CA2263031A1 - Communications based train control - Google Patents
Communications based train control Download PDFInfo
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- CA2263031A1 CA2263031A1 CA002263031A CA2263031A CA2263031A1 CA 2263031 A1 CA2263031 A1 CA 2263031A1 CA 002263031 A CA002263031 A CA 002263031A CA 2263031 A CA2263031 A CA 2263031A CA 2263031 A1 CA2263031 A1 CA 2263031A1
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- wayside
- train
- train control
- trains
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- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 30
- 230000011664 signaling Effects 0.000 description 7
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 description 4
- 238000001228 spectrum Methods 0.000 description 4
- 238000012423 maintenance Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000000926 separation method Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000013478 data encryption standard Methods 0.000 description 2
- 229910000831 Steel Inorganic materials 0.000 description 1
- 238000013459 approach Methods 0.000 description 1
- 239000000969 carrier Substances 0.000 description 1
- 230000005465 channeling Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000006243 chemical reaction Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000001276 controlling effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000007812 deficiency Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 239000000835 fiber Substances 0.000 description 1
- 239000002184 metal Substances 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000001105 regulatory effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000005096 rolling process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 239000010959 steel Substances 0.000 description 1
- 230000001360 synchronised effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000011144 upstream manufacturing Methods 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L15/00—Indicators provided on the vehicle or train for signalling purposes
- B61L15/0018—Communication with or on the vehicle or train
- B61L15/0027—Radio-based, e.g. using GSM-R
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L25/00—Recording or indicating positions or identities of vehicles or trains or setting of track apparatus
- B61L25/02—Indicating or recording positions or identities of vehicles or trains
- B61L25/021—Measuring and recording of train speed
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L25/00—Recording or indicating positions or identities of vehicles or trains or setting of track apparatus
- B61L25/02—Indicating or recording positions or identities of vehicles or trains
- B61L25/025—Absolute localisation, e.g. providing geodetic coordinates
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
- B61L27/70—Details of trackside communication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W84/00—Network topologies
- H04W84/02—Hierarchically pre-organised networks, e.g. paging networks, cellular networks, WLAN [Wireless Local Area Network] or WLL [Wireless Local Loop]
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
- B61L27/20—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation
- B61L2027/204—Trackside control of safe travel of vehicle or train, e.g. braking curve calculation using Communication-based Train Control [CBTC]
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L2205/00—Communication or navigation systems for railway traffic
- B61L2205/04—Satellite based navigation systems, e.g. global positioning system [GPS]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W84/00—Network topologies
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W92/00—Interfaces specially adapted for wireless communication networks
- H04W92/02—Inter-networking arrangements
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
The present invention involves a secure, wireless communication subsystem for communications-based train control, which provide the wireless data communications subsystem needed for locating trains and for exchanging control information between the onboard train control computers and the fixed site computers that manage the movement of the trains.
Description
2 Background Historically, train and transit operators have utilized a signaling architecture known as "fixed block" where trains are physically signaled from fixed posts along the wayside as to whether or not they are authorized to enter the next block of track - if there is another train in the next block of track, the signal will be red, indicating that the train must stop until signaled that the block is cleared. The "fixed blocks" vary in length from hundreds of yards to tens and even hundreds of miles.
Virtually all of these signal and train control systems use track circuits for train detection.
Track circuits detect trains by injecting a tiny electric current into one end of a rail section.
As long as there is no train in the track circuit, the current travels down the rails where it energizes a relay at the other end In its most basic form, the energized track relay causes a green aspect to be displayed to the train operator. But when a train enters the track circuit, the steel wheels and axles short out this signal current and causes the track relay to drop. The de-energized relay makes the green aspect go dark and illuminates a red aspect for the operator in the following train.
This approach served the rail industry well for more than 100 years. But as heavy steam trains gave way to light rail systems and DC and AC propulsion it became increasingly difficult to make track circuit-based systems work reliably.
All track circuit-based systems are designed to be "failsafe" and as a consequence of traditional signal design, nearly all are "fail stop." This means that when they fail safely these systems present a more restrictive aspect (usually red) to the operator or on-board train control system.
Virtually all of these signal and train control systems use track circuits for train detection.
Track circuits detect trains by injecting a tiny electric current into one end of a rail section.
