig. 32 is an example of processing an authenticity verification chip of binary random numbers by analog processing.

FIG. 33 is an example of a mark for alignment, a read start and end line, and a mark for a synchronization signal.

Fig. 34 is an example of a card authentication processing flow.

Fig. 35 is another example of the card authenticity discrimination processing flow.

Fig. 36 is another example of the flow of card authenticity discrimination processing.

Mark description

1, 11 cards

2 magnetic stripes

3 arrows

4, 8, 11, 12, 15, 18, 21, 46, 78, 124, 126, 128 authenticity authentication chips

5 metal particles

6, 14 surface panels

7, 13 Substrate

9 grids

10 fiber sheets

16, 19, 22, 23, 25, 101, 104, 106, 107, 108 pits

17, 20, 24, 103 No dimples are formed

48 alignment markers

49 Movement direction reading start line

50 Move direction reading end line

51, 52 end indicator line

111 read element matrix

112, 123, 131, 133 read element

113, 114 reading element array housing

115R Red Read Element Array

115G green read element array

115B blue read element array

119 camera device

120 semi-cylindrical parabolic reflector

121 light through holes

122 polygon mirrors

125, 127 semi-cylindrical semi-parabolic reflector

130, 132 shell

132, 120 straight path

133 multi-line paths

Detailed ways

Hereinafter, preferred modes for carrying out the invention will be described with reference to the drawings.

Fig. 5 shows the basic structure of a card mounted with an embossed hologram chip. In the figure, (a) is an overall view, (b) is a sectional view, and (c) to (e) are enlarged views of an embossed hologram chip.

In this card 11 , a surface plate 14 having an opening in which an embossed hologram chip 12 is embedded is attached to a light-impermeable card base 13 . In addition, the magnetic stripe 2 and the arrow 3 are formed on the surface plate 14 .

The embossed hologram chip is composed of pits with a depth of 1/4 wavelength of the laser used and a portion where no pits are formed. In the portion where pits exist, the emitted laser light is canceled by the incident laser light, so that no outgoing light can be detected. For laser light, in the portion where there is no pit, the outgoing laser light is not canceled by the incident laser light, and the outgoing laser light is detected.

In the case of CD, the laser used is an infrared laser of λ=780nm, λ/4=195nm. In the case of DVD, a red laser light of λ=650nm is used, λ/4=151.25nm. In the case of the next-generation DVD, the blue-violet laser of λ=405nm, the ultraviolet laser of λ=351nm, and the far-ultraviolet laser of λ=266nm are studied, and λ/4 means that the depth of the pit is 101.25nm, 87.75nm, and 66.5 nm respectively. nm.

(c) shows the most basic structure. On the hologram chip 15, pits 16 having a depth of 1/4 wavelength of laser light and portions 17 without pits are arranged at appropriate intervals. In the case of the example shown in the figure, a solid line indicated by a double-headed arrow indicates that both incident light and emitted light exist, and a dotted line indicated by a one-way arrow indicates that there is incident light but no emitted light.

(d) shows an example in which the direction of the laser light is tilted. If there is no information on the tilt angle, the written data cannot be read. In this example, inclined pits 19 having a depth of 1/4 wavelength of laser light and inclined portions 20 not formed with pits are arranged at appropriate intervals on the hologram chip 18 .

In the case of the example shown in the figure, a solid line indicated by a double-headed arrow indicates the presence of both incident light and outgoing light, and a dotted line indicated by a one-way arrow indicates the presence of incident light but no exiting light. An embossed hologram chip that replicates this structure is near impossible. In addition, the structure shown in (c) and the structure shown in (d) can also coexist.

(e) shows an example using laser beams of various wavelengths, and it is difficult to read written data without information on the wavelengths of all the laser beams used. In this example, on the embossed hologram chip 21, pits 22 having a depth of 1/4 wavelength of the red (R) laser light and pits 22 having a depth of 1/4 wavelength of the green (G) laser light are arranged at appropriate intervals. 23. A pit 25 with a depth of 1/4 wavelength of the blue (B) laser and a portion 24 where no pit is formed.

In the case of the example shown in the figure, a solid line indicated by a double-headed arrow indicates the presence of both incident light and emitted light, and a dotted line indicated by a one-way arrow indicates the presence of incident light but no emitted light. An embossed hologram chip that replicates this structure is near impossible. In addition, the configuration shown in (d) and the configuration shown in (e) can also coexist.

Authenticity authentication chip embodiment 1

The authenticity verification information written in the pits will be described with reference to FIG. 6 . For reliable reading, pits representing information are regularly arranged. In this figure, the dotted line indicates the arrangement rule of the pits. In the figure, (a) and (b) are examples using a single-wavelength laser, and the same information is recorded. (c) Using multi-wavelength (three-wavelength in this case) laser light.

In Figs. 6(a), (b), and (c), pits for recording information are arranged at regular intervals. (a) Corresponding to FIG. 5(c), pits 101 are formed at positions where 101010110 information of the embossed hologram chip substrate 15 is recorded, and a protective layer 100 is provided thereon.

Authenticity authentication chip embodiment 2

(b) Corresponding to Fig. 5(d), in order to record the 101010110 information of the embossed hologram chip substrate 18, a pit 104 with an inclined surface is formed at the position of information 1, and an inclined surface 103 is formed at the position of information 0 , and a protective layer 102 is provided thereon. It is also possible to form inclined surfaces and pits having different inclination angles from these inclination angles so that information detection is performed in a direction different from these inclined surfaces 103 and pits 104 .

