AU2012202853B2 - Self encryption - Google Patents

Abstract

This invention is a network that is defined by its novel approach to privacy, security and freedom for its users. Privacy by allowing access anonymously, security by encrypting and obfuscating resources and freedom by allowing users to anonymously and irrefutably be seen as genuine individuals on the network and to communicate with other users with total security and to securely access resources that are both their own and those that are shared by others with them. Further, this invention comprises a system of self healing data, secure messaging and a voting system to allow users to dictate the direction of development of the network, whereby adoption or denial of proposed add-ons to the network will be decided. System incompatibilities and security breaches on networks and the Internet are addressed by this invention where disparity and tangents of development have had an undue influence. The functional mechanisms that this invention provides will restore open communications and worry-free access in a manner that is very difficult to infect with viruses or cripple through denial of service attacks and spam messaging, plus, it will provide a foundation where vendor lock-in need not be an issue.

Description

1 PATENT SPECIFICATION TITLE: SELF ENCRYPTION 5 An issue with today's networks is a combination of vendor lock in, imposed vendor based controls and lack of standards. It would be desirable to allow users to take charge of a new global network in a manner that will maintain effectiveness and promote the setting and attaining of common goals. 10 Another issue with today's networks is the security and privacy of data. It would be desirable to allow a secure private and free network where users can enjoy an efficiently managed working environment that presents a guaranteed level of private and securely protected activity. 15 Also today, many computer resources are underutilised to a great degree, including disk space, memory, processing power and any other attached resources, this is inefficient and environmentally detrimental. It would be desirable to maximise these resources and share them globally to 20 people who purchase them or to people or organisations who are deemed appropriate to benefit from them, such as children in poorer countries, science labs etc. Allocation from these resource pools, together with other resources, will be decided by the users of the system. 25 BACKGROUND: Digital data is often stored on the hard disks of individual PCs which invariably have memory and operational overhead restrictions. Storage 2 21 on distributed systems such as the intemet is also possible but requires 22 specific storage servers to be available. In addition to these physical 23 systems, data management elements such as security, repair, 24 encryption, authentication, anonymity and mapping etc. are required to 25 ensure successful data transactions and management via the Internet. 26 Systems of messaging and voting exist today but do not allow either 27 authentication on what was voted for or on line anonymity, There have 28 been some attempts as listed below, but none of these systems operate 29 as maidsafe.net does. 30 Listed below is some prior art for these individual elements, of which we 31 have analysed and rejected as true prior art, where necessary we 32 indicate why it is not prior art for our invention: 33 PERPETUAL DATA 34 Most perpetual data generation is allocated with time & calendar etc. 35 (US62669563, JP2001100633). This is not related to this current 36 invention as we have no relation to calendaring, which demonstrates 37 perpetual generation time related data. However, External devices as 38 communication terminal (JP2005057392) (this is a hardware device not 39 related to this present invention) have been used for plurality of packet 40 switching to allow perpetual hand-ff of roaming data between networks 41 and battery pack (EP0944232) has been used to around-the-clock 42 accessibility of customer premises equipment interconnected to a Ir-ifedrd-rietwark-iireriharidd by-p -rp etU-imcde-operatian-of-a 44 broadband network interface. In addition, perpetual data storage and 45 retrieval in reliable manner in peer to peer or distributed network The 46 only link here is these devices are connected to Internet connections 47 but otherwise presents no prior art. 48 DATABASES & DATA STORA GE METHODS 49 Patents W09637837, TW223167B, US6760756 and US7099898 50 describe methods of data replication and retention of data during failure.

3 51 Patent W0200505060625 discloses method of secure interconnection 52 when failure occurs. 53 AUTHENTICATION 54 Authentication servers are for user and data transaction authentication 55 e.g. JP2005311545 which describe a system wherein the application of 56 'a digital seal' to electronic documents conforms to the Electronic 57 Signature Act. This is similar to the case of signing paper documents 58 but uses the application of an electronic signature through an electronic 59 seal authentication system. The system includes: client computers, to 60 each of which a graphics tablet is connected; an electronic seal 61 authentication server and a PKI authentication server, plus the 62 electronic seal authentication server. US2004254894 discloses an 63 automated system for the confirmed efficient authentication of an 64 anonymous subscriber's profile data in this case. 65 JP2005339247 describes a server based one time ID system and uses 66 a portable terminal. US2006136317 discloses bank drop down boxes 67 and suggests stronger protection by not transmitting any passwords or 68 IDs. Patent US2006126848 discloses a server centric and deals with a 69 one time password or authentication phrase and is not for use on a 70 distributed network. Patent US2002194484 discloses a distributed 71 networks where all chunks are not individually verified and where the 72 manifest is only re-computed after updates to files and hashes are 73 applied and are tor validation only. 74 SELF-AUTHENTICATION 75 This is mostly used in biometric (W02006069158). System for 76 generating a patch file from an old version of data which consists of a 77 series of elements and a new version of data which also consists of a 78 series of elements US2006136514). Authentication servers (therefore 79 not a distributed networking principle as per this invention) are 80 commonly used (JP2006107316, US2005273603, EP1548979).

4 81 However, server and client exchange valid certificates can be used 82 (US2004255037). Instead of server, uses of information exchange 83 system (semantic information) by participant for authentication can be 84 used (JP2004355358), again this semantic information is stored and 85 referenced unlike this present invention. 86 Concepts of identity-based cryptography and threshold secret sharing 87 provides for a distributed key management and authentication. Without 88 any assumption of pre-fixed trust relationship between nodes, the ad 89 hoc network works in a self-organizing way to provide the key 90 generation and key management service, which effectively solves the 91 problem of single point of failure in the traditional public key 92 infrastructure (PKI)-supported system (US2006023887). Authenticating 93 involves encryption keys for validation (W02005055162) These are 94 validated against known users unlike the present invention. Also, for 95 authentication extemal housing are used (W02005034009). All of 96 these systems require a lost or (whether distributed or not) record of 97 authorised users and pass phrases or certificates and therefore do not 98 represent prior art. 99 Ranking, hashing for authentication can be implemented step-by-step 100 and empirical authentication of devices upon digital authentication 101 among a plurality of devices. Each of a plurality of authentication 102 devices can unidirectionally generate a hash value of a low experience 103- rank-from-a-hash-value-of-a-hig h-experience-rank-and-receive aset of 104 high experience rank and hash value in accordance with an experience. 105 In this way, the authentication devices authenticate each other's 106 experience ranks (US2004019788). This is a system of hashing access 107 against known identities and providing a mechanism of effort based 108 access. This present invention does not rely or use such mechanisms. 109 QuicK ENcIPHERING 5 110 This is another method for authentication (JP2001308845). Self 111 verifying certificate for computer system, uses private and public keys 112 no chunking but for trusted hardware subsystems (US2002080973) this 113 is a mechanism of self signing certificates for authentication, again 114 useful for effort based computing but not used in this present invention. 115 Other authentication modes are, device for exchanging packets of 116 information (JP2001186186), open key certificate management data 117 (JP10285156), and certification for authentication (WO96139210). 118 Authentication for Peer to Peer system is demonstrated by digital rights 119 management (US2003120928). Digital rights management and CSC 120 (part of that patent s a DRM container) issues which are based on 121 ability to use rather than gaining access to network or resources and 122 therefore not prior art. 123 Known self-healing techniques are divided broadly into two classes. [24 One is a centralized control system that provides overall rerouting [25 control from the central location of a network. In this approach, the .26 rerouting algorithm and the establishing of alarm collection times .27 become increasingly complex as the number of failed channels .28 increases, and a substantial amount of time will be taken to collect 29 alarm signals and to transfer rerouting information should a large 30 number of channels of a multiplexed transmission system fail. The other 131 is a distributed approach in which the rerouting functions are provided 132 by distributed points of the network. The following papers on distributed 1-33 rerouting-approach have beerrpublish~ed(these-are all-elated-tU'self 134 healing but from a network pathway perspective and therefore are not 135 prior art for this invention which deals with data or data chunks self 136 healing mechanisms. 137 Document 1: W. D. Grover, "The Selfhealing Network", Proceedings of .38 Grobecom '87, November 1987.

6 139 Document 2: H. C. Yang and S. Hasegawa, "Fitness: Failure 140 Immunization Technology For Network Service Survivability", 141 Proceedings of Globecom '88, December 1988. 142 Document 3: H. R. Amirazizi, "Controlling Synchronous Networks With 143 Digital Cross-Connect Systems", Proceedings of Globecom '88, 144 December 1988. 145 Document 1 is concerned with a restoration technique for failures in a 146 single transmission system, and Document 2 relates to a "multiple 147 wave" approach in which route-finding packets are broadcast in multiple 148 wave fashion in search of a maximum bandwidth until alternate routes 149 having the necessary bandwidth are established. One shortcoming of 150 this multiple wave approach is that it takes a long recovery time. 151 Document 3 also relates to fault recovery for single transmission 152 systems and has a disadvantage in that route-finding packets tend to 153 form a loop and hence a delay is likely to be encountered. 154 SELF-HEALING 155 This is demonstrated by a system and method of secure and 156 tamperproof remote files over distributed system, redirects integrity 157 check fail data to install module for repairing (W020566133) This 158 discloser relies on testing data from a central location and not 159 distributed chunking as with the present invention. It also does not allow 160 for multipeaccess-and-s1Tuirg-of-th-testing andowi-nershi5 of chunks. 161 Server are used for self-healing (US2004177156), effectively removing 162 these from a prior art claim. Self-repairing is conducted by data overlay 163 is built as a data structure on top of a logical space defined by a 164 distributed hash table (DHT) in a peer-to-peer (P2P) network 165 environment (US2005187946) This Microsoft patent is a patent to DT 166 networks which is peculiar as these exist in some quantity and have 167 done for many years, however there is no claim made to self repair data 168 as is in this present invention but to self repair data storage locations 7 169 (i.e. in p2p terms find nearest node). This is not self healing data but 170 merely a description of a typical DHT and the availability of routes to 171 data and providing multiple routes. This is not prior art for this present 172 inventions but very likely not enforceable as there are many cases of 173 prior art against this Microsoft patent. 174 Identical communicating node elements are used for power delivery 175 network for self-repairing (US2005043858). Self-healing also relates to 176 distributed data systems and, in particular, to providing high availability 177 during performance of a cluster topology self-healing process within a 178 distributed data system cluster. A cluster topology self-healing process 179 may be performed in response to a node failure in order to replicate a 180 data set stored on a failed node from a first node storing another copy 181 of the data set to a second non-failed node (US2004066741). An 182 apparatus and method for self-healing of software may rely on a 183 distribution object in a directory services of a network to provide data for 184 controlling distribution of software and installation of files associated 185 therewith (US6023586). A technique for the substantially instantaneous 186 self-healing of digital communications networks. Digital data streams 187 from each of N nearby sources are combined and encoded to produce 188 N+M coded data streams using a coding algorithm. The N+M coded 189 data streams are then each transmitted over a separate long haul 190 communications link to a decoder where any N of the N+M coded data 191 streams can be decoded uniquely to produce the original N data steams 192 (EP042UG648-.Toprvide a self hnalig comuni caiiotions network whidh 193 can be recovered from a failure in a short period of time even if the 194 failure has occurred in a multiplexed transmission line (US5235599) 195 The above patents and inventions are based on clustering technology 196 and not distributed computing or Internet based computing. The cluster 197 is simply many machines connected to create a larger machine. It is 198 treated as a single machine with known user access etc. and not prior 199 art to this present invention. The N + M coding schemes discussed are 200 patents based on digital communications and reception links and are 8 201 not related to this present invention although at first glance they appear 202 to have the same language in areas. 203 Attempts to moving towards attaining some limited aspects of self 204 encryption are demonstrated by 205 (a) US2003053053625 discloser shows limitation of asymmetrical and 206 symmetrical encryption algorithms, and particularly not requiring 207 generating a key stream from symmetric keys, nor requiring any time 208 synchronising, with minimal computational complexity and capable of 209 operated at high speed. A serial data stream to be securely transmitted 210 is first demultiplexed into a plurality N of encryptor input data stream. 211 The input data slices are created which have cascade of stages, include 212 mapping & delay function to generate output slices. These are 213 transmitted though a transmission channel. Decryptor applies inverse 214 step of cascade of stages, equalizing delay function and.mapping to 215 generate output data slices. The output data streams are multiplexed. 216 The encryptor and decryptor require no synchronizing or timing and 217 operate in simple stream fashion. N:N mapping does not require 218 expensive arithmetic and implemented in table lookup. This provides 219 robust security and efficiency. A significant difference between this 220 approach and prior cipher method is that the session key is used to 221 derive processing parameters (tables and delays) of the encryptor and 222 decryptor in advance of data transmission. Instead of being used to zzJ gi -ftefea key steam at rea[-time rafes.~Algoritihifdr generating 224 parameters from a session key is disclosed This patent is based on 225 data communications and encrypting data in transit automatically and 226 decrypting automatically at the remote end, this is not related to this 227 present invention. 228 (b) US2002184485 discloser addresses secure communication, by 229 encryption of message (SSDO-self signing document objects), such 230 that only known recipient in possession of a secret key can read the 9 231 message and verification of message, such that text and origin of 232 message can be verified. Both capabilities and built into message that 233 can be transmitted over internet and decrypted or verified by computer 234 implementing a document representation language that supports 235 dynamic content e.g. any standard web browser, such that elaborate 236 procedures to ensure transmitting and receiving computers have same 237 software are no longer necessary. Encrypted message or one encoded 238 for verification can carry within itself all information needed to specify 239 the algorithm needed for decryption. This is a patent describing a key 240 pair encryption and validation of same software. This is not used by the 241 present invention where key pairs are used for asymmetric encryption 242 of some data but this is used with the RSA (now out of patent) 243 encryption ciphers and not in the manner described above which is 244 more for validation. 245 A range of limited methods for self-encryption have been developed 246 e.g. system for radomisation-encryption of digital data sequence with 247 freely selectable (EP1 182777) (this is a key generating patent and not 248 self encryption as this current invention shows), use of code key 249 calculation encryption mode but using server (CN1658553), uses self 250 test mode (US6028527), encryption system for randomising data signal 251 for transmission (not storing) and reproducing information at a receiver 252 (US4760598), uses private encryption keys into components and 253 sending them to trusted agents (rather than self encryption as per this 254- -pre'itrfveTiti-nT(JP200532854)7-rypt graphid-sytiem with key 255 escrow feature, rather than self encryption as described in this present 256 invention (US6009177), steps of first encoding one set of message 257 signal with first keyed transformation (US6385316), self-modifying fail 258 safe password system (US6370649), time-based encrypting method 259 involves splitting voice signal into time intervals, random permutations 260 etc. (RU2120700), uses hardware decryption module (HDM) 261 (US2003046568), realizing data security storage and algorithm storage 262 by means of semiconductor memory device (US2006149972), use 10 263 certificate from certificate server (US20020428080), use certificates for 264 encryption of communications (EP1422865), use self-service terminal 265 for encryption and transmission of data (US2006020788), method for 266 implementing security communication by encryption algorithm 267 (US2005047597), method of data encryption - block encryption variable 268 length (BEVL) encoding, overcomes weakness of CMEA algorithm) 269 (US2004190712), encrypted cipher code for secure data transmission 270 (CN1627681) method and system for encrypting streamed data 271 employing fast set-up single use key and self-synchronising 272 (US2005232424) and for security, generate MAC for data integrity, 273 placing electronic signature, use TREM software module 274 (US2004199768) 275 None of the above systems utilise self encryption as per the present 276 invention and are related to voice and data transmissions, or include 277 hardware controllers or servers. 278 PRIVATE SHARED FLESH 279 US6859812 discloses a system and method for differentiating private 280 and shared files, where clustered computers share a common storage 281 resource, Network-Attached Storage (NAS) and Storage Area Network 282 (SAN), therefore not distributed as in this present invention. US5313646 283 has a system which provides a copy-on-write feature which protects the 284 integrity of the shared files by automatically copying a shared file into 285 user's-private layeTwhen the user attempts-to-nid'ifyashared file in a 286 back layer, this is a different technology again and relies on user 287 knowledge - not anonymous. W002095545 discloses a system using a 288 server for private file sharing which is not anonymous. 289 DISTRIBUTED NETWoRK SHARED MAPS 290 A computer system having plural nodes interconnected by a common 291 broadcast bus is disclosed by U85117350. US5423034 shows how 292 each file and level in the directory structure has network access 11 293 privileges. The file directory structure generator and retrieval tool have a 294 document locator module that maps the directory structure of the files 295 stored in the memory to a real world hierarchical file structure of files. 296 Therefore not distributed across public networks or anonymous or self 297 encrypting, the present inventions does not use broadcasting in this 298 manner. 299 SECURITY 300 Today systems secure transactions through encryption technologies 301 such as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), Digital Certificates, and Public 302 Key Encryption technologies. The systems today address the hackers 303 through technologies such as Firewalls and Intrusion Detection 304 systems. The merchant certification programs are designed to ensure 305 the merchant has adequate inbuilt security to reasonably assure the 306 consumer their transaction will be secure. These systems also ensure 307 that the vendor will not incur a charge back by attempting to verify the 308 consumer through secondary validation systems such as password 309 protection and eventually, Smart Card technology. 310 Network firewalls are typically based on packet filtering which is limited 311 in principle, since the rules that judge which packets to accept or reject 312 are based on subjective decisions. Even VPNs (Virtual Private 313 Networks) and other forms of data encryption, including digital 314 signatures, are not really safe because the information can be stolen 'D ~.0 15efrebTthe errpfo s e prograri ~-dldwed to do 316 whatever they like to other programs or to their data files or to critical 317 files of the operating system. This is done by (CA247150) automatically 318 creating an unlimited number of Virtual Environments (VEs) with virtual 319 sharing of resources, so that the programs in each VE think that they 320 are alone on the computer. The present invention takes a totally 321 different approach to security and obviates the requirement of much of 322 the above particularly CA2471505.

