Matthew T Beard

Much of the modern debate about torture has surrounded the question of whether torture can ever be justified. Torture, in every serious moral treatment of the subject, is a bad thing. Some argue, however, it may be morally permissible to practice torture because the benefits outweigh the moral costs. Thus, the question surrounding whether it is ever morally permissible to practice torture places the moral requirement to treat every human being with whom we come into contact with justice in direct competition with the responsibility of statesmen and intelligence officers to make decisions that protect their citizens (C.f. Allhoff 2003). In this chapter I will largely ignore that debate. Instead, I will focus on the ethical consequences of performing acts of torture or being subjected to torture, whether or not the actions are morally justifiable.

So far, most contributions to the moral injury literature have been from the disciplines of psychology and trauma studies. However, it is noteworthy that a number of philosophers have taken a keen and particular interest in moral injury. However, although philosophers have added their voices to the discussion, it remains unclear what unique contribution philosophy can provide to those interested in moral injury. In this paper I make a case for philosophy’s role in the literature. Philosophy provides a methodology for considering problems that are neither empirical, nor formal in nature. This is true of moral injury, which cannot be described merely by its psychopathology; I demonstrate this with reference to existing psychological approaches to moral injury. I note a number of concepts that are clearly relevant to our understanding of moral injury about which philosophy is the most appropriate discipline to provide insight. Having argued for the place of philosophy in the discussion, I conclude by noting some shortcomings of the philosophical method, noting the importance of an interdisciplinary approach.

The moral dimension of combat trauma is being increasingly recognised within psychological and philosophical literature. Indeed, there is a growing movement to distinguish between PTSD and “moral injury.” By moral injury, these theorists refer to something like what psychiatrist Jonathan Shay describes as “the soul wound inflicted by doing something that violates one’s own ethics, ideals, or attachments.” This type of injury does not appear to be captured by the increasing diagnosis of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Each of these has important moral implications for philosophers of war, but the conditions need to be appropriately delineated before appropriate remedies can be identified.
The growing interest in moral injury opens the door for philosophers to explore and explain how moral concepts can contribute to understanding, treatment and prevention of combat trauma-related psychological injuries. In this paper I will explore some of the significant differences between PTSD and moral injury, and how these differences hold moral significance. Using the clinical guidelines presented in the DSM-5, I will explore how the conditions of PTSD differ in terms of clinical presentation. I will then consider the experiential differences between moral injury and PTSD, which will reveal some possible avenues for therapeutic interventions for the morally injured.

The modern soldier is faced with a complex moral and psychological landscape. As Nancy Sherman puts it in The Untold War: Inside the Hearts and Minds of our Soldiers, ‘soldiers go to
war to fight external enemies… but most fight inner wars as well.’ The modern soldier is no longer simply a warrior: he (or she) is at once a peacekeeper, diplomat, leader, sibling and friend. In the face of such challenges, some responsible for the teaching of soldiers have endeavoured to incorporate a character-based training programme, designed to develop virtues that will assist soldiers in fulfilling the multiple roles required of them. However, these training programmes are
stymied by the dearth of virtue-based discussion within the most influential guide to the moral conduct of soldiers: just war theory (JWT). JWT remains a primarily deontic system in which rights, duties and law are generally perceived as the most important considerations. Aretaic ethics has a great deal to offer both JWT and military education programmes.

The images of soldiers which are evoked on memorial days commonly include a number of different virtues: courage, loyalty, fraternity, etc. One ideal perhaps extolled above all others is that of sacrifice. Soldiers, according to popular moral platitudes, are lauded for the sacrifices they make for the common good. Implied in this is the expectation that soldiers ought to be the type of people who are prepared to sacrifice
themselves in defence of an ideal. Within the most popular framework for morally evaluating war, Just War Theory, sacrifice tends to be understood from within the deontological, rights-based framework that modern just war theorists favour. In this chapter I will aim to show how the conclusions drawn by considering sacrifice through a deontological lens can be enriched through the addition of virtue theoretical considerations, leading to a fuller account of sacrifice.

This chapter takes a philosophical approach to the idea of sacrifice in the military. It explores whether the predominant framework used for evaluating war, Just War Theory, is a suitable framework for understanding the sacrifices soldiers, commanders, and political leaders can be asked to make in times of war. Focussing on various conceptions of sacrifice, including physical and moral sacrifices, the chapter argues that the predominantly deontological formulation of modern just war theories could be enriched by considering notions surrounding the ancient Greek concept of arete (virtue). Thus, as well as being a detailed exposition of sacrifice in war, the chapter also seeks to show how consideration of aretaic notions such as virtue, character and moral psychology can enrich just war theories responses to various issues.

