Books by M. Taylor Fravel
As China emerges as an international economic and military power, the world waits to see how the ... more As China emerges as an international economic and military power, the world waits to see how the nation will assert itself globally. Yet, as M. Taylor Fravel shows in Strong Borders, Secure Nation, concerns that China might be prone to violent conflict over territory are overstated. The first comprehensive study of China's territorial disputes, Strong Borders, Secure Nation contends that China over the past sixty years has been more likely to compromise in these conflicts with its Asian neighbors and less likely to use force than many scholars or analysts might expect.
By developing theories of cooperation and escalation in territorial disputes, Fravel explains China's willingness to either compromise or use force. When faced with internal threats to regime security, especially ethnic rebellion, China has been willing to offer concessions in exchange for assistance that strengthens the state's control over its territory and people. By contrast, China has used force to halt or reverse decline in its bargaining power in disputes with its militarily most powerful neighbors or in disputes where it has controlled none of the land being contested. Drawing on a rich array of previously unexamined Chinese language sources, Strong Borders, Secure Nation offers a compelling account of China's foreign policy on one of the most volatile issues in international relations.
M. Taylor Fravel is associate professor of political science and member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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Papers by M. Taylor Fravel
Asian Security, 2011
Although China’s armed forces have yet to complete its ambitious modernization
program, its milit... more Although China’s armed forces have yet to complete its ambitious modernization
program, its military strategy has begun to emphasize the ability to conduct noncombat operations such as disaster relief and peacekeeping in addition to traditional war fighting. This new component of China’s military strategy is best explained by an unexpected relationship between economic growth and regime security. Although growth is key to the legitimacy of leaders in developing countries, it also creates new sources of domestic unrest and increases the vulnerability of the economy to external shocks, both of which, if unchecked, can harm future growth. As a result, developing countries such as China may use their armed forces to maintain political stability and provide services that the state lacks, such as emergency disaster relief. These conclusions are based on original data from China.
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Current History a Journal of Contemporary World Affairs, 1997
Acceso de usuarios registrados. Acceso de usuarios registrados Usuario Contraseña. ...
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International Security, 2015
Whether China will abandon its long-standing nuclear strategy of assured retaliation for a first-... more Whether China will abandon its long-standing nuclear strategy of assured retaliation for a first-use posture will be a critical factor in future U.S.-China strategic stability. In the past decade, advances in U.S. strategic capabilities, especially missile defenses and enhanced long-range conventional strike capacity, could undermine China's nuclear retaliatory capability, which is based on a relatively small force and second-strike posture. An exhaustive review of Chinese writings on military affairs indicates, however, that China is unlikely to abandon its current nuclear strategy of assured retaliation. Instead, China will modestly expand its arsenal, increase the sophistication of its forces, and allow limited ambiguity regarding its pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. This limited ambiguity allows China to use the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter a conventional attack on its nuclear arsenal, without significantly increasing the size of its nuclear forces and triggering a costly arms race. Nevertheless, China's effort to maintain its strategy of assured retaliation while avoiding an arms race could backfire. Those efforts increase the risk that nuclear weapons could be used in a crisis between the United States and China, even though China views this possibility as much less likely than the United States does.
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China’s Challenges: The Road Ahead , 2015
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The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia, 2014
Territorial disputes involve a state’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity—its core in... more Territorial disputes involve a state’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity—its core interests. Historically, they have been the most common issue over which states collide and go to war. Since 1945, Asia has been more prone to conflict over territory and maritime boundaries than other regions in the world. Asia accounts for the greatest number of disputes over territory that have become militarized and that have escalated into interstate wars. Disputes in Asia have also been resistant to settlement, accounting for the lowest rate of settlement when compared with other regions. Most importantly, Asia today has far more territorial disputes than any other part of the world. When combined with the rise of new powers, which are involved in multiple territorial disputes, such conflicts are poised to become an increasing source of tension and instability in the region.
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PLA Influence on China's National Security Policymaking, 2015
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Security Studies, 2010
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Journal of Strategic Studies, 2007
The study of military doctrine is one tool that scholars can use to
understand a rising power’s p... more The study of military doctrine is one tool that scholars can use to
understand a rising power’s potential for involvement in interstate war. In its
evolving joint operational doctrine, China pursues a defensive approach to
securing its land borders and maintaining territorial integrity. Despite the
prominence of a Taiwan conflict in China’s defense planning, frontier defense
remains a core mission for China’s armed forces, involving almost half of the
PLA’s ground forces. China’s force structure is consistent with a defensive
doctrine for securing its borders, as light infantry units are stationed on the
border itself while most maneuver units capable of offensive operations are based
hundreds of kilometers away in the interior. Due to the potential for ethnic
unrest in the frontiers, which places a premium on cooperation with neighboring
states, China’s defensive posture on the Asian continent is likely to endure.