12 323 US6185316 discloses security via fingerprint imaging testing bit of code 324 using close false images to deter fraudulent copying, this is different 325 from the present invention in that we store no images at all and certainly 326 not in a database. 327 SECURITY & STORAGE SYSTEMS 328 There are currently several types of centralised file storage systems 329 that are used in business environments. One such system is a server 330 tethered storage system that communicates with the end users over a 331 local area network, or LAN. The end users send requests for the 332 storage and retrieval of files over the LAN to a file server, which 333 responds by controlling the storage and/or retrieval operations to 334 provide or store the requested files. While such a system works well for 335 smaller networks, there is a potential bottleneck at the interface 336 between the LAN and the file storage system. 337 Another type of centralised storage system is a storage area network, 338 which is a shared, dedicated high-speed network for connecting storage 339 resources to the servers. While the storage area networks are generally 340 more flexible and scalable in terms of providing end user connectivity to 341 different server-storage environments, the systems are also more 342 complex. The systems require hardware, such as gateways, routers, 343 switches, and are thus costly in terms of hardware and associated 344 software acquisition. 345 Yet another type of storage system is a network attached storage 346 system in which one or more special-purpose servers handle file 347 storage over the LAN. 348 Another file storage system utilizes distributed storage resources 349 resident on various nodes, or computers, operating on the system, 350 rather than a dedicated centralised storage system. These are 351 distributed systems, with the clients communicating peer-to-peer to 13 352 determine which storage resources to allocate to particular files, 353 directories and so forth. These systems are organized as global file 354 stores that are physically distributed over the computers on the system. 355 A global file store is a monolithic file system that is indexed over the 356 system as, for example, a hierarchical directory. The nodes in the 357 systems use Byzantine agreements to manage file replications, which 358 are used to promote file availability and/or reliability. The Byzantine 359 agreements require rather lengthy exchanges of messages and thus 360 are inefficient and even impractical for use in a system in which many 361 modifications to files are anticipated. US200211434 shows a peer-to 362 peer storage system which describes a storage coordinator that 363 centrally manages distributed storage resources. The difference here is 364 the requirement of a storage broker, making this not fully distributed. 365 The present invention also differs in that the present invention has no 366 central resources for any of the system and we also encrypt data for 367 security as well as the self healing aspect of our system which is again 368 distributed. 369 US7010532 discloses improved access to information stored on a 370 storage device. A plurality of first nodes and a second node are coupled 371 to one another over a communications pathway, the second node being 372 coupled to the storage device for determining meta data including block 373 address maps to file data in the storage device. 3-74- -JP2003273860-discloses-a method-of-enh-arreirigthirecurity level 375 during access of an encrypted document including encrypted content. A 376 document access key for decrypting an encrypted content within an 377 encrypted document is stored in a management device, and a user 378 device wishing to access the encrypted document transmits its user ID 379 and a document identification key for the encrypted document, which 380 are encrypted by a private key, together with a public key to the 381 management device to request transmission of the document access 382 key. Differing from this invention in that it never transmit user id or login 14 383 in the network at all. Also it does not require management devices of 384 any form. 385 JP2002185444 discloses improves security in networks and the 386 certainty for satisfying processing requests, In the case of user 387 registration, a print server forms a secret key and a public key, and 388 delivers the public key to a user terminal, which forms a user ID, a 389 secret key and a public key, encrypts the user ID and the public key by 390 using the public key, and delivers them to the print server. This is not 391 linked at all to this invention and is a system for a PKI infrastructure for 392 certificate access to network nodes. 393 The private and public keys of users are used in US6925182, and are 394 encrypted with a symmetric algorithm by using individual user 395 identifying keys and are stored on a network server making it a different 396 proposition from a distributed network 397 US2005091234 describes data chunking system which divides data into 398 predominantly fixed-sized chunks such that duplicate data may be 399 identified. This is associated with storing and transmitting data for 400 distributed network. US2006206547 discloses a centralised storage 401 system, whilst US2005004947 discloses a new PC based file system. 402 US2005256881 discloses data storage in a place defined by a path 403 algorithm. This is a server based duplicate removal and not necessarily -404 encrypting-dataun like the pras t~ih-itiv rT whThdoeds-5th arid 405 requires no servers. 406 SECURITY & ENCRYPTION 407 Common email communications of sensitive information is in plain text 408 and is subject to being read by unauthorized code on the senders 409 system, during transit and by unauthorized code on the receiver's 410 system. Where there is a high degree of confidentially required, a 411 combination of hardware and software secures data.

15 412 A high degree of security to a computer or several computers 413 connected to the Internet or a LAN as disclosed in US2002099666. 414 Hardware system is used which consists of a processor module, a 415 redundant non-volatile memory system, such as dual disk drives, and 416 multiple communications interfaces. This type of security system must 417 be unlocked by a pass phrase to access data, and all data is 418 transparently encrypted, stored, archived and available for encrypted 419 backup. A system for maintaining secure communications, file transfer 420 and document signing with PKI, and a system for intrusion monitoring 421 and system integrity checks are provided, logged and selectively 422 alarmed in a tamper-proof, time-certain manner. 423 ENCRYPTION 424 W02005093582 discloses method of encryption where data is secured 425 in the receiving node via private tag for anonymous network browsing. 426 However, other numerous encryption methods are also available such 427 as (i) implantation of Reed Solomon algorithm (WO02052787), which 428 ensures data is coded in parabolic fashion for self-repairing and 429 storage, (ii) storage involves incremental backup (WO02052787), (ii) 430 uses stenographic (US2006177094), (iv) use cipher keys (CN1620005), 431 encryption for non text (US2006107048) and US2005108240 discloses 432 user keys and randomly generated leaf node keys. The present 433 invention uses none of these methods of encryption and in particular 434 EnsFes-alr-h1ink~-ars unid-qnd0do--ofpdintTo~arotheYfor security 435 (an issue with Reed Solomon and N + K implementations of parabolic 436 coding) 437 ENCRYPTED DOCUMENT SIGNING 438 W02005060152 discloses a digital watermark representing the one 439 way hash is embedded in a signature document is used for electronic 440 signing. Mostly encrypted document signing is associated with legal 441 documents, e.g. on-line notary etc. e.g. US2006161781, signature 16 442 verification (US6381344). WOO1 82036 discloses a system and method 443 for signing, storing, and authenticating electronic documents using 444 public key cryptography. The system comprises a document service 445 computer cluster connected to user computers, document owner server 446 computers, and registration computers via a network such as for 447 example, the intemet or the world wide web. WO001 3368 discloses 448 both the data object and the signature data are encrypted. None of 449 these systems are designed or allow for distributed signing networks 450 unlike the present invention. 451 US6912660 discloses a method for parallel approval of an electronic 452 document. A document authentication code (DAC 0) is generated, 453 linked to the original document. Subsequent approvals of the document 454 generate a DAC x related to that specific approval. This is not linked to 455 the present invention as it's a document approval system - i.e. one 456 which allows a document to have multiple signatories to authenticate 457 approval, the present invention does not do this at all. 458 US6098056 discloses a system and method for controlling access 459 rights to and security of digital content in a distributed information 460 system, e.g., Internet. The network includes at least one server coupled 461 to a storage device for storing the limited access digital content 462 encrypted using a random-generated key, known as a Document 463 Encryption Key (DEK). The DEK is further encrypted with the server's -464- -public-key-usinga public/private kiypairl-orithmiwafwd -raced in a 465 digital container stored in a storage device and including as a part of the 466 meta-information which is in the container. The client's workstation is 467 coupled to the server (one of the many difference's from the present 468 invention) for acquiring the limited access digital content under the 469 authorized condition. A Trusted Information Handler (TIH) is validated 470 by the server after the handler provides a data signature and type of 471 signing algorithm to transaction data descriptive of the purchase 472 agreement between the client and the owner. After the handler has 17 473 authenticated, the server decrypts the encrypted DEK with its private 474 key and re-encrypts the DEK with the handler's public key ensuring that 475 only the information handler can process the information. The encrypted 476 DEK is further encrypted with the client's public key personalizing the 477 digital content to the client. The client's program decrypts the DEK with 478 his private key and passes it along with the encrypted content to the 479 handler which decrypts the DEK with his private key and proceeds to 480 decrypt the content for displaying to the client. 481 US5436972 discloses a method for preventing inadvertent betrayal by a 482 trustee of escrowed digital secrets. After unique identification data 483 describing a user has been entered into a computer system, the user is 484 asked to select a password to protect the system. US5557518 discloses 485 a system to open electronic commerce using trusted agents. 486 US5557765 discloses a system and method for data recovery. An 487 encrypting user encrypts a method using a secret storage key (KS) and 488 attaches a Data Recovery Field (DRF), including an Access Rule Index 489 (ARI) and the KS to the encrypted message. 490 US5590199, discloses a system for authenticating and authorizing a 491 user to access services on a heterogeneous computer network. The 492 system includes at least one workstation and one authorization server 493 connected to each other through a network. 494- US2006123227'aTd-WO0221~49~d eiilthusf basedeffort measuring 495 techniques to validate signatures without the requirement for a central 496 body or central messaging entity. This is an interesting new concept but 497 not used in the current invention. 498 SELF-ENcRYPTION 499 Attempts to moving towards attaining some limited aspects of self 500 encryption are demonstrated by: 18 501 (a) US2003053053625 discloses limitation of asymmetrical and 502 symmetrical encryption algorithms, and particularly not requiring 503 generation of a key stream from symmetric keys, nor requiring any time 504 synchronizing, with minimal computational complexity and capable of 505 operating at high speed. A serial data stream to be securely transmitted 506 is first demultiplexed into a plurality N of encryptor input data stream. 507 The input data slices are created which have a cascade of stages, 508 include mapping & delay functions to generate output slices. These are 509 transmitted though a transmission channel. Decryptor applies inverse 510 step of cascade of stages, equalizing delay function and mapping to 511 generate output data slices. The output data streams are multiplexed. 512 The encryptor and decryptor require no synchronizing or timing and 513 operate in simple stream fashion. N:N mapping does not require 514 expensive arithmetic and implemented in table lookup. This provides 515 robust security and efficiency. A significant difference between this 516 approach and prior cipher method is that the session key is used to 517 derive processing parameters (tables and delays) of the encryptor and 518 decryptor in advance of data transmission. Instead of being used to 519 generate a key stream at real-time rates. Algorithm for generating 520 parameters from a session key is disclosed. This is a data 521 communications network and not related to current invention. 522 (b) US2002184485 addresses secure communication, by encryption of 523 message (SSDO-self signing document objects), such that only known 524~ -recipientin-p'oe-ession of a sert~Rey cae7dfid~1 ne ' and 525 verification of message, such that text and origin of message can be 526 verified. Both capabilities are built into message that can be transmitted 527 over intemet and decrypted or verified by computer implementing a 528 document representation language that supports dynamic content e.g. 529 any standard web browser, such that elaborate procedures to ensure 530 transmitting and receiving computers have same software are no longer 531 necessary. Encrypted message or one encoded for verification can 19 532 carry within itself all information needed to specify the algorithm needed 533 for decryption. 534 ANONYMOUS TRANSACTIONS & INTERFACES 535 US2004117303 discloses an anonymous payment system and is 536 designed to enable users of the Internet and other networks to 537 exchange cash for electronic currency that may be used to conduct 538 commercial transactions world-wide through public networks. 539 US2005289086 discloses an anonymity for web registration which 540 allows payment system. US2002073318 describe use of servers where 541 the system is effort based trust on combination of anonymous keys to 542 transact and public key to buy non anonymous credits. Each of these is 543 a centrally controlled system and do not provide a mechanism to 544 transfer credits or cash to anonymous accounts. Many of these actually 545 require user registration on a web site. 546 US2003163413 discloses a method of conducting anonymous 547 transactions over the Internet to protect consumers from identity fraud. 548 The process involves the formation of a Secure Anonymous 549 Transaction Engine to enable any consumer operating over an open 550 network, such as the Internet to browse, collect information, research, 551 shop, and purchase anonymously. The Secure Anonymous Transaction 552 Engine components provide a highly secure connection between the 553 consumer and the provider of goods or services over the Internet by 534 emulating an in store anonymous cash transactidifelth6olghcbnducted 555 over the Internet. This again is server based and requires user 556 registration. 557 With regard to cash transfers, a truly anonymous purchase is one in 558 which the purchaser and seller are unknown to each other, the 559 purchase process is not witnessed by any other person, and the 560 exchange medium is cash. Such transactions are not the norm. Even 561 cash transactions in a place of business are typically witnessed by 20 562 salespersons and other customers or bystanders, if not recorded on 563 videotape as a routine security measure. On the other hand, common 564 transaction media such as payment by personal check or credit card 565 represent a clear loss of anonymity, since the purchaser's identity as 566 well as other personal information is attached to the transaction (e. g., 567 driver's license number, address, telephone number, and any 568 information attached to the name, credit card, or driver's license 569 number). Thus, although a cash transaction is not a truly anonymous 570 purchase, it provides a considerably higher degree of purchase 571 anonymity than a transaction involving a personal check or credit card, 572 and affords perhaps the highest degree of purchase anonymity 573 achievable in the present. The use of cash, however, has limitations, 574 especially in the context of electronic commerce. 575 W00203293 discloses methods, systems, and devices for performing 576 transactions via a communications network such as the Internet while 577 preserving the anonymity of at least one of the parties. A transaction 578 device is linked to an anonymous account to allow a party to preserve 579 an equivalent level of anonymity as the use of cash when making a 580 transaction at a traditional brick-and-mortar business as well as in the 581 virtual world of electronic commerce. As such, the transaction device 582 may be considered equivalent to a flexible and versatile cash wallet. In 583 this way, combines the desirable features of cash (anonymity, security, 584 and acceptance) and of electronic commerce (speed, ease, and 585 -convenienee-.-T-his like the next-invention-requires-a hardware based 586 device unlike the present invention. 587 EP0924667 is based on a distributed payment system for cash-free 588 payment with purse chip cards using the Net. The system consists of a 589. client system which is, for example, installed at the customer site and a 590 server system which is, for example, installed at the dealer.