Authenticity authentication chip embodiment 3

(c) Corresponding to Fig. 5(e), the embossed hologram chip substrate 21 is formed: pits 108 for "00101010" information formed by a 780nm infrared laser, and "01000100" information formed by a 650nm red laser The pits 107 used were the pits 105 for "10010001" information formed by a 405 nm blue light laser, and the protective layer 105 was formed thereon.

Authenticity authentication chip embodiment 4

In the authenticity verification chip by machine reading, there is no need to write characters, patterns, and other graphics that can be authenticated by humans. FIG. 8 shows an example of pits of an authenticity verification chip made of computer-generated binary data suitable for machine reading.

For the authenticity verification embossed hologram chip, 1024 pieces of binary data composed of embossed holograms are configured into a 32×32 matrix, and in this figure, where the binary data “0” is written It is indicated by a blank, and a place where binary data "1" is written is indicated by a "*".

A method for obtaining this binary data will be described. What Fig. 9 shows is the example of the true random number (true random number) of hexadecimal 256 bits (digit) obtained by detecting the radiation emitted by the nuclear fission of radioactive material, for the encryption key (crypt key) ), etc., are usually provided as such hexadecimal numbers.

In FIG. 10 , a matrix in which the hexadecimal random numbers shown in FIG. 9 are arranged in 8 columns and 32 rows is shown. This hexadecimal number can be represented by replacing it with a 4-digit binary number.

That is, "0" of a hexadecimal number is represented by "0000" of a binary number, similarly, "1" is represented by "0001", "2" is represented by "0010", and "3" is represented by "0011". "4" is represented by "0100", "5" is represented by "0101", "6" is represented by "0110", "7" is represented by "0111", "8" is represented by "1000", and "9" is represented by " 1001", "A" is represented by "1010", "B" is represented by "1011", "C" is represented by "1100", "D" is represented by "1101", "E" is represented by "1110", " F" is represented by "1111".

Based on this, the 256-bit hexadecimal random number shown in FIG. 9 is replaced with a binary random number, as shown in FIG. 11 . One-bit hexadecimal number is replaced by four-bit binary number, therefore, 256-bit hexadecimal number becomes 256-bit×4-bit=1024-bit binary number. These binary numbers are obtained directly in the random number generator, so, in this case, the permutation operation is not needed.

These are arranged in a matrix of 8 columns and 32 rows as shown in FIG. 10 , and a matrix of 32 columns and 32 rows is shown in FIG. 12 in units of bits of binary numbers.

Finally, in the matrix of Fig. 12, no information is written in the place corresponding to the binary number 0, and the information is written in the place represented by "*" corresponding to 1, so as to obtain the authenticity authentication chip shown in Fig. 8 .

The authenticity authentication chip thus formed has 32 columns×32 rows×1 bit (bit)=1024 bits of authenticity authentication information, that is, a 1024-bit authentication key.

The embossed hologram chip shown in Figure 6(c) is capable of using multiple wavelengths of light. Therefore, the following shows the pits of a card authenticity verification chip that is suitable for mechanical reading and is produced by a computer using general red (R), green (G) and blue (B) lights as binary data. Structure example.

These "R", "G", and "B" can express a total of four states including "0" in a state where no data has been written. In other words, they can be handled as quaternary numbers, and quaternary numbers can be represented by four 2-bit numbers, namely "00", "01", "10", and "11".

FIG. 13 is a diagram showing the 256-bit hexadecimal random number shown in FIG. 9 together with the previous 256-bit hexadecimal random number. Here, "hexadecimal random number sequence a" is the same random number sequence as shown in FIG. 9 , and "hexadecimal random number sequence b" is a random number sequence preceding "hexadecimal random number sequence a".

In FIG. 14, the hexadecimal random number sequence is converted into a binary random number sequence, and the random number sequence divided by 2 bits for conversion into a quaternary number expressed as 0, R, G, and B is shown. .

And, as shown in FIG. 15, the binary number "00" is converted into a quaternary number "0", the binary number "01" is converted into a quaternary number "R", and the binary number "10" is converted into a quaternary number "R". System number "G", convert binary number "11" into quaternary number "B".

As shown in FIG. 16, similar to the binary numbers shown in FIG. 8 or FIG. 12, the quaternary numbers thus obtained are arranged in a matrix of 32 columns×32 rows. The authenticity verification chip thus formed has 32 columns×32 rows×2 bits=2048 bits of authenticity verification information, in other words, a 2048-bit authenticity verification key.

Authenticity identification chip embodiment 5

The method of obtaining a plurality of authenticity authentication chips from one random number sequence is described according to FIG. 17 . In this figure, (a), (b), (c), and (d) are respectively 16×16 matrix graphics obtained according to the 32×32 matrix graphics shown in Figure 8, and (a) is represented by coordinates ( 0, 0) is the origin, (b) takes the coordinates (1, 0) as the origin, (c) takes the coordinates (0, 1) as the origin, and (d) takes the coordinates (1, 1) as the origin. In this way, a plurality of matrix patterns can be obtained from one matrix pattern obtained from the random number sequence shown in FIG. 6 .

In order to obtain a plurality of matrix patterns from one random sequence, various methods such as changing the starting position of using the random sequence shown in FIG. 6 or changing the starting position of creating the matrix pattern shown in FIG. 7 can be used.

