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New article on Kierkegaard in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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The aim of this paper is to make sense of cases of apparent nonsense in the writings of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. Against commentators such as Cora Diamond and James Conant, we argue that, in the case of Wittgenstein, recognising such... more
The aim of this paper is to make sense of cases of apparent nonsense in the writings of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. Against commentators such as Cora Diamond and James Conant, we argue that, in the case of Wittgenstein, recognising such a category of nonsense is necessary in order to understand the development of his thought. In the case of Kierkegaard, we argue against the view that the notion of the ‘absolute paradox’ of the Christian incarnation is intended to be nonsensical. However, we recognise that Kierkegaard’s discussion of Christianity uses a similar methodology to a Wittgensteinian grammatical investigation. We maintain that by making sense of their respective views on nonsense and paradox we are able more fully to appreciate their positions on, and approaches to, ethics and religion.
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Objectives: 1.Introduce Fear and Trembling within the context of Kierkegaard’s wider authorship. 2. Identify the pseudonymous author of the book and suggest some additional complicationsthat this introduces for understanding it. 3.... more
Objectives:
1.Introduce Fear and Trembling within the context of Kierkegaard’s wider authorship.
2. Identify the pseudonymous author of the book and suggest some additional complicationsthat this introduces for understanding it.
3. Explain the main themes and structure of the book.
4. Outline some of the main concerns of each section.
1.Introduce Fear and Trembling within the context of Kierkegaard’s wider authorship.
2. Identify the pseudonymous author of the book and suggest some additional complicationsthat this introduces for understanding it.
3. Explain the main themes and structure of the book.
4. Outline some of the main concerns of each section.
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This chapter sketches some central features of Kierkegaard's discussion of forgiveness. It focuses on the relationship between the divine forgiveness of sins and interpersonal forgiveness between human beings; the difficulties of... more
This chapter sketches some central features of Kierkegaard's discussion of forgiveness. It focuses on the relationship between the divine forgiveness of sins and interpersonal forgiveness between human beings; the difficulties of accepting, as well as offering, forgiveness; and the importance of love to our understanding of forgiveness. Neighbour-love incorporates, for Kierkegaard, a certain way of seeing the other, which highlights the need for certain other virtues or spiritual qualities, such as generosity of spirit, humility and hope. Kierkegaard, I suggest, is interested in what it means to be a forgiving person, as an aspect of what it means to be a loving person. The chapter also summarises some secondary literature on Kierkegaard and forgiveness published in recent years.
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In this chapter, I argue that part of the answer to the problem of worry is to be found in a certain view of humility: one that can be teased out from several Kierkegaardian discourses, and which has recently been gaining increasing... more
In this chapter, I argue that part of the answer to the problem of worry is to be found in a certain view of humility: one that can be teased out from several Kierkegaardian discourses, and which has recently been gaining increasing support—from both philosophers and psychologists—against competing views of humility. Humility is understood not in terms of self-abasement, underestimating oneself, or being ignorant of one’s good qualities, but rather in terms of being focused on others and sources of value besides oneself: thinking not less of oneself, but thinking less about oneself. Exploring the centrality of future-oriented worries to Kierkegaard’s lily and bird discourses in particular, I argue that such worries often stem from excessive, debilitating self-absorption, which the variety of humility sketched here enables us to avoid. I aim to show how this conception of humility addresses questions such as how those of impressive achievements may nevertheless remain humble, and why its relative lack of self-focus does not rule out the possibility of self-improvement.
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Abstract of recent article in Philosophy and Literature. Currently available for open access download here: https://muse.jhu.edu/article/728542 Abstract What does it take to forgive oneself? I argue that reflection on Briony... more
Abstract of recent article in Philosophy and Literature. Currently available for open access download here:
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/728542
Abstract
What does it take to forgive oneself? I argue that reflection on Briony Tallis in Ian McEwan’s Atonement can help us understand two key aspects of self-forgiveness. First, she illustrates an unorthodox conception of humility that, I argue, aids the process of responsible self-forgiveness. Second, she fleshes out a self-forgiveness that includes continued self-reproach. While Briony illustrates elements of the self-absorption about which critics of continued self-reproach (such as Margaret Holmgren) are rightly concerned, she also shows a way of getting beyond this, such that the delicate balance between self-forgiveness and self-condemnation is upheld. Atonement also shows the significance for the task of self-forgiveness of a particular kind of narrative continuity.
