Rabia Saglam
University Of Kocaeli, Law, Faculty Member
In this study, the idea of “sacred human beings” of modern law and obsolescence of the sense of ressentiment is analysed as the cause and effect of ongoing crisis of post-law. The post-law process is a conception, exclusive to the 21st... more
In this study, the idea of “sacred human beings” of modern law and obsolescence of the sense of ressentiment is analysed as the cause and effect of ongoing crisis of post-law. The post-law process is a conception, exclusive to the 21st century that describes the digital advancements in technology with the transformation of human and law. Such conceptualization makes possible to think critically about this convergence between the human subjects and the digital platforms from the perspective of modern law and the psychology of ressentiment.
In digitalization process, we come across to a crisis of post-law which humans can interact with technological devises and virtual networks directly in an unpresented way. From now on, human beings can reproduce themselves in digital areas via virtual networks. Thus, our age is a post-law process in which normative construction of modern law focused on human subjects is being gradually declining by the virtue of technological developments.
Post-law process is neither a pre-modern natural condition presumed by social contracts, nor a “civil” society of legal condition envisaged by Kant. All these modern legal theories based on transition from natural condition to civil society assume that individuals or moral subjects are an autonomous, rational, independent, being able to calculate what is best interest for himself and public. However, more importantly all these approaches grounding on the modern society and law presume a human nature which revenge, retaliate, inflict a pain, grudge, and punish. Even though fundamental principles of modern law created by these moral subjects -such as equality before the law, freedom, democracy, rule of law, human rights, universal morality- are prevailed in the legal regulations after the World War II, today we interface with a different crisis which is transformed this modern human subject’s ‘selves’, ‘mind’ and ‘bodies’ in a general manner. I claim that human subjects lost their material and moral value before the law, and the sense of ressentiment has been atrophied by digital technologies in the post-law process. In other words, what seems to be a crisis of modern law is the crisis of post-law process: the tecno-digital advancements transform the human beings and legal subjects in an irretrievable manner. This convergence between the human and tecno-digital network is something that undermines the understanding of what it is to be a human subject and subsequently challenges the idea of moral legal subjects in modern law.
I examine the post-law process in two chapters, based on the categorization of internal and external crisis: (1) The internal crisis of post-law process: The transformation of human and legal subjects via digital technologies. (2) The external crisis of post-law process: The obsolescence of ressentiment phenomenon which created modern law.
In the first chapter, I discuss the internal crisis of post-law process with a reference to post humanist arguments. I argue that modern law abandoned the idea or ideology of human, who is the holder of personal rights or the category of human that it constructs on the basis of universal morality. According to this, I try to demonstrate that the right to personality, which modern law bestows equally to human beings, has lost its moral and legal value in post-law process. Today, the morally inviolable and inalienable personal integrity of human is reduced to the value of exchangeable commodity. I will show this reduction with a refence to the legal norms of the personal data protection. In post-law process, the rights attributed to human are marginalised. The personal integrity and the rights, which are assumed to represent a high value, are degraded by the legal regulation of personal data. Human as an honourable individual is now measured and appraised according to the economic value. Therefore, the decline of the myth of “sacred human beings” -or moral legal subject- composed by modern law itself is the internal crisis of post-law process.
In the second chapter, I discuss the external crisis of post-law process with a reference to Max Scheler’s notion of ressentiment, which means hatred, envy, grudge, malice, and revenge. I consider the atrophy of the psychology of ressentiment and the obsolescence of resentful culture as an external crisis of post-law process. For Scheler, modern bourgeois morality, society and law which is a manifestation of universal humanism and utilitarian civilization bears upon the psychology and culture of ressentiment. The reason of modern law is that unpowered and vengeful people are accumulated their hatred, and inverted the moral values, and then built modern law that equalizes everyone, as a remedy for themselves. However, there is a dilemma posed by ressentiment. Ressentiment gives rise to new value schemes, but, on the other hand these values lay the basis for the ressentiment is not higher level of values.