Thereby, the card issuer can keep secret one random number sequence as the main random number sequence, and can obtain a plurality of matrix patterns based on the main random number sequence. In addition, multiple matrix graphics can be automatically managed based on origin information.

The embodiment shown in Fig. 8, Fig. 12 and Fig. 17 utilizes the binary number that expresses with 1 bit to record authenticity authentication information, and the embodiment shown in Fig. 16 utilizes the quaternary number that expresses with 2 bits to record authenticity authentication information. As an extension of these, an octal number represented by 3 digits or a hexadecimal number represented by 4 digits can also be used.

Authenticity authentication chip installation position

FIG. 7 shows mounting positions of authenticity verification chips having these structures. For the installation position of authenticity authentication chip 46, except the position of the card main body shown in Figure 5 approximately center, also can be the center front position shown in Figure 7 (a), the center center position shown in (b) , The central rear position shown in (c), the lower front end position shown in (d), the lower central position shown in (e), and the lower rear position shown in (f). Although an upper position is also possible, it is preferable to avoid disposing at an upper position if there is a possibility of affecting reading of information from the magnetic stripe.

Reading device embodiment 1

Reading of a hologram chip, that is, an authenticity verification chip will be described. The reading method includes a method of reading a hologram chip directly as a plane, a method of reading a plane as a collection of lines, and a method of reading a plane as a collection of dots.

FIG. 18 shows an example of an imaging device using the most basic configuration in which a hologram chip is read directly as a surface. Use the imaging device 110 to read the hologram chip 15 from the card main body 11 composed of the card substrate 13, the card upper surface board 14, and the hologram chip 15, and use pattern recognition technology for authentication.

When the card 11 is taken into the reading device and stopped, the imaging device 110 photographs the hologram chip 15 irradiated with a laser beam light source not shown, and authenticates the hologram chip 15 based on the photographed image. As a result, the authenticity of the card 11 is authenticated.

Reading device embodiment 2

In FIG. 19 , a configuration example of a reading device configured with detection elements arranged in a matrix and performing reading in a planar manner will be described. In this figure, (a) is a figure which shows the schematic structure of a reader, and (b) is a figure which shows the correspondence relationship of a card and a reader. In this figure, 11 is a card main body, 13 is a base plate, 14 is an upper surface plate, and 15 is an authenticity authentication chip which is a hologram chip. 111 is a read element matrix in which small-sized read elements 112 are arranged in a planar shape covering the hidden authenticity authentication chip 15. Each read element is composed of a light source and a light receiving element. The light source is composed of a semiconductor laser or the like, and the light receiving element Consists of light emitting diodes etc.

When the card 11 is taken into the reading device and stopped, the authenticity verification chip 15 is located under the planar read element matrix 111 , and the read element matrix 111 reads the authenticity authentication information of the authenticity verification chip 15 .

Reading device embodiment 3

A device that reads the surface of an authenticity verification chip as a collection of lines will be described.

FIG. 20 shows an example in which read elements are arranged in an array. In the figure, (a) is a diagram showing a schematic configuration of a detection unit of a reading device, and (b) is a diagram showing a correspondence relationship between cards and array-shaped reading elements. The card 11 in this figure is the same as the card shown in FIG. 19, so the description of the card is omitted.

In this figure, 113 is a casing having a length slightly longer than the width of the authenticity verification chip 15 in the moving direction, wherein a plurality of reading elements 112 are arranged in a line to form an array of reading elements, and each reading element consists of The light source is composed of a semiconductor laser or the like, and the light receiving element is composed of a light emitting diode or the like.

In this reading device, when the card 11 is taken into the card reading device, it passes under the reading element array. At this time, the reading elements 112 arranged in an array read the authenticity authentication information in the authenticity authentication chip 15 .

FIG. 21 shows an example of arrangement of reading elements of the reading device shown in FIG. 20 . As shown in (a), 32 reading elements from "D00" to "D31" are arranged in a row on the base. Furthermore, as an arrangement, as shown in (b), reading units "D00" to "D31" may be arranged in a zigzag shape.

Reading device embodiment 4

FIG. 22 shows an example of the configuration of the card recognition device in the case of using the quaternary numbers shown in FIG. 16 , that is, different plural colors. In this example, based on the reading element array shown in FIG. 20 , a red reading element array 115R, a green reading element array 115G, and a blue reading element array 115B are accommodated in a housing 114 .

The red reading element array 115R, the green reading element array 115G, and the blue reading element array 115B are examples, and of course any combination of colors is possible.

FIG. 23 shows a configuration example of the reading element array when laser R, laser G, and laser B shown in FIG. 22 are used. For the read element array, 32 laser R read element arrays "R00" to "R31", laser G read element arrays "G00" to "G31", laser B read element array "B00" ~ "B31" are arranged in three columns.

Reading device embodiment 5

In the development of the next-generation DVD, the use of an optical head or a three-wavelength laser is studied, and a photodetector corresponding to the three wavelengths is used for detection. With laser integration of lasers, the three-wavelength laser is capable of emitting three kinds of laser light from one element. (Refer to Nikkei Electronics, No. 883, page 119, issued on September 27, 2004) If the photodetectors are arranged in a row and used, then using the same structure as in FIG. Read element array.