21 591 US6299062 discloses an electronic cash system for performing an 592 electronic transaction using an electronic cash, comprises at least one 593 user apparatus each capable of using the electronic cash; an 594 authentication centre apparatus, for receiving a user identity 595 information, a corresponding public key along with a certificate issue 596 request from one of the user apparatus and for issuing a certificate for 597 the user apparatus's public key after confirming the identity of the 598 corresponding user. This again requires hardware and user registration 599 to the system 600 US2004172539 discloses method for generating an electronic receipt in 601 a communication system providing a public key infrastructure, 602 comprising the steps of receiving by a second party a request message 603 from a first party, the request message comprising a transaction request 604 and a first public key based on a secret owned by the first party and 605 wherein the secret is associated with at least the secret of a further 606 public key of the first party. (server based) 607 W00219075 discloses publicly-accessible, independent, and secure 608 host internet site that provides a downloadable agent program to any 609 anonymous client PC, with the agent program generating within the 610 client PC a registration checksum based upon the document to be 611 registered. 6-1-2 ANONYMOUS VOTING 613 US2003159032 discloses automatically generating unique, one-way 614 compact and mnemonic voter credentials that support privacy and 615 security services. Discloses any voting system, voting organization, or 616 voting game wherein participants need to be anonymous and/or must 617 exchange secrets and/or make collective decisions. US2002077887 618 (requires registration and initial knowledge of the person who receives 619 the ballot, and requires a server) discloses an architecture that enables 620 anonymous electronic voting over the Internet using public key 22 621 technologies. Using a separate public key/private key pair, the voting 622 mediator validates the voting ballot request. (Hardware device) 623 DE1 0325491 discloses that the voting method has an electronic ballot 624 box for collecting encoded electronic voting slips and an electronic box 625 for collecting the decoded voting slips. The voter fills out his voting slip 626 at a computer and authenticates his vote with an anonymous signature 627 setting unit. 628 US2004024635 (hardware based, requiring servers) discloses a 629 distributed network voting system; a server for processing votes cast 630 over a distributed computing network. The server includes memory 631 storage, data identification, an interested party and a processor in 632 communication with the memory. The processor operates to present an 633 issue to a user of a client computer, receive a vote on the issue from 634 the user, and transmit data relating to the vote to the interested party 635 based upon the data identifying the interested party stored in the 636 memory. The processor further operates to generate a vote status 637 cookie when the user submits the vote, transmit the vote status cookie 638 to the client for storage, and transmit data to the user that prompts the 639 user to provide authentication data relating to the user, who then 640 receives authentication data relating to the user and authenticate the 641 user based on the authentication data. 642 W003098172 discloses modular monitoring and protection system with 64-3- -distributed voting logic. 644 MAPPING 645 US2006112243 discloses a hard disk mapping where the data is copied 646 locally and then the machine decides it can use either copy and 647 whether or not update the other one. EP1049291 discloses a remote 648 device monitoring using pre-calculated maps of equipment locations. 649 These are hardware based data mapping systems and not related.

23 As above prior art highlights separate existence of elements such as storage, security, repairing, encryption, authentication, anonymity, voting and mapping etc. for data transaction and storage via internet. There is some limited linkage between a few of the individual elements, but none are inter-linked to provide 5 comprehensive solution for secure data storage and transmittance via internet utilisation. Any discussion of documents, devices, acts or knowledge in this specification is included to explain the context of the invention. It should not be taken as an 10 admission that any of the material formed part of the prior art base or the common general knowledge in the relevant art in Australia on or before the priority date of the claims herein. SUMMARY OF INVENTION 15 In accordance with the present invention, there is provided a method of protecting data in a peer-to-peer network of a plurality of nodes, including: splitting the data into a plurality of data chunks of one or more sizes, wherein the one or more sizes are randomly calculated based on a hash value of the data; obfuscating the 20 plurality of data chunks by swapping data between the data chunks; naming the plurality of obfuscated data chunks using corresponding hash values; and encrypting the plurality of obfuscated data chunks using corresponding hash values. 25 The encryption algorithm is preferably a symmetric encryption algorithm. The method may further include searching an encrypted data chunk in the peer to-peer network based on a corresponding hash value. The encrypting of a first data chunk of the plurality of obfuscated data chunks 30 preferably includes: determining hash values of second and third data chunks of the plurality of obfuscated data chunks; applying a modulo division technique to 24 the hash value of the second data chunk and a first predefined number of bytes of the hash value of the third data chunk to generate a random number; and using the random number and the hash value of the second data chunk to encrypt the first data chunk. 5 The method may further include storing the plurality of encrypted data chunks on the plurality of nodes of the peer-to-peer network. The method may further include determining if each chunk of the data already exists on the network and, if each chunk of the data already exists, not storing the protected data. 10 A first predefined number of bits of the hash value may be added together and a modulo division technique can be applied to the added value to determine at least one chunk size and the number of data chunks. The method may further include repeating the swapping by same number of times as there are chunks, wherein obfuscating the data chunks leads to mixing 15 up of content of the data chunks, thereby ensuring that the data is rendered useless without presence of all the data chunks. A hash value of a first data chunk of the plurality of obfuscated data chunks can be used as an encryption key to encrypt a second data chunk of the plurality of obfuscated data chunks. 20 The main embodiments of this invention are as follows: A system of sharing access to private files which has the functional elements of: 25 1. Perpetual Data 2. Self encryption 3. Data Maps 4. Anonymous Authentication 24a 5. Shared access to Private files 6. ms Messenger 7. Cyber Cash 8. Worldwide Voting System 5 ... with the additionally linked functional elements of: 1. Peer Ranking 2. Self Healing 10 3. Security Availability 4. Storage and Retrieval 5. Duplicate Removal 6. Storing Files 7. Chunking 15 8. Encryption / Decryption 9. Identify Chunks 10. Revision Control 11. Identify Data with Very Small File 12. Logon 20 13. Provide Key Pairs 14. Validation 15. Create Map of Maps 25 686 16. Share Map 687 17. Provide Public ID 688 18. Encrypted Communications 689 19. Document Signing 690 20. Contract Conversations 691 21. Counterfeit Protection 692 22.Allow Selling of Machine Resources 693 23. Interface with Non-Anonymous Systems 694 24.Anonymous Transactions 695 25.Anonymity 696 26. Proven Individual 697 27. Validation of Vote Being Used 698 28. Distributed Controlled Voting 699 A distributed network system and product which provides: 700 a. secure communications 701 b. store data & share resources 702 c. anonymous backing and restoring data 703 d. share private files & secure data without using server 704 e. anonymous authentication of users 705 f. approve transaction based on digital currency 706 g. CPU sharing via anonymous voting system 70-7-, -A-methed-of-allowing-users to securely-store-data-and-share -resources 708 across a distributed network by utilising anonymously shared computer 709 resources. 710 A method to allow secure communications between users by utilising 711 public ID's linked to anonymous ID's to authenticate users as well as 712 allowing contract signed conversations.

26 713 A method to allow sharing and allocation of resources globally by 714 utilising effort based testing and anonymously authenticated users in a 715 global distributed network. 716 A method specifically to backup and restore data anonymously in a 717 distributed network with guarantees on integrity and recovery times.. 718 A method to share private and secured data without the use of file 719 servers or any controlling body or centralised resource. 720 A method to approve the exchange of resources and other transactions 721 based on a digital currency which utilises links with non anonymous 722 payment systems. 723 A method to allow data to be described decoded and identified using 724 very small data map files. 725 A method to allow anonymous authentication of users on a network. 726 A method of above to allow sharing of CPU power globally and to 727 contribute to systems based on users input from a worldwide secure 728 and anonymous voting system. 729 A method where a person's computer operating system and related 730 -computer program-may be-held-on-aTremovable-disk (such-as a USB 731 stick optionally with biometric recognition to evade keyloggers) and 732 used to boot any compatible computer with a known virus / trojan horse 733 free system to access their data remotely and securely without worrying 734 about the integrity of host machine they are using. 735 At least one computer program comprising instructions for causing at 736 least one computer to perform the method, system and product 737 according to any of above.

27 738 That at least one computer program of above embodied on a recording 739 medium or read-only memory, store.

28 DESCRIPTION Detailed Description: 740 (References to IDs used in descriptions of the system's functionality) 741 MID - this is the base ID and is mainly used to store and forget files. 742 Each of these operations will require a signed request. Restoring may 743 simply require a request with an ID attached. 744 PMID - This is the proxy mid which is used to manage the receiving of 745 instructions to the node from any network node such as get/ put / forget 746 etc. This is a key pair which is stored on the node - if stolen the key pair 747 can be regenerated simply disabling the thief's stolen PMID - although 748 there's not much can be done with a PMID key pair. 749 CID - Chunk Identifier, this is simply the chunkid.KID message on the 750 net. 751 TMID - This is today's ID a one time ID as opposed to a one time 752 password. This is to further disguise users and also ensure that their MID 753 stays as secret as possible. 754 MPID - The maidsafe.net public ID. This is the ID to which users can add 75-5- their-own-name-and actual data-If reqDired-TIti9--tIfe 1D-for messenger, 756 sharing, non anonymous voting and any other method that requires we 757 know the user. 758 MAID - this is basically the hash of and actual public key of the MID. this 759 ID is used to identify the user actions such as put / forget / get on the 760 maidsafe.net network. This allows a distributed PKI infrastructure to exist 761 and be automatically checked.

29 762 KID - Kademlia ID this can be randomly generated or derived from 763 known and preferably anonymous information such as an anonymous 764 public key hash as with the MAID.. In this case we use kademlia as the 765 example overlay network although this can be almost any network 766 environment at all. 767 MSID - maidsafe.net Share ID, an ID and key pair specifically created for 768 each share to allow users to interact with shares using a unique key not 769 related to their MID which should always be anonymous and separate. Anonymous Authentication Description 770 Anonymous authentication relates to system authentication and, in 771 particular, authentication of users for accessing resources stored on a 772 distributed or peer-to-peer file system. Its aim is to preserve the 773 anonymity of the users and to provide secure and private storage of data 774 and shared resources for users on a distributed system. It is a method of 775 authenticating access to a distributed system comprising the steps of; 776 0 Receiving a user identifier; 777 e Retrieving an encrypted validation record identified by the user 778 identifier; 779 e Decrypting the encrypted validation record so as to provide 780 decrypted informatiurir;'rd-... 781 * Authenticating access to data in the distributed system using the 782 decrypted information. 783 Receiving, retrieving and authenticating may be performed on a node in 784 the distributed system preferably separate from a node performing the 785 step of decrypting. The method further comprises the step of generating 786 the user identifier using a hash. Therefore, the user identifier may be 787 considered unique (and altered if a collision occurs) and suitable for 30 788 identifying unique validation records. The step of authenticating access 789 may preferably further comprise the step of digitally signing the user 790 identifier. This provides authentication that can be validated against 791 trusted authorities. The method further comprises the step of using the 792 signed user identifier as a session passport to authenticate a plurality of 793 accesses to the distributed system. This allows persistence of the 794 authentication for an extended session. 795 The step of decrypting preferably comprises decrypting an address in the 796 distributed system of a first chunk of data and the step of authenticating 797 access further comprises the step of determining the existence of the first 798 chunk at the address, or providing the location and names of specific 799 data elements in the network in the form of a data map as previously 800 describe. This efficiently combines the tasks of authentication and 801 starting to retrieve the data from the system. The method preferably 802 further comprises the step of using the content of the first chunk to obtain 803 further chunks from the distributed system. Additionally the decrypted 804 data from the additional chunks may contain a key pair allowing the user 805 at that stage to sign a packet sent to the network to validate them or 806 additionally may preferable self sign their own id. 807 Therefore, there is no need to have a potentially vulnerable record of the 808 file structure persisting in one place on the distributed system, as the 809 user's node constructs its database of file locations after logging onto the 810 system 811 There is provided a distributed system comprising; 812 e a storage module adapted to store an encrypted validation record; 813 e a client node comprising a decryption module adapted to decrypt an 814 encrypted validation record so as to provide decrypted information; 815 and 816 e a verifying node comprising: 31 817 e a receiving module adapted to receive a user identifier; 818 e a retrieving module adapted to retrieve from the storage module an 819 encrypted validation record identified by the user identifier; 820 * a transmitting module adapted to transmit the encrypted validation 821 record to the client node; and 822 * an authentication module adapted to authenticate access to data in 823 the distributed file system using the decrypted information from the 824 client node. 825 The client node is further adapted to generate the user identifier using a 826 hash. The authentication module is further adapted to authenticate 827 access by digitally sign the user identifier. The signed user identifier is 828 used as a session passport to authenticate a plurality of accesses by the 829 client node to the distributed system. The decryption module is further 830 adapted to decrypt an address in the distributed system of a first chunk of 831 data from the validation record and the authentication module is further 832 adapted to authenticate access by determining the existence of the first 833 chunk at the address. The client node is further adapted to use the 834 content of the first chunk to obtain further authentication chunks from the 835 distributed system. 836 There is provided at least one computer program comprising program 837 instructions for causing at least one computer to perform. One computer 838 program is embodied on a recording medium or read-only memory. 839 stored in at least one computer memory, or carried on an electrical 840 carrier signal. 841 Additionally there is a check on the system to ensure the user is login 842 into a valid node (software package). This will preferably include the 843 ability of the system to check validity of the running maidsafe.net 844 software by running content hashing or preferably certificate checking of 845 the node and also the code itself.

