BE1016653A6 - Secure payment cards. - Google Patents

Abstract

The card (30) is printed with a pattern or contains elements introduced into the card material during production, some or all of which are scanned during the use of the card, e.g. when inserting it into an ATM. The actual positions of the pattern elements are compared with the correct positions and if they do not match then the card is disabled, confiscated or refused. The pattern is not normally visible to the naked eye.

Description

       

  Description: Secure payment cards

  
The basis of payment cards and access cards, etc. are made uniformly, so all cards of a certain type or brand are identical. They are, for example, mold-injected with the same basic plastic, or laminated with the same material layers. The authentication almost always takes place in an electronic manner whereby the user must provide the correct code, or the owner is automatically deemed to be the right person. For more than ten years, additional information has been stored in the memory that refers to biometric characteristics of the user. In this way, safety is considerably increased. However, there is no way to make each card or holder (of electronics) unique.

   However, the present patent application describes a technology and method to give each card unique self-identification information, so that for each processing, it is possible to check unique structural properties of the card itself. It can be said that the unique "keys" are inserted into the material.

  
This application concerns a method, technology and structure and special composition of carriers (10) (eg cards made of plastic, foil, paper) and holders (11) (eg housing of plastic) of one or more electronic memories (eg SIM 13, USIM, flash memory 15, magnetic strip 14, etc.). The following products therefore fall under this application:

  
a. Credit cards (eg VISA),

  
b. Bank cards (eg ING card 20),

  
c. magnetic strip cards (eg customer card),

  
d. money ring cards (eg Proton),

  
e. admission tickets,

  
f. security cards,

  
g. identity cards,

  
h. Barcode cards,

  
i. USB memory device (17),

  
j. Banknotes,

  
k. Shares, bonds, checks,

  
1. Notarial deeds.

  
With such products, at least one layer (16A, 16B) or part of a layer of the carrier or container will have at least one specially added exogenous element (18, 25) (e.g. metal fiber 18B, crystal, molecule chain 18D, atom, etc.). In one card, for example, average and randomly distributed 30 elements can be present. These elements can be visible to the naked eye or hidden. These elements or part of these elements are visible for a special electronic scanner that may or may not be processed in a so-called electronic reader or scanner. The scanner will detect the elements that correspond to the frequency (s) and wavelength (s) being transmitted. Certain or all elements send the received signals in whole or in part. Figure 2 shows the steps in the production of such maps - in terms of positions of the elements.

  
The following steps are taken after applying a memory to the carrier or holder and after charging the usual basic configuration of the memory:

  
i. at least the position (x, y and optionally z) of one

  
element or zone in the carrier or holder is determined by at least one scanner (electronic, optical e.g. IR) and possibly other characteristics (e.g. type of material) thereof (20 and 21),

  
ii. that position (s) is then processed (22) by one

  
relevant external electronic processing system and associated software,

  
iii. this data - whether encrypted or not - is stored

  
(23) in the memory (24, 13, 14) located on the carrier

  
(10) or holder (11) itself,

  
The memory of the carrier or holder in question then contains identifiable structural quantitative and / or qualitative information about the material carrier or holder on or in which the memory itself is located.

  
With effective use (Fig.3) in an electronic reader - placed by the user in it - the following steps are taken:

  
iv. The card or holder is in an electronic reader

  
placed (30) (e.g. ATM bank counter machine) that is equipped with an appropriate electronic scanner,

  
v. The memory provides the data (32) related to the requirement

  
positioning (s) of the element (s),

  
vi. The scanner sets the actual positioning (s) of it

  
element (s) or zone (s) in the carrier or holder fixed (31), vii. The processing system of the electronic reader or

  
another system checks (33) the correspondence between the required positioning and the actual positioning of the element (s) and / or zone (s),

  
viii. If the result is different (36), the card or device becomes

  
disabled, withheld or removed (37) by a mechanism,

  
ix. With correct result (34) the usual

  
processing (35) of the card or holder, such as opening a screen for entering a code (eg pin code), door opened after voice recognition, etc.,

  
X. A different order may be applied to the

  
use (eg as a final check instead of a start check, simultaneous check, v. after vi.),

  
This identification method (Fig. 3) therefore gives the possibility to intercept false or counterfeit cards and devices on the basis of the unique structural properties that differ card-by-card, carrier-per-carrier and device-per-device depending on the technique used (eg random injection molding mixes in one layer 16A, random composite film 26, multi-layer screening, etc.) and the variations (types and combinations of elements) with which the elements or zones differ from each other.

