Anna Marhold, PhD (EUI)
Assistant Professor (International and European Energy Law, International Economic Law, WTO Law)
Supervisors: PhD EUI - Professor Petros Mavroidis (EUI/Columbia Law School)
Supervisors: PhD EUI - Professor Petros Mavroidis (EUI/Columbia Law School)
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It will argue that while it may be difficult to tackle fossil fuels subsidies in the WTO forum, more efforts are needed to (re)legalise environmental subsidies.
This contribution discusses regulatory private law in the energy sector as it manifests itself in the external relations of the EU. It looks at the example of the Energy Community Treaty and examines the synergy between the Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) and the Energy Community Regulatory Board (ECRB) in facilitating customer protection in the Members of the Energy Community.
Talks
This is one of the reasons why energy in the form of fossil fuels is different from most other traded goods. There are three main causes underlying their anomaly: 1) Energy is essential for human life and development and fossil fuels are still the main source of energy the world relies on; 2) Fossils fuels are unevenly distributed around the world, a relatively small group of countries posses large quantities of them, and; 3) The first and second reason combined make that those countries that have fossil fuels can logically exercise market power over them.
This reality comes to expression through the practices of e.g. the Organization of Petroleum Exporting States (OPEC). OPEC is the most famous cartel in energy at the global level, though it is currently faced with a radically changing energy landscape itself. It effectively is an international agreement among oil-producing countries, which has succeeded in influencing world oil prices above competitive levels. Hence, the cartel does not operate on the principles of free trade. Rather, it can exercise its market power (to a certain degree) by restricting its petroleum exports through administering production quotas on the production of crude oil.
Anticompetitive or not, the fact remains, however, that WTO law is not quite a ‘global competition law’: its goal is to promote trade flows through non-discrimination and to protect producers (hence, eliminate import barriers and stimulate access to markets). Consequently, potential abusive practices of global public monopolies such as OPEC will arguable not be caught easily under the laws of the WTO. Nevertheless, there are some pertinent issues that demand our attention. This presentation aims to bring some clarity by having a closer look at the law and economics of OPEC production quotas and their consistency with WTO law and its rationale.
It will argue that while it may be difficult to tackle fossil fuels subsidies in the WTO forum, more efforts are needed to (re)legalise environmental subsidies.
This contribution discusses regulatory private law in the energy sector as it manifests itself in the external relations of the EU. It looks at the example of the Energy Community Treaty and examines the synergy between the Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) and the Energy Community Regulatory Board (ECRB) in facilitating customer protection in the Members of the Energy Community.
This is one of the reasons why energy in the form of fossil fuels is different from most other traded goods. There are three main causes underlying their anomaly: 1) Energy is essential for human life and development and fossil fuels are still the main source of energy the world relies on; 2) Fossils fuels are unevenly distributed around the world, a relatively small group of countries posses large quantities of them, and; 3) The first and second reason combined make that those countries that have fossil fuels can logically exercise market power over them.
This reality comes to expression through the practices of e.g. the Organization of Petroleum Exporting States (OPEC). OPEC is the most famous cartel in energy at the global level, though it is currently faced with a radically changing energy landscape itself. It effectively is an international agreement among oil-producing countries, which has succeeded in influencing world oil prices above competitive levels. Hence, the cartel does not operate on the principles of free trade. Rather, it can exercise its market power (to a certain degree) by restricting its petroleum exports through administering production quotas on the production of crude oil.
Anticompetitive or not, the fact remains, however, that WTO law is not quite a ‘global competition law’: its goal is to promote trade flows through non-discrimination and to protect producers (hence, eliminate import barriers and stimulate access to markets). Consequently, potential abusive practices of global public monopolies such as OPEC will arguable not be caught easily under the laws of the WTO. Nevertheless, there are some pertinent issues that demand our attention. This presentation aims to bring some clarity by having a closer look at the law and economics of OPEC production quotas and their consistency with WTO law and its rationale.