As long as there is no train in the track circuit, the current travels down the rails where it energizes a relay at the other end In its most basic form, the energized track relay causes a green aspect to be displayed to the train operator. But when a train enters the track circuit, the steel wheels and axles short out this signal current and causes the track relay to drop. The de-energized relay makes the green aspect go dark and illuminates a red aspect for the operator in the following train.
This approach served the rail industry well for more than 100 years. But as heavy steam trains gave way to light rail systems and DC and AC propulsion it became increasingly difficult to make track circuit-based systems work reliably.
All track circuit-based systems are designed to be "failsafe" and as a consequence of traditional signal design, nearly all are "fail stop." This means that when they fail safely these systems present a more restrictive aspect (usually red) to the operator or on-board train control system.
3 For small systems with few track circuits, or systems with long headways, "fail stop" may be an infrequent annoyance. But in the case of larger transit systems "fail stop" can mean frequent operational disasters that are expensive and time consuming to mitigate For example, every 10 hours (on average) New York City Transit's (NYCT) operating department reports to its signal maintenance group that it believes there is a signal system failure. To fix the problem and get trains rolling within 10 minutes, NYCT
maintains a staff of nearly 1,000 in its signal maintenance department. Many, poised like firefighters, are ready to spring into action 24 hours per day.
A ten-minute delay on a roadway may seem like smooth sailing in today's big cities, but for subway commuters it can feel like eternity. Worse, a ten-minute signal system delay on a high capacity rail line can throw the line's schedule off for the rest of the day.
Clearly, there needs to be better train control system In order to address the obvious deficiencies of "fixed block" signaling, train and transit operators have been seeking ways to implement "moving block" signaling.
Instead of controlling train separation by regulating movement past fixed points along the wayside (i.e., into fixed blocks of track), "moving block" signaling regulates the actual separation, or distance, between trains. The key to "moving block" signaling is that the trains must have uninterrupted radio communication amongst themselves and to the wayside in order to pinpoint exact locations and receive control messages, This has proven to be a major challenge, due to the train environment, which is very "radio hostile" (e.g., large amounts of metal, tunnels etc. that tend to interfere with radio signals). This problem was partially overcome by a system known as communications-based train control (CBTC) Early versions of the CBTC overcame the radio communication challenge by installing a "leaky feeder" between the tracks so that the onboard radios were required to
maintains a staff of nearly 1,000 in its signal maintenance department. Many, poised like firefighters, are ready to spring into action 24 hours per day.
A ten-minute delay on a roadway may seem like smooth sailing in today's big cities, but for subway commuters it can feel like eternity. Worse, a ten-minute signal system delay on a high capacity rail line can throw the line's schedule off for the rest of the day.
Clearly, there needs to be better train control system In order to address the obvious deficiencies of "fixed block" signaling, train and transit operators have been seeking ways to implement "moving block" signaling.
Instead of controlling train separation by regulating movement past fixed points along the wayside (i.e., into fixed blocks of track), "moving block" signaling regulates the actual separation, or distance, between trains. The key to "moving block" signaling is that the trains must have uninterrupted radio communication amongst themselves and to the wayside in order to pinpoint exact locations and receive control messages, This has proven to be a major challenge, due to the train environment, which is very "radio hostile" (e.g., large amounts of metal, tunnels etc. that tend to interfere with radio signals). This problem was partially overcome by a system known as communications-based train control (CBTC) Early versions of the CBTC overcame the radio communication challenge by installing a "leaky feeder" between the tracks so that the onboard radios were required to
4 communicate only a few feet. However, the drawbacks to this solution are, among others, the cost of the cable and susceptibility to damage/sabotage.
There remains a need for a CBTC system that is accurate, fast, inexpensive, less susceptible to physical damage that can operate in a hostile environment in a truly wireless system.
Brief Description of the Drawings Figure 1: An overview of a CBTC system Summary on Invention The present invention demonstrates a truly wireless communications system that will support full implementation of "moving block" communications based train control. The present invention is the first integrated secure wireless communications system that will enable full scale deployment of "moving block" CBTC.
In a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the new CBTC system is a clear improvement over traditional fixed-block systems in that it allows for increased system capacity and very high availability. Moreover, the present invention reduces the possibility of human error by automating many manual operations.
Another embodiment of the present invention involves a communications-based train control data communications system comprising a standard Internet Protocol (IP) routed data communications network comprising three linked networks, which form the standards based data communication system, being: (1) the wayside network, (2) the RF
distribution network and, (3) the carborne network.