  
To illustrate: the dimensions of a standard three-part card is 85 mm x 54 mm. After subtracting 2 mm from each edge - and when using a square millimeter zone - there are 4050 possible position zones per card in which elements can sit. If 100 elements are observed over that grid, a number of positions can be selected therefrom - e.g. based on species such as those containing nickel - that will be used to assemble a complex position key. Suppose 25 nickel elements are scanned. From these 25, 4 elements are selected as key positions. The unique combination of these 4 is then optional: 4050 x 4049 x 4048 x
4047 or 1 / 268.643,605,903,200, and at 5 positions it gives one chance of 1,08693202948e + 18. This is impressive.

   So I can really speak of a "fingerprint" of a credit card. The opportunity to carry out large-scale and self-identical one-off counterfeits is virtually non-existent.

  
To realize this, it is sufficient to add an amount of suitable exogenous particles or elements during the polymer production process during a mixing process that is prematurely degraded in order to avoid perfect mixing. It is important to maintain uneven mixing. However, the number of added elements must not affect the structural strength of the card.

  
By means of a special software program, a series is selected from all elements or even all elements are processed in the calculation.

  
It is also possible to increase the degree of certainty by increasing the number of required positions (eg Military access card: 25 positions, VISA card: 10 positions, proton card: 3 positions.), So that an additional check is performed at authentication procedures, namely the identification check of the carrier itself.

  
A suitable electronic scanner can be incorporated into a card reader so that the scanning automatically takes place when the card is inserted. However, scanning can also be done from the moment that the card is fully positioned in the order.

  
The electronic scanner can therefore have moving parts
(eg vertical and diagonal sensors, transverse sensor) and / or non-moving parts (eg fixed sensor [s] at the card reader input). The map can move or remain motionless. However, a part (reading head) of the scanner can also move. A combination is also possible.

  
The electronic scanner will send electromagnetic waves of one or more frequencies and wavelengths to the carrier or holder (eg via transducer) and then receive reflections thereof, such as eg an acoustic scanner (eg based on Rayleigh wave analysis), an infrared scanner (eg thermography), etc. The scanner can also receive only a part of the weather chambers, and the lack of reflection can also be used as a "key" in the processing. In that case the lack of elements (so 'holes') is the object of the positioning (23). The identification (positioning) can also be a combination of the aforementioned holes and effective elements. For example, an electronic scanner can create a fully or partially electronically processable image of the carrier or of the holder, for example with the "gates" of the disturbing zones on a focus

  
 <EMI ID = 1.1>

  
parameter are in the whole. The electronic scanner can work in a broad spectrum, so at the same time distinguish between different types of elements and / or deviations.

  
The electronic scanner can be integrated in a reader - whether or not - has moving parts and is equipped with at least one sensor. The structural composition of carriers can be checked on the basis of spectral analysis.

  
This method is also applicable for securities such as banknotes, shares, bonds, checks, certificates, diplomas, etc. but where memory is replaced by at least one code (numbers, letters, symbols, barcode, etc.) that is generated in whole or in part on basis of the aforementioned positions and / or composition of at least one element in the carrier, the aforementioned code being pressed or glued onto the carrier. This makes counterfeiting particularly difficult.

  
With this method the correct relationship between memory and user, and memory and card / holder is thus done with the effective use of cards and devices by a user, so a double check, so that on the one hand the material authenticity of the card is checked and on the other hand the normal electronic authenticity (eg via pin code) is checked.

  
The layer (16B) in which the elements are located can be equipped with at least one contact point (e.g. on the edge of a card 19B) that can be brought into contact with a corresponding contact point (19B) of the electronic scanner, reader and / or processing system so that extra voltage can be applied to this layer and / or an electrical value can be read. By adding a conductive coating or special types of elements, a polymer support layer can be made more or less conductive.

  
 <EMI ID = 2.1>

  
one material that is different from the material (e.g., polymer) of the carrier or container itself, thus being exogenous, such as e.g. metal plates 18A, silver-coated copper chains 18D, Nickel-coated carbon chains or particles 18C, silver particles and clusters, Nickel flakes or splinters, graphite chains, metal wires, crystals, micro resonance circuits, gas capsules, specific nanostructures, nano-spirals, etc .. The dimensions of these elements can vary per card, but also per group of cards in production processes. This also applies to the type of elements.

  
The most desirable method is that during the production process of the support or a part of the support (e.g. one part of the laminate 16B) a number of elements are added randomly (e.g. in the plastic mass for mold injection or film production). The elements can, however, also be added in a structured way (eg about 0.5% per card), but still to a sufficient extent to be perceptible for electronic scanning or measurement.

  
It is also envisaged that the carrier or holder may have at least one radiation insulating auxiliary layer, e.g., a conductive film or coating, to prevent the possible adverse radiation from the scanner on the memory unit (13).

  
Also described here is a method involving a payment card
(e.g. VISA card) is implemented with either

  
a. a second series of digits,

  
b. a second set of letters,

  
c. a second series of symbols,

  
d. a second series with combinations of the foregoing.