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/728542
Abstract
What does it take to forgive oneself? I argue that reflection on Briony Tallis in Ian McEwan’s Atonement can help us understand two key aspects of self-forgiveness. First, she illustrates an unorthodox conception of humility that, I argue, aids the process of responsible self-forgiveness. Second, she fleshes out a self-forgiveness that includes continued self-reproach. While Briony illustrates elements of the self-absorption about which critics of continued self-reproach (such as Margaret Holmgren) are rightly concerned, she also shows a way of getting beyond this, such that the delicate balance between self-forgiveness and self-condemnation is upheld. Atonement also shows the significance for the task of self-forgiveness of a particular kind of narrative continuity.
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What difference would it make to our understanding of the process of interpersonal forgiveness to treat it as what Kierkegaard calls a ‘work of love’? In this article, I argue that such an approach – which I label ‘love’s forgiveness’ -... more
What difference would it make to our understanding of the process of interpersonal forgiveness to treat it as what Kierkegaard calls a ‘work of love’? In this article, I argue that such an approach – which I label ‘love’s forgiveness’ - challenges key assumptions in two prominent philosophical accounts of forgiveness. First, it challenges ‘desert-based’ views, according to which forgiveness at its best is ‘conditional’ upon such features as the wrongdoer’s repentance and making amends. But second, it also avoids legitimate worries raised against some forms of ‘unconditional’ forgiveness (such as Derrida’s claim that true forgiveness can forgive only ‘the unforgivable’). I argue that ‘love’s forgiveness’ neither endorses the Derridean view, nor communicates to the wrongdoer that no judgement is being made on her action. ‘Love’s vision’, I argue, has a crucial role to play in interpersonal forgiveness. I consider the objection that viewing forgiveness as a work of love is problematic because love involves a certain wilful blindness. Drawing on both Kierkegaard and some contemporary work in the philosophy of love, I examine Troy Jollimore’s argument that love has epistemic standards of its own, further arguing that in the relevant respects claims about romantic love and friendship can be extended to the case of agapic love of neighbour. By developing this view in relation to several key sections of Kierkegaard’s Works of Love, I show the importance of understanding ‘love’s forgiveness’ in the light of other virtues, especially hope and humility.
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In recent years, a growing body of work has connected Kierkegaard with discussions of the virtues. But how do these virtue terms hang together, for Kierkegaard? Part of the answer is obvious, insofar as most such ‘Kierkegaardian virtues’... more
In recent years, a growing body of work has connected Kierkegaard with discussions of the virtues. But how do these virtue terms hang together, for Kierkegaard? Part of the answer is obvious, insofar as most such ‘Kierkegaardian virtues’ are either expressions of, or in some other way related to, faith. But can we say more than this? In this paper, inspired by an approach taken by Robert C. Roberts in his Spiritual Emotions, I explore the prospects for understanding three such notions - contentment, patience and hope - as rooted in underlying attitudes of humility and gratitude. I explore what kind of humility and gratitude is in play, before going on to consider how these attitudes might support that species of contentment that seems integral to Kierkegaard’s discourses on the lilies and the birds. How, in turn, might this give rise to patience and hope, and of what sort? The paper thus seeks to sketch something of the internal dynamics of the relations between several virtue-terms including how, for Kierkegaard, they are all rooted in an image of God as He who forgives.
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Throughout his authorship, Kierkegaard shows an intense fascination with Socrates and Socratic self-knowledge. This chapter will trace, in roughly chronological order: (1) the young Kierkegaard’s autobiographical reflections on... more
Throughout his authorship, Kierkegaard shows an intense fascination with Socrates and Socratic self-knowledge. This chapter will trace, in roughly chronological order: (1) the young Kierkegaard’s autobiographical reflections on self-knowledge, when first coming to understand his task as an author; (2) Socrates as a negative figure in The Concept of Irony - where self-knowledge is understood in terms of separation from others and the surrounding society - and the contrast with the Concluding Unscientific Postscript’s treatment of Socrates as an exemplary “subjective thinker”; (3) in Either/Or, the connection between self-knowledge and self-transparency, and the link between self-knowledge and “choosing oneself”, understood as willing receptivity; (4) in writings such as The Concept of Anxiety and The Sickness Unto Death, the importance of sin and our utter dependence upon God for the question of whether self-knowledge is ever really possible; and (5) in Judge for Yourself! and related journal entries, a more precise specification of what Christian self-knowledge might amount to.
