- Montessorilaan 3
Nijmegen, the Netherlands
Sebo Uithol
Leiden University, Cognitive Psychology, Faculty Member
After introducing the notions of ‘representation’, ‘action’ and ‘intention’ in Chapter 1, in Chapter 2 I investigate the process of content attribution to the firing of single mirror neurons. Single cell recordings in monkeys provide... more
After introducing the notions of ‘representation’, ‘action’ and ‘intention’ in Chapter 1, in Chapter 2 I investigate the process of content attribution to the firing of single mirror neurons. Single cell recordings in monkeys provide strong evidence for an important role of the motor system in action understanding, but although the data acquired from single cell recordings are generally considered to be robust, several debates have shown that the interpretation of these data is far from straightforward. Chapter 2 argues that, without principled restrictions, research based on single-cell recordings allows for unlimited content attribution to single mirror neurons. A theoretical analysis of the type of processing attributed to the mirror neuron system can help formulating restrictions on what mirroring is and what cognitive functions could, in principle, be explained by a mirror mechanism. It is argued that the processing at higher levels of abstraction needs assistance of non-mirroring processes to such an extent that subsuming the processes needed to infer goals from actions under the label ‘mirroring’ is not warranted.
In humans single cell recordings are problematic. Therefore, activation of the motor areas upon action observation using fMRI or EEG is studied. The finding of this so called ‘motor resonance’ is generally regarded to be supportive for motor theories of action understanding. These theories take motor resonance to be essential in the understanding of observed actions and the inference of action goals. However, Chapter 3 shows that the notions of ‘resonance’, ‘action understanding' and ‘action goal’ appear to be used ambiguously in the literature. A survey of the literature on mirror neurons and motor resonance yields two different interpretations of the term resonance, three different interpretations of action understanding, and again three different interpretations of what the goal of an action is. This entails that, unless it is specified what interpretation is used, the meaning of any statement about the relation between these concepts can differ to a great extent. By discussing Umilta et al.’s (2001) well-known experiment on mirror neurons I show that more precise definitions and use of the concepts will allow for better assessments of motor theories of action understanding and hence a more fruitful scientific debate. Lastly, I provide an example of how the discussed experimental setup could be adapted, based on the preceding analysis, to test other interpretations of the concepts.
Actions are commonly thought of as structured hierarchically. Chapter 4 analyses such hierarchies. In the literature two hierarchies are often posited: The first—the action hierarchy—is a decomposition of an action into sub-actions and sub-sub-actions. The second—the control hierarchy—is a postulated hierarchy in the neural control processes that are supposed to bring about the action. A general assumption in cognitive neuroscience is that these two hierarchies are internally consistent and provide complementary descriptions of neuronal control processes. In this chapter I show that that neither hierarchy offers a complete explanation and that they cannot be reconciled in a logical or conceptual way. Furthermore, neither pays proper attention to the dynamics and temporal aspects of neural control processes. I explore an alternative hierarchical organization in which causality is inherent in the dynamics over time. Specifically, high levels of the hierarchy encode slower (goal-related) representations, while lower levels represent faster (action and motor acts) kinematics. If employed properly, a hierarchy based on this principle is not subject to the problems that plague the traditional accounts.
Chapter 5 analyzes the neural applicability of the notion of ‘intention’. Intentions are commonly conceived of as discrete mental states that are the direct cause of actions. In the last several decades, neuroscientists have taken up the project of localizing intentions in the brain, and a number of areas have been posited as implementing representations of intentions. I argue, however, that it is doubtful that the folk notion of ‘intention’ applies to any particular physical process by which the brain initiates actions. Drawing on the analysis of Chapter 4, Pacherie’s account of intentions (Pacherie, 2006, 2008), and Koechlin’s model on action control (Koechlin et al, 1999, 2003) I show that the idea of a discrete state that causes an action is deeply incompatible with the dynamic organization of the prefrontal cortex, the presumed neural locus of the causation and control of actions. Discrete representations can at best, I will claim, play a subsidiary, stabilizing role in action planning, but this role is still incompatible with the folk notion of intention. This chapter concludes by arguing that the prevalence of the folk notion, including its intuitive appeal in neuroscientific explanations, stems from the central role intentions play in constructing intuitive explanations of our own and others’ behavior. Some future directions based on the presented analysis are sketched below.