I would propose that the value-illusion and value-laden capacity of ressentiment has obsolesced in the 21st century, due to the tecno-digital effects on the human and legal subjects. Digital platforms are exercised in a way which is pacificator for ressentiment embodied in human beings. Since technological devices and virtual networks are entangled with human bodies, and subsequently, humans can be reproduced in digital spheres as a “digital subject” or “commercial persona”, we are deprived of ressentiment psychology which might develop a new ‘civil’ society. Therefore, I define this deprivation as the crisis of the post-law process where human’s mental capacity and exclusively emotions are becoming more obscure and even obsolete. Finally, I concrete the human’s ressentiment psychology which obsolete its efficiency in the face of tecno-devices and tecno-corporations with an example of pioneering philosopher Günther Anders’s diary kept in 1958, published in 1961.
In digitalization process, we come across to a crisis of post-law which humans can interact with technological devises and virtual networks directly in an unpresented way. From now on, human beings can reproduce themselves in digital areas via virtual networks. Thus, our age is a post-law process in which normative construction of modern law focused on human subjects is being gradually declining by the virtue of technological developments.
Post-law process is neither a pre-modern natural condition presumed by social contracts, nor a “civil” society of legal condition envisaged by Kant. All these modern legal theories based on transition from natural condition to civil society assume that individuals or moral subjects are an autonomous, rational, independent, being able to calculate what is best interest for himself and public. However, more importantly all these approaches grounding on the modern society and law presume a human nature which revenge, retaliate, inflict a pain, grudge, and punish. Even though fundamental principles of modern law created by these moral subjects -such as equality before the law, freedom, democracy, rule of law, human rights, universal morality- are prevailed in the legal regulations after the World War II, today we interface with a different crisis which is transformed this modern human subject’s ‘selves’, ‘mind’ and ‘bodies’ in a general manner. I claim that human subjects lost their material and moral value before the law, and the sense of ressentiment has been atrophied by digital technologies in the post-law process. In other words, what seems to be a crisis of modern law is the crisis of post-law process: the tecno-digital advancements transform the human beings and legal subjects in an irretrievable manner. This convergence between the human and tecno-digital network is something that undermines the understanding of what it is to be a human subject and subsequently challenges the idea of moral legal subjects in modern law.
I examine the post-law process in two chapters, based on the categorization of internal and external crisis: (1) The internal crisis of post-law process: The transformation of human and legal subjects via digital technologies. (2) The external crisis of post-law process: The obsolescence of ressentiment phenomenon which created modern law.
In the first chapter, I discuss the internal crisis of post-law process with a reference to post humanist arguments. I argue that modern law abandoned the idea or ideology of human, who is the holder of personal rights or the category of human that it constructs on the basis of universal morality. According to this, I try to demonstrate that the right to personality, which modern law bestows equally to human beings, has lost its moral and legal value in post-law process. Today, the morally inviolable and inalienable personal integrity of human is reduced to the value of exchangeable commodity. I will show this reduction with a refence to the legal norms of the personal data protection. In post-law process, the rights attributed to human are marginalised. The personal integrity and the rights, which are assumed to represent a high value, are degraded by the legal regulation of personal data. Human as an honourable individual is now measured and appraised according to the economic value. Therefore, the decline of the myth of “sacred human beings” -or moral legal subject- composed by modern law itself is the internal crisis of post-law process.
In the second chapter, I discuss the external crisis of post-law process with a reference to Max Scheler’s notion of ressentiment, which means hatred, envy, grudge, malice, and revenge. I consider the atrophy of the psychology of ressentiment and the obsolescence of resentful culture as an external crisis of post-law process. For Scheler, modern bourgeois morality, society and law which is a manifestation of universal humanism and utilitarian civilization bears upon the psychology and culture of ressentiment. The reason of modern law is that unpowered and vengeful people are accumulated their hatred, and inverted the moral values, and then built modern law that equalizes everyone, as a remedy for themselves. However, there is a dilemma posed by ressentiment. Ressentiment gives rise to new value schemes, but, on the other hand these values lay the basis for the ressentiment is not higher level of values.