Reading device embodiment 6

A reading device of a new structure is shown in FIG. 24 . A light scanning unit that uses a rotating polygonal lenticular mirror (polygon mirror) to reflect a laser beam is used in a laser beam printer or the like. In this scanning unit, optical scanning can be performed only by the rotational movement of the polygon mirror, but the resulting reflected light beam is reflected radially, so the light beam does not enter the target portion perpendicularly. Therefore, optical scanning using a polygon mirror cannot be said to be a system suitable for use in a detection unit of a hologram chip that reads information using the depth of pits and the wavelength of incident light.

As a means of obtaining parallel light beams, paraboloids are used in reflecting telescopes and parabolic antennas. Figure 24(a) shows the relationship between paraboloids and parallel rays. In this figure, what is marked X is the X axis, what is marked Y is the Y axis orthogonal to the X axis, and O is the origin. P is a parabola represented by Y= ^-X2 . In this parabola, the focal point F is located at the position of X=0, Y=-1/4, and when the straight lines parallel to the Y axis are reflected by the parabola P, they all converge to the focal point F. Conversely, when a straight line based on the focal point F is reflected by the parabola 100, it becomes parallel to the Y axis.

In Fig. 24(b), the basic structure of a device for reading embossed holograms applying this principle is shown. In this figure, 120 is a reflecting mirror having a paraboloid, and is formed in a semi-cylindrical shape having a length in a direction perpendicular to the paper surface. Furthermore, a light passage hole 121 through which light passes is formed at a position corresponding to the origin in FIG. 24( a ). In addition, the focal point of the semi-cylindrical parabolic mirror 120 has a rotation axis parallel to the axis in the extending direction of the semi-cylindrical parabolic mirror 120, and a polygonal mirror (polygonal mirror) 122 having a polygonal reflecting surface is arranged. Also, 124 is a hologram chip.

The laser beam light emitted by the light receiving and emitting element 123 in the Y-axis direction in FIG. 24( a ) enters the polygon mirror 122 through the light passage hole 121 . The laser beam incident on the polygon mirror is reflected, reflected on the semi-cylindrical parabolic mirror 120 , and is incident on the hologram chip 124 .

Since the polygonal reflector 122 is arranged at the focal point of the semi-cylindrical parabolic reflector 120, the laser beam light reflected by the polygonal reflector 122 and incident on the semi-cylindrical parabolic reflective mirror 120 is reflected again, reflected to and from the light-receiving The laser beam light emitted by the light emitting element 123 is incident on the hologram chip 124 in a direction parallel to the traveling direction. When the laser beam incident on the pits of the hologram chip 124 is reflected without being cancelled, the reflected laser beam is incident on the light receiving and emitting element 123 along the same path as the incident laser beam. As can be understood from this description, all the laser beam light emitted from the light receiving and emitting element 123 is incident perpendicularly to the hologram chip 124 .

Reading device embodiment 7

In the hologram chip reading device shown in FIG. 24( b ), the information of the hologram chip 124 corresponding to the back side of the polygon mirror 122 cannot be read when viewed from the light receiving and emitting element 123 . Although it is possible not to write necessary information in this part, or to write unnecessary information, according to the structure shown in FIG. All information written into the hologram chip 124.

Figure 24(c) shows the basic structure for the above purpose, using half of a semi-cylindrical parabolic mirror. In this figure, 125 is a reflecting mirror having a paraboloid, but it is formed into a semi-cylindrical shape having a length in a direction perpendicular to the paper surface using only the negative X portion of FIG. 24( a ). In addition, the light passage hole 121 formed in FIG. 24(b) is not formed because it is unnecessary. And, at the focal point of the semi-cylindrical semi-parabolic mirror 125, a polygonal mirror (polygonal mirror) 122 having a polygonal reflection surface having a rotation axis parallel to the axis of extension of the semi-cylindrical semi-parabolic mirror 125 is arranged. . Also, 126 is an embossed hologram chip.

The laser beam emitted from the light-receiving and emitting element 123 to the polygon mirror 122 is reflected by the polygon mirror 122 , is incident on the semi-cylindrical semi-parabolic mirror 125 , is reflected, and is vertically incident on the hologram chip 126 . In this hologram reading device, since the hologram chip 124 corresponding to the rear side of the polygon mirror 122 is only an end portion when viewed from the light receiving and emitting element 123, the influence of the unreadable portion is small.

Reading device embodiment 8

And, as shown in FIG. 24( d), an offset structure in which the center portion of the semi-cylindrical partial parabolic mirror 127 is smaller and the polygon mirror 122 is not opposed to the semi-cylindrical partial parabolic mirror 127 is adopted, thereby , the unreadable portion is completely eliminated, and the information written in all portions of the embossed hologram chip 128 can be read.

Reading device embodiment 9

Multiple wavelengths can be read by providing a plurality of reading devices of FIG. 24(b), (c), and (d) corresponding to a plurality of wavelengths.

Reading device embodiment 10

A reading device that reads the face of the authenticity verification chip as a set of dots will be described. In Fig. 25, a reading device using a single reading element is shown. In FIG. 25, (a) is a schematic structure of the relationship between a card and a reader, and (b) is an explanatory diagram of a data detection method. In this figure, 11 is a card main body, 13 is a substrate, 14 is a card upper surface plate, 15 is an authenticity authentication chip, 131 is a reading element, and 130 is a housing for storing the reading element 131. 131 moves in a direction orthogonal to the direction in which the card 11 is taken in.