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International Studies Review, 2010
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International Security, 2005
... ambiguity of authoritarian behavior also suggests that the causal mech-anisms explaining why ... more ... ambiguity of authoritarian behavior also suggests that the causal mech-anisms explaining why and ... stable in any given case and offer less leverage in understanding attempts to ... to compromise in territorial disputes carries several im-plications for international relations theory. ...
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CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA, 2011
This article examines China’s behaviour in the South China Sea disputes
through the lens of its s... more This article examines China’s behaviour in the South China Sea disputes
through the lens of its strategy for managing its claims. Since the
mid-1990s, China has pursued a strategy of delaying the resolution of
the dispute. The goal of this strategy is to consolidate China’s claims,
especially to maritime rights or jurisdiction over these waters, and to
deter other states from strengthening their own claims at China’s expense,
including resource development projects that exclude China. Since the
mid-2000s, the pace of China’s efforts to consolidate its claims and deter
others has increased through diplomatic, administrative and military
means. Although China’s strategy seeks to consolidate its own claims, it
threatens weaker states in the dispute and is inherently destabilizing. As
a result, the delaying strategy includes efforts to prevent the escalation
of tensions while nevertheless seeking to consolidate China’s claims.
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Asian Survey, 1996
... nor the invocation of Chapter VII in the affairs of UNPROFOR." China&amp... more ... nor the invocation of Chapter VII in the affairs of UNPROFOR." China's opposition to ... actions required by Chapter VII were in-consistent with UNPROFOR's non-mandatory mandate ... these resolutions shifted UNPROFOR into the uncharted terri-tory of nontraditional peacekeeping ...
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After exploding its ªrst nuclear device in 1964, China did not develop sufficient forces or doctr... more After exploding its ªrst nuclear device in 1964, China did not develop sufficient forces or doctrine to overcome its vulnerability to a first strike by the United States or the Soviet Union for more than three decades. Two factors explain this puzzling willingness to live with nuclear vulnerability: (1) the views and beliefs of senior leaders about the utility of nuclear weapons and the requirements
of deterrence, and (2) internal organizational and political constraints on doctrinal innovation. Even as China’s technical expertise grew and financial resources for modernization became available after the early 1980s, leadership beliefs have continued to shape China’s approach to nuclear strategy, reflecting the idea of assured retaliation (i.e., using the fewest number of weapons to threaten an opponent with a credible second strike). The enduring
effect of these leadership ideas has important implications for the trajectory of China’s current efforts to modernize its nuclear force.
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Washington Quarterly, Jan 2015
The understanding in the United States of China’s use of the concept of “counter-intervention” is... more The understanding in the United States of China’s use of the concept of “counter-intervention” is flawed. In Chinese military writings, counter-intervention is not a military strategy, much less a broader grand strategic goal to oppose the role of the United States in regional affairs. To be sure, China is developing new capabilities that could be used against the United States if it intervened in a regional conflict involving China. Nevertheless, when Chinese sources do refer to related concepts such as “resisting” or “guarding against” intervention, they are describing as one of the many subsidiary components of campaigns and contingencies that have more narrow and specific goals, especially a conflict over Taiwan. Reducing such misunderstandings of Chinese strategic concepts will require increased engagement with Chinese writings, but will also help to reduce security dilemmas and misperceptions of Chinese strategy and ensure that new developments in Chinese capabilities are properly understood.
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China's Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs, 2005
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Books by M. Taylor Fravel
By developing theories of cooperation and escalation in territorial disputes, Fravel explains China's willingness to either compromise or use force. When faced with internal threats to regime security, especially ethnic rebellion, China has been willing to offer concessions in exchange for assistance that strengthens the state's control over its territory and people. By contrast, China has used force to halt or reverse decline in its bargaining power in disputes with its militarily most powerful neighbors or in disputes where it has controlled none of the land being contested. Drawing on a rich array of previously unexamined Chinese language sources, Strong Borders, Secure Nation offers a compelling account of China's foreign policy on one of the most volatile issues in international relations.