I would propose that the value-illusion and value-laden capacity of ressentiment has obsolesced in the 21st century, due to the tecno-digital effects on the human and legal subjects. Digital platforms are exercised in a way which is pacificator for ressentiment embodied in human beings. Since technological devices and virtual networks are entangled with human bodies, and subsequently, humans can be reproduced in digital spheres as a “digital subject” or “commercial persona”, we are deprived of ressentiment psychology which might develop a new ‘civil’ society. Therefore, I define this deprivation as the crisis of the post-law process where human’s mental capacity and exclusively emotions are becoming more obscure and even obsolete. Finally, I concrete the human’s ressentiment psychology which obsolete its efficiency in the face of tecno-devices and tecno-corporations with an example of pioneering philosopher Günther Anders’s diary kept in 1958, published in 1961.
Research Interests:
Bu makale Rosi Braidotti’nin ben ve öteki arasındaki içsel bağlantı temelinde insan ve teknolojiyi birbiriyle ilişkilendiren eleştirel posthümanist öznellik tasarısına odaklanıyor. Braidotti posthuman öznelliği, insan-olmayan ötekileri... more
Bu makale Rosi Braidotti’nin ben ve öteki arasındaki içsel bağlantı temelinde insan ve teknolojiyi birbiriyle ilişkilendiren eleştirel posthümanist öznellik tasarısına odaklanıyor. Braidotti posthuman öznelliği, insan-olmayan ötekileri kapsayacak şekilde, içsel anlamıyla farklılaşmış göçebe bir oluş şeklinde tanımlar. Braidotti’nin tekno-bilimsel ilerlemeye dair eleştirel fakat aynı zamanda olumlayıcı perspektifi, insanlığın geleceğinden toplumsal cinsiyet ve ırksal eşitsizliği tasfiye etmek adına, insan ve insan-olmayan öznelerin teknolojiye iliştirilmiş bir şekilde yeniden üretilebileceğine işaret eder. Buna karşın, ileri kapitalizmin şimdiki zamanında teknoloji dolayımındaki özneler arasında etik ilişkiler geliştirmenin mümkün olmadığını savunuyorum. Dahası, oluş etiğine dayalı insan sonrası özne inşası ileri kapitalizmdeki verili sosyo-ekonomik eşitlik nedeniyle gerçekleşemez. Braidotti’nin insan sonrası tasarısını Philip Dick’in “Human Is” öyküsüne uyarlayarak, posthuman özne ö...
Research Interests: Philosophy and Posthuman
Bu makalede, Kelsen'in normatiflik kuramını, Kant'ın aşkınsal çıkarımıyla karşılaştırarak hukuki muhakemenin geçerlilik koşulları ekseninde okumayı deniyorum. İlk bölümde, Kelsen'in normatif isnat kuramının Kantçı aşkınsal a priori bilgi... more
Bu makalede, Kelsen'in normatiflik kuramını, Kant'ın aşkınsal çıkarımıyla karşılaştırarak hukuki muhakemenin geçerlilik koşulları ekseninde okumayı deniyorum. İlk bölümde, Kelsen'in normatif isnat kuramının Kantçı aşkınsal a priori bilgi temelinde nasıl anlaşılabileceğini açıklıyorum. Hukuki bilişteki hipotetik Grundnorm ideasının ve normatif hukuk bilimindeki olan ve olması gereken arasındaki kapatılamaz mesafenin, hukuki muhakemede kurucu bir rol oynadığını ileri sürüyorum. Buna göre, normatifliği ve isnadı hukuki muhakemenin sui generis tanımlayıcı unsurları olarak belirliyorum. Kelsen açısından temel norm, hukuk normlarını sistematik bir bütün olarak idrak etmenin varsayılan zorunlu koşuludur. Kelsen'e göre temel normun işlevi, "verili hukuk materyalini hukuk olarak tanımak" ve "anlamlı bir bütün olarak kavramaktır." Yargıçların, maddi olgu ile pozitif hukuk normu arasında normatif (olması gereken) bir ilişki kurarken, temel normun bu iki işlevine bağlı kalmaları gerektiğini öne sürüyorum. Bir başka ifadeyle, yargıçların hukuki bilişi, hukuki sonuçları ve hukuki koşulları normatif açıdan örtüştürürken, empirik hukuki materyalleri anlamlı bir düzenin parçası olarak inşa eder.
