Reinforcement learning systems usually assume that a value function is defined over all states (o... more Reinforcement learning systems usually assume that a value function is defined over all states (or state-action pairs) that can immediately give the value of a particular state or action. These values are used by a selection mechanism to decide which action to take. In contrast, when humans and animals make decisions, they collect evidence for different alternatives over time and take action only when sufficient evidence has been accumulated. We have previously developed a model of memory processing that includes semantic, episodic and working memory in a comprehensive architecture. Here, we describe how this memory mechanism can support decision making when the alternatives cannot be evaluated based on immediate sensory information alone. Instead we first imagine, and then evaluate a possible future that will result from choosing one of the alternatives. Here we present an extended model that can be used as a model for decision making that depends on accumulating evidence over time...
Over the past few decades, cognitive science has identified several forms of reasoning that make ... more Over the past few decades, cognitive science has identified several forms of reasoning that make essential use of conceptual knowledge. Despite significant theoretical and empirical progress, there is still no unified framework for understanding how concepts are used in reasoning. This paper argues that the theory of conceptual spaces is capable of filling this gap. Our strategy is to demonstrate how various inference mechanisms which clearly rely on conceptual information—including similarity, typicality, and diagnosticity-based reasoning—can be modeled using principles derived from conceptual spaces. Our first topic analyzes the role of expectations in inductive reasoning and their relation to the structure of our concepts. We examine the relationship between using generic expressions in natural language and common-sense reasoning as a second topic. We propose that the strength of a generic can be described by distances between properties and prototypes in conceptual spaces. Our t...
Thus far, most researchers have focused on the cognition of fire use, but few have explored the c... more Thus far, most researchers have focused on the cognition of fire use, but few have explored the cognition of firemaking. With this contribution we analyse aspects of the two main hunter-gatherer firemaking techniques—the strike-a-light and the manual fire-drill—in terms of causal, social and prospective reasoning. Based on geographic distribution, archaeological and ethnographic information, as well as our cognitive interpretation of strike-a-light firemaking, we suggest that this technique may well have been invented by Neanderthal populations in Eurasia. Fire-drills, on the other hand, represent a rudimentary form of a symbiotic technology, which requires more elaborate prospective and causal reasoning skills. This firemaking technology may have been invented by different Homo sapiens groups roaming the African savanna before populating the rest of the globe, where fire-drills remain the most-used hunter-gatherer firemaking technique.
Reasoning is not just following logical rules, but a large part of human reasoning depends on our... more Reasoning is not just following logical rules, but a large part of human reasoning depends on our expectations about the world. To some extent, non-monotonic logic has been developed to account for the role of expectations. In this article, the focus is on expectations based on actions and their consequences. The analysis is based on a two-vector model of events where an event is represented in terms of two main components – the force of an action that drives the event, and the result of its application. Actions are modelled in terms of the force domain and the results are modelled with the aid of different domains for locations or properties of objects. As a consequence, the assumption that reasoning about causal relations should be made in terms of propositional structures becomes very unnatural. Instead, the reasoning will be based on the geometric and topological properties of causes and effects modelled in conceptual spaces.
The central thesis of this article is that the evolution of teaching is one of the main factors t... more The central thesis of this article is that the evolution of teaching is one of the main factors that lead to increasingly complex communicative systems in the hominin species. Following earlier analyses of the evolution of teaching, the following steps are identified: (i) evaluative feedback, (ii) drawing attention, (iii) demonstration and pantomime, (iv) communicating concepts, (v) explaining relations between concepts, and (vi) narrating. For each of these step the communicative and cognitive demands will be analyzed. The focus will be on demonstration and pantomime, since these seem to be the evolutionarily earliest unique human capacities. An important step is the transition from pantomime for teaching to pantomime for informing and how this in turn leads to communicating concepts. As regards explaining relations between concepts, the focus will be of the role of generics in teaching and communication. Analyzing these topics involves combining cognitive science with evolutionary...
Many animal species use tools, but human technical engagement is more complex. We argue that ther... more Many animal species use tools, but human technical engagement is more complex. We argue that there is coevolution between technical engagement (the manufacturing and use of tools) and advanced forms of causal cognition in the human (Homo) lineage. As an analytic tool, we present a classification of different forms of causal thinking. Human causal thinking has become detached from space and time, so that instead of just reacting to perceptual input, our minds can simulate actions and forces and their causal consequences. Our main thesis is that, unlike the situation for other primate species, an increasing emphasis on technical engagement made some hominins capable of reasoning about the forces involved in causal processes. This thesis is supported in three ways: (1) We compare the casual thinking about forces of hominins with that of other primates. (2) We analyze the causal thinking required for Stone Age hunting technologies such as throwing spears, bow hunting and the use of pois...