The value of this research is in suggesting that soldiers are morally obligated to accept more risk than modern warfare typically places, or at least historically has placed, on them. It also has implications for military ethics education in that it suggests that soldiers’ characters should be shaped in such a way as to dispose them to sacrifice. Further, it has implications for the use of Just War Theory in international relations
by introducing a moral framework through which political leaders can determine when they might be morally obligated to forgive the indiscretions of another nation, and what it means to forgive in this context. As such, it makes a contribution to a growing discussion within Just War Theory: jus post bellum
the moral norms surrounding the resolution of conflict.

In the article ‘After-birth abortion: why should the baby
live?’ arguments are made in favour of the moral
permissibility of intentionally killing newborn infants,
under particular conditions. Here we argue that their
arguments are based on an indefensible view of
personhood, and we question the logic of harm and
interest that informs their arguments. Furthermore, we
argue that the conclusions here are so contrary to
ordinary moral intuitions that the argument and
conclusions based upon it—including those which
defend more mainstream methods of abortion—should
be treated with immediate suspicion.

Just War Theory treats preventive war with a healthy suspicion. Those who oppose preventive war tend to do so on the basis that it fails to fit popular criteria for jus ad bello; particularly, the just cause and last resort criteria. However, more recent developments in military practice suggest a questioning of an outright ban: rogue states appear to be ongoing threats to security, and other states risk being subject to aggression to protect the rights of these antagonistic states. Is tolerance of risk consistent with the logic of just war? When is the risk of being attacked too great to abstain from preventive war?
I will highlight the theoretical and practical difficulties in determining what counts as a grave and imminent threat; focussing especially on the complicating case of ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’. I will argue that the notion of preventive war is (1) inconsistent with the defending the rights of political communities, and (2) forbidden by the proportionality requirement of jus ad bellum. The risk of being subject to aggression is a cost of global peace; political communities can do a great deal to prevent and prepare for aggression, but the demands of just war forbid preventive war.

Cyberwar is increasingly common in the landscape of global conflict, and represents a dramatic shift away from conventional means of fighting war and toward an entirely new landscape. Coinciding with this shift has been a view amongst some academics that cyberwar represents a ‘new’ type of war with new ethical requirements which the traditional and widely accepted view known as ‘Just War Theory’ is unable to address. It is likely that this debate will grow and continue as cyberwar becomes increasingly prominent in military discussions. This paper contributes to that growing debate by arguing against the ‘new war’ view of cyberwar and just war. I will argue that just war theory is adequately equipped to explain the new challenge of cyberwar, and that although cyberwar requires novel applications of just war theory, this neither generates any need for a new theory, nor does it demonstrate that cyberwar is a new kind of war. I will conclude with some remarks about how existing just war theory might best be applied to the unusual challenges of cyberwar.

Australian democracy has recently seen a new emphasis on ‘conscience votes’ in parliament. Although no conscience votes were actually held by the last federal government, public awareness of the notion has increased, with the NSW state parliament holding a conscience vote in September 2010 on the Adoption Amendment (Same Sex Couples) Bill, 2010, (hereafter Same Sex Couples) and increasing calls for Prime Minister Julia Gillard to call a conscience vote on the issue of same-sex marriage. Further discussion about the nature and purpose of conscience votes arose when Joe Hockey announced that he would call a conscience vote on the ETS issue if elected leader of the Liberal Party in 2009, and in discussion of the Victorian Abortion Law Reform Bill, 2008.

However, despite this increasing awareness, the Australian media, public and governments have failed to examine closely the concept of a ‘conscience vote’, and the important question of what conscience really is. I will examine a number of statements made by politicians, media commentators and other groups surrounding conscience votes to show the problems that emerge from lacking a clear account of conscience. From this, I will outline two different classical views of conscience: that of Bishop Joseph Butler and that of St. Thomas Aquinas, and show the implications for politicians of adopting either view. I will suggest that the contemporary Australian usage of conscience has more in common with Butler than Aquinas, but that the Thomistic view could serve to better inform both the contemporary Australian usage, and Butler’s views. I will briefly suggest some ways that adopting the Thomistic view of conscience would impact on the Australian democratic system, and explain the problems with a philosophical view that upholds the primacy of conscience and fails to appeal to external moral truth.