In a further embodiment of the present invention, the new CBTC offers improved capacity because it is able to locate trains with greater precision. By knowing more precisely where trains are located, the present invention can operate trains closer together.
In a further embodiment, the CBTC systems can use microcomputers making it practical for two or more to be configured in parallel so that when one fails the system is able to seamlessly switch over to a working unit. This "fail-operational" aspect of CBTC is attractive because it reduces the frequency of service disrupting failures and allows more flexibility in managing maintenance crews.
Detailed Description of the Invention In one aspect of the present invention, a CBTC communication system consists of the following:
~ WRF - Wayside RF Router (with Spread Spectrum, 2.4 GHz radio) ~ CRF - Carborne RF Router (with radio) ~ WIU - Wayside Network Interface Unit ~ CIU - Carborne Network Interface Unit An overview of a CBTC system is shown in Figure 1. As is evidence, a key component of the present invention is the radio, which has been designed to operate efficiently and reliably in harsh environments such as a subway system where signal channeling, multi-path distortion and intermittent blockage by train cars occurs on a continuous basis.
GHz Hybrid Spread Spectrum Transceivers The present invention further involves a capable routers (WRF-3000 and CRF-3100) employ similar 2.4 GHz Hybrid Spread Spectrum (SS) radio transceivers along the wayside and on the trains. These RF capable routers employ both Slow Frequency Hopping (SFH) and Direct Sequence (DS) Spread Spectrum techniques Technically the wayside to train RF data link employs a half duplex Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) scheme which allows one wayside SS transceiver to communicate with many carborne SS transceivers at one time. Adjacent wayside communication cells use different SFH patterns, are not synchronized and a frequency hop is the length of a TDMA frame. There are a limited number of SFH carriers but a frequency hopping sequence can be reused based on distance separation.
Frequency hopping sequences for adjacent cells are designed such that two consecutive frames will not collide.
In the present CBTC system, a Zone Controller (ZC) manages the movement of trains on a contiguous section of track. To do this the ZC is in constant communication with onboard Train Controllers (TC). The TC controls vehicle operation.
The present CBTC data communications system interfaces with existing ZC and TC
equipment in order to transport their messages using, among others, industry standard protocols. That is, the interface converts the train control messages to an industry standard form. In addition, the data communications system is capable of carrying secondary data used to facilitate transit operations.
The present CBTC data communications system has at its core, a standard Internet Protocol (IP) routed data communications network.
The three linked networks, which form the standards based data communication system, are the wayside network, the RF distribution network and the carborne network.
Wayside Network The wayside network, as its name implies, interconnects a signaling company's train control systems and RF radios located along the side of the track. Interface points allow other supervisory or management equipment to connect to the wayside network.
The wayside network is a fully redundant, primarily linear, network, which connects wayside stations to their 'upstream' and 'downstream' neighbors. The minimum configuration for a wayside network node is a redundant set of RF capable IP
routers (WRF-3000). Connections between wayside network nodes are made using point to point, redundant fiber optic cables operating at 10 Mbps.
Each wayside station, through the WRF-3000, provides a connection to the RF
distribution network - the network which links the wayside and the carborne networks.
Carborne Network The carborne network, like the wayside network, is based on the IP routing paradigm. The minimum configuration for a carborne network is a redundant set of RF capable IP routers (CRF-3100) located at each end of a multi-car train unit. Carborne devices capable of attachment directly to an IP based local area network can be connected to the redundant network provided by the CRF-3100 units.
Since existing onboard Train Controllers do not have IP capable local area network interfaces, an interface unit (CIU-3300) provides a protocol conversion gateway service for the onboard Train Controllers. The CIU-3300 also provides gateway services for LonWorksTM type networks.
RF Distribution Network Each wayside network node will manage one RF communication cell. A cell is a dynamic area within which RF communication between a wayside transceiver and a number of carborne transceivers is possible.
Each multi-car train unit has two operational radio transceivers, one at each end of the train. Each radio transceiver attempts to become a member of a RF
communication cell.
The process for this is called acquisition. The management of mobile radios within wayside cells is controlled by the RF distribution network. No intervention from the train control system is required.