The movement in the direction perpendicular to the direction in which the card 11 is taken in can be performed using pseudo linear motion caused by rotational motion using a point as a fulcrum, linear motion resulting from conversion from rotational motion to linear motion, or linear motion caused by a linear motor or the like. Appropriate exercise such as exercise. (b) shows a representative example of the moving path. In this example, move in the direction indicated by the arrow in (b) at a uniform speed, and follow the straight path 132 synthesized with the moving direction of the card itself. move. The reading element 131 does not necessarily have to move, and may be moved to an arbitrary position in a direction perpendicular to the direction in which the card 11 is taken in, and may be fixedly used.

Reading device embodiment 11

The reading device shown in FIG. 25 uses a single reading element, but, as shown in FIG. 26, this reading element is made into a plurality, so that reading can be performed through multiple paths, and the reliability of reading can be improved. However, since the information to be processed is linear information, the processing load does not increase.

In FIG. 26, (a) is a schematic structure of the relationship between a card and a reader, and (b) is explanatory drawing of a detection method. The card 11 in this figure is the same as the card 11 shown in FIG. 25, so the description of the card is omitted.

For this embodiment, in addition to the first reading device consisting of the reading element 131 and the housing 130 of the embodiment shown in FIG. Read device.

The second reading device constituted by the reading element 132 and the housing 133 shown in this figure moves in the direction opposite to the moving direction of the first reading device constituted by the reading element 131 and the housing 130, but , and the direction of movement can also be the same.

A representative example of the path is shown in (b), in which the first reading device and the second reading device move at a uniform speed in the directions indicated by arrows in (b), respectively, along the The combined path 132, 120 moves in its own moving direction.

read path

There is a possibility that a reading error may occur due to a path error or a defect of a reading device. In such a case, in FIG. 27 , as indicated by 134 , reading is performed by a plurality of reading elements at the same time, and the final read information is determined by the average or majority decision.

Reading device embodiment 12

The case where it is applied to the authenticity verification chip shown in FIG. 12 and FIG. 16 will be described.

For convenience of description, an example using the binary numbers shown in FIG. 12 will be described using FIG. 29 . This can also be similarly applied to the example using the quaternary numbers shown in FIG. 16 .

In FIG. 29 , the authenticity verification data on the linear detection path from coordinates (0, 0) to (31, 31) is 11000101001001101010101101110111. In addition, the authenticity verification data on the linear detection path from the coordinates (0, 31) to (31, 0) is 11100101001010000000110000010011.

The detection path is not limited to the path shown in FIG. 29 , for example, any path shown in FIG. 28 may be used, and it may be changed every time reading is performed.

In addition, coordinate conversion may be performed within the machine after reading.

Such a combination of data detection paths is a sufficiently large number of 3232≈1048 even under the condition that the data detection paths do not return. Even so, for comparison, the image information stored in advance in the reading device is only 1024 bits.

In addition, the quaternary number example shown in FIG. 16 is only different from the quaternary number example in that the information amount of the pattern compared for detection information is increased to 2048 bits, so description is omitted.

read path

Several examples of read paths are shown in FIG. 28 . (a) to (d) are examples using a single information reading path, and (e) to (f) are examples using two reading paths. In addition, there may be three or more read paths.

These reading paths can also be realized by selecting and switching the reading elements of the detection arrays shown in FIG. 21 and FIG. 23 . For example, in the detection array shown in FIG. 21 , the detection elements are read out in the order of D00, D01, D02, D03...D28, D29, D30, D31, resulting in the path 132 shown in FIG. 25 . The reading path is not limited to these examples, and any path may be adopted. Also, electrical readout can be performed in an irregular order.

A method of discriminating the authenticity of the authenticity verification chip shown in FIG. 12 and FIG. 16 by applying the feature point extraction method used in biometric identification will be described. Referring to FIG. 30 , a method for authenticating the authenticity verification chip formed of binary number information of 0 and 1 shown in FIG. 12 will be described. In this figure, four or more consecutive "0"s are represented by reversed white and black symbols, and similarly, four or more consecutive "1"s are represented by enclosing symbols.

For example, "0000" has 13 starting from coordinates (16, 1). . .

"00000" has 7 starting from coordinates (15, 5). . .

"000000" has one starting from coordinates (13, 31).

There are three "0000000" starting from coordinates (24, 2).

"000000000000" has one starting from coordinates (6, 12).

"00000000000000" has one starting from coordinates (7, 15).

"1111" has 12 starting from coordinates (14, 4). . .

"11111" has 8 starting from coordinates (0, 7). . .

"111111" has one starting from coordinate (19, 1).

"1111111" has one starting from coordinates (12, 19).

"11111111" has two coordinates starting from (17, 6)....

"1111111111" has one starting from coordinates (14, 3).

By detecting these feature points and their starting position coordinates, the authenticity of the authenticity verification chip can be authenticated.

Reading device embodiment 13

Using FIG. 31 , a method of authenticating the authenticity verification chip formed using the quaternary numbers shown in FIG. 16 will be described. As shown in FIG. 16 , in this matrix, 5 "000", 3 "0000", 0 "00000", and 2 "000000" are arranged horizontally as feature points.

In addition, 9 "RRR", 4 "RRRR", and 0 "RRRR" are arranged in the horizontal direction.

In addition, five "GGG", four "GGGG", and one "GGGGG" are arranged in a horizontal direction.

In addition, 8 "BBB", 0 "BBBB", and 3 "BBBB" are arranged in the horizontal direction.

