We all agree that democratic decision-making requires a factual input, and most of us assume that... more We all agree that democratic decision-making requires a factual input, and most of us assume that when the pertinent facts are not in plain view, they should be furnished by well-functioning scientific institution. But how should liberal democracy respond when apparently sincere, rational and well-informed citizens object to coercive legislation because it is based on what they consider a misguided trust in certain parts of science? Cases are familiar, the most prominent concerning climate science and evolution, but one may also count GMO-scepticism and vaccine-skepticism, and there are plenty of others. The paper I defend what I, borrowing an expression from Badiola, call Science as Public Reason, asserting roughly that some policy-relevant factual proposition P is part of public reason if and only if there is consensus that P among scientific experts in the relevant well-functioning scientific institutions. I defend this view against the controversiality objection claiming that scientific findings cannot in this general way pass as public reason as they are sometimes controversial among reasonable citizens. My preferred line of defense is what I call Dogmatism about Science as Public Reason, which roughly amounts to insisting on Science as Public Reason on the ground that it is a philosophically well-motivated view, while conceding that it may not be acceptable to all minimally rational and well-informed individuals.
This paper sketches a general account of how to respond in an epistemically rational way to moral... more This paper sketches a general account of how to respond in an epistemically rational way to moral disagreement. Roughly, the account states that when two parties, A and B, disagree as to whether p, A says p while B says not-p, this is higher-order evidence that A has made a cognitive error on the first-order level of reasoning in coming to believe that p (and likewise for B with respect to not-p). If such higher-order evidence is not defeated, then one rationally ought to reduce one's confidence with respect to the proposition in question. We term this the higher-order evidence account (the HOE account), and present it as superior to what we might call standard conciliationism, which holds that when agents A and B disagree about p, and are (known) epistemic peers, they should both suspend judgement about p or adjust their confidence towards the mean of A and B's prior credences in p. Many have suspected that standard conciliationism is implausible and may have skeptical implications. After presenting the HOE account, we put it to work by applying it to # We have presented this material at workshops in London, Lisbon, and Copenhagen. Thanks to audiences there for helpful comments, in particular Julien Dutant, Alexander Heape and participants in LVU18, Lisbon. 2 a range of cases of moral disagreement, including those that have featured in recent debates assuming standard conciliationism. We show that the HOE account support reasonable, non-skeptical verdicts in a range of cases. Note that this is a paper on moral disagreement, not on the HOE account, thus the account is merely stated here, while defended more fully elsewhere. 1
In deep disagreements local disagreements are intertwined with more general basic disagreements a... more In deep disagreements local disagreements are intertwined with more general basic disagreements about the relevant evidence, standards or argument or proper methods of inquiry in that domain. The paper provides a more specific conception of deep disagreement along these lines, and argues that while we should generally conciliate in cases of disagreement, this is not so in deep disagreements. The paper offers a general view of disagreement holding roughly, that one should moderate one's credence towards uncertainty in so far as disagreement with others provide undefeated higher order evidence that one might have made a mistake in one's appreciation of the first order evidence. When applying this view to deep disagreement we get that in cases of deep disagreement higher order evidence from disagreement is rebutted or undercut by the nature of the disagreement. So, in cases of deep disagreement one should not moderate one's credence. I finally argue that this gives a better general view of deep disagreement than views appealing to epistemic peers, personal information or independence.
I start by focusing on the question of when dissent is epistemically good and bad (section 2). As... more I start by focusing on the question of when dissent is epistemically good and bad (section 2). As we shall see, an importantly different question concerns when dissent is reasonable or not reasonable in a sense that I will try to specify. I will start developing this account in section 3. The distinction between reasonable and unreasonable dissent is, I suggest, in certain ways similar to Rawls's distinction between reasonable and unreasonable political views, and I find it instructive to briefly consider some of the details in Rawls's distinction (section 4). In section 5, I outline what I call the relevant alternative account of reasonable dissent, and propose a more specific interpretation of this account which links reasonable dissent to publicly available scientific evidence. I section 6, I assess the account, and in section 7, I sum up some of the features of it. Finally, section 8 briefly considers the question of how we should respond to unreasonable dissent. My overall aim is to provide a conceptual framework for thinking about good and bad dissent, and reasonable and unreasonable dissent, and to consider what may justify a plausible way of distinguishing reasonable from unreasonable dissent.