İkinci bölümde, Kelsen’in normatifliğini ve Kant’ın aşkınsallığını yargıcın karar verme sürecine uyarlıyorum. Normatif hukuki muhakemeyi somutlaştırmak amacıyla Yargıtay Hukuk Genel Kurulu kararını eleştirel bir şekilde inceliyorum. Hukuki dava, iş yerindeki vestiyerden yarı boş çikolata kutusunu aldığı gerekçesiyle işten çıkarılan bir temizlik işçisiyle ilgilidir. İşçi 15 yıllık kıdem tazminatına hak kazanmış olmasına rağmen, yargıçlar, davacı işçinin İş Kanunu’na göre “hırsızlık” olarak tanımlanan hukuka aykırı eylemine istinaden kıdem tazminatını hak etmediğine karar verir. İşçinin eylemini indirgemeci bir biçimde yorumlayan Genel Kurul’un tekil normunu, maddi gerçeğin görmezden gelinen ayrıntılarına odaklanarak analiz ediyorum. Olgusal gerçekle ilgili çok sayıda nüans ve ayrıntı olmasına rağmen, yargıçlar olgunun bütününü dikkate almamıştır. Dahası, yargıçlar, yargı içtihatları ve öğreti tarafından geliştirilen iş güvencesi ilkesini hukuk normu olarak tanımamıştır. Yargıçların hukuki muhakemesinin normatifliğe değil nedenselliğe dayandığı, dolayısıyla hukuken geçersiz olduğu sonucuna varıyorum.
Abstract: In this article, I try to read Kelsen’s normativity tenet compared with Kant’s transcendental deduction regarding the validity condition of legal reasoning. In the first section, I explain how Kelsen’s normative imputation tenet can be understood on the grounding of Kantian’s transcendental a priori cognition. I would argue that the idea of hypothetical Grundnorm in legal cognition and the unbridgeable gap between Sein and Sollen in normative legal science explicitly plays a foundational role in legal reasoning. In this regard, I define normativity and imputation as a sui generis descriptive component of legal reasoning. For Kelsen, the basic norm is necessarily presupposed condition to intellect legal norms as a systematically meaningful unity. According to Kelsen, the function of the basic norm is “to recognise a given legal material as law” and “to comprehend it as a meaningful whole.” I assert that judges should adhere to these two functions of the basic norm while making a normative (ought) connection between material fact and positive legal norms. In other words, judges’ legal cognitions construct the empirical legal materials as part of a meaningful order by normatively connecting legal consequences with legal conditions.
In the second section, I simply adopt Kelsen’s normativity and Kant’s transcendentality to the judge’s decision-making process. I critically examine a decision given by the Turkish Supreme Court to concrete normative legal reasoning. The legal case is about a cleaning worker who was dismissed for the reason she took a half-empty chocolate box from the cloakroom in the office. Even though the worker is legally entitled to 15 years severance pay, judges decided that litigant-worker does not deserve the severance pay because of the unlawful action written as a “thieving” in the labour code. I analyse Supreme Court’s individual norm interpreted the worker’s act in a reductive way, concentrating on what fails to notice the material fact. Although there is a great deal of nuances and details regarding the factual reality, judges took no account of the whole point properly. Additionally, judges avoided considering the job security principle as a legal norm developed by judicial precedents and doctrines. I conclude that judges’ legal reasoning does not rely on normativity, but causality, therefore it is legally invalid reasoning.