By detecting these feature points and their starting position coordinates, the authenticity of the authenticity verification chip can be authenticated. For the extracted feature points, in addition to the same authentication information arranged in a row in the horizontal direction, the same authentication information arranged in a row in the vertical direction and the same authentication information arranged in a hook shape can also be used. The specific arrangement determined by different authentication information such as "0RGB".

Furthermore, when binary information is used, a quaternary number is created by using authentication information at an intermediate stage, for example, two stages of gray in the middle of white and black binary information. With such a structure, not only is it more difficult to forge, but also if some of the binary information that are 0 are used as fakes using halftones, the forger will be more confused.

For the use of halftones, the same applies when quaternary information such as 0, R, G, and B is used, and 3-digit octal numbers, 4-digit hexadecimal numbers, and the like can also be used.

The authenticity verification method described so far is a method of digitally processing digitally recorded authenticity verification information, however, FIG. 32 shows a configuration in which digitally recorded authenticity verification information is subjected to analog processing.

In this figure, for example, using the authenticity authentication chip reading device shown in FIG. 25 or FIG. 26, the paths indicated by 132 and 120 scan the pattern of the authenticity authentication chip shown in (a), thereby, The electrical signals shown in (b) and (c) are obtained, and these electrical signal patterns are compared with the stored regular electrical signal patterns to verify the authenticity of the card authenticating body and the card itself.

Reading device embodiment 14

The physical specifications of cash cards and credit cards are strictly regulated from the viewpoint of versatility, so of course, the physical specifications of components installed thereon are also strictly regulated. However, the possibility of deformation due to excessive use cannot be denied.

In order to cope with such a situation, it is preferable to form the alignment mark 48 shown in FIG. 33 on the authenticity verification chip in advance. There may be one mark for alignment most easily, but a plurality of marks are provided in order to perform alignment more reliably.

In addition, the alignment mark is useful not only for linear reading but also for planar reading using an imaging device.

In order to read more reliably, it is also used as a mark for alignment. Arbitrary marks, such as a moving direction reading start line 49 and a moving direction reading end line 50, are provided at the reading start position and the reading end position of the card identification body. , and further set the end indicator lines 51,52.

The information on the card identification body is read through the relative movement of the card identification body and the reading device. Therefore, in order to perform reliable reading, it is necessary to synchronize the movement of the card identification body and the reading device. Therefore, if the mark 53 for a synchronizing signal is formed on the card identification body in advance, the movement of the reading device and the reading of the mark can be synchronized.

In addition, it is also possible to use marks for reading start and end lines and/or synchronization signals for signal normalization during signal processing.

These alignment marks, reading start and end lines, and/or marks for synchronizing signals are all made of fluorescent substance particles, and are formed, for example, by a suitable printing unit such as an inkjet printer.

Processing flow embodiment 1

An example of a card authenticity verification process flow is shown in FIGS. 34 to 36 . Shown in FIG. 34 is Embodiment 1 of the basic structure.

(1) When a card user inserts a cash card into the card slot of a terminal device such as an ATM with the arrow part as the front end, the sensor of the card slot detects this, and the card is taken into the device.

(2) When the card is taken in, the terminal device reads the card information from the magnetic recording portion of the card.

(3) The terminal device judges whether or not the inserted card is a card that can be handled by the terminal device.

(4) If it cannot be confirmed from the read card information that it can be processed, or if the card information cannot be read even if it is a legitimate card due to damage or contamination, the terminal device will send the The card is ejected as an unsuitable card that cannot be processed.

(5) For the terminal device, the authenticity authentication information written in the authenticity authentication chip is read by using the mechanical scanning of the movement of the card when the card is taken in, or in the state of stopping after the card is taken in .

(6) The terminal device judges whether the read authenticity authentication information is legitimate.

(7) When the terminal device judges that the authentication information is incorrect, it judges the inserted card as not a legitimate card, withdraws the card from the terminal device, and ends the process.

In addition, the judgment of the legitimacy of the authenticity authentication information and the subsequent card processing can also be performed in parallel with other processing.

(8) When the terminal device judges that the authenticity authentication information is valid, it requests the user to perform further input operations such as withdrawal amount.

(9) The user performs an input operation such as the withdrawal amount according to the request.

(10) The host judges whether the content of the input operation such as the withdrawal amount is appropriate.

(11) When the host judges that the content of the input operation such as the withdrawal amount is inappropriate due to reasons such as insufficient balance, the card is withdrawn from the terminal device, and the process is terminated.

(12) When the host judges that the content of the input operation such as the withdrawal amount is appropriate, it outputs according to the withdrawal, withdraws the card from the terminal device, and ends the process.

Processing flow embodiment 2

FIG. 35 shows the second embodiment of the card authenticity verification process flow. In the example shown in FIG. 34, when the card authentication information is incorrect, the card is withdrawn from the terminal device. On the other hand, in this card authentication processing flow, when the card authentication information is incorrect, the card is withdrawn from the terminal device. , the card is taken into the terminal device, and an alarm is issued. In this way, fraudulent cards are easily revealed.

(1) When a card user inserts a cash card into the card slot of a terminal device such as an ATM with the arrow part as the front end, the sensor of the card slot detects this, and the card is taken into the device.

(2) When taking in the card, the terminal device reads the card information from the magnetic recording portion of the card.

(3) The terminal device judges whether or not the inserted card is a card that can be handled by the terminal device.