32 Linked elements for maidsafe.net (Figure 1) 846 The maidsafe.net product invention consists of 8 individual inventions, 847 which collectively have 28 inter-linked functional elements, these are:. 848 The individual inventions are: 849 PT1 - Perpetual Data 850 PT2 - Self encryption 851 PT3 - Data Maps 852 PT4 - Anonymous Authentication 853 PT5 - Shared access to Private files 854 PT6 - ms Messenger 855 PT7 - Cyber Cash 856 PT8 - Worldwide Voting System 857 The inter-linked functional elements are: 858 P1 - Peer Ranking 859 P2 - Self Healing 860 P3 - Security Availability 861 P4 - Storage and Retrieval 862 P5 - Duplicate Removal 863 P6 - Storing Files .864 -- P-7-Chunking 865 P8 - Encryption / Decryption 866 P9 - Identify Chunks 867 P10 - Revision Control 868 P11 - Identify Data with Very Small File 869 P12-Logon 870 P13 - Provide Key Pairs 871 P14 - Validation 872 P15 - Create Map of Maps 33 873 P16 - Share Map 874 P17 - Provide Public ID 875 P18 - Encrypted Communications 876 P19 - Document Signing 877 P20 - Contract Conversations 878 P21 - Counterfeit Prevention 879 P22 - Allow Selling of Machine Resources 880 P23 - Interface with Non-Anonymous Systems 881 P24 - Anonymous Transactions 882 P25 - Anonymity 883 P26 - Proven Individual 884 P27 - Validation of Vote Being Used 885 P28 - Distributed Controlled Voting 886 887 (description of figure 1 here ****) 888 Self Authentication Detail (Figure 2) 889 1. A computer program consisting of a user interface and a chunk server (a 890 system to process anonymous chunks of data) should be running, if not 891 they are started when user selects an icon or other means of starting the 892 program. 893 2. A user will input some data known to them such as a userid (random ID) 894 and PIN number in this case. These pieces of information may be 895 concatenated together and hashed to create a unique (which may be 896 confirmed via a search) identifier, In this case this is called the MID 897 (maidsafe.net ID) 898 3. A TMID (Today's MID) is retrieved from the network, the TMID is then 899 calculated as follows: 34 900 The TMID is a single use or single day ID that is constantly changed, 901 This allows maidsafe.net to calculate the hash based on the user ID pin 902 and another known variable which is calculable. For this variable we use 903 a day variable for now and this is the number of days since epoch 904 (01/01/1970). This allows for a new ID daily, which assists in maintaining 905 the anonymity of the user. This TMID will create a temporary key pair to 906 sign the database chunks and accept a challenge response from the 907 holder of these db chunks. After retrieval and generation of a new key 908 pair the db is put again in new locations - rendering everything that was 909 contained in the TMID chunk useless. The TMID CANNOT be signed by 910 anyone (therefore hackers can't BAN an unsigned user from retrieving 911 this - in a DOS attack)- it is a special chunk where the data hash does 912 NOT match the name of the chunk (as the name is a random number 913 calculated by hashing other information (i.e. its a hash of the TMID as 914 described below) 915 9 take dave as user ID and 1267 as pin. 916 * dave + (pin) 1267 = dave1267 Hash of this becomes MID 917 9 day variable (say today is 13416 since epoch) = 13416 918 e so take pin, and for example add the number in where the pin states 919 i.e. 920 * 613dav41e1267 921 e (6 at beainnina is aoina round Din aaain) 922 e so this is done by taking 1st pin 1 - so put first day value at position 1 923 * then next pin number 2 - so day value 2 at position 2 924 e then next pin number 6 so day value 3 at position 6 925 e then next pin number 7 so day value 4 at position 7 926 * then next pin number is 1 so day value 5 at position 1 (again) 927 e so TMID is hash of 613dav41e1267 and the MID is simply a hash of 928 dave1267 35 929 (This is an example algorithm and many more can be used to enforce 930 further security.) 931 4. From the TMID chunk the map of the user's database (or list of files 932 maps) is identified. The database is recovered from the net which 933 includes the data maps for the user and any keys passwords etc.. The 934 database chunks are stored in another location immediately and the old 935 chunks forgotten. This can be done now as the MID key pair is also in 936 the database and can now be used to manipulate user's data. 937 5. The maidsafe.net application can now authenticate itself as acting for 938 this MID and put get or forget data chunks belonging to the user. 939 6. The watcher process and Chunk server always have access to the PMID 940 key pair as they are stored on the machine itself, so can start and 941 receive and authenticate anonymous put / get / forget commands. 942 7. A DHT ID is required for a node in a DHT network this may be randomly 943 generated or in fact we can use the hash of the PMID public key to 944 identify the node. 945 8. When the users successfully logged in he can check his authentication 946 validation records exist on the network. These may be as follows: MAID (maidsafe.net anonymous ID) 947 1. This is a data element stored on net and preferably named with the hash 948 of the MID public Key. 949 2. It contains the MID public key + any PMID public keys associated with 950 this user.

36 951 3. This is digitally signed with the MID private key to prevent forgery. 952 4. Using this mechanism this allows validation of MID signatures by 953 allowing any users access to this data element and checking the 954 signature of it against any challenge response from any node pertaining 955 to be this MID (as only the MID owner has the private key that signs this 956 MID) Any crook could not create the private key to match to the public 957 key to digitally sign so forgery is made impossible given today's 958 computer resources. 959 5. This mechanism also allows a user to add or remove PMIDS (or chunk 960 servers acting on their behalf like a proxy) at will and replace PMID's at 961 any time in case of the PMID machine becoming compromised. 962 Therefore this can be seen as the PMID authentication element. PMID (Proxy MID) 963 1. This is a data element stored on the network and preferably named with 964 the hash of the PMID public key. 965 2. It contains the PMID public key and the MID ID (i.e. the hash of the MID 966 public key) and is signed by the MID private key (authenticated). 967 3. This allows a machine to act as a repository for anonymous chunks and 968 supply resources to the net for a MID. 969 4. When answering challenge responses any other machine will confirm the 970 PMID by seeking and checking the MIAD for the PMID and making sure 971 the PMID is mentioned in the MAID bit - otherwise the PMID is 972 considered rouge.

37 973 5. The key pair is stored on the machine itself and may be encoded or 974 encrypted against a password that has to be entered upon start-up 975 (optionally) in the case of a proxy provider who wishes to further 976 enhance PMID security. 977 6. The design allows for recovery from attack and theft of the PMID key pair 978 as the MAID data element can simply remove the PMID ID from the 979 MAID rendering it unauthenticated. 980 Figure 3 illustrates, in schematic form, a peer-to-peer network in 981 accordance with an embodiment of the invention; and 982 Figure 4 illustrates a flow chart of the authentication, in accordance with 983 a preferred embodiment of the present invention. 984 With reference to Figure 3, a peer-to-peer network 2 is shown with nodes 985 4 to 12 connected by a communication network 14. The nodes may be 986 Personal Computers (PCs) or any other device that can perform the 987 processing, communication and/or storage operations required to 988 operate the invention. The file system will typically have many more 989 nodes of all types than shown in Figure 3 and a PC may act as one or 990 many types of node described herein. Data nodes 4 and 6 store chunks 991 16 of files in the distributed system. The validation record node 8 has a 992 storage module 18 for storing encrypted validation records identified by a 99-3 -- user-identifier. 994 The client node 10 has a module 20 for input and generation of user 995 identifiers. It also has a decryption module 22 for decrypting an encrypted 996 validation record so as to provide decrypted information, a database or 997 data map of chunk locations 24 and storage 26 for retrieved chunks and 998 files assembled from the retrieved chunks.

38 999 The verifying node 12 has a receiving module 28 for receiving a user 1000 identifier from the client node. The retrieving module 30 is configured to 1001 retrieve from the data node an encrypted validation record identified by 1002 the user identifier. Alternatively, in the preferred embodiment, the 1003 validation record node 8 is the same node as the verifying node 12, i.e. 1004 the storage module 18 is part of the verifying node 12 (not as shown in 1005 Figure 3). The transmitting module 32 sends the encrypted validation 1006 record to the client node. The authentication module 34 authenticates L007 access to chunks of data distributed across the data nodes using the 1008 decrypted information. 009 With reference to Figure 4, a more detailed flow of the operation of the 010 present invention is shown laid out on the diagram with the steps being 011 performed at the User's PC (client node) on the left 40, those of the 012 verifying PC (node) in the centre 42 and those of the data PC (node) on 013 the right 44. 014 A login box is presented 46 that requires the user's name or other detail 015 Preferably email address (the same one used in the client node software D16 installation and registration process) or simply name (i.e. nickname) and )17 the user's unique number, preferably PIN number. If the user is a 'main )18 user' then some details may already be stored on the PC. If the user is a 019 visitor, then the login box appears. 020-- A content-hashed-number such-asHA (Secure Hash-Algorithm), 021 Preferably 160 bits in length, is created 48 from these two items of data. 022 This 'hash' is now known as the 'User ID Key' (MID), which at this point is 023 classed as 'unverified' within the system. This is stored on the network as D24 the MAID and is simply the hash of the public key containing an )25 unencrypted version of the public key for later validation by any other )26 node. This obviates the requirement for a validation authority 39 .027 The software on the user's PC then combines this MID with a standard .028 'hello' code element 50, to create 52 a 'hello.packet'. This hello.packet is 029 then transmitted with a timed validity on the Internet. 030 The hello.packet will be picked up by the first node (for this description, 031 now called the 'verifying node') that recognises 54 the User ID Key 032 element of the hello.packet as matching a stored, encrypted validation 033 record file 56 that it has in its storage area. A login attempt monitoring 034 system ensures a maximum of three responses. Upon to many attempts, 035 the verifying PC creates a 'black list' for transmission to peers. 036 Optionally, an alert is returned to the user if a 'black list' entry is found 037 and the user may be asked to proceed or perform a virus check. 038 The verifying node then returns this encrypted validation record file to the 039 user via the internet. The user's pass phrase 58 is requested by a dialog 040 box 60, which then will allow decryption of this validation record file. 041 When the validation record file is decrypted 62, the first data chunk D42 details, including a 'decrypted address', are extracted 64 and the user PC 343 sends back a request 66 to the verifying node for it to initiate a query for )44 the first 'file-chunk ID' at the 'decrypted address' that it has extracted )45 from the decrypted validation record file, or preferably the data map of 046 the database chunks to recreate the database and provide access to the 047 key pair associated with this MID. 048 The verifying node then acts as a 'relay node' and initiates a 'notify only' 049 query for this 'file-chunk ID' at the 'decrypted address'. 050 Given that some other node (for this embodiment, called the 'data node') 051 has recognised 68 this request and has sent back a valid 'notification 052 only' message 70 that a 'file-chunk ID' corresponding to the request sent 053 by the verifying node does indeed exist, the verifying node then digitally 054 signs 72 the initial User ID Key, which is then sent back to the user.

40 1055 On reception by the user 74, this verified User ID Key is used as the 1056 user's session passport. The user's PC proceeds to construct 76 the 1057 database of the file system as backed up by the user onto the network. 1058 This database describes the location of all chunks that make up the 1059 user's file system. Preferably the ID Key will contain irrefutable evidence 1060 such as a public/private key pair to allow signing onto the network as 1061 authorised users, preferably this is a case of self signing his or her own 1062 ID - in which case the ID Key is decrypted and user is valid - self 1063 validating. [064 Further details of the embodiment will now be described. A 'proxy [065 controlled' handshake routine is employed through an encrypted point-to 066 point channel, to ensure only authorised access by the legal owner to the .067 system, then to the user's file storage database, then to the files therein. .068 The handshaking check is initiated from the PC that a user logs on to 069 (the 'User PC'), by generating the 'unverified encrypted hash' known as 070 the 'User ID Key', this preferably being created from the user's 071 information preferably email address and their PIN number. This 'hash' 072 is transmitted as a 'hello.packet' on the Internet, to be picked up by any 073 system that recognises the User ID as being associated with specific 074 data that it holds. This PC then becomes the 'verifying PC' and will 1075 initially act as the User PC's 'gateway' into the system during the 1076 authentication process. The encrypted item of data held by the verifying 107-7 PC-will-temporarily-be- used as-a-'validation-record'T it-being directly .078 associated with the user's identity and holding the specific address of a 079 number of data chunks belonging to the user and which are located 080 elsewhere in the peer-to-peer distributed file system. This 'validation 081 record' is returned to the User PC for decryption, with the expectation 082 that only the legal user can supply the specific information that will allow 083 its accurate decryption.

41 1084 Preferably this data may be a signed response being given back to the 1085 validating node which is possible as the id chunk when decrypted 1086 (preferably symmetrically) contains the users public and private keys 1087 allowing non refutable signing of data packets. 1088 Preferably after successful decryption of the TMID packet (as described 1089 above) the machine will now have access to the data map of the [090 database and public/private key pair allowing unfettered access to the [091 system. L092 It should be noted that in this embodiment, preferably no communication 1093 is carried out via any nodes without an encrypted channel such as TLS [094 (Transport Layer Security) or SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) being set up [095 first. A peer talks to another peer via an encrypted channel and the other [096 peer (proxy) requests the information (e.g. for some space to save [097 information on or for the retrieval of a file). An encrypted link is formed [098 between all peers at each end of communications and also through the .099 proxy during the authentication process. This effectively bans snoopers .100 from detecting who is talking to whom and also what is being sent or .101 retrieved. The initial handshake for self authentication is also over an .102 encrypted link. 1103 Secure connection is provided via certificate passing nodes, in a manner 1104 that does not require intervention, with each node being validated by 1-105- -another;-where any invalid 'event-ordata-for whatever reason (fraud 1106 detection, snooping from node or any invalid algorithms that catch the 1107 node) will invalidate the chain created by the node. This is all transparent 1108 to the user. 1109 Further modifications and improvements may be added without departing 1110 from the scope of the invention herein described.

42 1111 Figure 5 illustrates a flow chart of data assurance event sequence in 1112 accordance with first embodiment of this invention 1113 Figure 6 illustrates a flow chart of file chunking event sequence in 1114 accordance with second embodiment of this invention 1115 Figure 7 illustrates a schematic diagram of file chunking example 1116 Figure 8 illustrates a flow chart of self healing event sequence 1117 Figure 9 illustrates a flow chart of peer ranking event sequence 1118 Figure 10 illustrates a flow chart of duplicate removal event sequence 1119 With reference to Figure 5, guaranteed accessibility to user data by data 1120 assurance is demonstrated by flow chart. The data is copied to at least 1121 three disparate locations at step (10). The disparate locations store data 1122 with an appendix pointing to the other two locations by step (20) and is 123 renamed with hash of contents. Preferably this action is managed by [124 another node i.e. super node acting as an intermediary by step (30). .125 Each local copy at user's PC is checked for validity by integrity test by 1126 step (40) and in addition validity checks by integrity test are made that 1127 the other 2 copies are also still ok by step (50). 1128 Any single node failure initiates a replacement copy of equivalent leaf 1129 node being made in another disparate location by step (60) and the other 1130 remaining copies are updated to reflect this change to reflect the newly 1131 added replacement leaf node by step (70). 1132 The steps of storing and retrieving are carried out via other network 1133 nodes to mask the initiator (30).