So far, most contributions to the moral injury literature have been from the disciplines of psychology and trauma studies. However, it is noteworthy that a number of philosophers have taken a keen and particular interest in moral injury. However, although philosophers have added their voices to the discussion, it remains unclear what unique contribution philosophy can provide to those interested in moral injury. In this paper I make a case for philosophy’s role in the literature. Philosophy provides a methodology for considering problems that are neither empirical, nor formal in nature. This is true of moral injury, which cannot be described merely by its psychopathology; I demonstrate this with reference to existing psychological approaches to moral injury. I note a number of concepts that are clearly relevant to our understanding of moral injury about which philosophy is the most appropriate discipline to provide insight. Having argued for the place of philosophy in the discussion, I conclude by noting some shortcomings of the philosophical method, noting the importance of an interdisciplinary approach.

Perhaps one of the most pressing challenges for today’s military practitioners are the immense numbers of veterans suffering from moral injury, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and other non-physical maladies as a result of their involvement in war. There is growing evidence in philosophical and psychological literature that associates the moral and psychological trauma suffered by veterans with their involvement in acts of "perpetration," most notably, acts of intentional killing against other human beings. For many, it does not matter whether or not the killings they performed were administered permissibly or not. From a psychological perspective, moral justification is only one morally salient factors to consider. Also relevant to the psychological and moral experiences of veterans will be, I contend, the soldier’s intentions: the act of intentionally killing another person contains inherent psychological risks, even when it is justified. Those who believe themselves to have killed another person will be more liable to moral and mental post-war trauma then those who do not. I will turn to the doctrine of double-effect as a framework that, if taught well, can provide moral and psychological defences for military personnel who are required to take another person’s life in the performance of their duties.

In a recent defence of President Truman’s infamous authorisation of nuclear strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Wilson D. Miscamble calls for the moralising of that decision to end, and to replace judgement with “some empathy for the man who felt required to make the decision and who carried the burden of it.”  Although Miscamble correctly identifies the moral burdens of political leadership, there is also a sense in which Miscamble’s defence of Truman glamorises him as the antihero with the moral courage to do what is right, even at the expense of his own private morality.

Supreme emergencies are postulated as cases in which a political leader is duty-bound to sanction conduct in violation of morality. Thus, the political leader is required to transgress against prima facie moral principles based on the demands of necessity. However, there has been a substantial lack of attention dedicated to the moral and psychological implications of such transgressions on the private flourishing of the political leader. Drawing on insights from scholarly literature regarding the moral and psychological trauma of military veterans, I will argue that political leaders faced with Supreme Emergencies are faced with consequences that threaten to decimate their own private opportunities to flourish as human beings.

I will not speculate on whether such consequences amount to an absolute prohibition against transgressing in supreme emergency cases. I will, however, argue that a full appreciation of what political leaders hold personally at stake in such matters will make it less likely than any leader would accept those costs.

In recent years there has been a growing interest in approaches to military ethics that focus on guarding the moral character of soldiers against the horrors they may be required to commit in war. This approach, which Christopher Toner calls the “shield approach”, offers a variety of mechanisms by which soldiers might shape their characters (or have their characters shaped) in ways that reduce their vulnerability to moral corruption; specifically, the likelihood of their committing moral atrocities. Two prominent examples of the shield approach are those of Nancy Sherman and Shannon French. Sherman argues that the inculcation of empathy within soldiers; empathy for the plight and humanity of noncombatants, enemy soldiers, and colleagues, is the best way for soldiers to guard themselves against committing atrocities. French, on the other hand, argues that appealing to a warrior code of honour provides soldiers with an internalised set of beliefs about the type of things that soldiers should and should not do. In this paper I will argue that Sherman’s approach, whilst effective in preventing the killing of noncombatants, will do little to restrain soldier’s passions when the target of those passions is culpable for some wrongdoing (i.e. killing a member of the troop). French’s approach, on the other hand, relies on a soldier seeing himself primarily as a warrior (and thus being governed by the warrior code). The difficulty here is that the soldier’s conduct is governed by what the rest of his peers (fellow warriors) see as laudable or blameworthy.
A better approach, I believe, is revealed to us by Shakespeare in Coriolanus when the protagonist, Caius Marcius, is persuaded against destroying Rome by the exhortations of his mother, who reminds him of the shame he will bring on himself as a son, a husband, a father, and as a Roman. Coriolanus is swayed by the prospect of shame not by fellow soldiers, but by society generally. In a similar vein, this paper will argue for a variant on the shield approach which appeals to the soldiers’ self-identity outside of the military, as well as his role as a warrior. Coriolanus’ eyes are brought to “sweat compassion” out of love for his mother, and his memories of home. This approach is also appealing in that it can be applied more easily to the growing number of military operators who do not fit the warrior archetype, such as drone operators. Thus, soldiers will do well to remember their moral commitments on the “home front”, as well as the expectations of fellow soldiers.