İkinci bölümde, Kelsen’in normatifliğini ve Kant’ın aşkınsallığını yargıcın karar verme sürecine uyarlıyorum. Normatif hukuki muhakemeyi somutlaştırmak amacıyla Yargıtay Hukuk Genel Kurulu kararını eleştirel bir şekilde inceliyorum. Hukuki dava, iş yerindeki vestiyerden yarı boş çikolata kutusunu aldığı gerekçesiyle işten çıkarılan bir temizlik işçisiyle ilgilidir. İşçi 15 yıllık kıdem tazminatına hak kazanmış olmasına rağmen, yargıçlar, davacı işçinin İş Kanunu’na göre “hırsızlık” olarak tanımlanan hukuka aykırı eylemine istinaden kıdem tazminatını hak etmediğine karar verir. İşçinin eylemini indirgemeci bir biçimde yorumlayan Genel Kurul’un tekil normunu, maddi gerçeğin görmezden gelinen ayrıntılarına odaklanarak analiz ediyorum. Olgusal gerçekle ilgili çok sayıda nüans ve ayrıntı olmasına rağmen, yargıçlar olgunun bütününü dikkate almamıştır. Dahası, yargıçlar, yargı içtihatları ve öğreti tarafından geliştirilen iş güvencesi ilkesini hukuk normu olarak tanımamıştır. Yargıçların hukuki muhakemesinin normatifliğe değil nedenselliğe dayandığı, dolayısıyla hukuken geçersiz olduğu sonucuna varıyorum.
Abstract: In this article, I try to read Kelsen’s normativity tenet compared with Kant’s transcendental deduction regarding the validity condition of legal reasoning. In the first section, I explain how Kelsen’s normative imputation tenet can be understood on the grounding of Kantian’s transcendental a priori cognition. I would argue that the idea of hypothetical Grundnorm in legal cognition and the unbridgeable gap between Sein and Sollen in normative legal science explicitly plays a foundational role in legal reasoning. In this regard, I define normativity and imputation as a sui generis descriptive component of legal reasoning. For Kelsen, the basic norm is necessarily presupposed condition to intellect legal norms as a systematically meaningful unity. According to Kelsen, the function of the basic norm is “to recognise a given legal material as law” and “to comprehend it as a meaningful whole.” I assert that judges should adhere to these two functions of the basic norm while making a normative (ought) connection between material fact and positive legal norms. In other words, judges’ legal cognitions construct the empirical legal materials as part of a meaningful order by normatively connecting legal consequences with legal conditions.
In the second section, I simply adopt Kelsen’s normativity and Kant’s transcendentality to the judge’s decision-making process. I critically examine a decision given by the Turkish Supreme Court to concrete normative legal reasoning. The legal case is about a cleaning worker who was dismissed for the reason she took a half-empty chocolate box from the cloakroom in the office. Even though the worker is legally entitled to 15 years severance pay, judges decided that litigant-worker does not deserve the severance pay because of the unlawful action written as a “thieving” in the labour code. I analyse Supreme Court’s individual norm interpreted the worker’s act in a reductive way, concentrating on what fails to notice the material fact. Although there is a great deal of nuances and details regarding the factual reality, judges took no account of the whole point properly. Additionally, judges avoided considering the job security principle as a legal norm developed by judicial precedents and doctrines. I conclude that judges’ legal reasoning does not rely on normativity, but causality, therefore it is legally invalid reasoning.
Research Interests:
Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction, Theory and Criticism After Structuralism, New York, Cornell University, 1986, pp. 85-86. Jacques Derrida, “Tympan”, Margins of Philosophy, Trans. by. Alan Bass, The University of Chicago Press, 1982, p.... more
Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction, Theory and Criticism After Structuralism, New York, Cornell University, 1986, pp. 85-86. Jacques Derrida, “Tympan”, Margins of Philosophy, Trans. by. Alan Bass, The University of Chicago Press, 1982, p. xiv
Research Interests:
This article focuses on Rosi Braidotti’s critical posthumanist project of subjectivity that relates human and technology on the basis of the internal connection between self and the other. Braidotti defines posthuman subjectivity as a... more
This article focuses on Rosi Braidotti’s critical posthumanist project of subjectivity that relates
human and technology on the basis of the internal connection between self and the other.