When a first order belief accurately reflects the evidence, how should this affect the epistemic ... more When a first order belief accurately reflects the evidence, how should this affect the epistemic justification of a higher order belief that this is the case? In an influential paper, Kelly argues that first order evidential accuracy tends to generate more justified higher order beliefs (Kelly 2010). Call this Bottom Up. I argue that neither general views about what justifies our higher order beliefs nor the specific arguments that Kelly offers support Bottom Up. Second, I suggest that while we can reject Bottom Up, we can still accept that justified higher order beliefs significantly affect the justification of first order beliefs. Third, I argue that the epistemic justification of higher order belief is fragile in the sense that it tends to dissipate when a subject is confronted with certain defeaters, including notably the sort of defeaters arising from disagreement, precisely when higher order justification depends on first order success in the ways that one may think support Bottom Up.
Acta Analytica-international Periodical for Philosophy in The Analytical Tradition, Jan 1, 2010
The aim of the paper is to state a version of epistemic expressivism regarding knowledge, and to ... more The aim of the paper is to state a version of epistemic expressivism regarding knowledge, and to suggest how this expressivism about knowledge explains the value of knowledge. The paper considers how an account of the value of knowledge based on expressivism about knowledge responds to the Meno Problem, the Swamping Problem, and a variety of other questions that pertains to the value of knowledge, and the role of knowledge in our cognitive ecology.
We all agree that democratic decision-making requires a factual input, and most of us assume that... more We all agree that democratic decision-making requires a factual input, and most of us assume that when the pertinent facts are not in plain view, they should be furnished by well-functioning scientific institution. But how should liberal democracy respond when apparently sincere, rational and well-informed citizens object to coercive legislation because it is based on what they consider a misguided trust in certain parts of science? Cases are familiar, the most prominent concerning climate science and evolution, but one may also count GMO-scepticism and vaccine-skepticism, and there are plenty of others. The paper I defend what I, borrowing an expression from Badiola, call Science as Public Reason, asserting roughly that some policy-relevant factual proposition P is part of public reason if and only if there is consensus that P among scientific experts in the relevant well-functioning scientific institutions. I defend this view against the controversiality objection claiming that scientific findings cannot in this general way pass as public reason as they are sometimes controversial among reasonable citizens. My preferred line of defense is what I call Dogmatism about Science as Public Reason, which roughly amounts to insisting on Science as Public Reason on the ground that it is a philosophically well-motivated view, while conceding that it may not be acceptable to all minimally rational and well-informed individuals.
This paper sketches a general account of how to respond in an epistemically rational way to moral... more This paper sketches a general account of how to respond in an epistemically rational way to moral disagreement. Roughly, the account states that when two parties, A and B, disagree as to whether p, A says p while B says not-p, this is higher-order evidence that A has made a cognitive error on the first-order level of reasoning in coming to believe that p (and likewise for B with respect to not-p). If such higher-order evidence is not defeated, then one rationally ought to reduce one's confidence with respect to the proposition in question. We term this the higher-order evidence account (the HOE account), and present it as superior to what we might call standard conciliationism, which holds that when agents A and B disagree about p, and are (known) epistemic peers, they should both suspend judgement about p or adjust their confidence towards the mean of A and B's prior credences in p. Many have suspected that standard conciliationism is implausible and may have skeptical implications. After presenting the HOE account, we put it to work by applying it to # We have presented this material at workshops in London, Lisbon, and Copenhagen. Thanks to audiences there for helpful comments, in particular Julien Dutant, Alexander Heape and participants in LVU18, Lisbon. 2 a range of cases of moral disagreement, including those that have featured in recent debates assuming standard conciliationism. We show that the HOE account support reasonable, non-skeptical verdicts in a range of cases. Note that this is a paper on moral disagreement, not on the HOE account, thus the account is merely stated here, while defended more fully elsewhere. 1
In deep disagreements local disagreements are intertwined with more general basic disagreements a... more In deep disagreements local disagreements are intertwined with more general basic disagreements about the relevant evidence, standards or argument or proper methods of inquiry in that domain. The paper provides a more specific conception of deep disagreement along these lines, and argues that while we should generally conciliate in cases of disagreement, this is not so in deep disagreements. The paper offers a general view of disagreement holding roughly, that one should moderate one's credence towards uncertainty in so far as disagreement with others provide undefeated higher order evidence that one might have made a mistake in one's appreciation of the first order evidence. When applying this view to deep disagreement we get that in cases of deep disagreement higher order evidence from disagreement is rebutted or undercut by the nature of the disagreement. So, in cases of deep disagreement one should not moderate one's credence. I finally argue that this gives a better general view of deep disagreement than views appealing to epistemic peers, personal information or independence.