Finally, in Chapter 6 the ideas, results, and analyses of the previous chapters are applied to the field of developmental psychology. Intention reading and action understanding have been reported in ever-younger infants, but these findings are highly debated. In this chapter I set out to clarify the notions of ‘action understanding’ and ‘intention attribution’ and discuss their relation. I use the various forms of ‘action understanding’ from Chapter 3 and speculate on the mechanisms that could underlie these capacities. Based on Chapter 5 I argue that these forms of action understanding do not generally result in the attribution of an intention to an observed actor. By disentangling intention attribution from action understanding, and by exposing the latter as an umbrella notion, I provide a framework that allows for better comparing findings from different experimental paradigms.
In humans single cell recordings are problematic. Therefore, activation of the motor areas upon action observation using fMRI or EEG is studied. The finding of this so called ‘motor resonance’ is generally regarded to be supportive for motor theories of action understanding. These theories take motor resonance to be essential in the understanding of observed actions and the inference of action goals. However, Chapter 3 shows that the notions of ‘resonance’, ‘action understanding' and ‘action goal’ appear to be used ambiguously in the literature. A survey of the literature on mirror neurons and motor resonance yields two different interpretations of the term resonance, three different interpretations of action understanding, and again three different interpretations of what the goal of an action is. This entails that, unless it is specified what interpretation is used, the meaning of any statement about the relation between these concepts can differ to a great extent. By discussing Umilta et al.’s (2001) well-known experiment on mirror neurons I show that more precise definitions and use of the concepts will allow for better assessments of motor theories of action understanding and hence a more fruitful scientific debate. Lastly, I provide an example of how the discussed experimental setup could be adapted, based on the preceding analysis, to test other interpretations of the concepts.
Actions are commonly thought of as structured hierarchically. Chapter 4 analyses such hierarchies. In the literature two hierarchies are often posited: The first—the action hierarchy—is a decomposition of an action into sub-actions and sub-sub-actions. The second—the control hierarchy—is a postulated hierarchy in the neural control processes that are supposed to bring about the action. A general assumption in cognitive neuroscience is that these two hierarchies are internally consistent and provide complementary descriptions of neuronal control processes. In this chapter I show that that neither hierarchy offers a complete explanation and that they cannot be reconciled in a logical or conceptual way. Furthermore, neither pays proper attention to the dynamics and temporal aspects of neural control processes. I explore an alternative hierarchical organization in which causality is inherent in the dynamics over time. Specifically, high levels of the hierarchy encode slower (goal-related) representations, while lower levels represent faster (action and motor acts) kinematics. If employed properly, a hierarchy based on this principle is not subject to the problems that plague the traditional accounts.
Chapter 5 analyzes the neural applicability of the notion of ‘intention’. Intentions are commonly conceived of as discrete mental states that are the direct cause of actions. In the last several decades, neuroscientists have taken up the project of localizing intentions in the brain, and a number of areas have been posited as implementing representations of intentions. I argue, however, that it is doubtful that the folk notion of ‘intention’ applies to any particular physical process by which the brain initiates actions. Drawing on the analysis of Chapter 4, Pacherie’s account of intentions (Pacherie, 2006, 2008), and Koechlin’s model on action control (Koechlin et al, 1999, 2003) I show that the idea of a discrete state that causes an action is deeply incompatible with the dynamic organization of the prefrontal cortex, the presumed neural locus of the causation and control of actions. Discrete representations can at best, I will claim, play a subsidiary, stabilizing role in action planning, but this role is still incompatible with the folk notion of intention. This chapter concludes by arguing that the prevalence of the folk notion, including its intuitive appeal in neuroscientific explanations, stems from the central role intentions play in constructing intuitive explanations of our own and others’ behavior. Some future directions based on the presented analysis are sketched below.
Finally, in Chapter 6 the ideas, results, and analyses of the previous chapters are applied to the field of developmental psychology. Intention reading and action understanding have been reported in ever-younger infants, but these findings are highly debated. In this chapter I set out to clarify the notions of ‘action understanding’ and ‘intention attribution’ and discuss their relation. I use the various forms of ‘action understanding’ from Chapter 3 and speculate on the mechanisms that could underlie these capacities. Based on Chapter 5 I argue that these forms of action understanding do not generally result in the attribution of an intention to an observed actor. By disentangling intention attribution from action understanding, and by exposing the latter as an umbrella notion, I provide a framework that allows for better comparing findings from different experimental paradigms.