(4) When the information indicating that it can be processed cannot be confirmed from the read card information, or when the card information cannot be read due to damage or contamination even if it is a legitimate card, the terminal device will The card is withdrawn as an unsuitable card that cannot be processed.

(5) For the terminal device, the authenticity authentication information written in the authenticity authentication chip is checked by mechanical scanning of the movement of the card when the card is taken in, or when the card is taken in and stopped. Read.

(6) The terminal device judges whether the read-in authentication information is correct.

(7) When the terminal device judges that the authenticity authentication information is not correct, the inserted card is judged as not a legitimate card, the card is stored in the terminal device, and an alarm is issued.

If the alarm is only sent out at a place far away from the terminal machine and the fault display is carried out in the terminal machine, then it is easy to control the irregular card user.

In addition, the judgment of the legitimacy of the authenticity authentication information and the subsequent card processing may be performed in parallel with other processing.

(8) When the terminal device judges that the authenticity verification information is legitimate information, it requests the user to perform further input operations such as the withdrawal amount.

(9) The user performs an input operation such as the withdrawal amount according to the request.

(10) The host judges whether the content of the input operation such as the withdrawal amount is appropriate.

(11) When the host judges that the content of the input operation such as the withdrawal amount is inappropriate due to reasons such as insufficient balance, the card is withdrawn from the terminal device, and the process is terminated.

(12) When the host judges that the content of the input operation such as the amount of withdrawal is appropriate, it outputs according to the withdrawal, etc., withdraws the card from the terminal device, and ends the process.

Processing flow embodiment 3

FIG. 36 shows Embodiment 3 of the card authenticity verification processing flow. In Embodiment 2 of the card authenticity authentication processing flow shown in FIG. 35, when the authentication information is incorrect, the card is directly taken into the terminal device and only an alarm is issued. For the pseudo-authentication processing flow, the card user is made to operate. Thereby, fraudulent card detection can be reliably performed.

(1) When a card user inserts a cash card into the card slot of a terminal device such as an ATM with the arrow part as the tip, the sensor of the card slot detects this, and the card is taken into the device.

(2) When taking in the card, the terminal device reads the card information from the magnetic recording portion of the card.

(3) The terminal device judges whether or not the inserted card is a card that can be handled by the terminal device.

(4) When it is not possible to confirm the information indicating that it can be processed based on the read card information, or when the card information cannot be read due to damage or contamination even if it is a legitimate card, the terminal device will The card is withdrawn as an unsuitable card that cannot be processed.

(5) The terminal device reads the authenticity authentication information written in the authenticity authentication chip by mechanically scanning the movement of the card when the card is taken in, or in a state of stopping after the card is taken in.

(6) The terminal device judges whether the read-in card authenticity authentication information is correct.

(7) When the terminal device judges that the authentication information is incorrect, it requests the user to perform further input operations such as withdrawal amount.

In addition, the judgment of the legitimacy of the authenticity authentication information and the subsequent card processing can also be performed in parallel with other processing.

(8) The user performs further input operations such as withdrawal amount according to the request.

(9) Store the card in the terminal device, and issue an alarm.

If the alarm is only sent out at a place far away from the terminal and the fault is displayed in the terminal, it is easy to control the illegal card user.

(10) When the terminal device judges that the card authenticity authentication information is valid, it requests the user to perform further input operations such as withdrawal amount.

(11) The user performs an input operation such as the withdrawal amount according to the request.

(12) The host computer judges whether the content of the input operation such as the withdrawal amount is appropriate.

(14) When the host judges that the content of the input operation such as the withdrawal amount is inappropriate due to reasons such as insufficient balance, the card is withdrawn from the terminal device, and the process is terminated.

By making such a structure, not only the time for the unauthorized card user to use the terminal device becomes longer and the time for controlling it is longer, but also makes it operate, whereby evidence such as fingerprints can be collected. In this case, when a contact type contact switch is used, fingerprint collection becomes more reliable.

From the viewpoint of versatility, since the physical specifications of cash cards and credit cards are strictly regulated, the physical specifications of components installed thereon are also strictly regulated. However, the possibility of deformation due to excessive use cannot be denied.

Industrial availability

The authenticity authentication chip and the card with the authenticity authentication chip described above can be applied to bank cash cards, credit cards, prepaid cards, point cards, securities, ID cards, institution passes, certificates, and the like.

In addition, instead of embossed hologram chips, optical patterns can be generated by the same interference of incident light and reflected light as embossed holograms, that is, natural materials or artificial materials that emit nacreous or iridescent colors. Chips of material.

Claims (as amended under Article 19 of the Treaty)

1. (After modification) A card consisting of a substrate and an authenticity authentication chip, wherein,

The authenticity authentication chip is stacked on the substrate, and an embossed hologram is formed in the authenticity authentication chip. Part of the above-mentioned pits.

2. (Modified) The card of claim 1, wherein,

A surface plate is further laminated on the authenticity verification chip, and the surface plate is made of a material with high transmittance to the incident light.

3. (As amended) The card of claim 1 or claim 2, wherein,

The pits are pits of the same depth vertically formed in the chip.

4. A card as claimed in claim 1 or claim 2 wherein,

The embossed hologram consists of pits of different depths vertically formed in the chip.

5. A card as claimed in claim 1 or claim 2 wherein,

The embossed hologram consists of pits of the same depth obliquely formed in the chip.

6. A card as claimed in claim 1 or claim 2 wherein,

The embossed hologram consists of pits of different depths obliquely formed in the chip.