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[A later version of this paper appears in Manu Bazzano and Julie Webb (eds) Therapy and the Counter-Tradition (Routledge, 2016).] Why should therapists read Søren Kierkegaard? In our largely secular age, in which the latest generation... more
[A later version of this paper appears in Manu Bazzano and Julie Webb (eds) Therapy and the Counter-Tradition (Routledge, 2016).]
Why should therapists read Søren Kierkegaard? In our largely secular age, in which the latest generation of religion’s ‘cultured despisers’ often seem to speak for the cultural mainstream, what has psychotherapy to learn from an unorthodox nineteenth century Lutheran with an uncompromising view of the importance of a proper ‘God-relationship’? There can be no denying the influence of Kierkegaard on important psychotherapeutic figures as diverse as Ludwig Binswanger, Rollo May, Carl Rogers, R. D. Laing and Ernest Becker. His insightful diagnoses of anxiety and despair have been a significant influence, via Heidegger, on existential psychotherapy. As one therapist recently told me, Kierkegaard is a source of great insight provided we ‘ignore the religious stuff’. Yet therapists who insist on taking their Kierkegaard safely secularised are missing a trick. In this article, I shall argue that it is in some of his lesser known, explicitly ‘religious’ writings, that Kierkegaard offers some of his most important insights for therapeutic practice. I have argued elsewhere that Kierkegaard offers a rich conception of ‘proper self-love’ that I believe has important implications for therapy. Central to this account is the application to ourselves of the trust, hope and forgiveness that are central to his accounts of love of God and neighbour. But here I shall concentrate primarily on a perhaps surprising theme from this famous diagnostician of anxiety and despair: what the reflections on ‘the lilies and the birds’ in Kierkegaard’s ‘upbuilding’ discourses can teach us about contentment and self-acceptance and their relation to gratitude and patience.
Why should therapists read Søren Kierkegaard? In our largely secular age, in which the latest generation of religion’s ‘cultured despisers’ often seem to speak for the cultural mainstream, what has psychotherapy to learn from an unorthodox nineteenth century Lutheran with an uncompromising view of the importance of a proper ‘God-relationship’? There can be no denying the influence of Kierkegaard on important psychotherapeutic figures as diverse as Ludwig Binswanger, Rollo May, Carl Rogers, R. D. Laing and Ernest Becker. His insightful diagnoses of anxiety and despair have been a significant influence, via Heidegger, on existential psychotherapy. As one therapist recently told me, Kierkegaard is a source of great insight provided we ‘ignore the religious stuff’. Yet therapists who insist on taking their Kierkegaard safely secularised are missing a trick. In this article, I shall argue that it is in some of his lesser known, explicitly ‘religious’ writings, that Kierkegaard offers some of his most important insights for therapeutic practice. I have argued elsewhere that Kierkegaard offers a rich conception of ‘proper self-love’ that I believe has important implications for therapy. Central to this account is the application to ourselves of the trust, hope and forgiveness that are central to his accounts of love of God and neighbour. But here I shall concentrate primarily on a perhaps surprising theme from this famous diagnostician of anxiety and despair: what the reflections on ‘the lilies and the birds’ in Kierkegaard’s ‘upbuilding’ discourses can teach us about contentment and self-acceptance and their relation to gratitude and patience.