  
However, this second series (12B) is an alias, ie. is not the correct number series (12A), but a series that is generated or not based on the aforementioned positions, and where this virtual / alias series is only used for electronic transactions over networks (eg Internet). This can be useful to avoid hacking third-party payment servers on which millions of credit card numbers are stored. Such external servers then only store the alias series.

  
In the case of a payment over an electronic network, only the virtual / alias series is then sent by the buyer to the seller, whose server sends the virtual / alias series to a third party organization or banking institution which in turn transmits this virtual / alias series
(12B) turnover (eg as a quick link, via a register) in the correct number series (12A) that belongs to the payment card. This means that the customer does know his real CC number, as well as the banking institution, but not the seller.

  
We therefore also claim a payment card, as described above, on which or in which - additionally - a virtual / alias series is printed, either on the same side or on the other side, and whose number of digits, letters and / or symbols may differ of the number of the traditional card. The virtual / alias series is just a front piece with the real code behind it. The series can also be based on prime numbers, possibly in combination with Catalan numbers.

  
Such a payment card can only be used for payments via

  
 <EMI ID = 3.1>

  
sequence is printed and / or pressed. The customer may receive two cards with his connection, one real payment card and one virtual / alias card for the Internet.

  
Such a payment card with the virtual / alias series on it may also have been processed in a unique e-mail address of the banking institution (eg to: 12AB-34CD-56EF-78GH@visa.com or john-12AB-
34CD-56EF-78GH@visa.com) and are pressed and / or pressed thereon, and eg are automatically sent by the user to the banking institution in a payment module with every purchase from a supplier on the Internet or other network.

  
Finally, a new type of electronic key card is pointed out with the method that certain positions or all positions of the exogenous elements (18) are used as a fixed static structure for calculating encryption. The memory unit interacts with the positioning scheme or register for encrypting data. The correspondent can decrypt the data via a public position key. At the sender, a processing unit (eg reader, computer, etc.) based on traditional software in combination with unique positions in the card will calculate and apply a specific encryption that is only possible for the owner of the card in question. , ie. an encryption card or new type of electronic key.


    

Claims (19)

