Abstract
Digital signatures usually serve as irrefutable cryptographic evidence to support dispute resolution in electronic transactions. Trusted time-stamping and certificate revocation services, although very costly in practice, must be available to prevent big loss due to compromising of the signing key. In this paper, we employ a revocation-free public-key framework to improve the efficiency in maintaining the validity of digital signatures as non-repudiation evidence. The new PKI allows an end user to control the validity of his own public-key certificate and enables certificate verification without retrieving the revocation information from the CA. Based on this new PKI, we could validate generic digital signatures using a TSA only. Moreover, we could validate forward-secure digital signatures without the TTP’s involvement.
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Zhou, J. (2003). Efficient Signature Validation Based on a New PKI. In: Bauknecht, K., Tjoa, A.M., Quirchmayr, G. (eds) E-Commerce and Web Technologies. EC-Web 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2738. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45229-4_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45229-4_10
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