The emergence of cyberwar as a mode of warfare poses a number of challenges to moral appraisals of war. Although elsewhere I have argued that most of the questions provoked by cyberwar can be resolved within the existing framework of just war theory, there do appear to be important moral differences between individuals carrying out acts of cyberwar and soldiers on the battlefield. As well as being governed by principles of jus in bello, warriors tend to see themselves as being bound by a “code of honour”. This code includes values like loyalty, fraternity, courage and obedience, as is central to soldiers’ ability to take pride in a practice which can be morally dubious.
However, as war shifts into the cyber dimension, it is important to ask whether practitioners of “cyberwar” should see the same warrior codes as governing their conduct. Unlike soldiers, these government-employed hackers face no personal risk. Should they be divided into regiments and seen as military personnel, or are they more akin to intelligence agents? In this paper, I will argue that the cyberwarrior must see himself as governed by a different moral code than the soldier, because he faces no personal risk in plying his trade. The cyberwarrior is much more akin to a spy than a soldier, and thus the “cyberwarrior code” should emphasise values such as discretion, creativity and temperance over courage, loyalty and fraternity.

The images of soldiers which are commonly evoked on memorial days commonly include a number of different virtues: courage, loyalty, fraternity, etc. One ideal perhaps extolled above all others is that of sacrifice. Soldiers, according to popular moral platitudes, are lauded for the sacrifices they make for the common good. Implied in this is the expectation that soldiers ought to be the type of people who are willing to sacrifice themselves in defence of an ideal. However, within modern formulations of just war theory – the most popular framework for morally evaluating war – sacrifice is difficult to explain or justify. Why should a solider be expected to risk his life for that of somebody else? This is particularly complex in cases where soldiers might be asked to take on increased levels of personal risk in order to reduce the chance of civilian casualties in wartime and in cases where forgiveness appears necessary in the interests of peace. In this paper I will argue that the problem of sacrifice highlights a problem in formulations of just war theory which emphasise moral rights above other moral values. I argue that modern just war theories would be better equipped to explain the morality of sacrifice by seeing it as a function of virtue.

The modern soldier is faced with a complex moral and psychological landscape. As Nancy Sherman puts it, "soldiers go to war to fight external enemies ... but most fight inner wars as well."  The modern soldier is no longer simply a warrior: he (or she) is at once a peacekeeper, diplomat, leader, sibling and friend.
In the face of such challenges, some responsible for the teaching of soldiers have endeavoured to incorporate a character-based training program for soldiers; designed to develop virtues which will assist soldiers in fulfilling the multiple roles required of them.  However, these training programs are stymied by the dearth of virtue-based discussion within the most influential guide to the moral conduct of soldiers, Just War Theory (JWT). JWT remains a primarily deontic, system in which rights, duties and law are generally perceived as the most important considerations. Virtue ethics has a great deal to offer both JWT and military education programs.
However, earlier instantiations of JWT had in mind a specific role for the virtues in the conduct of just war; the virtues were indeed the foundation of JWT. This approach saw the type of actions a soldier or political leader was likely to perform as intimately linked to the type of person that soldier or leader was. The best guarantee of just warfare, therefore, was to ensure it was fought by just men and women.
In the first section of this paper I will describe JWT as overwhelmingly rights-interested, and argue that the omission of virtue discussion from JWT is historically inconsistent with the origins of JWT and both a serious problem for the moral theory itself, and for the actual practice of soldiering.  A virtue ethics approach to JWT will be shown to serve the basis of the modern-day deontic approach by giving deeper meaning to the rights, laws and duties it espouses; as well as complimenting the deontic theory by providing a suitable psychological explanation of the best circumstances for adherence to its requirements. 
In the second section I will review a number of examples of virtue-based educational methods suggested for military education. These approaches, the best of which focus on enabling capacities such as autonomy, responsibility and critical thinking, will be shown to be easily complemented by the liberal arts approach to education's formative interest in the development of moral and intellectual virtues within its students. A broad, liberal arts-inspired education would facilitate the moral virtues and thus encourage greater rule adherence; and by fostering intellectual virtues, empower soldiers to seriously consider the justice of the causes for which they fight.

