Abstract
The extension of Nash's bargaining solution to differential games is discussed. It is shown that a closed-loop solution verifies very stringent necessary conditions and that an open-loop solution can present serious weakness from a normative point of view.
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Communicated by G. Leitmann
This research has been supported by the Canada Council (S73-0935) and the Ministère de l'Education du Québec (DGES).
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Haurie, A. A note on nonzero-sum differential games with bargaining solution. J Optim Theory Appl 18, 31–39 (1976). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00933792
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00933792