M. Taylor Fravel is associate professor of political science and member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Papers by M. Taylor Fravel
program, its military strategy has begun to emphasize the ability to conduct noncombat operations such as disaster relief and peacekeeping in addition to traditional war fighting. This new component of China’s military strategy is best explained by an unexpected relationship between economic growth and regime security. Although growth is key to the legitimacy of leaders in developing countries, it also creates new sources of domestic unrest and increases the vulnerability of the economy to external shocks, both of which, if unchecked, can harm future growth. As a result, developing countries such as China may use their armed forces to maintain political stability and provide services that the state lacks, such as emergency disaster relief. These conclusions are based on original data from China.
understand a rising power’s potential for involvement in interstate war. In its
evolving joint operational doctrine, China pursues a defensive approach to
securing its land borders and maintaining territorial integrity. Despite the
prominence of a Taiwan conflict in China’s defense planning, frontier defense
remains a core mission for China’s armed forces, involving almost half of the
PLA’s ground forces. China’s force structure is consistent with a defensive
doctrine for securing its borders, as light infantry units are stationed on the
border itself while most maneuver units capable of offensive operations are based
hundreds of kilometers away in the interior. Due to the potential for ethnic
unrest in the frontiers, which places a premium on cooperation with neighboring
states, China’s defensive posture on the Asian continent is likely to endure.
through the lens of its strategy for managing its claims. Since the
mid-1990s, China has pursued a strategy of delaying the resolution of
the dispute. The goal of this strategy is to consolidate China’s claims,
especially to maritime rights or jurisdiction over these waters, and to
deter other states from strengthening their own claims at China’s expense,
including resource development projects that exclude China. Since the
mid-2000s, the pace of China’s efforts to consolidate its claims and deter
others has increased through diplomatic, administrative and military
means. Although China’s strategy seeks to consolidate its own claims, it
threatens weaker states in the dispute and is inherently destabilizing. As
a result, the delaying strategy includes efforts to prevent the escalation
of tensions while nevertheless seeking to consolidate China’s claims.
of deterrence, and (2) internal organizational and political constraints on doctrinal innovation. Even as China’s technical expertise grew and financial resources for modernization became available after the early 1980s, leadership beliefs have continued to shape China’s approach to nuclear strategy, reflecting the idea of assured retaliation (i.e., using the fewest number of weapons to threaten an opponent with a credible second strike). The enduring
effect of these leadership ideas has important implications for the trajectory of China’s current efforts to modernize its nuclear force.
By developing theories of cooperation and escalation in territorial disputes, Fravel explains China's willingness to either compromise or use force. When faced with internal threats to regime security, especially ethnic rebellion, China has been willing to offer concessions in exchange for assistance that strengthens the state's control over its territory and people. By contrast, China has used force to halt or reverse decline in its bargaining power in disputes with its militarily most powerful neighbors or in disputes where it has controlled none of the land being contested. Drawing on a rich array of previously unexamined Chinese language sources, Strong Borders, Secure Nation offers a compelling account of China's foreign policy on one of the most volatile issues in international relations.
M. Taylor Fravel is associate professor of political science and member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
program, its military strategy has begun to emphasize the ability to conduct noncombat operations such as disaster relief and peacekeeping in addition to traditional war fighting. This new component of China’s military strategy is best explained by an unexpected relationship between economic growth and regime security. Although growth is key to the legitimacy of leaders in developing countries, it also creates new sources of domestic unrest and increases the vulnerability of the economy to external shocks, both of which, if unchecked, can harm future growth. As a result, developing countries such as China may use their armed forces to maintain political stability and provide services that the state lacks, such as emergency disaster relief. These conclusions are based on original data from China.
understand a rising power’s potential for involvement in interstate war. In its
evolving joint operational doctrine, China pursues a defensive approach to
securing its land borders and maintaining territorial integrity. Despite the
prominence of a Taiwan conflict in China’s defense planning, frontier defense
remains a core mission for China’s armed forces, involving almost half of the
PLA’s ground forces. China’s force structure is consistent with a defensive
doctrine for securing its borders, as light infantry units are stationed on the
border itself while most maneuver units capable of offensive operations are based
hundreds of kilometers away in the interior. Due to the potential for ethnic
unrest in the frontiers, which places a premium on cooperation with neighboring
states, China’s defensive posture on the Asian continent is likely to endure.
through the lens of its strategy for managing its claims. Since the
mid-1990s, China has pursued a strategy of delaying the resolution of
the dispute. The goal of this strategy is to consolidate China’s claims,
especially to maritime rights or jurisdiction over these waters, and to
deter other states from strengthening their own claims at China’s expense,
including resource development projects that exclude China. Since the
mid-2000s, the pace of China’s efforts to consolidate its claims and deter
others has increased through diplomatic, administrative and military
means. Although China’s strategy seeks to consolidate its own claims, it
threatens weaker states in the dispute and is inherently destabilizing. As
a result, the delaying strategy includes efforts to prevent the escalation
of tensions while nevertheless seeking to consolidate China’s claims.
of deterrence, and (2) internal organizational and political constraints on doctrinal innovation. Even as China’s technical expertise grew and financial resources for modernization became available after the early 1980s, leadership beliefs have continued to shape China’s approach to nuclear strategy, reflecting the idea of assured retaliation (i.e., using the fewest number of weapons to threaten an opponent with a credible second strike). The enduring
effect of these leadership ideas has important implications for the trajectory of China’s current efforts to modernize its nuclear force.