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Michele Giavazzi
University of Munich, Philosophy, Post-Doc
- Social and Political Philosophy, Ethics of Voting, Epistocracy, Political Theory, Democratic Theory, Political Philosophy, and 14 more19th-century German philosophy, 20th-century German philosophy, Political Science, Politics, History of Philosophy, Vice Epistemology, Virtue Epistemology, Frankfurt School, Hegel, Modernity, Communitarianism, Political Epistemology, Social Epistemology, and Institutional Theoryedit
- I am a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Chair in Philosophy & Political Theory of the University of Munich, Germany. Before that, I was a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen, a research assistant for the AHRC-funded project "Norms for the New Public Sphere" at the University of Warwic... moreI am a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Chair in Philosophy & Political Theory of the University of Munich, Germany.
Before that, I was a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen, a research assistant for the AHRC-funded project "Norms for the New Public Sphere" at the University of Warwick and a postdoctoral research fellow for the H2020 Project "Rethinking Democracy in Times of Crisis: a Voter-Centred Perspective", at the University of Genoa.
I obtained my PhD in Philosophy from the University of Warwick and I was a Visiting Research Student at Brown University.
My research interests lie at the intersection of democratic theory and political epistemology. My current research agenda seeks to understand what role the epistemic conduct of democratic citizens may have in establishing or challenging the normative justification of public decision-making practices such as voting, and the implications that this inquiry might have for the legitimacy of democracy more broadly.edit
As part of recent epistemic challenges to democracy, some have endorsed the implementation of epistemic constraints on voting, institutional mechanisms that bar incompetent voters from participating in public decision-making procedures.... more
As part of recent epistemic challenges to democracy, some have endorsed the implementation of epistemic constraints on voting, institutional mechanisms that bar incompetent voters from participating in public decision-making procedures. This proposal is often considered incompatible with a commitment to political equality. In this paper, I aim to dispute the strength of this latter claim by offering a theoretical justification for epistemic constraints on voting that does not rest on antiegalitarian commitments. Call this the civic accountability justification for epistemic constraints on voting. On this view, voters stand to one another in a normative relation of reciprocal accountability that requires them to uphold an epistemically responsible conduct. Modest epistemic constraints on voting are justifiable because they secure that participation in voting is conforming to this normative requirement. Thanks to its distinctive features, the civic accountability justification can overcome two problems that egalitarians commonly associate with the idea of epistemic constraints on voting: the disrespect problem and the hierarchy problem.
Research Interests:
In this paper we discuss an often-neglected topic in the literature on the ethics of voting. Our aim is to provide an account of what states are obligated to do, so that voters may fulfil their role as public decision-makers in an... more
In this paper we discuss an often-neglected topic in the literature on the ethics of voting. Our aim is to provide an account of what states are obligated to do, so that voters may fulfil their role as public decision-makers in an epistemically competent manner. We argue that the state ought to provide voters with what we call a substantive opportunity for competence. This entails that the state ought to actively foster the epistemic capabilities that are necessary to achieve competent participation in political decision-making practices.
Research Interests:
It is often claimed that democratic voters have epistemic responsibilities. However, it is not often specified why voters have such epistemic responsibilities. In this paper, I contend that voters have epistemic responsibilities because... more
It is often claimed that democratic voters have epistemic responsibilities. However, it is not often specified why voters have such epistemic responsibilities. In this paper, I contend that voters have epistemic responsibilities because voting is best understood as an act that bears assertoric force. More precisely, voters perform what I call an act of political advocacy whereby, like an asserter who states or affirms that something is the case, they state or affirm that a certain course of political action is the one that should be followed or enacted. Consequently, the performance of acts of political advocacy such as voting should be understood as bounded by epistemic norms mirroring those binding the act of assertion and yield epistemic responsibilities mirroring the ones required to satisfy these norms.
Research Interests:
It is often claimed that democratic voters have epistemic responsibilities. However, it is not often specified why voters have such epistemic responsibilities. In this paper, I contend that voters have epistemic responsibilities because... more
It is often claimed that democratic voters have epistemic responsibilities. However, it is not often specified why voters have such epistemic responsibilities. In this paper, I contend that voters have epistemic responsibilities because voting is best understood as an act that bears assertoric force. More precisely, voters perform what I call an act of political advocacy whereby, like an asserter who states or affirms that something is the case, they state or affirm that a certain course of political action is the one that should be followed or enacted. Consequently, the performance of acts of political advocacy such as voting should be understood as bounded by epistemic norms mirroring those binding the act of assertion and yield epistemic responsibilities mirroring the ones required to satisfy these norms.
Research Interests:
In this paper we discuss an often-neglected topic in the literature on the ethics of voting. Our aim is to provide an account of what states are obligated to do, so that voters may fulfil their role as public decision-makers in an... more
In this paper we discuss an often-neglected topic in the literature on the ethics of voting. Our aim is to provide an account of what states are obligated to do, so that voters may fulfil their role as public decision-makers in an epistemically competent manner. We argue that the state ought to provide voters with what we call a substantive opportunity for competence. This entails that the state ought to actively foster the epistemic capabilities that are necessary to achieve competent participation in political decision-making practices.