Abstract
The disjunction effect (Tversky and Shafir in Psychol Sci 3:305–309, 1992) occurs when decision makers prefer option x (versus y) when knowing that event A occurs and also when knowing that event A does not occur, but they refuse x (or prefer y) when not knowing whether or not A occurs. This form of incoherence violates Savage’s (Cognition 57:31–95, 1954) sure-thing principle, one of the basic axioms of the rational theory of decision-making. The phenomenon was attributed to a lack of clear reasons for accepting an option (x) when the subjects are under uncertainty. Through a pragmatic analysis of the task and a consequent reformulation of it, we show that the effect does not depend on the presence of uncertainty, but on the introduction into the text-problem of a non-relevant goal.
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Notes
For obvious geographical reasons, Hawaii (which cannot be a reasonable destination for a 5-day holiday from Europe) have been changed with "a nice destination".
We used the Italian word "caparra" (deposit) which indicates a percentage (usually around 20%) of the total amount of money that has to be paid for the holiday. In this sense, it is surely more onerous than a fee.
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Acknowledgments
We are very grateful to Giuseppe Mosconi and Peter Ayton for their comments on a previous draft of this paper.
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Bagassi, M., Macchi, L. The “vanishing” of the disjunction effect by sensible procrastination. Mind & Society 6, 41–52 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-006-0024-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-006-0024-0