Conclusions: 1. Notarial deeds, of which at least one layer (16A, 16B) or part of a layer of the carrier or container has at least one specially added exogenous element (18, 25) (e.g. metal fiber 18B, crystal, molecule chain 18D, atom, etc.) contains that can be observed by an electronic scanner - whether or not processed in a so-called electronic reader - so that the following steps are taken after applying a memory to the carrier or holder and after charging the usual basic configuration of the memory: i. at least the position (x, y and optionally z) of one element or zone in the carrier or holder is determined by at least one scanner (electronic, optical e.g. IR) and possibly other characteristics (e.g. type of material) thereof (20 and 21), ii. that position (s) is subsequently processed (22) by a relevant external electronic processing system and associated software, iii. this data - whether encrypted or not - is stored (23) in the memory (24, 13, 14) located on the carrier 1. Method, technology and structure and special composition of carriers (10) (e.g. cards made of plastic, foil, paper) and holders (11) (e.g. plastic housing) of one or more electronic memories (e.g. SIM 13, USIM, flash memory 15, magnetic strip 14, etc.), such as: a. Credit cards (eg VISA), b. Bank cards (eg INC card 20), c. magnetic strip cards (eg customer card), d. money ring cards (eg Proton), e. admission tickets, f. security cards, g. identity cards, h. Barcode cards, i. USB memory device (17), j. Banknotes, k. Shares, bonds, checks, An electronic scanner, as described in claim 1, which is in one card reader has been incorporated; An electronic scanner, as described in claim 1, that has moving parts (eg vertical and diagonal sensors, transverse sensor) and / or non-moving parts (eg fixed sensor [s] at the card reader input); The electronic scanner, as described in claim 1, that sends electromagnetic waves of one or more frequencies and wavelengths to the carrier or holder (e.g. via transducer) and then receives reflections thereof, such as e.g. an acoustic scanner (e.g. based on Rayleigh wave analysis), an infrared scanner (e.g. thermography), etc.; An electronic scanner, as described in claim 1, comprising a makes a fully or partially electronically processable image of the carrier or holder, eg with the "gates" of the <EMI ID = 4.1> An electronic scanner as described in claim 1 broad spectrum, which can simultaneously distinguish several different types of elements and / or deviations; An electronic scanner, as described in claim 1, in one reader integrated - with or without moving parts and equipped with at least one sensor; An electronic scanner, as described in claim 1, which op can check the structural composition of carriers on the basis of spectral analysis; The method as described in claim 1, also applicable for securities such as banknotes, shares, bonds, checks, certificates, diplomas, etc. but where memory is replaced by at least one code (numbers, letters, symbols, barcode, etc.) that is generated in whole or in part based on the aforementioned positions and / or assembly of at least one element in the carrier, wherein said code is subsequently printed or glued on the carrier; The method as described in claim 1, wherein in the effective use of the cards and devices by a user the correct relationship between memory, user and memory and card / holder can be done, so that on the one hand the material authenticity of the card is checked and on the other hand the normal electronic authenticity (eg via pin code) is checked ; (10) or holder (11) itself, so that the memory of the carrier or holder in question contains identifiable structural quantitative and / or qualitative information about the material carrier or holder on or in which the memory itself is located, and subsequently - in the effective use (Fig. 3) in an electronic reader - following steps are taken: iv. The card or holder is in an electronic reader placed (30) (e.g. ATM bank counter machine) that is equipped with an appropriate electronic scanner, v. The memory provides the data (32) related to the requirement positioning (s) of the element (s), vi. The scanner sets the actual positioning (s) of it element (s) or zone (s) in the carrier or holder fixed (31), vii. The processing system of the electronic reader or another system checks (33) the correspondence between the required positioning and the actual positioning of the element (s) and / or zone (s), viii. If the result is different (36), the card or device becomes disabled, withheld or removed (37) by a mechanism, ix. With correct result (34) the usual processing (35) of the card or holder, such as opening a screen for entering a code (eg PIN code), door opened after voice recognition, etc., X. Possibly a different order is applied to it use (eg as a final check instead of a start check, simultaneous check, v. after vi.), so that an identification method (Fig. 3) is followed whereby false or counterfeit cards and devices are found based on the unique structural properties that differ card-by-card, carrier-per-carrier and device-per-device depending on the used technique (eg random injection molding mixes in one layer 16A, random composite film 26, multi-layer screening, etc.) and the variations (types and combinations of elements) with which the elements or zones differ from each other, and where it is also possible to increase the degree of certainty by increasing the number of required positions (eg Military access card: 25 positions, VISA card: 10 positions, proton card: 3 positions.), so that an additional check is exercised during authentication procedures, namely the identification check of the carrier itself; The layer (16B) as described in claim 1, which is equipped with at least one contact point (e.g. on the edge of a card 19B) that can be brought into contact with a corresponding contact point (19B) of the electronic scanner, reader and / or processing system so that additional voltage can be applied to this layer and / or a electrical value can be read; The element as described in claim 1 that exists or is composed of at least one material that is different from the material (e.g. polymer) of the carrier or container itself, so is exogenous, such as e.g. metal plates 18A, silver-coated copper chains 18D, Nickel-coated carbon chains or particles 18C, silver particles and clusters, Nickel flakes or splinters, graphite chains, metal wires, crystals, micro resonance circuits, gas capsules, specific nano-structures, nano-spirals, etc .; The method as described in claim 1, wherein during the production process of the support or a part of the support (e.g. one part of the laminate 16B) a number of elements random (eg in the plastic mass for mold injection or film production) or be added in a structured way, to a sufficient extent to be perceptible for electronic scanning or measurement; A carrier or container, as described in claim 1, that at least one radiation insulating auxiliary layer, e.g. a conductive film or coating; The method as described in claim 1, wherein a payment card (e.g., VISA card) is implemented with either a. a second series of digits, b. a second set of letters, c. a second series of symbols, d. a second series with combinations of preceding ones, with this second series (12B) being an alias, ie. do not contain the correct number series (12A), but a series that - whether or not - is generated based on the aforementioned positions, and where this virtual / alias series is only used for electronic transactions over networks (eg Internet), where for a payment over an electronic network, the virtual / alias series is provided by the buyer to the seller, whose server transmits the virtual / alias series to a third party organization or banking institution which in turn converts this virtual / alias series (1213) as a quick link, via a register) in the correct number series (12A) associated with the payment card; A payment card, as described in claim 15, on which or in which - in addition - a virtual / alias sequence is printed, either on the same side or on the other side, and the number of numbers, letters and / or symbols may differ from the number of the traditional card; 17. Payment card, as described in claim 1, - only usable for payments via Internet or other networks - on which only the virtual / alias series as described in claim 15 is printed and / or pressed; The payment card as described in claim 1, wherein the virtual / alias string, as described in claim 15, is processed in an email address of the banking institution (e.g. to: 12AB-34CD-56EF-78GH@visa.com or john-12AB-34CD-56EF- 78GH@visa.com) and is printed and / or pressed on it, and is eg automatically sent by the user to the banking institution in a payment module with every purchase from a supplier on the Internet or other network; The method as described in claim 1, and map (carrier + memory) where certain positions or all positions of the exogenous elements are used as a fixed static structure for calculating encryption, ie. a processing unit (eg reader, computer, etc.) calculates a specific encryption based on traditional software in combination with unique positions in the card, which is only possible for the owner of the relevant card, ie. an encryption card or new type of electronic key.