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In her highly critical account of Harry Frankfurt's account of self-love (in this volume), Sylvia Walsh presents Kierkegaard’s Christian view as a corrective to Frankfurt’s naturalistic account. Walsh criticises Frankfurt for lacking a... more
In her highly critical account of Harry Frankfurt's account of self-love (in this volume), Sylvia Walsh presents Kierkegaard’s Christian view as a corrective to Frankfurt’s naturalistic account. Walsh criticises Frankfurt for lacking a concept of self-denial, and this notion is central to the view of self-love she finds in Kierkegaard. In this paper, I argue that while Frankfurt’s account of self-love certainly warrants criticism, it does bring to light some key points that can be brought to bear on how we may best understand Kierkegaard’s view of proper self-love. First, we can see from Frankfurt’s account how love – not just of oneself, but also of others - entails commitment, and that such commitment requires an appropriate relation to oneself. Further, Frankfurt shows clearly how self-love necessarily points outside the self and how love can involve self-interest without being based upon it in a ‘merely selfish’ way. For Frankfurt, love involves caring about the good of the person or thing loved for their own sake. So in self-love, I care about the good of myself for my own sake. This reminder – phrased in more Christian terminology, that I am a ‘neighbour’ too – gives an important standard against which accounts of Kierkegaardian self-love should be measured. It is, I argue, a problem for accounts which would have us put too much emphasis on self-denial. There is, on these matters, a more moderate – more loving? - Kierkegaard, and his voice should be heard. While it is true that Kierkegaard describes self-denial as ‘Christianity’s essential form’, there are other things he says which qualify this. In the final section, I’ll point out the relevance for oneself of his focus on trust and hope, and his insistence on the importance of accepting that one’s sins are forgiven, and the self-forgiveness consequent upon this.
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Kierkegaard’s work contains rich discussions of several virtue-terms: faith; courage; trust; patience; gratitude; humility; hope. Several recent interpretations of Fear and Trembling have connected Abraham’s faith with some related such... more
Kierkegaard’s work contains rich discussions of several virtue-terms: faith; courage; trust; patience; gratitude; humility; hope. Several recent interpretations of Fear and Trembling have connected Abraham’s faith with some related such terms: for instance, a series of recent articles by John J. Davenport has treated faith as “eschatological trust”, while Clare Carlisle places courage centre-stage. I find myself increasingly attracted to the “faith as eschatological trust” reading. My purpose here is to try to complement Davenport’s account, by putting more emphasis than is typical on the role of hope in Abraham’s faith. (Although it plays a significant role in the eschatological trust interpretation, Davenport does not discuss hope in detail.) I aim to flesh this out by reading Fear and Trembling against the background of the 1843 discourse “The expectancy of faith”, one of the discourses in which – as both Robert C. Roberts and William McDonald have noted - Kierkegaard discusses the concept of hope in most detail. Then, after a brief outline of the “eschatological trust” reading of Fear and Trembling, I’ll discuss two possible objections thereto, arising from “The expectancy of faith”. Both, I’ll suggest, can be resisted. The second can be addressed by comparing Abraham’s hope with the “radical hope” discussed by Jonathan Lear in his book of that title. This reading seeks to clarify, in more detail than hitherto, the importance of hope in existential faith. It will also throw some light on what Johannes de silentio calls “the courage of faith”, and why he describes that courage as “humble”.
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This short paper is scheduled to appear as one of the entries in a book series on Kierkegaard's Concepts (part of the multi-volume Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources series). In line with the house style, it opens with... more
This short paper is scheduled to appear as one of the entries in a book series on Kierkegaard's Concepts (part of the multi-volume Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources series). In line with the house style, it opens with a brief discussion of the etymology of the Danish terms Tilgivelse and Forladelse, before moving on to a discussion of how Kierkegaard addresses the theme of forgiveness - with continual reference to the forgiveness of sins - throughout his authorship. In line with the purposes of the volume, the focus is on exegesis rather than critique.
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What kind of a therapist is Kierkegaard? In this brief response to Helle Møller Jensen & George Pattison's rendering of some of Kierkegaard's Upbuilding Discourses as dialogues, I shall approach this question by looking at a major form of... more
What kind of a therapist is Kierkegaard? In this brief response to Helle Møller Jensen & George Pattison's rendering of some of Kierkegaard's Upbuilding Discourses as dialogues, I shall approach this question by looking at a major form of contemporary psychotherapy that claims Kierkegaard as an influence. Carl Rogers’ ‘person-centred’ approach is one of the most commonly practiced forms of contemporary psychotherapy. I shall argue that what Kierkegaard offers is something essentially different from Rogers' approach. In fact, I argue, Rogers’ position ultimately rests on assumptions that manifest a version of what Kierkegaard calls the ‘despair of defiance’. I consider the view of the self and its autonomy presupposed by Rogers’ approach, and compare this view with that of Anti-Climacus, the pseudonym under which Kierkegaard wrote The Sickness Unto Death. While finding something admirable about person-centred therapy’s trust in its clients, I thus raise some Kierkegaard-inspired questions about this trust. And I close by briefly considering how, both in the dialogues presented here and in the therapeutic relationship, a kind of ‘indirect communication’ may be at work.