I start by focusing on the question of when dissent is epistemically good and bad (section 2). As... more I start by focusing on the question of when dissent is epistemically good and bad (section 2). As we shall see, an importantly different question concerns when dissent is reasonable or not reasonable in a sense that I will try to specify. I will start developing this account in section 3. The distinction between reasonable and unreasonable dissent is, I suggest, in certain ways similar to Rawls's distinction between reasonable and unreasonable political views, and I find it instructive to briefly consider some of the details in Rawls's distinction (section 4). In section 5, I outline what I call the relevant alternative account of reasonable dissent, and propose a more specific interpretation of this account which links reasonable dissent to publicly available scientific evidence. I section 6, I assess the account, and in section 7, I sum up some of the features of it. Finally, section 8 briefly considers the question of how we should respond to unreasonable dissent. My overall aim is to provide a conceptual framework for thinking about good and bad dissent, and reasonable and unreasonable dissent, and to consider what may justify a plausible way of distinguishing reasonable from unreasonable dissent.
When a first order belief accurately reflects the evidence, how should this affect the epistemic ... more When a first order belief accurately reflects the evidence, how should this affect the epistemic justification of a higher order belief that this is the case? In an influential paper, Kelly argues that first order evidential accuracy tends to generate more justified higher order beliefs (Kelly 2010). Call this Bottom Up. I argue that neither general views about what justifies our higher order beliefs nor the specific arguments that Kelly offers support Bottom Up. Second, I suggest that while we can reject Bottom Up, we can still accept that justified higher order beliefs significantly affect the justification of first order beliefs. Third, I argue that the epistemic justification of higher order belief is fragile in the sense that it tends to dissipate when a subject is confronted with certain defeaters, including notably the sort of defeaters arising from disagreement, precisely when higher order justification depends on first order success in the ways that one may think support Bottom Up.
Acta Analytica-international Periodical for Philosophy in The Analytical Tradition, Jan 1, 2010
The aim of the paper is to state a version of epistemic expressivism regarding knowledge, and to ... more The aim of the paper is to state a version of epistemic expressivism regarding knowledge, and to suggest how this expressivism about knowledge explains the value of knowledge. The paper considers how an account of the value of knowledge based on expressivism about knowledge responds to the Meno Problem, the Swamping Problem, and a variety of other questions that pertains to the value of knowledge, and the role of knowledge in our cognitive ecology.
Jeg fokuserer på to spørgsmål paperet. Hvad skal der nærmere forstås ved reflekteret ligevægt? Og... more Jeg fokuserer på to spørgsmål paperet. Hvad skal der nærmere forstås ved reflekteret ligevægt? Og hvorfor antage, at reflekteret ligevægt er en god metode i etisk teori eller politisk filosofi? Kapitlets konklusion er mudret – det er svært at opstille en begrundelse af højere orden for brugen af metoden, og svært at svare overbevisende på skeptiske indvendinger. Men det er også vanskeligt at se, hvordan vores refleksion over etiske spørgsmål skulle forløbe, hvis man ikke bruger noget, der minder om reflekteret ligevægt.