7. The card of claim 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6, wherein,

The pits are arranged in a matrix.

8. The card of claim 7, wherein,

The pits are configured using binary random numbers.

9. The card of claim 8, wherein,

The pits are part of pits configured with binary random numbers.

10. The card of claim 7, wherein:

The pits are configured using quaternary random numbers.

11. The card of claim 10, wherein:

The pits are part of pits configured with quaternary random numbers.

12. (After modification) An embossed hologram chip reading device, which reads the embossed hologram of the authenticity authentication chip installed on the card. Dimples and parts where the dimples are not formed, wherein,

The reading device has an incident light-receiving and light-emitting element matrix having the same area as the authentication chip.

13. (Modified) An embossed hologram chip reading device, which reads the embossed hologram of the authenticity authentication chip installed on the card. Dimples and parts where the dimples are not formed, wherein,

The reading device has an incident light-receiving light-emitting element array having the same width as the authenticity authentication chip.

14. (After modification) An embossed hologram chip reading device, which reads the embossed hologram of the authenticity authentication chip installed on the card. Dimples and parts where the dimples are not formed, wherein,

The embossed hologram chip reading device includes a parabolic cylindrical reflecting mirror, a polygonal reflecting mirror, and an incident light-receiving and light-emitting element. configured behind the reflector.

15. (After modification) The embossed hologram chip reading device of claim 14, wherein,

The paraboloid is a whole paraboloid, a light passing hole is formed in the center of the reflector, and the incident light receiving and light emitting element is arranged behind the reflector.

16. (After modification) The embossed hologram chip reading device of claim 14, wherein,

The paraboloid is a semi-paraboloid.

17. (After modification) The embossed hologram chip reading device of claim 14, wherein,

The paraboloid is a paraboloid smaller than a half paraboloid, and the polygon mirrors are offset.

18. (Modified) An embossed hologram chip reading device, which reads the embossed hologram of the authenticity authentication chip installed on the card. Dimples and parts where the dimples are not formed, wherein,

The embossed hologram chip reading device has an incident light-receiving and light-emitting element that can move in the width direction of the authenticity authentication chip, and the incident light-receiving and light-emitting element reads the embossed hologram of the authenticity authentication chip that is moving. picture.

19. (After modification) The embossed hologram chip reading device of claim 18, wherein,

It also has another incident light receiving light emitting element.

Claims (19)

1. a card is made of substrate and true and false trusted authentication chip, wherein,

Described true and false trusted authentication chip is layered on the described substrate, is formed with the embossing hologram in described true and false trusted authentication chip.

2. card as claimed in claim 1, wherein,

Also be laminated with surface plate on described true and false trusted authentication chip, described surface plate is by constituting at the high synthetic resin of the permeability of light.

3. as the card of claim 1 or claim 2, wherein,

Described embossing hologram is made of the pit of the same depth that vertically forms in described chip.

4. as the card of claim 1 or claim 2, wherein,

Described embossing hologram is made of the pit of the different depth that vertically forms in described chip.

5. as the card of claim 1 or claim 2, wherein,

Described embossing hologram is made of the pit of the same depth that forms in described chip medium dip.

6. as the card of claim 1 or claim 2, wherein,

Described embossing hologram is made of the pit of the different depth that forms in described chip medium dip.

7. as claim 1,2,3,4,5 or 6 card, wherein,

Described pit is configured to rectangular.

8. card as claimed in claim 7, wherein,

Described pit utilizes the configuration of scale-of-two random number.

9. card as claimed in claim 8, wherein,

Described pit is a part of utilizing the pit of scale-of-two random number configuration.

10. card as claimed in claim 7, wherein,

Described pit utilizes the configuration of quaternary random number.

11. as the card of claim 10, wherein,

Described pit is a part of utilizing the pit of quaternary random number configuration.

12. a hologram chip reader reads the hologram of the true and false trusted authentication chip that is installed on the card, wherein,

Described reading device has and the described true and false trusted authentication chip light light-emitting element matrix that is subjected to of the same area.

13. a hologram chip reader reads the hologram of the true and false trusted authentication chip that is installed on the card, wherein,

Described reading device have with described true and false trusted authentication chip same widths be subjected to the light light-emitting device array.

14. a hologram chip reader reads the hologram of the true and false trusted authentication chip that is installed on the card, wherein,

Described hologram chip reader possess parabolic tubular catoptron, polygonal mirror, be subjected to the light light-emitting component, the turning axle of described polygonal mirror is configured in the focus of described catoptron, is subjected to the light light-emitting component to be configured in the behind of described catoptron.

15. as the hologram chip reader of claim 14, wherein,

Described parabola is whole parabolic, is formed with light by the hole in the central authorities of described catoptron, disposes described photodetector at described light by the behind in hole and in the behind of described catoptron.

16. as the hologram chip reader of claim 14, wherein,

Described parabola is a half paraboloid.

17. as the hologram chip reader of claim 14, wherein,

Described parabola is the parabola littler than half paraboloid, described polygonal mirror offset configuration.

18. a hologram chip reader reads the hologram of the true and false trusted authentication chip that is installed on the card, wherein,

Described hologram chip reader have can move at the Width of described true and false trusted authentication chip be subjected to the light light-emitting component, the described hologram that is subjected to the light light-emitting component to read the true and false trusted authentication chip in moving.

19. as the hologram chip reader of claim 18, wherein,

Also have another and be subjected to the light light-emitting component.

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