43 134 The method further comprises the step of renaming all files with a hash 135 of their contents. 136 Therefore, each file can be checked for validity or tampering by running a 137 content hashing algorithm such as (for example) MD5 or an SHA variant, 138 the result of this being compared with the name of the file. 139 With reference to Figure 6, provides a methodology to manageable sized 140 data elements and to enable a complimentary data structure for and 141 compression and encryption and the step is to file chunking. By user's 142 pre-selection the nominated data elements (files are passed to chunking 143 process. Each data element (file) is split into small chunks by step (80) 144 and the data chunks are encrypted by step (90) to provide security for the 145 data. The data chunks are stored locally at step (100) ready for network 146 transfer of copies. Only the person or the group, to whom the overall data 147 belongs, will know the location of these (100) or the other related but 148 dissimilar chunks of data. All operations are conducted within the user's 149 local system. No data is presented externally. 150 Each of the above chunks does not contain location information for any 151 other dissimilar chunks. This provides for, security of data content, a 152 basis for integrity checking and redundancy. 1153 The method further comprises the step of only allowing the person (or 1-54 -group) to-whom the data belongsrto-have-access- to it, preferably via a .155 shared encryption technique. This allows persistence of data. 156 The checking of data or chunks of data between machines is carried out 157 via any presence type protocol such as a distributed hash table network. 158 On the occasion when all data chunks have been relocated (i.e. the user 159 has not logged on for a while,) a redirection record is created and stored 160 in the super node network, (a three copy process - similar to data) 44 1161 therefore when a user requests a check, the redirection record is given to 1162 the user to update their database, 1163 This efficiently allows data resilience in cases where network churn is a 1164 problem as in peer to peer or distributed networks. [165 With reference to Figure 7 which illustrates flow chart example of file t166 chunking. User's normal file has 5Mb document, which is chunked into 1167 smaller variable sizes e.g. 135kb, 512kb, 768kb in any order. All chunks 168 may be compressed and encrypted by using Pass phrase. Next step is to .169 individually hash chunks and given hashes as names. Then database 170 record as a file is made from names of hashed chunks brought together 171 e.g. in empty version of original file (C1#######,t1,t2,t3: 172 C2########,tl,t2,t3 etc), this file is then sent to transmission queue in 173 storage space allocated to client application. 174 With reference to Figure 8 provides a self healing event sequence 175 methodology. Self healing is required to guarantee availability of accurate 176 data. As data or chunks become invalid by failing integrity test by step 177 (110). The location of failing data chunks is assessed as unreliable and 178 further data from the leaf node is ignored from that location by step (120). 179 A 'Good Copy' from the 'known good' data chunk is recreated in a new 180 and equivalent leaf node. Data or chunks are recreated in a new and 181 safer location by step (130). The leaf node with failing data chunks is 182- marked- as-unreliable-and-the data-thereirras'dfrty' by step (140). Peer 183 leaf nodes become aware of this unreliable leaf node and add its location 184 to watch list by step (150). All operations conducted within the user's 185 local system. No data is presented externally. 186 Therefore, the introduction of viruses, worms etc. will be prevented and 187 faulty machines/ equipment identified automatically.

45 1188 The network will use SSL or TLS type encryption to prevent unauthorised 189 access or snooping. 1190 With reference to Figure 9, Peer Ranking id required to ensure consistent .191 response and performance for the level of guaranteed interaction .192 recorded for the user. For Peer Ranking each node (leaf node) monitors 193 its own peer node's resources and availability in a scaleable manner, 194 each leaf node is constantly monitored. 195 Each data store (whether a network service, physical drive etc.) is 196 monitored for availability. A qualified availability ranking is appended to 197 the (leaf) storage node address by consensus of a monitoring super node 198 group by step (160). A ranking figure will be appended by step (160) and 199 signed by the supply of a key from the monitoring super node; this would 200 preferably be agreed by more super nodes to establish a consensus for 201 altering the ranking of the node. The new rank will preferably be 202 appended to the node address or by a similar mechanism to allow the 203 node to be managed preferably in terms of what is stored there and how 204 many copies there has to be of the data for it to be seen as perpetual. 205 Each piece of data is checked via a content hashing mechanism for data 206 integrity, which is carried out by the storage node itself by step (170) or 207 by its partner nodes via super nodes by step (180) or by instigating node 208 via super nodes by step (190) by retrieval and running the hashing 209- algorithm-agaiRet that piece ef-data-The-data-checking cycle-repeats 210 itself. 211 As a peer (whether an instigating node or a partner peer (i.e. one that 212 has same chunk)) checks the data, the super node querying the storage 213 peer will respond with the result of the integrity check and update this 214 status on the storage peer. The instigating node or partner peer will 215 decide to forget this data and will replicate it in a more suitable location.

46 1216 If data fails the integrity check the node itself will be marked as 'dirty' by 1217 step (200) and 'dirty' status appended to leaf node address to mark it as 1218 requiring further checks on the integrity of the data it holds by step (210). 1219 Additional checks are carried out on data stored on the leaf node marked 1220 as 'dirty' by step (220). If pre-determined percentage of data found to be 1221 'dirty' node is removed from the network except for message traffic by 1222 step (230). A certain percentage of dirty data being established may 1223 conclude that this node is compromised or otherwise damaged and the 1224 network would be informed of this. At that point the node will be removed 1225 from the network except for the purpose of sending it warning messages 1226 by step (230). 1227 This allows either having data stored on nodes of equivalent availability 1228 and efficiency or dictating the number of copies of data required to 1229 maintain reliability. 1230 Further modifications and improvements may be added without departing 1231 from the scope of the invention herein described. 1232 With reference to Figure 10, duplicate data is removed to maximise the 1233 efficient use of the disk space. Prior to the initiation of the data backup [234 process by step (240), internally generated content hash may be 1235 checked for a match against hashes stored on the internet by step (250) 1236 or a list of previously backed up data (250). This will allow only one 1-23-7- backed-up-copy -of-data-to be kept.-This reducesthe-network wide 1238 requirement to backup data which has the exact same contents. 1239 Notification of shared key existence is passed back to instigating node by 1240 step (260) to access authority check requested, which has to pass for 1241 signed result is to be passed back to storage node. The storage node 1242 passes shared key and database back to instigating node by step (270) 1243 Such data is backed up via a shared key which after proof of the file 1244 existing (260) on the instigating node, the shared key (270) is shared with 47 245 this instigating node. The location of the data is then passed to the node 246 for later retrieval if required. 247 This maintains copyright as people can only backup what they prove to 248 have on their systems and not publicly share copyright infringed data 249 openly on the network, 250 This data may be marked as protected or not protected by step (280) 251 which has check carried out for protected or non-protected data content. 252 The protected data ignores sharing process. Perpetual Data (Figure 1 - PTI and Figure 11) Z53 According to a related aspect of this invention, a file is chunked or Z54 split into constituent parts (1) this process involves calculating the chunk Z55 size, preferably from known data such as the first few bytes of the hash Z56 of the file itself and preferably using a modulo division technique to !57 resolve a figure between the optimum minimum and optimum maximum 158 chunk sizes for network transmission and storage. 59 Preferably each chunk is then encrypted and obfuscated in some manner 260 to protect the data. Preferably a search of the network is carried out 261 looking for values relating to the content hash of each of the chunks (2). 262 If this is found (4) then the other chunks are identified too, failure to 263 identify all chunks may mean there is a collision on the network of file 264 names or some other machine is in the process of backing up the same 265 file. A back-off time is calculated to check again for the other chunks. If 266 all chunks are on the network the file is considered backed up and the 267 user will add their MID signature to the file after preferably a challenge 268 response to ensure there a valid user and have enough resources to do 269 this.

48 1270 If no chunks are on the net the user preferably via another node (3) will 1271 request the saving of the first copy (preferably in distinct time zones or 1272 other geographically dispersing method). 1273 The chunk will be stored (5) on a storage node allowing us to see the 1274 PMID of the storing node and store this. 1275 Then preferably a Key.value pair of chunkid.public key of initiator is 1276 written to net creating a Chunk ID (CID) (6) Storage and Retrieval (Figure 1- P4) 1277 According to a related aspect of this invention, the data is stored in 1278 multiple locations. Each location stores the locations of its peers that hold 1279 identical chunks (at least identical in content) and they all communicate 1280 regularly to ascertain the health of the data. The preferable method is as 1281 follows: 1282 Preferably the data is copied to at least three disparate locations. 1283 Preferably each copy is performed via many nodes to mask the initiator. -284- Prefer-ably-each local -copy-is-ctecked-forvalidity-and-checks are-made 1285 that the preferably other 2 copies are also still valid. 1286 Preferably any single node failure initiates a replacement copy being 1287 made in another disparate location and the other associated copies are 1288 updated to reflect this change. 1289 Preferably the steps of storing and retrieving are carried out via other 1290 network nodes to mask the initiator.

49 ,291 Preferably, the method further comprises the step of renaming all files 292 with a hash of their contents. 293 Preferably each chunk may alter its name by a known process such as a 294 binary shift left of a section of the data. This allows the same content to 295 exist but also allows the chunks to appear as three different bits of data 296 for the sake of not colliding on the network. 297 Preferably each chunk has a counter attached to it that allows the 298 network to understand easily just how many users are attached to the 299 chunk - either by sharing or otherwise. A user requesting a 'chunk forget' 300 will initiate a system question if they are the only user using the chunk 301 and if so the chunk will be deleted and the user's required disk space 302 reduced accordingly. This allows users to remove files no longer required 303 and free up local disk space. Any file also being shared is preferably 304 removed from the user's quota and the user's database record or data 305 map (see later) is deleted, 306 Preferably this counter is digitally signed by each node sharing the data 307 and therefore will require a signed 'forget' or 'delete' command. 308 Preferably even 'store', 'put', 'retrieve' and 'get' commands should also 309 be either digitally signed or preferably go through a PKI challenge 310 response mechanism. 311 To ensure fairness preferably this method will be monitored by a 312 supernode or similar to ensure the user has not simply copied the data 313 map for later use without giving up the disk space for it. Therefore the 314 user's private ID public key will be used to request the forget chunk 315 statement. This will be used to indicate the user's acceptance of the 316 'chunk forget' command and allow the user to recover the disk space. 317 Any requests against the chunk will preferably be signed with this key 50 1318 and consequently rejected unless the user's system gives up the space 1319 required to access this file. 1320 Preferably each user storing a chunk will append their signed request to 1321 the end of the chunk in an identifiable manner i.e. prefixed with 80 - or 1322 similar. 1323 Forgetting the chunk means the signature is removed from the file. This 1324 again is done via a signed request from the storage node as with the 1325 original backup request. 1326 Preferably this signed request is another small chunk stored at the same 1327 location as the data chunk with an appended postfix to the chunk 1328 identifier to show a private ID is storing this chunk. Any attempt by 1329 somebody else to download the file is rejected unless they first subscribe 1330 to it, i.e. a chunk is called 12345 so a file is saved called 12345 <signed 1331 store request>. This will allow files to be forgotten when all signatories to 1332 the chunk are gone. A user will send a signed 'no store' or 'forget' and 1333 their ID chunk will be removed, and in addition if they are the last user 1334 storing that chunk, the chunk is removed. Preferably this will allow a 1335 private anonymous message to be sent upon chunk failure or damage 1336 allowing a proactive approach to maintaining clean data. 1337 Preferably as a node fails the other nodes can preferably send a 1338- -message-to-alItsharers-ofthe-chunk-to identifythenewfocation ofhhe~ 1339 replacement chunk, 1340 Preferably any node attaching to a file then downloading immediately 1341 should be considered an alert and the system may take steps to slow 1342 down this node's activity or even halt it to protect data theft.

51 Chunk Checks: (Figure 1 - P9 and Figure 12) 1343 1. Storage node containing chunk 1 checks its peers. As each peer is 1344 checked it reciprocates the check. These checks are split into preferably 1345 2 types: 1346 a. Availability check (i.e. simple network ping) [347 b. Data integrity check - in this instance the checking node takes a chunk L348 and appends random data to it and takes a hash of the result. It then 1349 sends the random data to the node being checked and requests the 1350 hash of the chunk with the random data appended. The result is 351 compared with a known result and the chunk will be assessed as 352 either healthy or not. If not, further checks with other nodes occur to 353 find the bad node. 354 2. There may be multiple storage nodes depending on the rating of 355 machines and other factors. The above checking is carried out by all 356 nodes from 1 to n (where n is total number of storage nodes selected for 357 the chunk). Obviously a poorly rated node will require to give up disk 358 space in relation to the number of chunks being stored to allow perpetual 359 data to exist. This is a penalty paid by nodes that are switched off. 1360 3. The user who stored the chunk will check on a chunk from 1 storage 1361 node randomly selected. This check will ensure the integrity of the chunk -362- -and-aise-ensure there are at least-1-othersignatures-existing-alregdy-for 363 the chunk. If there are not and the user's ID is not listed, the user signs 364 the chunk. 365 4. This shows another example of another user checking the chunk. Note 366 that the user checks X (40 days in this diagram) are always at least 75% 367 of the forget time retention (Y) (i.e. when a chunk is forgotten by all 368 signatories it is retained for a period of time Y). This is another algorithm 369 that will continually develop.