The RF distribution network provides redundant RF data links between the wayside network and each carborne network. Each multi-car train unit has two RF data links to the wayside network - one from each end of the train unit. As the train moves, each radio transceiver will independently attempt to find a better wayside cell. When an onboard RF
capable router switches to a new cell, it immediately transmits a routing information packet to update the wayside network routes on the most direct path to reach the IP
networks in the carborne network. This process of moving into a new cell is called handover. Handover is independent from the train control system and has no impact on train control communications.
In an alternative embodiment of the present invention, a security system can be installed.
For example, the WRF-3000 can implement a data encryption capacity. Additional data protection shall be provided on the RF data link by encrypting the data with a method compliant with Data Encryption Standard (DES). Such an encryption could use a secret 56 bit key, which is stored within the RF transceivers and is not retrievable.
Interfaces to Next Vendors' Equipment Interface is provided between the WIU and the Zone Controller and between the CIU and the Train Controller. The details of the interfaces will be specific to a particular signaling company.
These interfaces can be X.21, V.35 or V.24 compliant physical connections with the WIU
or CIU providing a DCE interface. Note that the WIU and CIU hardware provide standard DTE physical interfaces. This allows for modem/line driver equipment between the interface units and controller.
From the foregoing, it will be appreciated that, although specific embodiments of the invention have been described herein for purposes of illustration, various modifications may be made without deviating from the spirit and scope of the invention.
Accordingly, the invention is not limited except as by the appended claims.
There remains a need for a CBTC system that is accurate, fast, inexpensive, less susceptible to physical damage that can operate in a hostile environment in a truly wireless system.
Brief Description of the Drawings Figure 1: An overview of a CBTC system Summary on Invention The present invention demonstrates a truly wireless communications system that will support full implementation of "moving block" communications based train control. The present invention is the first integrated secure wireless communications system that will enable full scale deployment of "moving block" CBTC.
In a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the new CBTC system is a clear improvement over traditional fixed-block systems in that it allows for increased system capacity and very high availability. Moreover, the present invention reduces the possibility of human error by automating many manual operations.
Another embodiment of the present invention involves a communications-based train control data communications system comprising a standard Internet Protocol (IP) routed data communications network comprising three linked networks, which form the standards based data communication system, being: (1) the wayside network, (2) the RF
distribution network and, (3) the carborne network.
In a further embodiment of the present invention, the new CBTC offers improved capacity because it is able to locate trains with greater precision. By knowing more precisely where trains are located, the present invention can operate trains closer together.
In a further embodiment, the CBTC systems can use microcomputers making it practical for two or more to be configured in parallel so that when one fails the system is able to seamlessly switch over to a working unit. This "fail-operational" aspect of CBTC is attractive because it reduces the frequency of service disrupting failures and allows more flexibility in managing maintenance crews.
Detailed Description of the Invention In one aspect of the present invention, a CBTC communication system consists of the following:
~ WRF - Wayside RF Router (with Spread Spectrum, 2.4 GHz radio) ~ CRF - Carborne RF Router (with radio) ~ WIU - Wayside Network Interface Unit ~ CIU - Carborne Network Interface Unit An overview of a CBTC system is shown in Figure 1. As is evidence, a key component of the present invention is the radio, which has been designed to operate efficiently and reliably in harsh environments such as a subway system where signal channeling, multi-path distortion and intermittent blockage by train cars occurs on a continuous basis.
GHz Hybrid Spread Spectrum Transceivers The present invention further involves a capable routers (WRF-3000 and CRF-3100) employ similar 2.4 GHz Hybrid Spread Spectrum (SS) radio transceivers along the wayside and on the trains. These RF capable routers employ both Slow Frequency Hopping (SFH) and Direct Sequence (DS) Spread Spectrum techniques Technically the wayside to train RF data link employs a half duplex Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) scheme which allows one wayside SS transceiver to communicate with many carborne SS transceivers at one time. Adjacent wayside communication cells use different SFH patterns, are not synchronized and a frequency hop is the length of a TDMA frame. There are a limited number of SFH carriers but a frequency hopping sequence can be reused based on distance separation.
Frequency hopping sequences for adjacent cells are designed such that two consecutive frames will not collide.
In the present CBTC system, a Zone Controller (ZC) manages the movement of trains on a contiguous section of track. To do this the ZC is in constant communication with onboard Train Controllers (TC). The TC controls vehicle operation.