Most semantic models employed in human-robot interactions concern how a robot can understand comm... more Most semantic models employed in human-robot interactions concern how a robot can understand commands, but in this article the aim is to present a framework that allows dialogic interaction. The key idea is to use events as the fundamental structures for the semantic representations of a robot. Events are modeled in terms of conceptual spaces and mappings between spaces. It is shown how the semantics of major word classes can be described with the aid of conceptual spaces in a way that is amenable to computer implementations. An event is represented by two vectors, one force vector representing an action and one result vector representing the effect of the action. The two-vector model is then extended by the thematic roles so an event is built up from an agent, an action, a patient, and a result. It is shown how the components of an event can be put together to semantic structures that represent the meanings of sentences. It is argued that a semantic framework based on events can ge...
This introductory chapter provides a non-technical presentation of conceptual spaces as a represe... more This introductory chapter provides a non-technical presentation of conceptual spaces as a representational framework for modeling different kinds of similarity relations in various cognitive domains. Moreover, we briefly summarize each chapter in this volume.
Maja Brala-Vukanović, PhD, University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences marija... more Maja Brala-Vukanović, PhD, University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences marija.brala@ffri.uniri.hr orcid.org/0000-0002-5708-7624 Peter Gärdenfors, PhD, Department of Philosophy, Lund University peter.gardenfors@lucs.lu.se orcid.org/0000-0001-7423-828X Mihaela Matešić, PhD, University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences mihaela.matesic@ffri.uniri.hr orcid.org/0000-0002-4780-8512
This article is a rejoinder to Hernandez-Conde’s (Synthese 194(10):4011–4037, 2017) criticism of ... more This article is a rejoinder to Hernandez-Conde’s (Synthese 194(10):4011–4037, 2017) criticism of the convexity criterion in the theory of conceptual spaces. His arguments in general claim that the convexity criterion could be false and that it therefore is problematic for the theory. However, this is a misunderstanding since the convexity criterion is put forward as an empirically testable law for concepts. The long list of cases where the convexity criterion could be false that Hernandez-Conde presents rather exhibits the rich empirical content of the criterion.
Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2014
The aim of this article is to present an evolutionarily grounded explanation of why we speak in s... more The aim of this article is to present an evolutionarily grounded explanation of why we speak in sentences. This question is seldomly addressed, neither in the Chomskian tradition nor in cognitive linguistics. I base my explanation on an analysis of different levels of communication. I identify four levels: praxis, instruction, coordination of common ground and coordination of meaning. The analysis will be focused on the evolutionary benefits of communicating about events as a way of coordinating actions. A cognitively grounded model of events will be outlined. My central thesis is that the communicative role of sentences is to express events.
Reinforcement learning systems usually assume that a value function is defined over all states (o... more Reinforcement learning systems usually assume that a value function is defined over all states (or state-action pairs) that can immediately give the value of a particular state or action. These values are used by a selection mechanism to decide which action to take. In contrast, when humans and animals make decisions, they collect evidence for different alternatives over time and take action only when sufficient evidence has been accumulated. We have previously developed a model of memory processing that includes semantic, episodic and working memory in a comprehensive architecture. Here, we describe how this memory mechanism can support decision making when the alternatives cannot be evaluated based on immediate sensory information alone. Instead we first imagine, and then evaluate a possible future that will result from choosing one of the alternatives. Here we present an extended model that can be used as a model for decision making that depends on accumulating evidence over time...
Over the past few decades, cognitive science has identified several forms of reasoning that make ... more Over the past few decades, cognitive science has identified several forms of reasoning that make essential use of conceptual knowledge. Despite significant theoretical and empirical progress, there is still no unified framework for understanding how concepts are used in reasoning. This paper argues that the theory of conceptual spaces is capable of filling this gap. Our strategy is to demonstrate how various inference mechanisms which clearly rely on conceptual information—including similarity, typicality, and diagnosticity-based reasoning—can be modeled using principles derived from conceptual spaces. Our first topic analyzes the role of expectations in inductive reasoning and their relation to the structure of our concepts. We examine the relationship between using generic expressions in natural language and common-sense reasoning as a second topic. We propose that the strength of a generic can be described by distances between properties and prototypes in conceptual spaces. Our t...