52 Storage of Additional Chunks: (Figure 12) .370 1. maidsafe.net program with user logged in (so MID exists) has chunked a .371 file. It has already stored a chunk and is now looking to store additional .372 chunks. Therefore a Chunk ID (CID) should exist on the net. This process 1373 retrieves this CID. 1374 2. The CID as shown in storing initial chunk contains the chunk name and [375 any public keys that are sharing the chunk. In this instance it should only 1376 be our key as we are first ones storing the chunks (others would be in a [377 back-off period to see if we back other chunks up). We shift the last bit 1378 (could be any function on any bit as long as we can replicate it) 1379 3. We then check we won't collide with any other stored chunk on the net L380 i.e. it does a CID search again. [381 4. We then issue our broadcast to our supernodes (i.e. the supernodes we [382 are connected to) stating we need to store X bytes and any other [383 information about where we require to store it (geographically in our case 1384 - time zone (TZ)) 1385 5. The supernode network finds a storage location for us with the correct -1-386- - rank-etc 1387 6. The chunk is stored after a successful challenge response i.e, In the 1388 maidsafe.net network. MIDs will require to ensure they are talking or 1389 dealing with validated nodes, so to accomplish this a challenge process 1390 is carried out as follows: sender [S] receiver [R] 1391 e [S] I wish to communicate (store retrieve forget data etc.) and I am MAID 53 1392 e [R] retrieves MAID public key from DHT and encrypts a challenge 1393 (possibly a very large number encrypted with the public key retrieved) 1394 e [S] gets key and decrypts and encrypts [R] answer with his challenge 1395 number also encrypted with [R]'s public key 1396 e [R] receives response and decrypts his challenge and passes back 1397 answer encrypted again with [S] public key 1398 (Communication is now authenticated between these two nodes.) 1399 7. The CID is then updated with the second chunk name and the location it 1400 is stored at. This process is repeated for as many copies of a chunk that [401 are required. 402 8. Copies of chunks will be dependent on many factors including file .403 popularity (popular files may require to be more dispersed closer to .404 nodes and have more copies. Very poorly ranked machines may require 405 an increased amount of chunks to ensure they can be retrieved at any 406 time (poorly ranked machines will therefore have to give up more space.) Security Availability (Figure 1 - P3) 407 According to a related aspect of this invention, each file is split into 1408 small chunks and encrypted to provide security for the data. Only the 1409 person or the group, to whom the overall data belongs, will know the 1410-. location-of-the-ether related but-dissimilar-chunks of data. .411 Preferably, each of the above chunks does not contain location 412 information for any other dissimilar chunks; which provides for security of 413 data content, a basis for integrity checking and redundancy. 414 Preferably, the method further comprises the step of only allowing the 415 person (or group) to whom the data belongs to have access to it, 54 1416 preferably via a shared encryption technique which allows persistence of 1417 data. 1418 Preferably, the checking of data or chunks of data between machines is 1419 carried out via any presence type protocol such as a distributed hash 1420 table network. 1421 Preferably, on the occasion when all data chunks have been relocated, 1422 i.e. the user has not logged on for a while, a redirection record is created 1423 and stored in the super node network, (a three copy process - similar to 1424 data) therefore when a user requests a check, the redirection record is 1425 given to the user to update their database, which provides efficiency that 1426 in turn allows data resilience in cases where network churn is a problem 1427 as in peer to peer or distributed networks. This system message can be 1428 preferably passed via the messenger system described herein. 1429 Preferably the system may simply allow a user to search for his chunks 1430 and through a challenge response mechanism, locate and authenticate 1431 himself to have authority to get/forget this chunk. 432 Further users can decide on various modes of operation preferably such t433 as maintain a local copy of all files on their local machine, unencrypted or 1434 chunked or chunk and encrypt even local files to secure machine 1435 (preferably referred to as off line mode operation) or indeed users may 1-436- decide to-remove-all local-data-and-rely-completely-or preferably 1437 maidsafe.net or similar system to secure their data. Self Healing (Figure 1 - P2) 1438 According to a related aspect of this invention, a self healing network 1439 method is provided via the following process; 55 1440 0 As data or chunks become invalid - data is ignored from that location 1441 e Data or chunks are recreated in a new and safer location. 1442 e The original location is marked as bad. 1443 a Peers note this condition and add the bad location to a watch list. 1444 This will prevent the introduction of viruses; worms etc. will allow faulty 1445 machines/ equipment to be identified automatically. 1446 Preferably, the network layer will use SSL or TLS channel encryption to [447 prevent unauthorised access or snooping. Self Healing (Figure 13) .448 1. A data element called a Chunk ID (CID) is created for each chunk. Added 449 to this is the 'also stored at' MID for the other identical chunks. The other 450 chunk names are also here as they may be renamed slightly (i.e. by bit 451 shifting a part of the name in a manner that calculable). 452 2. All storing nodes (related to this chunk) have a copy of this CID file or 453 can access it at any stage from the DHT network, giving each node .454 knowledge of all others. 1455 3. Each of the storage nodes have their copy of the chunk. 1456 4. Each node queries its partner's availability at frequent intervals. On less 1457 frequent intervals a chunk health check is requested. This involves a .458 node creating some random data and appending this to it's chunk and 459 taking the hash. The partner node will be requested to take the random 460 data and do likewise and return the hash result. This result is checked 461 against the result the initiator had and chunk is then deemed healthy or 462 not. Further tests can be done as each node knows the hash their chunk 56 1463 should create and can self check n that manner on error and report a 1464 dirty node. 1465 5. Now we have a node fail (creating a dirty chunk) 1466 6. The first node to note this carries out a broadcast to other nodes to say it 1467 is requesting a move of the data. 1468 7. The other nodes agree to have CID updated (they may carry out their 1469 own check to confirm this). 1470 8. A broadcast is sent to the supemode network closest to the storage node 1471 that failed, to state a re-storage requirement. [472 9. The supernode network picks up the request. .473 10. The request is to the supernode network to store x amount of data at a .474 rank of y. 475 11. A supernode will reply with a location 476 12. The storage node and new location carry out a challenge response 1477 request to validate each other. .478. 13,-he-chunk-is stored-and the CID-is updated-and signed by the three or 479 more nodes storing the chunk. Peer Ranking (Figure 1 - P1) 480 According to a related aspect of this invention, there is the addition of 481 a peer ranking mechanism, where each node (leaf node) monitors its 57 482 own peer node's resources and availability in a scalable manner. Nodes 483 constantly perform this monitoring function. 484 Each data store (whether a network service, physical drive etc.) is 485 monitored for availability. A ranking figure is appended and signed by the 486 supply of a key from the monitoring super node, this being preferably 487 agreed by more super nodes to establish a consensus before altering the 488 ranking of the node. Preferably, the new rank will be appended to the 489 node address or by a similar mechanism to allow the node to be 490 managed in terms of what is stored there and how many copies there 491 has to be of the data for it to be seen as perpetual. 492 Each piece of data is checked via a content hashing mechanism. This is 493 preferably carried out by the storage node itself or by its partner nodes 494 via super nodes or by an instigating node via super nodes by retrieving 495 and running the hashing algorithm against that piece of data. 496 Preferably, as a peer (whether an instigating node or a partner peer (i.e. 497 one that has same chunk)) checks the data, the super node querying the 498 storage peer will respond with the result of the integrity check and update 499 this status on the storage peer. The instigating node or partner peer will 500 decide to forget this data and will replicate it in a more suitable location. 501 If data fails the integrity check, the node itself will be marked as 'dirty' and 502 this-status will preferably-be appendedio-themodes-addresfor-futher 503 checks on other data to take this into account. Preferably a certain 504 percentage of dirty data being established may conclude that this node is 505 compromised or otherwise damaged and the network would be informed 506 of this. At that point the node will be removed from the network except for 507 the purpose of sending it warning messages. 508 In general, the node ranking figure will take into account at least; 509 availability of the network connection, availability of resources, time on 58 1510 the network with a rank (later useful for effort based trust model), amount 1511 of resource (including network resources) and also the connectivity 1512 capabilities of any node (i.e. directly or indirectly contactable) 1513 This then allows data to be stored on nodes of equivalent availability and 1514 efficiency, and to determine the number of copies of data required to 1515 maintain reliability. Aput: (Figure 15) 1516 Here the MID is the MID of the machine saving data to the net and the [517 PMID is the ID of the storage node chunk server, The communication is 1518 therefore between a maidsafe.net application with a logged in user (to .519 provide MID) and a chunking system on the net somewhere (storage .520 node). 521 1. A message signed with a user's MID (checked by getting the MAID 522 packet from the net) is received requesting storage of a data chunk. 523 2. This message is a specific message stating the storage node's ID (PMID) 524 and the chunk name to be saved and signed (i.e. this is a unique 1525 message) L526 3- The chunk-server decides-if-it-will -store-the- chunk 527 4. A signed message is retumed stating if PMID will store this chunk 528 (chunkID). 529 5. The chunk is stored and checked (SHA check) 530 6. A message is sent back to state that the chunk is saved and is ok. This is 531 signed by the PMID of the chunk server.

59 1532 7. The chunk server awaits the locations of the other identical chunks. [533 8. Locations of the identical chunks returned to the chunk server signed with [534 the MID. [535 9. Each storage node is contacted and public keys exchanged (PMIDs) 1536 10. The chunk checking process is initiated. Aforget (Figure 16) 537 1. A user has requested that a file should be deleted from his backup 538 (forgotten). The system signs a request using the user MID. 539 2. The request is sent to a chunk server (storage node). 540 3. The storage node picks up the request 541 4. The storage node sends the signed request to the other storage nodes 542 that have this chunk. 543 5. The MID is checked as being on the list of MIDs that are watching the .544 chunk-(-remember only a fewa-2-in otr-case-are-everlisted) 545 6. The other storage nodes are notified of this. 546 7. If this is the only MID listed then all owners are possibly gone. 547 8. Chunk delete times begins, this timer will always be higher than a user 548 check interval - i.e. timer of 60 days - user check interval 40 days.

60 1549 9. This information is also passed to other storage nodes. Duplicate Removal (Figure 1 - P5) 1550 According to a related aspect of this invention, prior to data being 1551 backed up, the content hash may be checked against a list of previously 1552 backed up data. This will allow only one backed up copy of data to be 1553 kept, thereby reducing the network wide requirement to backup data that 1554 has the exact same content. Preferably this will be done via a simple 1555 search for existence on the net of all chunks of a particular file. 1556 Preferably such data is backed up via a shared key or mechanism of 1557 appending keys to chunks of data. After proof of the file existing on the 1558 instigating node, the shared key is shared with the instigating node and 1559 the storing node issues a challenge response to add their ID to the pool if [560 it is capable of carrying out actions on the file such as get/ forget (delete). [561 The location of the data is then passed to the node for later retrieval if [562 required. .563 This maintains copyright as people can only backup what they prove to .564 have on their systems and not easily publicly share copyright infringed 1565 data openly on the network. 1-566 Preferably-data may be marked-as-protected or not protected. Preferably 1567 protected data ignores sharing process. Chunking (Figure 1 - P7) 1568 According to a related aspect of this invention, files are split 1569 preferably using an algorithm to work out the chunk size into several 1570 component parts. The size of the parts is preferably worked out from 61 1571 known information about the file as a whole, preferably the hash of the 1572 complete file. This information is run through an algorithm such as adding 1573 together the first x bits of the known information and using modulo 1574 division to give a chunk size that allows the file to preferably split into at 1575 least three parts. 1576 Preferably known information from each chunk is used as an encryption 1577 key. This is preferably done by taking a hash of each chunk and using 1578 this as the input to an encryption algorithm to encrypt another chunk in 1579 the file. Preferably this is a symmetrical algorithm such as AES256. 1580 Preferably this key is input into a password creating algorithm such as 1581 pbkdf and an initial vector and key calculated from that. Preferably the 1582 iteration count for the pbkdf is calculated from another piece of known 1583 information, preferably the sum of bits of another chunk or similar. 1584 Preferably each initial chunk hash and the final hash after encryption are 1585 stored somewhere for later decryption. Self Encrypting Files (Figure 1 - PT2 and Figure 17) 1586 1. Take a content hash of a file or data element 1-58-7- 2.-ehunk-a-file with- preferably-a- random calculable-size i.e. based on an 1588 algorithm of the content hash (to allow recovery of file). Also obfuscate 1589 the file such as in 3 1590 3. Obfuscate the chunks to ensure safety even if encryption is eventually 1591 broken (as with all encryption if given enough processing power and time) 1592 a. chunk 1 byte 1 swapped with bytel of chunk 2 1593 b. chunk 2 byte 2 swapped with byte I chunk 3 62 1594 c. chunk 3 byte 2 swapped with byte 2 of chunk 1 1595 d. This repeats until all bytes swapped and then repeats the same 1596 number of times as there are chunks with each iteration making next 1597 chunk first one 1598 e. - i.e. second time round chunk 2 is starting position 1599 4. Take hash of each chunk and rename chunk with its hash. 1600 5. Take h2 and first x bytes of h3 (6 in our example case) and either use 1601 modulo division or similar to get a random number between 2 fixed 1602 parameter (in our case 1000) to get a variable number. Use the above 1603 random number and h2 as the encryption key to encrypt hi or use h2 and 1604 the random number as inputs to another algorithm (pdbfk2 in our case) to L605 create a key and iv.(initialisation vector) .606 6. This process may be repeated multiple times to dilute any keys 607 throughout a series of chunks. 608 7. Chunk name i.e. h1 (unencrypted) and h1c (and likewise for each chunk) 609 written to a location for later recovery of the data. Added to this we can 610 simply update such a location with new chunks if a file has been altered, 611 thereby creating a revision control system where each file can be rebuilt 1612 to any previous state. L61. 8.. -The-existence of the chunk-wil be-checked-on-the-net-to-ensure it is riot 614 already backed up. All chunks may be checked at this time. 615 9. If a chunk exists all chunks must be checked for existence. 616 10. The chunk is saved 617 11. The file is marked as backed up.

63 1618 12. If a collision is detected the process is redone altering the original size .619 algorithm (2) to create a new chunk set, each system will be aware of this .620 technique and will do the exact same process till a series of chunks do 621 not collide. There will be a back off period here to ensure the chunks are 622 not completed due to the fact another system is backing up the same file. 623 The original chunk set will be checked frequently in case there are false 624 chunks or ones that have been forgotten. If the original names become 625 available the file is reworked using these parameters. Duplicate Removal (Figure 1 - P5) 626 According to a related aspect of this Invention, data chunked and 627 ready for storing can be stored on a distributed network but a search 628 should preferably be carried out for the existence of all associated 529 chunks created. Preferably the locations of the chunks have the same 530 ranking (From earlier ranking system) as user or better, otherwise the 531 existing chunks on the net are promoted to a location of equivalent rank 532 at least, If all chunks exist then the file is considered as already backed 533 up. If less than all chunks exist then this will preferably be considered as i34 a collision (after a time period) and the file will be re chunked using the i35 secondary algorithms (preferably just adjusted file sizes). This allows 636 duplicate files on any 2 or more machines to be only backed up once, 637 although through perpetual data several copies will exist of each file, this 638 is-limited to-an amount-that will-maintain-perpetual-data Encrypt - Decrypt (Figure 1 - P8) 539 According to a related aspect of this invention, the actual encrypting 540 and decrypting is carried out via knowledge of the file's content and this 541 is somehow maintained (see next). Keys will be generated and preferably 542 stored for decrypting. Actually encrypting the file will preferably include a 64 1643 compression process and further obfuscation methods. Preferably the 1644 chunk will be stored with a known hash preferably based on the contents 1645 of that chunk. 1646 Decrypting the file will preferably require the collation of all chunks and 1647 rebuilding of the file itself. The file may preferably have its content mixed 1648 up by an obfuscation technique rendering each chunk useless on its own, 1649 Preferably every file will go through a process of byte (or preferably bit) 1650 swapping between its chunks to ensure the original file is rendered 1651 useless without all chunks. 1652 This process will preferably involve running an algorithm which preferably 1653 takes the chunk size and then distributes the bytes in a pseudo random 1654 manner preferably taking the number of chunks and using this as an 1655 iteration count for the process. This will preferably protect data even in 1656 event of somebody getting hold of the encryption keys - as the chunks 1657 data is rendered useless even if transmitted in the open without 1658 encryption. 1659 This defends against somebody copying all data and storing for many 1660 years until decryption of today's algorithms is possible, although this is 1661 many years away. 1-662- -This-also- defends against-somebody,-instead of attempting to decrypt a 1663 chunk by creating the enormous amount of keys possible, (in the region 1664 of 2A54) rather instead creating the keys and presenting chunks to all 1665 keys - if this were possible (which is unlikely) a chunk would decrypt. 1666 The process defined here makes this attempt useless. 1667 All data will now be considered to be diluted throughout the original 1668 chunks and preferably additions to this algorithm will only strengthen the 1669 process.