Braidotti defines posthuman subjectivity as a nomadic being, which is internally differentiated,
including the non-human others. Braidotti’s critical but at same time affirmative perspective on
techno-scientific progress points out that human and non-human subjects can be (re)produced in
a way that entangled with technology in order to eliminate gender and racial inequality from
humanity’s future. Conversely, I argue that it is not possible to develop ethical relationships
between technology-mediated subjects in the present time of advanced capitalism. And
furthermore, the construction of posthuman subject resting on the ethics of becoming cannot be
fulfilled because of the given socio-economic inequality in advanced capitalism. By adapting
Braidotti’s posthuman project to Philip Dick’s story of “Human Is”, I try to demonstrate that the
prediction of posthuman subject must assume a humane identity, in one way or another. In
accordance with this idea, I put forward that nowadays posthuman digital subjects, connecting
with techno-devices and communicating via virtual networks gradually losing their humanitarian
potential to be able to create a -with a reference to Dick’s story- “value of life”. Then I discuss the
status of posthuman digital subject in advanced capitalism through a reference to Deleuze’s
Postscript on Societies of Control. Finally, I briefly examine the norms of personal data protection
as an example of posthuman law, in which humanitarian identity and personal rights are
commoditised, while the interests of companies (the forces of the market) are promoted.
human and technology on the basis of the internal connection between self and the other.
Braidotti defines posthuman subjectivity as a nomadic being, which is internally differentiated,
including the non-human others. Braidotti’s critical but at same time affirmative perspective on
techno-scientific progress points out that human and non-human subjects can be (re)produced in
a way that entangled with technology in order to eliminate gender and racial inequality from
humanity’s future. Conversely, I argue that it is not possible to develop ethical relationships
between technology-mediated subjects in the present time of advanced capitalism. And
furthermore, the construction of posthuman subject resting on the ethics of becoming cannot be
fulfilled because of the given socio-economic inequality in advanced capitalism. By adapting
Braidotti’s posthuman project to Philip Dick’s story of “Human Is”, I try to demonstrate that the
prediction of posthuman subject must assume a humane identity, in one way or another. In
accordance with this idea, I put forward that nowadays posthuman digital subjects, connecting
with techno-devices and communicating via virtual networks gradually losing their humanitarian
potential to be able to create a -with a reference to Dick’s story- “value of life”. Then I discuss the
status of posthuman digital subject in advanced capitalism through a reference to Deleuze’s
Postscript on Societies of Control. Finally, I briefly examine the norms of personal data protection
as an example of posthuman law, in which humanitarian identity and personal rights are
commoditised, while the interests of companies (the forces of the market) are promoted.
Research Interests:
Michel Rosenfeld, Derrida, Hukuk, Şiddet ve Adalet Paradoksu, Çev.: R. Sağlam ve K. Akbaş, Hukuk Kuramı, C. 1, S. 1,
Ocak-Şubat 2014, ss. 13-17.
Ocak-Şubat 2014, ss. 13-17.
THE READING OF DECONSTRUCTIVE IDENTITY: SPIVAK AND THE COLLECTIVE-SUBJECT STATUS OF SUBALTERN FEMALE Abstract: In this article, I will discuss the collective-subject status of subaltern female and the post-structuralist and... more
THE READING OF DECONSTRUCTIVE IDENTITY:
SPIVAK AND THE COLLECTIVE-SUBJECT STATUS OF SUBALTERN FEMALE
Abstract: In this article, I will discuss the collective-subject status of subaltern female and the post-structuralist and post-colonialist understanding of the identity through a reference to Spivak’s deconstructivist arguments. The collective subaltern female identity states the economic deprivation of the other-female subject, who is kept on an unequal and disadvantaged position in the hierarchy of social norms borne upon the patriarchal ideology. The majority of post-structuralist feminist or post-colonial thinkers conceive of the identity as only free-floating or symbolical/cultural entities. In spite of this, in the article, I put forward the idea that these intellectual considerations cover up the real existential conditions of the subaltern subject –based on the experience of gender inequality and economical exploitation. In order to explain their fictional-truth narratives, these intellectual considerations that ignore the social inequality and economical exploitation, and consider the sexual difference as an abstract identity without taking account of dispossession of the gendered female subject, should presume a ‘temporality outside of the world.’ I will try to demonstrate the way of fictional-truth narratives and components of the collective subaltern female identity by comparing Jean-Paul Sartre’s play, No Exist, with the story of Mahasweta Devi, The Breast-Giver, translated into English by Spivak. In contrast to Devi, Sartre’s play, which depicts the tense relation between three subjects in the way that isolated from the real socio-economic conditions, exemplifies impeccably the presumption of the ‘temporality outside of the world.’ Devi’s story, on the other hand, fictionalizes the subaltern female subject within the real existential conditions.