The moral legitimacy of preventive war has been perhaps the most serious debate in military ethics over the past decade. Following the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2002, serious questions begun to be asked about the legitimacy of a type of action which was, until then, generally agreed to be unjust.
Here I want to suggest that the ongoing debate between preventive war supporters and deniers can be usefully examined through the dual lenses of liberty and risk. How much risk ought a state to tolerate, or be required to tolerate, before a military response is justifiable? In what follows, I will argue that states are required to accept a degree of risk as a necessary effect of state liberty, and deny the morality of preventive war. However, I will note that the case of WMDs might require certain policies be put in place in order to mitigate that risk.

St. Augustine's Just War Theory is relatively unique in the history of just war in that he relies heavily on Divine involvement in his doctrine of just war. God is the ultimate source of the justice of all wars, and his command is the source of justice for some wars. Furthermore, the authority of political leaders is also derived from God. This is problematic for Augustine's theory because it renders the causa justa of wars inexpressible to the subjects of the sovereign, who are forced to rely on the sovereign's (divinely originated) authority. Although these ideas may seem a long way from the state-of-affairs in war today, I will suggest that notions like the privilege of state secrecy, the implied expertise of political leaders, and the coercive power of patriotism represent new manifestations of the inexpressibility of the Divine in the modern-day practice of warfare.

Human relationships have always held a unique position in moral philosophy, particularly in eudaemonist ethics, where they are considered by most to be essential to “the good life”. However, this fact has made conceptualising the good life in purely individualistic terms difficult, due to the important role that the ‘other’ plays in any kind of relationship. In this paper I argue that the fragile relationship between self and other that exists in all human relationships – but especially in more meaningful ones – can be best understood by considering it to be a kind of luck.

In developing this account I look closely at the nature of human relationships, using Aristotle’s account of friendship as a model. From this I argue that friendship consists of two virtues working in reciprocity in two persons. Finally, I explain how this reciprocity can be understood as luck, and how recognising that a particular type of luck, dependence luck, is inherent to relationships can in fact help to foster the virtues that allow a person to participate in those relationships.

One of the more common questions arising in areas of political and media ethics today is ‘are the public entitled to know of the private activities of public figures?’ As the media continue to push the boundaries of privacy, and as the rise of social media permits anybody with a camera phone and internet access to expose a person’s behaviour to the world, the question is constantly asked: how much of a public figures life should be public knowledge? However, whilst this question is important, the focus that it has been given has, in my opinion, undermined another important question associated with the public exposition of a person’s behaviour: the psychological ramifications it can have on an individual. In this paper I will discuss, with reference to a number of recent ‘public outings’ of behaviour, the moral dimension of guilt, and how social perception and guilt can affect self-perception in a way that can be damaging to the individual who is the subject of it. Informed by this account, I will examine whether, where the publicising of private activity is argued to be a call to a ‘higher standard’ for the character of public figures,  such a call is successful, given the overwhelming change to self-perception that can manifest as a result of public shaming. As such, this paper will be an evaluation of whether the media can be considered to play a moral-pedagogical function in society, or whether the publicising of private activity represents an unethical crippling of a public figure’s moral-psychological wellbeing and self-perception.

There are a myriad opportunities presented by biomedical human enhancement of military ​forces, and recognition of this has prompted substantial research and limited implementation of some forms of medical enhancement by various military organisations. These include ethical advantages, where enhancement might reduce unethical conduct during war.

However, as with most emerging technologies, it would be reckless to pursue these opportunities without first identifying the ethical risks such interventions may pose. Not only can these undermine the ethical advantages of enhancement, but they may lead to reputational crises which stymie further research and development. Here, I outline a few of the (not insurmountable) risks posed by enhancement and suggest some avenues of safeguarding against them.