The present CBTC data communications system interfaces with existing ZC and TC
equipment in order to transport their messages using, among others, industry standard protocols. That is, the interface converts the train control messages to an industry standard form. In addition, the data communications system is capable of carrying secondary data used to facilitate transit operations.
The present CBTC data communications system has at its core, a standard Internet Protocol (IP) routed data communications network.
The three linked networks, which form the standards based data communication system, are the wayside network, the RF distribution network and the carborne network.
Wayside Network The wayside network, as its name implies, interconnects a signaling company's train control systems and RF radios located along the side of the track. Interface points allow other supervisory or management equipment to connect to the wayside network.
The wayside network is a fully redundant, primarily linear, network, which connects wayside stations to their 'upstream' and 'downstream' neighbors. The minimum configuration for a wayside network node is a redundant set of RF capable IP
routers (WRF-3000). Connections between wayside network nodes are made using point to point, redundant fiber optic cables operating at 10 Mbps.
Each wayside station, through the WRF-3000, provides a connection to the RF
distribution network - the network which links the wayside and the carborne networks.
Carborne Network The carborne network, like the wayside network, is based on the IP routing paradigm. The minimum configuration for a carborne network is a redundant set of RF capable IP routers (CRF-3100) located at each end of a multi-car train unit. Carborne devices capable of attachment directly to an IP based local area network can be connected to the redundant network provided by the CRF-3100 units.
Since existing onboard Train Controllers do not have IP capable local area network interfaces, an interface unit (CIU-3300) provides a protocol conversion gateway service for the onboard Train Controllers. The CIU-3300 also provides gateway services for LonWorksTM type networks.
RF Distribution Network Each wayside network node will manage one RF communication cell. A cell is a dynamic area within which RF communication between a wayside transceiver and a number of carborne transceivers is possible.
Each multi-car train unit has two operational radio transceivers, one at each end of the train. Each radio transceiver attempts to become a member of a RF
communication cell.
The process for this is called acquisition. The management of mobile radios within wayside cells is controlled by the RF distribution network. No intervention from the train control system is required.
The RF distribution network provides redundant RF data links between the wayside network and each carborne network. Each multi-car train unit has two RF data links to the wayside network - one from each end of the train unit. As the train moves, each radio transceiver will independently attempt to find a better wayside cell. When an onboard RF
capable router switches to a new cell, it immediately transmits a routing information packet to update the wayside network routes on the most direct path to reach the IP
networks in the carborne network. This process of moving into a new cell is called handover. Handover is independent from the train control system and has no impact on train control communications.
In an alternative embodiment of the present invention, a security system can be installed.
For example, the WRF-3000 can implement a data encryption capacity. Additional data protection shall be provided on the RF data link by encrypting the data with a method compliant with Data Encryption Standard (DES). Such an encryption could use a secret 56 bit key, which is stored within the RF transceivers and is not retrievable.
Interfaces to Next Vendors' Equipment Interface is provided between the WIU and the Zone Controller and between the CIU and the Train Controller. The details of the interfaces will be specific to a particular signaling company.
These interfaces can be X.21, V.35 or V.24 compliant physical connections with the WIU
or CIU providing a DCE interface. Note that the WIU and CIU hardware provide standard DTE physical interfaces. This allows for modem/line driver equipment between the interface units and controller.
From the foregoing, it will be appreciated that, although specific embodiments of the invention have been described herein for purposes of illustration, various modifications may be made without deviating from the spirit and scope of the invention.
Accordingly, the invention is not limited except as by the appended claims.
Claims
1. A communications-based train control data communications system comprising a standard Internet Protocol (IP) routed data communications network comprising three linked networks, which form the standards based data communication system, being:
(1) the wayside network, (2) the RF distribution network and, (3) the carborne network.
(1) the wayside network, (2) the RF distribution network and, (3) the carborne network.