Keywords: Subaltern, identity, female subject, Spivak, Sartre, deconstruction
SPIVAK AND THE COLLECTIVE-SUBJECT STATUS OF SUBALTERN FEMALE
Abstract: In this article, I will discuss the collective-subject status of subaltern female and the post-structuralist and post-colonialist understanding of the identity through a reference to Spivak’s deconstructivist arguments. The collective subaltern female identity states the economic deprivation of the other-female subject, who is kept on an unequal and disadvantaged position in the hierarchy of social norms borne upon the patriarchal ideology. The majority of post-structuralist feminist or post-colonial thinkers conceive of the identity as only free-floating or symbolical/cultural entities. In spite of this, in the article, I put forward the idea that these intellectual considerations cover up the real existential conditions of the subaltern subject –based on the experience of gender inequality and economical exploitation. In order to explain their fictional-truth narratives, these intellectual considerations that ignore the social inequality and economical exploitation, and consider the sexual difference as an abstract identity without taking account of dispossession of the gendered female subject, should presume a ‘temporality outside of the world.’ I will try to demonstrate the way of fictional-truth narratives and components of the collective subaltern female identity by comparing Jean-Paul Sartre’s play, No Exist, with the story of Mahasweta Devi, The Breast-Giver, translated into English by Spivak. In contrast to Devi, Sartre’s play, which depicts the tense relation between three subjects in the way that isolated from the real socio-economic conditions, exemplifies impeccably the presumption of the ‘temporality outside of the world.’ Devi’s story, on the other hand, fictionalizes the subaltern female subject within the real existential conditions.
Keywords: Subaltern, identity, female subject, Spivak, Sartre, deconstruction
Adultery, which means “illegitimate sexual intercourse”, is a regulative gender norm in the patriarchal symbolic order. In this article, I will discuss the concept of patriarchal symbolic order through a reference to Butler’s thesis.... more
Adultery, which means “illegitimate sexual intercourse”, is a regulative gender norm in the patriarchal symbolic order. In this article, I will discuss the concept of patriarchal symbolic order through a reference to Butler’s thesis. Butler argues that Lévi-Strauss’ and Lacan’s structuralist discourse, bases on the incest law, are formulated as a universal and ideal form of social/symbolic norms. The common point of this universal structure is that there is no room for an equal and autonomous female subject. In other words, the female subject has a subsidiary position in the patriarchal symbolic order. I will explain that the patriarchal symbolic order norms and the social/symbolic meaning of adultery internally and externally affect the legal norms and interpretations through acts of violence. I will critically debate on legal norms and interpretations of adultery by analyzing Cover's concepts of “legal violence” and Fricker’s “epistemic injustice” by briefly mentioning the history of adultery in common-law. In Turkey, adultery is regulated as a specific reason for divorce in the Civil Code. Thus, it is necessary to argue on the ways of interaction between the legal violence and the jurisprudence on adultery in Turkey. I will try to put forward the ways of interpretation of judicial decisions in the fault-based divorce process and subjection of women to legal violence by examining Turkish Family Court’s and Supreme Court’s precedents on adultery. While determining the amount of the compensation and the share of intra-marital acquisitions in divorce cases, the Supreme Court firmly considers adultery of the wife as a gross fault, even more than domestic violence of the husband.