Much of the recent literature on higher-order evidence has revolved around the following three th... more Much of the recent literature on higher-order evidence has revolved around the following three theses. First, one’s credence in any given proposition p should rationally reflect one’s evidence e bearing on the truth of p. Second, one’s credence in any given higher-order proposition p′ (concerning the evidential relation between e and p) should rationally reflect one’s evidence e′ bearing on the truth of p′. Third, it is epistemically irrational to have a high credence in p based on e, while having a high credence that e does not support p, or that one’s processing of e is somehow faulty (The Non-Akrasia Requirement). All three theses are prima facie plausible, yet they jointly lead to inconsistencies. This is what might be called The Akratic Trilemma. This chapter assesses two recent responses to The Akratic Trilemma (Titelbaum 2015; Lasonen-Aarnio 2014), argues that both responses fail, and offers a novel way out of the Trilemma.Keywords
Informed consent is considered by many to be a moral imperative in medical research. However, it ... more Informed consent is considered by many to be a moral imperative in medical research. However, it is increasingly acknowledged that in many actual instances of consent to participation in medical research, participants do not employ the provided information in their decision to consent, but rather consent based on the trust they hold in the researcher or research enterprise. In this article we explore whether trust-based consent is morally inferior to information-based consent. We analyse the moral values essential to valid consent - autonomy, voluntariness, non-manipulation, and non-exploitation - and assess whether these values are less protected and promoted by consent based on trust than they are by consent based on information. We find that this is not the case, and thus conclude that trust-based consent if not morally inferior to information-based consent.
Dossier : Public Participation, Legitimate Political Decisions, and Controversial Technologies, 2017
Many instances of new and emerging science and technology are controversial. Although a number of... more Many instances of new and emerging science and technology are controversial. Although a number of people, including scientific experts, welcome these developments, a considerable skepticism exists among members of the public. The use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) is a case in point. In science policy and in science communication, it is widely assumed that such controversial science and technology require public participation in the policy-making process. We examine this view, which we call the Public Participation Paradigm, using the case of GMOs as an example. We suggest that a prominent reason behind the call for public participation is the belief that such participation is required for democratic legitimacy. We then show that the most prominent accounts of democratic legitimacy do not, in fact, entail that public participation is required in cases of controversial science in general, or in the case of GMOs in particular.
Complementary and alternative medicine, evidence, randomized and controlled trial, health care po... more Complementary and alternative medicine, evidence, randomized and controlled trial, health care policy
We all agree that democratic decision-making requires a factual input, and most of us assume that... more We all agree that democratic decision-making requires a factual input, and most of us assume that when the pertinent facts are not in plain view they should be furnished by well-functioning scientific institutions. But how should liberal democracy respond when apparently sincere, rational and well-informed citizens object to coercive legislation because it is based on what they consider a misguided trust in certain parts of science? Cases are familiar, the most prominent concerning climate science and evolution, but one may also count GMO-skepticism and vaccine-skepticism, and there are plenty of others. The paper defends what I, borrowing an expression from Badiola, call Science as Public Reason, asserting roughly that some policy-relevant factual proposition P is part of public reason if and only if there is consensus about P among scientific experts in the relevant well-functioning scientific institutions. I defend this view against the controversiality objection claiming that scientific findings cannot in this general way pass as public reason as they are sometimes controversial among reasonable citizens. My preferred line of defense is what I call Dogmatism about Science as Public Reason, which roughly amounts to insisting on Science as Public Reason on the ground that it is a philosophically well-motivated view, while conceding that it may not be acceptable to all minimally rational and well-informed individuals.
This paper aims to show that Selim Berker’s widely discussed prime number case is merely an insta... more This paper aims to show that Selim Berker’s widely discussed prime number case is merely an instance of the well-known generality problem for process reliabilism and thus arguably not as interesting a case as one might have thought. Initially, Berker’s case is introduced and interpreted. Then the most recent response to the case from the literature is presented. Eventually, it is argued that Berker’s case is nothing but a straightforward consequence of the generality problem, i.e., the problematic aspect of the case for process reliabilism (if any) is already captured by the generality problem.
Organic farming is based on the concept of working ‘with nature’ instead of against it; however, ... more Organic farming is based on the concept of working ‘with nature’ instead of against it; however, compared with conventional farming, organic farming reportedly has lower productivity. Ideally, the goal should be to narrow this yield gap. In this review, we specifically discuss the feasibility of new breeding techniques (NBTs) for rewilding, a process involving the reintroduction of properties from the wild relatives of crops, as a method to close the productivity gap. The most efficient methods of rewilding are based on modern biotechnology techniques, which have yet to be embraced by the organic farming movement. Thus, the question arises of whether the adoption of such methods is feasible, not only from a technological perspective, but also from conceptual, socioeconomic, ethical, and regulatory perspectives.
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