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"Kierkegaard’s Works of Love has often been accused of being unable to deal adequately with ‘special relationships’. This debate has re-emerged in a fresh form in a recent disagreement in the secondary literature between M. Jamie Ferreira... more
"Kierkegaard’s Works of Love has often been accused of being unable to deal adequately with ‘special relationships’. This debate has re-emerged in a fresh form in a recent disagreement in the secondary literature between M. Jamie Ferreira and Sharon Krishek. Krishek charges Ferreira with failing to acknowledge some important conflicts in Kierkegaard’s account of preferential love. In this article, I argue that some key passages are indeed insufficiently addressed in Ferreira’s account. Yet ultimately, I argue, Krishek ends up condemning the Kierkegaard of Works of Love unfairly. As a solution to Krishek’s concerns, I present a defence of Kierkegaard’s position centred round the image of God as a ‘filter’ through which our loves must pass. Also, while acknowledging that Krishek raises some important questions for Ferreira’s account, I outline a possible response, based in part on Kierkegaard’s idea that neighbour love is only a ‘sketch’ until brought to fruition in any given manifestation of concrete love. Ultimately, I claim, Kierkegaard’s position in Works of Love can indeed be defended from Krishek’s critique.
Keywords: God, Kierkegaard, neighbour-love, preferential love, self-love."
Keywords: God, Kierkegaard, neighbour-love, preferential love, self-love."
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Citation: Lippitt, J 2010,'Irony and humour in the Postscript', in RA Furtak (ed.), Kierkegaard's' Concluding Unscientific Postscript': A Critical Guide Cambridge Critical Guides, CAMBRIDGE... more
Citation: Lippitt, J 2010,'Irony and humour in the Postscript', in RA Furtak (ed.), Kierkegaard's' Concluding Unscientific Postscript': A Critical Guide Cambridge Critical Guides, CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS, Cambridge, pp. 149-169.
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In a mini-project funded by the Subject Centre for Philosophical and Religious Studies, we reviewed the educational literature on peer support and used focus groups to explore students’ ideas of academic and critical friendship. We report... more
In a mini-project funded by the Subject Centre for Philosophical and Religious Studies, we reviewed the educational literature on peer support and used focus groups to explore students’ ideas of academic and critical friendship. We report on our findings, make some connections with philosophical writing on friendship, and offer some steps that institutions might take to foster academically fecund friendships among philosophy students.
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In recent commentary on Kierkegaard’s Works of Love , a distinction is commonly drawn between ‘proper’ and ‘selfish’ forms of self-love. In arguing that not all vices of self-focus can be captured under the heading of selfishness, I seek... more
In recent commentary on Kierkegaard’s Works of Love , a distinction is commonly drawn between ‘proper’ and ‘selfish’ forms of self-love. In arguing that not all vices of self-focus can be captured under the heading of selfishness, I seek to distinguish selfishness from self-centredness. But the latter vice has a far more handsome cousin: proper self-focus of the kind necessary for ‘becoming a self’. As various feminist thinkers
have argued, this will be missed if we valorise self-sacrifice too uncritically. But nor need the latter concept be ditched. By distinguishing varieties of self-sacrifice, we can see the importance of avoiding the all too easy slide from proper self-sacrifice to outright self-annihilation. And we can discover that this avoidance is aided by recognising a kind of pride as part of true self-love.
have argued, this will be missed if we valorise self-sacrifice too uncritically. But nor need the latter concept be ditched. By distinguishing varieties of self-sacrifice, we can see the importance of avoiding the all too easy slide from proper self-sacrifice to outright self-annihilation. And we can discover that this avoidance is aided by recognising a kind of pride as part of true self-love.
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In a mini-project funded by the Subject Centre for Philosophical and Religious Studies, we used focus groups to explore students’ answers to six questions, including their reasons for going to university and their views of the purpose of... more
In a mini-project funded by the Subject Centre for Philosophical and Religious Studies, we used focus groups to explore students’ answers to six questions, including their reasons for going to university and their views of the purpose of higher education. Particular surprises were the invisibility of research to students and the depth of disagreement about the value of seminars. But most significant was the consequence of the dramatic decline in contact hours on arrival at university. Students found it difficult to form supportive study relationships. They also seem unclear about the distinction between collaboration and collusion. We end, therefore, by suggesting that learning and teaching practice needs to be illuminated by reflections on critical friendship.