This essay examines the legal violence themes that arise in modern law system. The preliminary legal violence, which imposed upon people, relates to legal language. The violence of legal language expresses the daunting and excluding legal... more
This essay examines the legal violence themes that arise
in modern law system. The preliminary legal violence, which imposed
upon people, relates to legal language. The violence of legal language expresses the daunting and excluding legal procedures and processes, which
can be traced in legal judgments and the verdicts of judge. The second
legal violence bears upon the enforcement of law which connects force
with mythical violence of law. In traditional jurisprudence, it is generally
accepted that force or violence locates within the structure of law only
as legal sanctions. However, for Benjamin and Derrida, mythical violence
means that law is found (law-making) and is maintained (law-preserving)
over violence, which is imposed by the “fate”. Another legal violence canbe seen in legal justice that is assumed to provide equality before law. Since
the legal justice bases on the similarity of subjects, it does not pay attention
to the individual differences in a legal case. Paradoxically while reproducing legal violence against different subjects it promises equality for everyone before law
in modern law system. The preliminary legal violence, which imposed
upon people, relates to legal language. The violence of legal language expresses the daunting and excluding legal procedures and processes, which
can be traced in legal judgments and the verdicts of judge. The second
legal violence bears upon the enforcement of law which connects force
with mythical violence of law. In traditional jurisprudence, it is generally
accepted that force or violence locates within the structure of law only
as legal sanctions. However, for Benjamin and Derrida, mythical violence
means that law is found (law-making) and is maintained (law-preserving)
over violence, which is imposed by the “fate”. Another legal violence canbe seen in legal justice that is assumed to provide equality before law. Since
the legal justice bases on the similarity of subjects, it does not pay attention
to the individual differences in a legal case. Paradoxically while reproducing legal violence against different subjects it promises equality for everyone before law
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
İDEOLOJİ, ANLATI VE HUKUK: BREZİLYA’DA ‘OTO YIKAMA OPERASYONU’
Enzo Bello, Gustavo Capela, and Rene José Keller
Enzo Bello, Gustavo Capela, and Rene José Keller
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Bu metinde, yıpratıcı ve hırpalayıcı hınç psikolojisinin devası görülen ahlaki affetme, öncelikle kavramın felsefi sınırlarını çizen Derrida’nın koşullu-koşulsuz affetme ay(ı)rımı açısından ele alınmaktadır. Ardından hukuk... more
Bu metinde, yıpratıcı ve hırpalayıcı hınç psikolojisinin devası görülen ahlaki
affetme, öncelikle kavramın felsefi sınırlarını çizen Derrida’nın koşullu-koşulsuz affetme ay(ı)rımı açısından ele alınmaktadır. Ardından hukuk felsefecilerinin ‘hukuk içi affetme’ önerileri tartışılmaktadır. Metnin amacı, affetme literatürünü eleştirel bir bakış açısıyla irdelemektir. Zira Anglo-Amerikan literatüründe dayanakları ziyadesiyle ikna edici görünen ahlaki ve hukuki affetme argümanlarını, adalet kurgusunu istikrarlı bir yasallıkla etkinleştirme ‘otoritesini’ çoktan kaybetmiş Türkiye hukuk sistemi açısından entelektüel gerekçelerle dahi olsa önermenin hiçbir
anlamı yoktur. Affetme, yozlaşmamış hukukun, inandırıcılığını yitirmemiş adaletin hüküm sürdüğü bir toplumda talep edilebilecek ahlaki ve hukuki bir alternatiftir.
affetme, öncelikle kavramın felsefi sınırlarını çizen Derrida’nın koşullu-koşulsuz affetme ay(ı)rımı açısından ele alınmaktadır. Ardından hukuk felsefecilerinin ‘hukuk içi affetme’ önerileri tartışılmaktadır. Metnin amacı, affetme literatürünü eleştirel bir bakış açısıyla irdelemektir. Zira Anglo-Amerikan literatüründe dayanakları ziyadesiyle ikna edici görünen ahlaki ve hukuki affetme argümanlarını, adalet kurgusunu istikrarlı bir yasallıkla etkinleştirme ‘otoritesini’ çoktan kaybetmiş Türkiye hukuk sistemi açısından entelektüel gerekçelerle dahi olsa önermenin hiçbir
anlamı yoktur. Affetme, yozlaşmamış hukukun, inandırıcılığını yitirmemiş adaletin hüküm sürdüğü bir toplumda talep edilebilecek ahlaki ve hukuki bir alternatiftir.