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Structural Lower Bounds on Black-Box Constructions of Pseudorandom Functions

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Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2024 (CRYPTO 2024)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 14924))

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Abstract

We address the black-box complexity of constructing pseudorandom functions (PRF) from pseudorandom generators (PRG). The celebrated GGM construction of Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali (Crypto 1984) provides such a construction, which (even when combined with Levin’s domain-extension trick) has super-logarithmic depth. Despite many years and much effort, this remains essentially the best construction we have to date. On the negative side, one step is provided by the work of Miles and Viola (TCC 2011), which shows that a black-box construction which just calls the PRG once and outputs one of its output bits, cannot be a PRF.

In this work, we make significant further progress: we rule out black-box constructions of PRF from PRG that follow certain structural constraints, but may call the PRG adaptively polynomially many times. In particular, we define “tree constructions” which generalize the GGM structure: they apply the PRG G along a tree path, but allow for different choices of functions to compute the children of a node on the tree and to compute the next node on the computation path down the tree. We prove that a tree construction of logarithmic depth cannot be a PRF (while GGM is a tree construction of super-logarithmic depth). We also show several other results and discuss the special case of one-call constructions.

Our main results in fact rule out even weak PRF constructions with one output bit. We use the oracle separation methodology introduced by Gertner, Malkin, and Reingold (FOCS 2001), and show that for any candidate black-box construction \(F^G\) from G, there exists an oracle relative to which G is a PRG, but \(F^G\) is not a PRF.

A. Beimel—Part of this work was done while visiting the Simons Institute. Research partly supported by ISF grant 391/21.

T. Malkin—Part of this work was done while visiting the Simons Institute. Research supported by NSF CCF-2312242 and an Amazon Research Award.

N. Mazor—Part of this work was done while at Cornell Tech and while visiting the Simons Institute. Research partly supported by NSF CNS-2149305.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Miles and Viola [MV11] considered the task of stretching the output of PRGs, but as noted in [MV15] their lower bound implies a lower bound on PRF constructions. The results in [MV15] additionally rules out, in our terminology, PRF constructions with non-adaptive calls and AC0 post-processing.

  2. 2.

    Their paper, and its journal version [MV15], has other results as well, in particular about increasing PRG stretch in a black box way; we focus here on the result relevant to our paper.

  3. 3.

    Here \(x_{\le i}\) denotes the first i bits of x.

  4. 4.

    In the actual proof we show how to do it for outputs of length \(n-\omega (\log n)\).

  5. 5.

    We assume here that G is secure against adversaries with oracle access to \(\pi \). We can construct such oracle PRG using [Imp11, GGKT05].

  6. 6.

    Actually, \(n/2+\omega (\log n)\), but we ignore it for this presentation.

  7. 7.

    This is already enough to get some lower bound. As Tianqi Yang commented to us, if we assume that the PRF construction is secure even when using different PRG in each one of the levels, we can construct each one of the functions \(\tau _i\) by applying the pseudo-inverse lemma separately for each \(S_i\). Specifically, letting \(\pi _i\) be the pseudo-inverse of \(S_i\), and taking the PRG \(G_i\) to be \(\pi _i\circ G\), we can get that \(S_t(G_t(S_{t-1}(G_{t-1}(\dots S_0(k,x)\dots ))))=\widehat{f}(k,x)\) for some function \(\widehat{f}\) (and for any \(t\in o(n/\log n))\). Interestingly, the GGM construction has this type of security.

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Acknowledgment

We thank Yanyi Liu, Tamer Mour, and Tianqi Yang for very useful discussions.

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Correspondence to Noam Mazor .

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Beimel, A., Malkin, T., Mazor, N. (2024). Structural Lower Bounds on Black-Box Constructions of Pseudorandom Functions. In: Reyzin, L., Stebila, D. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2024. CRYPTO 2024. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14924. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-68388-6_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-68388-6_16

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