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Though there are significant points of overlap between Michelle Kosch’s reading of Fear and Trembling and my own, this paper focuses primarily on a significant difference: the legitimacy or otherwise of looking to paradigmatic exemplars... more
Though there are significant points of overlap between Michelle Kosch’s reading of Fear and Trembling and my own, this paper focuses primarily on a significant difference: the legitimacy or otherwise of looking to paradigmatic exemplars of faith in order to understand faith. I argue that Kosch’s reading threatens to underplay the importance of exemplarity in Kierkegaard’s thought, and that there is good reason to resist her use of Philosophical Fragments as the key to interpreting the ‘hidden message’ of Fear and Trembling. Key to both claims is the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. I also briefly sketch an alternative reading of the ‘hidden message’, one in which Kierkegaard’s Christian commitments play a notably different role.
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In this article, I offer a brief account of some of Kierkegaard’s key concerns about friendship: its “preferential” nature and its being a form of self-love. Kierkegaard’s endorsement of the ancient idea of the friend as “second self”... more
In this article, I offer a brief account of some of Kierkegaard’s key concerns about friendship: its “preferential” nature and its being a form of self-love. Kierkegaard’s endorsement of the ancient idea of the friend as “second self” involves a common but misguided assumption: that friendship depends largely upon likeness between friends. This focus obscures a vitally important element, highlighted by the so-called “drawing” view of friendship. Once this is emphasized, we can see a significant aspect - though by no means all - of Kierkegaard’s worry as misplaced. However, the “drawing” view also enables us to begin to see what a “Kierkegaardian” friendship might look like.
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As part of the widespread turn to narrative in contemporary philosophy, several commentators have recently attempted to sign Kierkegaard up for the narrative cause, most notably in John Davenport and Anthony Rudd's recent collection... more
As part of the widespread turn to narrative in contemporary philosophy, several commentators have recently attempted to sign Kierkegaard up for the narrative cause, most notably in John Davenport and Anthony Rudd's recent collection Kierkegaard After MacIntyre: Essays on Freedom, Narrative and Virtue. I argue that the aesthetic and ethical existence‐spheres in Either/Or cannot adequately be distinguished in terms of the MacIntyre‐inspired notion of ‘narrative unity’. Judge William's argument for the ethical life contains far more in the way of substantive normative content than can be encapsulated by the idea of ‘narrative unity’, and the related idea that narratives confer intelligibility will not enable us to distinguish Kierkegaardian aesthetes from Kierkegaardian ethicists. ‘MacIntyrean Kierkegaardians’ also take insufficient notice of further problems with MacIntyre's talk of ‘narrative unity’, such as his failure to distinguish between literary narratives and the ‘enacted dramatic narratives’ of which he claims our lives consist; the lack of clarity in the idea of a ‘whole life’; and the threat of self‐deception. Finally, against the connections that have been drawn between Kierkegaardian choice and Harry Frankfurt's work on volitional identification, I show something of the dangers involved in putting too much stress on unity and wholeheartedness.
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This article investigates the concept of ‘narrative unity’ as used by recent commentators such as John Davenport. I argue that it is unclear what this term means, and that the ‘narrative unity’ view faces a serious problem:... more
This article investigates the concept of ‘narrative unity’ as used by recent commentators such as John Davenport. I argue that it is unclear what this term means, and that the ‘narrative unity’ view faces a serious problem: self-deception. Moreover, if we ask whether a pseudonym’s life possesses ‘narrative unity’, further problems emerge, as the Johannes Climacus case highlights. Davenport assigns a key role to ‘earnestness’. Yet Climacus and others insist true earnestness involves a unity of earnestness and jest. Considering this enables us to see something of the importance for Kierkegaard of a sense of humour in a virtuous life.