65 Identify Chunks (Figure 1 - P9) 670 According to a related aspect of this invention, a chunk's original 671 hash or other calculable unique identifier will be stored. This will be 672 stored with preferably the final chunk name. This aspect defines that 673 each file will have a separate map preferably a file or database entry to 674 identify the file and the name of its constituent parts. Preferably this will 675 include local information to users such as original location and rights 676 (such as a read only system etc.). Preferably some of this information 677 can be considered shareable with others such as filename, content hash 678 and chunks names. ID Data with Small File (Figure 1 - P11) 679 According to a related aspect of this invention; these data maps may 680 be very small in relation to the original data itself allowing transmission of 681 files across networks such as the intemet with extreme simplicity, 682 security and bandwidth efficiency. Preferably the transmission of maps .683 will be carried out in a very secure manner, but failure to do this is akin to 1684 currently emailing a file in its entirety. 1685- -This allows-a very-small-file such-asThe-data map or database record to 1686 be shared or maintained by a user in a location not normally large 1687 enough to fit a file system of any great size, such as on a PDA or mobile 1688 phone. The identification of the chunk names, original names and final 1689 names are all that is required to retrieve the chunks and rebuild the file 1690 with certainty. .691 With data maps in place a user's whole machine, or all its data, can exist .692 elsewhere. Simply retrieving the data maps of all data, is all that is 66 1693 required to allow the user to have complete visibility and access to all 1694 their data as well as any shared files they have agreed to. Revision Control (Figure 1 - P1O) 1695 According to a related aspect of this invention, as data is updated 1696 and the map contents alter to reflect the new contents, this will preferably 1697 not require the deletion or removal of existing chunks, but instead allow 1698 the existing chunks to remain and the map appended to with an 1699 indication of a new revision existing. Preferably further access to the file 1700 will automatically open the last revision unless requested to open an [701 earlier revision. L702 Preferably revisions of any file can be forgotten or deleted (preferably .703 after checking the file counter or access list of sharers as above). This .704 will allow users to recover space from no longer required revisions. Create Map of Maps (Figure 1 - P15) 705 According to a related aspect of this invention, data identifiers, 1706 preferably data maps as mentioned earlier, can be appended to each 1707 other in a way that preferably allows a single file or database record to 1708.. identify-several files in-one rmapF-This-is-known as-a-share.-Such a share .709 can be private to the individual, thereby replacing the directory structure .710 of files that users are normally used to, and replacing this with a new [711 structure of shares very similar to volumes or filing cabinets as this is 712 more in line with normal human nature and should make things simpler. Share Maps (Figure 1 - P16) 67 .713 According to a related aspect of this invention, this map of maps will .714 preferably identify the users connected to it via some public ID that is 715 known to each other user, with the map itself will being passed to users 716 who agree to join the share. This will preferably be via an encrypted 717 channel such as ms messenger or similar. This map may then be 718 accessed at whatever rank level users have been assigned. Preferably 719 there will be access rights such as read / delete / add / edit as is typically 720 used today. As a map is altered, the user instigating this is checked 721 against the user list in the map to see if this is allowed. If not, the request 722 is ignored but preferably the users may then save the data themselves to 723 their own database or data maps as a private file or even copy the file to 724 a share they have access rights for. These shares will preferably also 725 exhibit the revision control mechanism described above. 726 Preferably joining the share will mean that the users subscribe to a 727 shared amount of space and reduce the other subscription, i.e. a 10Gb 728 share is created then the individual gives up 10Gb (or equivalent 729 dependent on system requirements which may be a multiple or divisor of 730 10Gb). Another user joining means they both have a 5Gb space to give 731 up and 5 users would mean they all have a 2Gb or equivalent space to 732 give up. So with more people sharing, requirements on all users reduce. Shared Access to Private Files (Figure 1 - PT5 and Figure 18) 733 1. User 1 logs on to network 734 2. Authenticates ID - i.e. gets access to his public and private keys to sign 735 messages. This should NOT be stored locally but should have been 736 retrieved from a secure location - anonymously and securely. 737 3. User 1 saves a file as normal (encrypted, obfuscated, chunked, and 738 stored on the net via a signed and anonymous ID. This ID is a special 68 1739 maidsafe.net Share ID (MSID) and is basically a new key pair created 1740 purely for interacting with the share users - to mask the user's MID (i.e. 1741 cannot be tied to MPID via a share). So again the MSID is a key pair and 1742 the ID is the hash of the public key - this public key is stored in a chunk 1743 called the hash and signed and put on the net for others to retrieve and 1744 confirm that the public key belongs to the hash. 1745 4. User creates a share - which is a data map with some extra elements to 1746 cover users and privileges. 1747 5. File data added to file map is created in the backup process, with one 1748 difference, this is a map of maps and may contain many files - see 14 1749 6. User 2 logs in 1750 7. User 2 has authentication details (i.e. their private MPID key) and can 1751 sign / decrypt with this MPID public key. 1752 8. User I sends a share join request to user 2 (shares are invisible on the 1753 net - i.e. nobody except the sharers to know they are there). 1754 9. User I signs the share request to state he will join share. He creates his 1755 MSID key pair at this time. The signed response includes User 2's MSID 1756 public key. 1757 10. Share map is encrypted or sent encrypted (possibly by secure 1758 messenger) to User 1 along with the MSID public keys of any users of the 1759 share that exist. Note the transmittion of MSID public key may not be 1760 required as the MSID chunks are saved on the net as described in 3 so 1761 any user can check the public key at any time - this just saves the search 1762 operation on that chunk to speed the process up slightly.

69 1763 11. Each user has details added to the share these include public name 1764 (MPID) and rights (read / write / delete / admin etc.) 1765 12. A description of the share file 1766 Note that as each user saves new chunks he does so with the MSID [767 keys. this means that if a shares is deleted or removed the chunks still [768 exist in the users home database and he can have the option to keep the 769 data maps and files as individual files or simply forget them all. .770 Note also that as a user opens a file, a lock is transmitted to all other 771 shares and they will only be allowed to open a file read only - they can .772 request unlock (i.e. another user unlocks the file - meaning it becomes 773 read only). Non-logged in users will have a message buffered for them 774 if the file is closed the buffered message is deleted (as there is no point 775 in sending it to the user now) and logged in users are updated also. 776 This will take place using the messenger component of the system to 777 automatically receive messages from share users about shares (but 778 being limited to that). Provide Public ID (Figure 1 - P17) 7-79 -According-to-a-related-aspectof-this-Invention;-a public and Private 780 key pair is created for a network where preferably the user is 781 anonymously logged on, and preferably has a changeable pseudo 782 random private id which is only used for transmission and retrieval of ID 783 blocks giving access to that network. 784 Preferably this public private key pair will be associated with a public ID. 785 This ID will be transmittable in a relatively harmless way using almost 786 any method including in the open (email, ftp, www etc.) but preferably in 70 1787 an encrypted form. Preferably this ID should be simple enough to 1788 remember such as a phone number type length. Preferably this ID will be 1789 long enough however, to cope with all the world's population and more, 1790 therefore it would be preferably approx 11 characters long. 1791 This ID can be printed on business cards or stationary like a phone 1792 number or email address and cannot be linked to the users private ID by 1793 external sources. However the user's own private information makes this 1794 link by storing the data in the ID bit the user retrieves when logging in to 1795 the network or via another equally valid method of secure network 1796 authentication, 1797 This ID can then be used in data or resource sharing with others in a [798 more open manner than with the private id. This keeps the private ID [799 private and allows much improved inter-node or inter-person [800 communications. Secure Communications (Figure 1 - P18) 801 According to a related aspect of this invention, the communications 802 between nodes should be both private and validated. This is preferably 1803 irrefutable but there should be options for refutable communications if 1804 required. For irrefutable communications the user logs on to the network iR0 and- retrieves their key pair and-4D-This- is-then-used to start 1806 communications. Preferably the user's system will seek another node to .807 transmit and receive from randomly - this adds to the masking of the 808 user's private ID as the private ID is not used in any handshake with 809 network resources apart from logging in to the network. 810 As part of the initial handshake between users, a key may be passed. 811 Preferably this is a code passed between users over another 812 communications mechanism in a form such as a pin number known only 71 1813 to the users involved or it may be as simple as appending the user's 1814 name and other info to a communication request packet such as exists in 1815 some instant messaging clients today - i.e. David wants to communicate 1816 with you allow / deny / block, 1817 Unlike many communications systems today, this is carried out on a 1818 distributed server-less network. This however provides the problem of [819 what to do when users are off line. Today messages are either, stopped 1820 or stored on a server, and in many cases not encrypted or secured. This [821 invention allows users to have messages securely buffered whilst off line. [822 This is preferably achieved by the node creating a unique identifier for .823 only this session and passing that ID to all known nodes in the user's .824 address book. Users on-line get this immediately, users off-line have this 825 buffered to their last known random ID. This ensures that the ability to 826 snoop on a user's messages is significantly reduced as there is no 827 identifier to people outside the address book as to the name of the 828 random ID bit the messages are stored to. The random ID bit is 829 preferably used as the first part of the identified buffer file name and 830 when more messages are stored then another file is saved with the 831 random id and a number appended to it representing the next sequential 832 available number. Therefore a user will log on and retrieve the messages 833 sequentially. This allows buffered secured and distributed messaging to 834 exist. Document Signing (Figure 1 - P19) 835 According to a related aspect of this invention, a by-product of 836 securing communications between nodes using asymmetric encryption is 837 as previously stated, introducing a non-refutable link. This allows for not 838 only messages between nodes to be non-refutable but also for 839 documents signed in the same manner as messages to be non refutable. 840 Today somebody can easily steal a user's password or purposely attack 72 1841 users as they are not anonymous; this invention provides a great deal of 1842 anonymity and backs this up with access to resources. 1843 Documents may be signed and passed as legally enforceable between 1844 parties as a contract in many countries. Contract Conversations (Figure 1 - P20) 1845 According to a related aspect of this invention, a conversation or 1846 topic can be requested under various contracted conditions. The system 1847 may have a non disclosure agreement as an example and both parties 1848 digitally sign this agreement automatically on acceptance of a contract 1849 conversation. In this case a non disclosure conversation. This will 1850 preferably speed up and protect commercial entities entering into 1851 agreements or where merely investigating a relationship. Preferably other 1852 conditions can be applied here such as preferably full disclosure 1853 conversations, Purchase order conversations, contract signing 1854 conversations etc. This is all carried out via a system preferably having 1855 ready made enforceable contracts for automatic signing. These contracts [856 may preferably be country or legal domain specific and will require to be l857 enforceable under the law of the countries where the conversation is 1858 happening. This will require the users to preferably automatically use a 1859 combination of geographic IP status and by selecting which is their home E860 country-and where are they are-atthat'time located and- having that 1861 conversation. 1862 Preferably only the discussion thread is under this contract, allowing any 1863 party to halt the contract but not the contents of the thread which is under 1864 contract. 1865 Preferably there can also be a very clear intent statement for a 1866 conversation that both parties agree to. This statement will form the basis 73 1867 of a contract in the event of any debate. The clearer the intent statement 1868 is; the better for enforceability. These conversations are potentially not 1869 enforceable but should lead to simplifying any resolution required at a 1870 later date. Preferably this can be added together with an actual contract 1871 conversation such as a non disclosure agreement to form a pack of [872 contracts per conversation. Contract conversations will be clearly 1873 identified as such with copies of the contracts easily viewable by both .874 parties at any time, these contracts will preferably be data maps and be .875 very small in terms of storage space required. msmessenger (Figure 1 - PT6 and Figure 19) 876 1. A non public ID preferably one which is used in some other autonomous 877 system is used as a sign in mechanism and creates a Public ID key pair. 878 2. The user selects or creates their public ID by entering a name that can 879 easily be remembered (such as a nickname) the network is checked for a 880 data element existing with a hash of this and if not there, this name is 881 allowed. Otherwise the user is asked to choose again. 382 3. This ID called the MPID (maidsafe.net public ID) can be passed freely 883 between friends or printed on business cards etc. as an email address is 884 today. 885 4. To initiate communications a user enters the nickname of the person he 886 is trying to communicate with along with perhaps a short statement (like a 887 prearranged pin or other challenge). The receiver agrees or otherwise to 888 this request, disagreeing means a negative score starts to build with 889 initiator. This score may last for hours, days or even months depending 890 on regularity of refusals. A high score will accompany any communication 891 request messages. Users may set a limit on how many refusals a user 392 has prior to being automatically ignored.

74 1893 5. All messages now transmitted are done so encrypted with the receiving 1894 party's public key, making messages less refutable. 1895 6. These messages may go through a proxy system or additional nodes to 1896 mask the location of each user, 1897 7. This system also allows document signing (digital signatures) and 1898 interestingly, contract conversations. This is where a contract is signed. 1899 and shared between the users. Preferably this signed contract is equally 1900 available to all in a signed (non changeable manner) and retrievable by 1901 all. Therefore a distributed environment suits this method. These 1902 contracts may be NDAs Tenders, Purchase Orders etc. 1903 8. This may in some cases require individuals to prove their identity and this 1904 can take many forms from dealing with drivers licenses to utility bills 1905 being signed off in person or by other electronic methods such as 1906 inputting passport numbers, driving license numbers etc. 1907 9. If the recipient is on line then messages are sent straight to them for 1908 decoding. 1909 10. If the recipient is not on line, messages are require to be buffered as 1910 required with email today. 1911 11. Unlike today's email though, this is a distributed system with no servers to 1912 buffer to. In maidsafe.net messages are stored on the net encrypted with 1913 the receiver's public key. Buffer nodes may be known trusted nodes or 1914 not. 1915 12. Messages will look like receivers id.message message 2..... or simply 1916 be appended to the users MPID chunk, in both cases messages are 1917 signed by the sender. This allows messages to be buffered in cases 75 918 where the user is offline. When the user comes on line he will check his 919 ID chunk and look for appended messages as above ID.messagel etc. 920 which is MPID.<message I data>.<message 2 data> etc. .... 921 This system allows the ability for automatic system messages to be sent, 922 i.e.,. in the case of sharing the share, data maps can exist on everyone's 923 database and never be transmitted or stored in the open. File locks and 924 changes to the maps can automatically be routed between users using 925 the messenger system as described above. This is due to the distributed 926 nature of maidsafe.net and is a great, positive differentiator from other 927 messenger systems. These system commands will be strictly limited for 928 security reasons and will initially be used to send alerts from trusted 929 nodes and updates to share information by other shares of a private file 930 share (whether they are speaking with them or not). ?31 The best way within our current power to get rid of email spam is to get )32 rid of email servers. Anonymous Transactions (Figure 1 - P24) )33 According to a related aspect of this invention, the ability to transact 934 in a global digital medium is made available with this invention. This is 935 achieved by passing signed credits to sellers in return for goods. The 936- credits-are-data-chunks-witha-given-worth-preferably 1,-5, 10, 20; 50, 937 100 etc. units (called cybers in this case). These cybers are a digital 938 representation of a monetary value and can be purchased as described 939 below or earned for giving up machine resources such as disk space of 40 cpu time etc. There should be preferably many ways to earn cybers. )41 A cyber is actually a digitally signed piece of data containing the value )42 statement i.e. 10 cybers and preferably a serial number. During a )43 transaction the seller's serial number database is checked for validity of 76 1944 the cyber alone. The record of the ID used to transact is preferably not 1945 transmitted or recorded. This cyber will have been signed by the issuing 1946 authority as having a value. This value will have been proven and 1947 preferably initially will actually equate to a single currency for instance 1948 linked to a Euro. This will preferably alter through time as the system 1949 increases in capability. 1950 Some sellers may request non anonymous transactions and if the user 1951 agrees he will then use the public ID creation process to authenticate the 1952 transaction and may have to supply more data. However there may be 1953 other sellers who will sell anonymously. This has a dramatic effect on 1954 marketing and demographic analysis etc. as some goods will sell 1955 anywhere and some will not. It is assumed this system allows privacy 1956 and freedom to purchase goods without being analysed. 1957 The process of transacting the cybers will preferably involve a signing 1958 system such that two people in a transaction will actually pass the cyber 1959 from the buyer to the seller. This process will preferably alter the 1960 signature on the cyber to the seller's signature. This new signature is 1961 reported back to the issuing authority. Interface with Non-Anonymous Systems (Figure 1 - P23) 1962 According-o-a-related aspect-ofthis-inventon people-may purchase 1963 digital cash or credits from any seller of the cash. The seller will 1964 preferably create actual cash data chunks which are signed and 1965 serialised to prevent forgery. This is preferably accountable as with 1966 today's actual cash to prevent fraud and counterfeiting. Sellers will 1967 preferably be registered centrally in some cases. The users can then 1968 purchase cybers for cash and store these in their database of files in a 1969 system preferably such as maidsafe.net.