In recent years there has been a growing interest in approaches to military ethics that focus on guarding the moral character of soldiers against the horrors they may be required to commit in war. This approach, which Christopher Toner calls the “shield approach”, offers a variety of mechanisms by which soldiers might shape their characters (or have their characters shaped) in ways that reduce their vulnerability to moral corruption; specifically, the likelihood of their committing moral atrocities. Two prominent examples of the shield approach are those of Nancy Sherman and Shannon French. Sherman argues that the inculcation of empathy within soldiers; empathy for the plight and humanity of noncombatants, enemy soldiers, and colleagues, is the best way for soldiers to guard themselves against committing atrocities. French, on the other hand, argues that appealing to a warrior code of honour provides soldiers with an internalised set of beliefs about the type of things that soldiers should and should not do. In this paper I will argue that Sherman’s approach, whilst effective in preventing the killing of noncombatants, will do little to restrain soldier’s passions when the target of those passions is culpable for some wrongdoing (i.e. killing a member of the troop). French’s approach, on the other hand, relies on a soldier seeing himself primarily as a warrior (and thus being governed by the warrior code). The difficulty here is that the soldier’s conduct is governed by what the rest of his peers (fellow warriors) see as laudable or blameworthy.
A better approach, I believe, is revealed to us by Shakespeare in Coriolanus when the protagonist, Caius Marcius, is persuaded against destroying Rome by the exhortations of his mother, who reminds him of the shame he will bring on himself as a son, a husband, a father, and as a Roman. Coriolanus is swayed by the prospect of shame not by fellow soldiers, but by society generally. In a similar vein, this paper will argue for a variant on the shield approach which appeals to the soldiers’ self-identity outside of the military, as well as his role as a warrior. Coriolanus’ eyes are brought to “sweat compassion” out of love for his mother, and his memories of home. This approach is also appealing in that it can be applied more easily to the growing number of military operators who do not fit the warrior archetype, such as drone operators. Thus, soldiers will do well to remember their moral commitments on the “home front”, as well as the expectations of fellow soldiers.

The overwhelming majority of theorists addressing questions of the morality of war do so from within the moral framework provided by Just War Theory (JWT): a normative account of war that dates back over 1500 years in the Western Tradition. However, today’s iterations of Just War Theory are markedly different from those of its intellectual ancestors. Specifically, today’s accounts tend not to consider matters of moral virtue, personal excellence, moral psychology, or human flourishing – that is, aretaic matters – to be worthy subjects of discussion. Instead, they prefer to focus overtly on questions of law, justice, and human rights – deontological questions – as if they were the entire purview of a comprehensive morality of war.

I explore some of the major theorists in the history of Western JWT, showing that the ancestors of today’s just war theories did consider aretaic matters – in particular the moral virtues – to be of central importance to the morality of war. I also show how and why it came to be that deontological and aretaic discussions became fragmented in contemporary JWT.

In order to demonstrate how this fragmentation is problematic, I consider deontological ethics’ connection to aretaic ethics. I explain how contemporary JWT tends to conceptualise rights, emphasising the central place of intention in those theories. I show how aretaic ethics can enrich deontological appraisals of ongoing debates in military ethics.

Finally, I make a positive case for aretaic ethics by identifying new questions that aretaic ethics reveals to JWT, those being: the complexity of the identity of soldiers, how moral character and identity can help prevent moral transgressions, and the moral and psychological trauma suffered by many soldiers and veterans. I argue that aretaic modes of thinking help to explain moral transgressions of soldiers and the psychological difficulties that veterans can experience post-war.

Deontological and aretaic ethics also interact in the three professions most relevant to waging war: soldiers, commanders, and political leaders. I show how the virtues are necessary character traits in order to guarantee that warfighters and their political leaders can be relied on to fulfil their professional duties. Aretaic ethical analysis is also able to provide conceptual understanding of supererogatory actions.

Contemporary just war theorists would be wise to re-integrate aretaic ethics into their considerations of the morality of war. Aretaic ethics can be combined seamlessly and productively with deontological ethics, yielding more robust and intelligible responses to the most pressing controversies facing military ethics today. Rights and deontology present crucial elements of the ethics war, but they can be ably complemented by insights from aretaic ethics; specifically, matters of character and the moral development of the agent. Furthermore, incorporating aretaic ethics into JWT enables theorists to utilise that framework to consider matters currently outside of its purview, but which are of growing relevance to military practice.