Robert C. Roberts has argued that a sense of humour can be a moral virtue. I show how such a claim is rooted in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and - drawing on Aristotle and Kierkegaard - explore what features a ‘virtuous’ sense of humour... more
Robert C. Roberts has argued that a sense of humour can be a moral virtue. I show how such a claim is rooted in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and - drawing on Aristotle and Kierkegaard - explore what features a ‘virtuous’ sense of humour would need to possess. I support Roberts’ view that certain forms of moral wisdom are partially constituted by the possession of a certain kind of sense of humour, and that exposure to such can be a useful tool in moral education. But it does not follow from this that such a sense of humour is a distinct virtue. I also criticise Roberts’ claim that a sense of humour needs to be accompanied by compassion and hope to count as ‘virtuous’, and aim to show how humour lacking such qualities can play a role of vital ethical importance, such as fostering the self-recognition upon which self-knowledge depends.
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ON AUTHORITY AND REVOCATION: CLIMACUS AS HUMORIST John Lippitt University of Hertfordshire Just as in ... finds a note at the back of the book that notifies the reader that everything ... cases, since Conant quotes from the older... more
ON AUTHORITY AND REVOCATION: CLIMACUS AS HUMORIST John Lippitt University of Hertfordshire Just as in ... finds a note at the back of the book that notifies the reader that everything ... cases, since Conant quotes from the older translation by David F. Swenson and Walter ...
This paper investigates Johannes Climacus''s infamous satire against Hegelianism in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. In considering why Climacus aims to show speculative thought as comical rather than simply mistaken, it is argued... more
This paper investigates Johannes Climacus''s infamous satire against Hegelianism in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. In considering why Climacus aims to show speculative thought as comical rather than simply mistaken, it is argued that Climacus sees the need for the comic as a vital form of ''indirect communication.'' The thinker who approaches ethical and religious questions in an inappropriately ''objective'' manner is in the grip of an illusion which can only be dispelled by his coming to see his own confusion, and satire (as well as other forms of the comic) can be a more effective weapon in dispelling such illusions than can more ''direct'' forms of critical argument. Moreover, it is argued that the ''Hegelian'' is not simply a figure at whom Climacus''s readers are invited to scoff. Rather, we are intended to see ourselves as prone to the same kind of confusions and evasions. Thus Climacus''s ostensibly anti-Hegelian satire is itself a form of indirect communication which, if we do see how it rebounds upon ourselves, serves a vital ethical-religious purpose.
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The aim of this paper is to make sense of cases of apparent nonsense in the writings of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. Against commentators such as Cora Diamond and James Conant, we argue that, in the case of Wittgenstein, recognizing such... more
The aim of this paper is to make sense of cases of apparent nonsense in the writings of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. Against commentators such as Cora Diamond and James Conant, we argue that, in the case of Wittgenstein, recognizing such a category of nonsense is necessary in order to understand the development of his thought. In the case of Kierkegaard, we argue against the view that the notion of the 'absolute paradox' of the Christian incarnation is intended to be nonsensical. However, we recognize that Kierkegaard's discussion of Christianity uses a similar methodology to a Wittgensteinian grammatical investigation. We maintain that by making sense of their respective views on nonsense we are able more fully to appreciate their positions on, and approaches to, ethics and religion.
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The aim of this paper is to make sense of cases of apparent nonsense in the writings of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. Against commentators such as Cora Diamond and James Conant, we argue that, in the case of Wittgenstein, recognizing such... more
The aim of this paper is to make sense of cases of apparent nonsense in the writings of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. Against commentators such as Cora Diamond and James Conant, we argue that, in the case of Wittgenstein, recognizing such a category of nonsense is necessary in order to understand the development of his thought. In the case of Kierkegaard, we argue against the view that the notion of the 'absolute paradox' of the Christian incarnation is intended to be nonsensical. However, we recognize that Kierkegaard's discussion of Christianity uses a similar methodology to a Wittgensteinian grammatical investigation. We maintain that by making sense of their respective views on nonsense we are able more fully to appreciate their positions on, and approaches to, ethics and religion.
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... Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2299/3953. Title: Nietzsche,Zarathustra and the status of laughter. Authors: Lippitt, J. Issue Date: 1992. Publisher: Oxford University Press. Citation:... more
... Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2299/3953. Title: Nietzsche,Zarathustra and the status of laughter. Authors: Lippitt, J. Issue Date: 1992. Publisher: Oxford University Press. Citation: British Journal of Aesthetics 32 (1) pp.39-49. ...