Thus far, most researchers have focused on the cognition of fire use, but few have explored the c... more Thus far, most researchers have focused on the cognition of fire use, but few have explored the cognition of firemaking. With this contribution we analyse aspects of the two main hunter-gatherer firemaking techniques—the strike-a-light and the manual fire-drill—in terms of causal, social and prospective reasoning. Based on geographic distribution, archaeological and ethnographic information, as well as our cognitive interpretation of strike-a-light firemaking, we suggest that this technique may well have been invented by Neanderthal populations in Eurasia. Fire-drills, on the other hand, represent a rudimentary form of a symbiotic technology, which requires more elaborate prospective and causal reasoning skills. This firemaking technology may have been invented by different Homo sapiens groups roaming the African savanna before populating the rest of the globe, where fire-drills remain the most-used hunter-gatherer firemaking technique.
Reasoning is not just following logical rules, but a large part of human reasoning depends on our... more Reasoning is not just following logical rules, but a large part of human reasoning depends on our expectations about the world. To some extent, non-monotonic logic has been developed to account for the role of expectations. In this article, the focus is on expectations based on actions and their consequences. The analysis is based on a two-vector model of events where an event is represented in terms of two main components – the force of an action that drives the event, and the result of its application. Actions are modelled in terms of the force domain and the results are modelled with the aid of different domains for locations or properties of objects. As a consequence, the assumption that reasoning about causal relations should be made in terms of propositional structures becomes very unnatural. Instead, the reasoning will be based on the geometric and topological properties of causes and effects modelled in conceptual spaces.
The central thesis of this article is that the evolution of teaching is one of the main factors t... more The central thesis of this article is that the evolution of teaching is one of the main factors that lead to increasingly complex communicative systems in the hominin species. Following earlier analyses of the evolution of teaching, the following steps are identified: (i) evaluative feedback, (ii) drawing attention, (iii) demonstration and pantomime, (iv) communicating concepts, (v) explaining relations between concepts, and (vi) narrating. For each of these step the communicative and cognitive demands will be analyzed. The focus will be on demonstration and pantomime, since these seem to be the evolutionarily earliest unique human capacities. An important step is the transition from pantomime for teaching to pantomime for informing and how this in turn leads to communicating concepts. As regards explaining relations between concepts, the focus will be of the role of generics in teaching and communication. Analyzing these topics involves combining cognitive science with evolutionary...
Many animal species use tools, but human technical engagement is more complex. We argue that ther... more Many animal species use tools, but human technical engagement is more complex. We argue that there is coevolution between technical engagement (the manufacturing and use of tools) and advanced forms of causal cognition in the human (Homo) lineage. As an analytic tool, we present a classification of different forms of causal thinking. Human causal thinking has become detached from space and time, so that instead of just reacting to perceptual input, our minds can simulate actions and forces and their causal consequences. Our main thesis is that, unlike the situation for other primate species, an increasing emphasis on technical engagement made some hominins capable of reasoning about the forces involved in causal processes. This thesis is supported in three ways: (1) We compare the casual thinking about forces of hominins with that of other primates. (2) We analyze the causal thinking required for Stone Age hunting technologies such as throwing spears, bow hunting and the use of pois...
Most semantic models employed in human-robot interactions concern how a robot can understand comm... more Most semantic models employed in human-robot interactions concern how a robot can understand commands, but in this article the aim is to present a framework that allows dialogic interaction. The key idea is to use events as the fundamental structures for the semantic representations of a robot. Events are modeled in terms of conceptual spaces and mappings between spaces. It is shown how the semantics of major word classes can be described with the aid of conceptual spaces in a way that is amenable to computer implementations. An event is represented by two vectors, one force vector representing an action and one result vector representing the effect of the action. The two-vector model is then extended by the thematic roles so an event is built up from an agent, an action, a patient, and a result. It is shown how the components of an event can be put together to semantic structures that represent the meanings of sentences. It is argued that a semantic framework based on events can ge...
This introductory chapter provides a non-technical presentation of conceptual spaces as a represe... more This introductory chapter provides a non-technical presentation of conceptual spaces as a representational framework for modeling different kinds of similarity relations in various cognitive domains. Moreover, we briefly summarize each chapter in this volume.
Maja Brala-Vukanović, PhD, University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences marija... more Maja Brala-Vukanović, PhD, University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences marija.brala@ffri.uniri.hr orcid.org/0000-0002-5708-7624 Peter Gärdenfors, PhD, Department of Philosophy, Lund University peter.gardenfors@lucs.lu.se orcid.org/0000-0001-7423-828X Mihaela Matešić, PhD, University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences mihaela.matesic@ffri.uniri.hr orcid.org/0000-0002-4780-8512
This article is a rejoinder to Hernandez-Conde’s (Synthese 194(10):4011–4037, 2017) criticism of ... more This article is a rejoinder to Hernandez-Conde’s (Synthese 194(10):4011–4037, 2017) criticism of the convexity criterion in the theory of conceptual spaces. His arguments in general claim that the convexity criterion could be false and that it therefore is problematic for the theory. However, this is a misunderstanding since the convexity criterion is put forward as an empirically testable law for concepts. The long list of cases where the convexity criterion could be false that Hernandez-Conde presents rather exhibits the rich empirical content of the criterion.
Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2014
The aim of this article is to present an evolutionarily grounded explanation of why we speak in s... more The aim of this article is to present an evolutionarily grounded explanation of why we speak in sentences. This question is seldomly addressed, neither in the Chomskian tradition nor in cognitive linguistics. I base my explanation on an analysis of different levels of communication. I identify four levels: praxis, instruction, coordination of common ground and coordination of meaning. The analysis will be focused on the evolutionary benefits of communicating about events as a way of coordinating actions. A cognitively grounded model of events will be outlined. My central thesis is that the communicative role of sentences is to express events.
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Oct 26, 2017
By understanding laws of nature as geometrical rather than linguistic entities, this paper addres... more By understanding laws of nature as geometrical rather than linguistic entities, this paper addresses how to describe theory structures and how to evaluate their continuity. Relying on conceptual spaces as a modelling tool, we focus on the conceptual framework an empirical theory presupposes, thus obtain a geometrical representation of a theory's structure. We stress the relevance of measurement procedures in separating conceptual from empirical structures. This lets our understanding of scientific laws come closer to scientific practice, and avoids a widely recognized deficit in current philosophy of science accounts, namely to risk a collapse of the physical into the mathematical.
This paper offers a novel way of reconstructing conceptual change in empirical theories. Changes ... more This paper offers a novel way of reconstructing conceptual change in empirical theories. Changes occur in terms of the structure of the dimensions—that is to say, the conceptual spaces—underlying the conceptual framework within which a given theory is formulated. Five types of changes are identified: (1) addition or deletion of special laws, (2) change in scale or metric, (3) change in the importance of dimensions, (4) change in the separability of dimensions, and (5) addition or deletion of dimensions. Given this classification, the conceptual development of empirical theories becomes more gradual and rationalizable. Only the most extreme type—replacement of dimensions—comes close to a revolution. The five types are exemplified and applied in a case study on the development within physics from the original Newtonian mechanics to special relativity theory.
There is a great deal of justified concern about continuity through scientific theory change. Our... more There is a great deal of justified concern about continuity through scientific theory change. Our thesis is that, particularly in physics, such continuity can be appropriately captured at the level of conceptual frameworks (the level above the theories themselves) using conceptual space models. Indeed, we contend that the conceptual spaces of three of our most important physical theories—Classical Mechanics (CM), Special Relativity Theory (SRT), and Quantum Mechanics (QM)—have already been so modelled as phase-spaces. Working with their phase-space formulations, one can trace the conceptual changes and continuities in transitioning from CM to QM, and from CM to SRT. By offering a revised severity-ordering of changes that conceptual frameworks can undergo, we provide reasons to doubt the commonly held view that SRT is conceptually closer to CM than QM is.
Zenker, F. and Gärdenfors, P. (eds.) (2015). Applications of Conceptual SpacesApplications of Conceptual Spaces (pp 259-277). Dordrecht: Springer., 2015
This article outlines how conceptual spaces theory applies to modeling changes of scientific fram... more This article outlines how conceptual spaces theory applies to modeling changes of scientific frameworks when these are treated as spatial structures rather than as linguistic entities. The theory is briefly introduced and five types of changes are presented. It is then contrasted with Michael Friedman’s neo-Kantian account that seeks to render Kuhn’s “paradigm shift” as a communicatively rational historical event of conceptual development in the sciences. Like Friedman, we refer to the transition from Newtonian to relativistic mechanics as an example of “deep conceptual change.” But we take the communicative rationality of radical conceptual change to be available prior to the philosophical meta-paradigms that Friedman deems indispensable for this purpose.
Our aim in this article is to show how the theory of conceptual spaces can be useful in describin... more Our aim in this article is to show how the theory of conceptual spaces can be useful in describing diachronic changes to conceptual frameworks, and thus useful in understanding conceptual change in the empirical sciences. We also compare the conceptual space approach to Moulines’s typology of intertheoretical relations in the structuralist tradition. Unlike structuralist reconstructions, those based on conceptual spaces yield a natural way of modeling the changes of a conceptual framework, including noncumulative changes, by tracing the changes to the dimensions that reconstitute a conceptual framework. As a consequence, the incommensurability of empirical theories need not be viewed as a matter of conceptual representation.
Uploads