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Limits to Anonymity When Using Credentials

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Security Protocols (Security Protocols 2004)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 3957))

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Abstract

This paper identifies certain privacy threats that apply to anonymous credential systems. The focus is on timing attacks that apply even if the system is cryptographically secure. The paper provides some simple heuristics that aim to mitigate the exposure to the threats and identifies directions for further research.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, United Kingdom

    Andreas Pashalidis & Chris J. Mitchell

Authors
  1. Andreas Pashalidis
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  2. Chris J. Mitchell
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Department, University of Hertfordshire, UK

    Bruce Christianson

  2. Computer Systems Group, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Bruno Crispo

  3. Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA

    James A. Malcolm

  4. Microsoft Research, Cambridge, UK

    Michael Roe

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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Pashalidis, A., Mitchell, C.J. (2006). Limits to Anonymity When Using Credentials. In: Christianson, B., Crispo, B., Malcolm, J.A., Roe, M. (eds) Security Protocols. Security Protocols 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3957. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11861386_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11861386_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-40925-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-40926-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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