Priority Applications (6)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CA002263031A CA2263031A1 (en) | 1999-02-26 | 1999-02-26 | Communications based train control |
| CA002299778A CA2299778A1 (en) | 1999-02-26 | 2000-02-28 | Communication system for mobile networks |
| EP00906101A EP1166465A1 (en) | 1999-02-26 | 2000-02-28 | Communication system for mobile networks |
| NZ513887A NZ513887A (en) | 1999-02-26 | 2000-02-28 | Communication system for mobile networks |
| AU27888/00A AU2788800A (en) | 1999-02-26 | 2000-02-28 | Communication system for mobile networks |
| PCT/CA2000/000186 WO2000052851A1 (en) | 1999-02-26 | 2000-02-28 | Communication system for mobile networks |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CA002263031A CA2263031A1 (en) | 1999-02-26 | 1999-02-26 | Communications based train control |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CA2263031A1 true CA2263031A1 (en) | 2000-08-26 |
Family
ID=4163331
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CA002263031A Withdrawn CA2263031A1 (en) | 1999-02-26 | 1999-02-26 | Communications based train control |
Country Status (5)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| EP (1) | EP1166465A1 (en) |
| AU (1) | AU2788800A (en) |
| CA (1) | CA2263031A1 (en) |
| NZ (1) | NZ513887A (en) |
| WO (1) | WO2000052851A1 (en) |
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| WO2006028318A1 (en) * | 2004-09-10 | 2006-03-16 | Korea Institute Of Machinery And Materials | Apparatus for wireless remote control magnetic levitation train and method thereof |
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| PT3050308T (en) * | 2013-09-27 | 2018-10-25 | Teleste Oyj | Wireless data offload system |
| RU2550339C1 (en) * | 2014-03-18 | 2015-05-10 | Федеральное государственное казенное учреждение "27 Центральный научно-исследовательский институт" Министерства обороны Российской Федерации | Self-contained mobile telecommunication complex |
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| RU2645742C1 (en) * | 2017-01-23 | 2018-02-28 | Федеральное государственное казенное военное образовательное учреждение высшего образования "Академия Федеральной службы охраны Российской Федерации" (Академия ФСО России) | Mobile multifunctional communication node |
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| RU2645285C1 (en) * | 2017-05-15 | 2018-02-19 | Федеральное государственное бюджетное учреждение "16 Центральный научно-исследовательский испытательный ордена Красной Звезды институт имени маршала войск связи А.И. Белова" Министерства обороны Российской Федерации | Mobile communication equipment room for control and management for the transport network of the field communication system |
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| CN108134779B (en) * | 2017-12-06 | 2020-09-18 | 交控科技股份有限公司 | CBTC communication system protocol analysis method and protocol library management method |
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| RU2735368C1 (en) * | 2019-08-06 | 2020-10-30 | Федеральное государственное казенное военное образовательное учреждение высшего образования "Военный учебно-научный центр Военно-Морского Флота "Военно-морская академия имени Адмирала флота Советского Союза Н.Г. Кузнецова" | Remote control system of a field communication unit |
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| DE4310645A1 (en) * | 1993-04-01 | 1994-10-06 | Deutsche Aerospace | Radio system for transmitting messages between at least one mobile station and n fixed base stations arranged along a route |
| DE4334631C2 (en) * | 1993-10-06 | 1996-12-19 | Koepenick Funkwerk Gmbh | Mobile, linear radio network |
| DE59611297D1 (en) * | 1995-04-04 | 2005-12-29 | Siemens Ag | System for collecting and transmitting information to central offices |
| EP0858715A1 (en) * | 1995-06-02 | 1998-08-19 | Charles D. Gavrilovich | Mobile radio communications system with moving base station |
| SE9604492L (en) * | 1996-12-05 | 1998-06-06 | Ericsson Telefon Ab L M | Device and method of telecommunication systems |
-
1999
- 1999-02-26 CA CA002263031A patent/CA2263031A1/en not_active Withdrawn
-
2000
- 2000-02-28 WO PCT/CA2000/000186 patent/WO2000052851A1/en not_active Application Discontinuation
- 2000-02-28 NZ NZ513887A patent/NZ513887A/en not_active Application Discontinuation
- 2000-02-28 AU AU27888/00A patent/AU2788800A/en not_active Abandoned
- 2000-02-28 EP EP00906101A patent/EP1166465A1/en not_active Withdrawn
Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WO2006028318A1 (en) * | 2004-09-10 | 2006-03-16 | Korea Institute Of Machinery And Materials | Apparatus for wireless remote control magnetic levitation train and method thereof |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| WO2000052851B1 (en) | 2000-11-30 |
| WO2000052851A1 (en) | 2000-09-08 |
| NZ513887A (en) | 2001-09-28 |
| EP1166465A1 (en) | 2002-01-02 |
| AU2788800A (en) | 2000-09-21 |
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| AZWI | Withdrawn application |