77 )70 As a cyber is purchased it is preferably unusable and in fact simply a 71 reference number used to claim the cyber's monetary value by the ?72 purchaser's system. This reference number will preferably be valid for a ?73 period of time. The purchaser then logs in to their system such as ?74 maidsafe.net and inputs the reference number in a secure )75 communications medium as a cyber request. This request is analysed by ?76 the issuing authority and the transaction process begins. Preferably the ?77 cyber is signed by the issuing authority that then preferably encrypts it ?78 with the purchaser's public key and issues a signing request. The cyber 979 is not valid at this point. Only when a signed copy of the cyber is received 980 by the issuing authority is the serial number made valid and the cyber is 981 live. 982 This cyber now belongs to the purchaser and validated by the issuer. To 983 carry out a transaction this process is preferably carried out again i.e. the 984 seller asks for payment and a cyber signed by the buyer is presented 985 this is validated by checking with the issuer that the serial code is valid 986 and that the buyer is the actual owner of the cyber. Preferably the buyer 987 issues a digitally signed transaction record to the issuing authority to 988 state he is about to alter that cyber's owner. This is then passed to the 989 seller who is requested to sign it. The seller then signs the cyber and 990 requests the issuing authority to accept him as new owner via a signed 991 request. The authority then simply updates the current owner of the cyber 992 in their records. .993 These transactions are preferably anonymous, as users should be using 994 a private id to accomplish this process. This private ID can be altered at 995 any time but the old id should be saved to allow cyber transactions to 996 take place with the old id.

78 Anonymity (Figure 1 - P25) 1997 According to a related aspect of this invention, a system of voting 1998 which is non refutable and also anonymous is to be considered, This is a 1999 requirement to allow free speech and thinking to take place on a global 2000 scale without recrimination and negative feedback as is often the case. 2001 To partake in a vote the user will have to be authenticated as above then 2002 preferably be presented with the issue to be voted on. The user will then 2003 use a private ID key to sign their vote anonymously. Preferably non 2004 anonymous irrefutable voting may also take place in the system by 2005 simply switching from a private ID to a public one. This will preferably 2006 form the basis of a petition based system as an add-on to the voting Z007 system. 008 The system will require that a block of data can be published (preferably !009 broadcast to each user via messenger) and picked up by each user of .010 the system and presented as a poll. This poll will then be signed by the .011 user and sent back to the poll issuer whose system will count the votes 012 and preferably show a constant indication of the votes to date. 013 As there are public and private IDs available, then each vote will require 6014 preferably only ONE ID to be used to prevent double voting. Preferably Z015 geographic IP may be used to establish geographic analysis of the voting .016 community,-particularly on local-issuest Voting System (Figure 1 - PT8 and Figure 20) 017 1. A vote is created in a normal fashion; it could be a list of candidates or a 018 list of choices that users have to select. Preferably this list will always 019 have an "I do not have enough information" option appended to the 020 bottom of the list - to ensure voters have sufficient knowledge to make a 79 2021 decision. A limit on the last option should be stipulated as a limit to void Z022 the vote and redo with more information. 023 2. This vote is stored on the system with the ID of the voting authority. This 024 may be a chunk of data called with a specific name and digitally signed !025 for authenticity. All storage nodes may be allowed to ensure certain .026 authorities are allowed to store votes, and only store votes digitally 027 signed with the correct ID. 1028 3. A system broadcast may be used to let everyone interested know that 029 there is a new vote to be retrieved. This is an optional step to reduce 030 network congestion with constant checking for votes; other similar 031 systems may be used for the same ends. 032 4. A non anonymous user logged into the net will pick up the vote. This is a 033 user with a public ID known at least to the authority. The vote may in fact 034 be a shared chunk that only certain IDs have access to or know of its 035 location (i.e. split onto several component parts and a messaging system 036 used to alert when votes are ready.) 037 5. An anonymous user may be logged onto the net and may in fact use a 038 random ID to pick up the vote. !039 6. The vote is retrieved. !040 7. The system will send back a signed (with the ID used to pick up the vote) 041 "I accept the vote". 042 8. The voting authority will transmit a ballot paper - i.e. a digitally signed 043 (and perhaps encrypted / chunked) ballot paper. This may be a digitally 044 signed "authorisation to vote" slip which may or may not be sequentially 045 numbered or perhaps a batch of x number of the same serial numbers (to 80 2046 prevent fraud by multiple voting from one source - i.e. issue 5 same 2047 numbers randomly and only accept 5 votes with that number). 2048 9. User machine decrypts this ballot paper. 2049 10. The users system creates a one time ID + key pair to vote. This public 2050 key can be hashed and stored on the net as with a MAID or PMID so as 2051 to allow checking of any signed or encrypted votes sent back. 2052 11. The vote is sent back to the authority signed and preferably encrypted 2053 with the authority's public key. !054 12. In the case of anonymous or non anonymous voting this may be further !055 masqueraded by passing the vote through proxy machines en route. 1056 13. The vote is received and a receipt chunk put on the net. This is a chunk !057 called with the user's temp (or voting) ID hash with the last bit shifted or ,058 otherwise knowingly mangled - so as not to collide with the voting ID bit 059 the user stores for authentication of their public key. 060 14. The authority can then publish a list of who voted for what (i.e. a list of 061 votes and the voting ID's) 2062 15. The user's system checks the list for the ID that was used being present 063 -in4he- list. and-validates-that-the-vote-was-cast properly. !064 if this is not the case. 065 16. The users system issues an alert. This alert may take many forms and 066 may include signing a vote alert packet; this can be a packed similarly (as 067 in 13,) altered to be a known form of the vote chunk itself. There are 068 many forms of raising alerts including simply transmitting an electronic 81 Z069 message through messenger or similar and possibly to a vote 2070 authentication party and not necessarily the voting authority themselves. 2071 17. The user has all the information to show the party investigating voting 1072 authenticity, accuracy, legality or some other aspect, thereby allowing 073 faults and deliberately introduced issues to be tracked down. .074 18. The user has the option to remove all traces of the vote from his system ,075 at this time. Proven Individual (Figure 1 - P26) 076 According to a related aspect of this invention, using a system of 077 anonymous authentication preferably as in maidsafe.net, the first stage is 078 partially complete and individual accounts are authentic but this does not 079 answer the question of anonymous individuals, this is described here. 080 Access to a system can be made with information that we possess 081 (passwords etc.) or something that we physically have (iris/ fingerprint or 082 other biometric test). To prove an individual's identity the system will 083 preferably use a biometric test. This is a key to the voting system as it 2084 becomes more broadly adopted. It is inherent in this system that any Z085 personally identifying data must be kept secret, and also that any 086 - passwords or access control information is -never transmitted. 087 When a user authenticates, the system can recognise if they have done 088 so biometrically. In this case, the account is regarded as a unique 089 individual rather than an individual account. This is possible as 090 maidsafe.net can authenticate without accessing servers or database 091 records of a biometric nature for example.

82 2092 As a user logs into maidsafe.net through a biometric mechanism then the 2093 state of login is known so no login box is presented for typing information 2094 in to access the system. This allows the system to guarantee that the 2095 user has logged in biometrically. The system on each machine is always 2096 validated by maidsafe.net on login to ensure this process cannot be 2097 compromised. 2098 Preferably some votes will exist only for biometrically authenticated 2099 users. Distributed Controlled Voting (Figure 1 - P29) 2100 According to a related aspect of this invention, to further manage the 2101 system there has to be a level of control as well as distribution to enable 2102 all users to access it at any time. The distribution of the votes is 2103 controlled as system messages and stored for users using the 2104 messenger system described earlier. 105 The main issue with a system such as this would be 'what' is voted on H06 and 'who' poses the votes and words polls. This is key to the fairness 107 and clarity of the system and process. This voting system will preferably 2108 always have a 'not enough information' selection to provide a route by 2109 which users are able to access information so that they are well informed 2110- before- making any decision. 2111 The system will require a group of individuals, who are preferably voted 2112 into office by the public as the policyholders/ trustees of the voting 2113 system. This group will be known by their public ID and use their public 2114 ID to authenticate and publish a poll. This group will preferably be voted 2115 into office for a term and may be removed at any time via a consensus of 2116 the voting public. For this reason there will be continual polls on line 83 2 17 which reflect how well the policyholders are doing as a group and Z118 preferably individually as well. 119 According to a related aspect of this invendon, users of the system !120 will input to the larger issues on the system. Macro management should 121 be carried out via the policyholders of the system, whom as mentioned !122 previously may be voted in or out at any time, however larger issues 123 should be left to the users. These issues can preferably be what licenses 124 are used, costs of systems, dissemination of charitable contributions, 125 provision to humanitarian and scientific projects of virtual computing 126 resources on large scales etc. 127 To achieve this, preferably a system message will be sent out, where it is 128 not presented as a message but as a vote. This should show up in the 129 users voting section of the system. User private IDs will be required to 130 act on this vote and they can make their decision. 131 There will be appeals on these votes when it would be apparent that [32 conclusion of the vote is dangerous to either a small community or the [33 system as a whole. Users will have an option of continuing with the vote 134 and potential damage but essentially the user will decide and that will be [35 final. Preferably this system does not have a block vote or any other 136 system which rates one individual over another at any time or provides 137 an advantage in any other way. This requires no ability to allow veto on 138 any-decision.or casting of votes- by proxy so that the authenticated user's 139 decision is seen as properly recorded and final. 140 According to a related aspect of this invention, a system of perpetual 141 data, self encrypting files and data mapping will allow a global 142 anonymous backup and restore system for data to exist. This system can 143 be constructed from the previous discussions where data may be made .44 perpetual on a network and anonymously shared to prevent duplication. 45 This together with the ability to check, manipulate and maintain revision 84 2146 control over files adds the capability of a 'time machine' type environment 2147 where data may be time stamped on backup. 2148 This allows a system to rebuild a user's data set as it was at any time in 2149 history since using maidsafe.net or similar technologies. This may form a 2150 defence at times where in cases like prior art enquiries, insider dealing 2151 etc. is being considered, as the system is secure and validated by many 2152 other nodes etc. It can therefore be shown what knowledge (at least from 2153 the point of view of owning the data pertaining to a subject,) anyone had 2154 of certain circumstances. 2155 According to a related aspect of this invention, preferably using 2156 aspect(s) previously defined or any that may improve this situation. Z157 Taking distributed authentication, backup and restore along with data 158 map sharing; the system can add to this the ability for granular access 159 controls. In this case a node entering the network will request an 160 authenticator to authorise its access. In this case the authenticator will be. .161 a manager or equivalent in an organisation (whether matrix managed or 162 traditional pyramid). This authorisation will tie the public ID of the 163 authoriser to the system as having access to this node's data and any 164 other authorisations they make (in an authorisation chain). 2165 This allows an environment of distributed secure backup, restore and 2166 sharing in a corporate or otherwise private environment. 167 According to a related aspect of this invention, all of the capabilities 168 described here with the exception of the above will ensure that a network .169 of nodes can be created, in which users have security privacy and 170 freedom to operate. 171 These nodes will have refutable IDs (MAID, PMID etc.) as well as non 172 refutable IDs (MPID) for different purposes, just as in human life in 85 2173 general there is time to be identified and times when it is just best not to 2174 be. 2175 According to a related aspect of this invention, adding the ability of 2176 non refutable messaging allows users to not only communicate genuinely 2177 and securely but also the ability to communicate under contracted terms. 2178 This allows for the implementation of legally kept trade secrets (as 2179 implied with NDA agreements etc.) plus many more contracted 180 communications. This will hopefully lessen the burden on legal issues 1181 such as litigation etc. .182 According to a related aspect of this invention, adding the ability to .183 create two voting systems, anonymous and non-anonymous, allows the 184 system to provide a mechanism for instant democracy. This is achieved 185 by allowing a voting panel in a user's account that is constantly updated 186 with issues regarding the system and it's improvements initially. These 187 votes will be anonymous. 188 In another anonymous voting scenario users may continually vote on 189 certain subjects (as in a running poll) these subjects could be the leaders 190 of boards etc. z191 In a non anonymous voting scenario it may be there's groups of identified 192 people (via their MPID) who have a common grouping such as a charity 193 or similar and they may require certain people to vote on certain matters 194 and be recognised. This is where the MPID is used for voting. 195 According to a related aspect of this invention, adding to this the 196 ability to collect and trade credits anonymously allows users to sell 197 machine resources they are not using, trade on a network with a cash 198 equivalent and go about there business on a network as they do in real 199 life.

Claims (10)

1. A method of protecting data in a peer-to-peer network of a plurality of nodes, including: splitting the data into a plurality of data chunks of one or more sizes, 5 wherein the one or more sizes are randomly calculated based on a hash value of the data; obfuscating the plurality of data chunks by swapping data between the data chunks; naming the plurality of obfuscated data chunks using corresponding hash 10 values; and encrypting the plurality of obfuscated data chunks using corresponding hash values.

2. A method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the encryption algorithm is a symmetric encryption algorithm. 15

3. A method as claimed in claim 1, further including searching an encrypted data chunk in the peer-to-peer network based on a corresponding hash value.

4. A method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the encrypting of a first data chunk of the plurality of obfuscated data chunks includes: determining hash values of second and third data chunks of the plurality of 20 obfuscated data chunks; applying a modulo division technique to the hash value of the second data chunk and a first predefined number of bytes of the hash value of the third data chunk to generate a random number; and using the random number and the hash value of the second data chunk to 25 encrypt the first data chunk.

5. A method as claimed in any one of the preceding claims, including storing the plurality of encrypted data chunks on the plurality of nodes of the peer-to-peer network. 87

6. A method as claimed in any one of the preceding claims, including determining if each chunk of the data already exists on the network and, if each chunk of the data already exists, not storing the protected data.

7. A method as claimed in Claim 1, wherein a first predefined number of bits 5 of the hash value are added together and a modulo division technique is applied to the added value to determine at least one chunk size and the number of data chunks.

8. A method as claimed in Claim 1, further including repeating the swapping by same number of times as there are chunks, wherein obfuscating the data 10 chunks leads to mixing up of content of the data chunks, thereby ensuring that the data is rendered useless without presence of all the data chunks.

9. A method as claimed in claim 1, wherein a hash value of a first data chunk of the plurality of obfuscated data chunks is used as an encryption key to encrypt a second data chunk of the plurality of obfuscated data chunks. 15

10. A method of protecting data in a peer-to-peer network of a plurality of nodes, substantially as hereinbefore described with reference to the accompanying drawings. DAVID IRVINE WATERMARK PATENT AND TRADE MARKS ATTORNEYS P36072AU01